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ABSTRACT 
Background: There is a global emphasis to move towards universal health coverage (UHC) 
with the goal of making health services more equitable and accessible for all, without the 
risk of financial catastrophe when paying for the services. A key element of UHC reforms is 
to move away from out-of-pocket payments for health services towards a greater emphasis 
on mandatory prepayment health financing. The main challenge for low- and middle-income 
countries is how to extend coverage for informal sector populations, which in most cases 
are disproportionately exposed to catastrophic and impoverishing healthcare costs.  
 
Aim: This study explored the nature of the informal sector in Kenya, the experience of 
members of the informal sector with the health system, their views on different 
prepayment mechanisms for health services and compares the resource requirements for 
UHC through a system that requires contributions from the informal sector and a system 
that is non-contributory. 
 
Methods: A mixed-methods approach was used in the study. Members of the informal 
sector both in urban and rural settings were the main source of primary data. The following 
tools were used to collect data from informal sector workers: focus group discussions, 
individual in-depth interviews and a questionnaire survey. National level policymakers 
provided additional primary data through in-depth interviews. Secondary data sources 
included review of national and international literature. Thematic analysis was used to 
analyse qualitative data while Stata v.11 involving descriptive and binary regression analysis, 
was used for quantitative data. A Simulation Insurance (SimIns) modelling with secondary 
data inputs was used to estimate financial resource needs for UHC in Kenya.  
 
Findings and conclusions: The informal sector is characterised by a large diversity of entities 
some of which are directly associated with poverty. The sector also has lower average 
incomes compared to the formal sector and suffers from considerable instability. Less than 
50% of enterprises were sustainable (i.e. lasting more than five years) and some of the key 
determinants of sustainability with significant values include gender, household structure, 
number of employees per enterprise, monthly expenditure and ownership of land. Although 
the experiences of informal sector workers with the current public sector health system 
pointed to some serious access problems including lack of drugs, long waiting hours, 
distance to facilities and affordability, there were also positives including availability of basic 
diagnostic equipment and being attended to by skilled health workers. Views of informal 
sector workers regarding prepaid health care were largely positive with a strong preference 
for a non-contributory mechanism. However, there were serious concerns about quality of 
services, corruption and the scope of service benefits, which can influence the future 
development of a prepaid health system and progress towards UHC. From the simulation, 
although both contributory and non-contributory financing mechanisms would require 
considerable government subsidies to be sustainable, the results showed that a non-
contributory system would be less costly in the long-term and more sustainable than a 
contributory mechanism. In the case of a contributory model, because it involves high initial 
implementation costs, there is a need for careful planning including identifying potential 
sources of substantial additional revenue to be sustainable. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Universal health coverage and its significance to health care 
Universal health coverage (UHC) is a global health priority and is considered one of the post-
2015 Sustainable Development Goals. The World Health Organisation (WHO) (2010b) 
defines universal health coverage as “access to key promotive, preventive, curative and 
rehabilitative health interventions for all at an affordable cost, thereby achieving equity in 
access...” (Pg.1). The World Health Assembly in 2005 reiterated the importance of UHC and 
encouraged member countries to work towards this goal.  
 
The global focus on moving to UHC is related to the recognition of the problems associated 
with paying for health care out-of-pocket (OOP), including inequities between different 
socio-economic groups in payment and use of health services. Out-of-pocket payments 
include user fees in public sector health facilities and direct payments to private health 
sector providers (Gilson and McIntyre, 2005). The consequences of paying for health care 
OOP have been documented extensively. As of 2005, the WHO (2005b) global estimates 
showed that about 150 million individuals in 44 million households face financial 
catastrophe annually due to OOP payments for health services. About 25 million of these 
households or nearly 100 million individuals are likely to be pushed into poverty every year 
because of OOP payment.  
 
McIntyre et al. (2006) emphasise the inequity of OOP payment as a way of financing health 
care because each individual bears the medical cost burden and loss of income due to ill -
health. In most countries, OOP payments are regressive, with the financial burden being 
higher among low-income households relative to their income (Uga and Santos, 2007, Roy 
and Howard, 2007). Low-income households generally include groups such as subsistence 
farmers, those with no household member in any form of employment or reliant on 
informal sector economic entities (where the informal sector, also referred to as the parallel 
economy, consists of unregulated economic entities that are socially and legally acceptable). 
Out-of-pocket payments are particularly devastating to low-income households because of 
the unpredictable nature of illnesses. Most of these households have no savings or tradable 
assets which makes them more vulnerable as they have no resources to mobilise at short 
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notice in the event of illness. Low-income households are also affected adversely in terms of 
earnings and general welfare when the main wage earner falls ill and can no longer generate 
income for the household (Leive and Xu, 2008). Prolonged illnesses can be economically and 
socially overwhelming for households in any income group because of persistent financial 
strain occasioned by health facility fees, costs of drugs and transport to health facilities as 
well as special foods for patients (Leive and Xu, 2008).  
 
Furthermore, as a result of having to pay for health care OOP, households may postpone 
treatment or preventive measures for lack of ready cash (WHO (2010b). This means that 
health interventions cannot be received early enough when there are high chances of cure. 
Others may resort to seeking treatment from informal outlets with very poor quality 
services that may worsen illness. Paying for health OOP also limits utilisation of health 
services. Studies in Kenya, Uganda and South Africa showed large increases in utilisation 
among the poor upon removal of user-fees (Wamai, 2009, Ministry of Health, 2005, Xu et 
al., 2005, Gilson and McIntyre, 2005). To access health care, households may resort to 
various coping strategies including use of savings, sale of assets and borrowing high interest 
loans to meet illness costs, which have the potential to drive them deeper into poverty 
(Leive and Xu, 2008).  
 
It is important to reverse the trend where more and more people face catastrophic and 
impoverishing illness costs or cannot access quality and timely health services because they 
cannot afford to pay. It is for these reasons that UHC has become a global health priority. It 
is meant to improve access to quality health services for all and protect households from 
catastrophic and impoverishing health care costs as well as make payment and use of health 
services sustainable and equitable. 
 
1.2 Health financing policy reforms for UHC 
The WHO (2005b, 2000) proposed reforms in the design of national health financing 
systems to allow people to access health services on the basis of need rather than ability to 
pay and to protect households from financial catastrophe by eliminating or reducing OOP 
payments to a minimum. In so doing, the WHO (2005a) advised that countries should aim to 
develop mandatory prepaid health financing systems. An advantage with mandatory 
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prepayment is that it facilitates access to health care at the time of need and at a cost lower 
than would be required through OOP payments where the individual using the service bears 
the full payment burden (WHO, 2005a).  Mandatory prepayment also avoids problems such 
as self- or adverse -selection (Giedion and Bitran, 2003) and is regarded by the WHO (2010b) 
as the most efficient and equitable way to achieve universal coverage.  
 
To develop sustainable prepaid health systems, the WHO (2005a) recommended greater use 
of mandatory prepayment mechanisms involving contributory and non-contributory 
arrangements to achieve UHC. The main non-contributory mechanism is funding from 
general government revenues. Contributory mechanisms include premium contributions 
through social health insurance (SHI) or community-based health insurance (CBHI) schemes. 
The WHO however, recommends funding UHC through general government revenues or 
social health insurance complemented by government revenues. These two financing 
approaches are preferable because they are mandatory and also for their ability to mobilise 
substantial resources and create cross-subsidies and benefit from economies of scale. Their 
ability to create large risk pools make them more financially secure and contribute to the 
improvement of equity of financing and access to health care across socio-economic groups 
(McIntyre, 2007, Mills, 2007). Moreover, they are domestic financing sources and this 
makes them more sustainable and predictable for the long term.  
 
1.3 Relevance of UHC to low- and middle-income countries 
The call by the WHO for health system reforms for UHC is particularly important to low- and 
middle-income countries where there are limited prepayment systems and a heavy reliance 
on OOP payments to finance health care. Among the WHO regions, the ones with the 
highest OOP payments as a share of total health expenditure (THE) include Africa (50 -55%), 
South East Asia (52%) and Eastern Mediterranean (40%). In contrast, OOP spending 
constitutes only 14% and 16% of THE in the American and European regions respectively 
(WHO, 2012a). Although the ILO (2014) reports minimal decreases in OOP payments globally 
between 2001 and 2011, this form of payment for health care is still unacceptably high in 
many LMICs where it mostly surpasses the WHO (2013a) threshold of less than 20% of THE. 
The ILO (2014) report shows that OOP payments accounted for 48% of THE in low-income 
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countries, 55% in lower-middle-income countries, 33% in upper-middle-income and 14% of 
THE in high-income countries.  
 
High prevalence of OOP payments in LMICs is an indicator of low levels of mandatory 
prepaid funds.  This means that more people in these regions cannot access health services 
at the time of need, have no financial protection and are vulnerable to catastrophic and 
impoverishing OOP payments. Measures to increase mandatory prepaid funds to address 
these problems are faced with a number of challenges including inefficiencies in revenue 
collection and use of health resources, largely inequitable access and utilisation of health 
services among different socio-economic groups and large populations working in the 
informal sector (McIntyre and Kutzin, 2014, Kutzin, 2006, Kutzin, 2001). This study focuses 
on the informal sector as an important population group in expanding coverage in LMIC.  
 
The majority of the population in LMICs (about 65%) work in the informal sector according 
to a joint report by the ILO and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (2009). Existing 
prepayment systems for health care in many of these countries, whether through 
government revenue or premium contributions, tend to exclude low-income and poor 
people who are mainly found in the informal sector. These population groups are excluded 
because the funds are either inadequate (in the case of funding from general government 
revenue) or the poor cannot afford to pay insurance premiums (Mills, 2007). While ‘poor 
people’ is not always synonymous with the informal sector, the majority of the poor and 
those without coverage are found in the informal sector (ILO, 2010). Moreover, social health 
insurance (SHI) schemes historically have focused on the formal employment sector because 
it is relatively easy by law to enforce mandatory contributions through salary deductions. In 
terms of access to specifically hospital services, there is inequity often in favour of urban 
and wealthier populations who are more likely to be in the formal sector (Kutzin, 2006, 
Mills, 2007). The tendency to exclude groups outside the formal sector (informal sector and 
indigent populations) from prepaid health care means that these groups have to meet some 
of the costs of health care through OOP payments. 
 
Whereas mandatory contributory and non-contributory approaches have been 
recommended for expanding effective coverage to all population groups, questions have 
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recently been raised regarding the feasibility of the contributory model in contexts with 
large informal sector populations. A number of reasons are cited for the challenges faced by 
the contributory approach in extending coverage to the informal sector. First, it is difficult to 
determine incomes of informal sector workers and even if they were determined the 
premium contributions would be very onerous because of low-incomes in the sector. The 
experiences of Thailand and Ghana confirm that determining incomes and identifying the 
poor (those unable to contribute) in the informal sector are problematic 
(Tangcharoensathien et al., 2011, Letourmy, 2010). Secondly, contributory systems in many 
developing countries tend to be voluntary for those outside of formal employment and even 
when there is legislation for compulsory membership it is essentially voluntary as the law 
cannot be effectively enforced. This suggests that non-contributory approaches could offer 
more realistic alternatives to achieving UHC in countries with large populations in the 
informal sector. 
 
1.4 Relevance and policy initiatives for UHC in Kenya 
Less than 20% of the total population in Kenya has some form of coverage from the existing 
public health insurance scheme, the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) (Ministry of 
Health, 2014a). This means that the majority of the population meet some or most of their 
health care needs OOP. Paying for health care OOP remains a key source of impoverishment 
and a barrier to accessing services in Kenya. Successive national health account (NHA) 
reports by the MOH (2014c, 2010, 2006, 2002) present mixed results with regard to the 
trajectory of OOP payments. The reports show that as a share of THE, OOP payments were 
about 43.4% in 2001, 29%, 24.5% and 32% respectively in 2005, 2009 and 2013. No specific 
reasons have been put forward for the inconsistency in the levels of OOP payments. 
However, the number of households impoverished through paying for health care OOP 
increased from about one million in 2010 to about 2.2 million as of 2014. About 6.7% of all 
Kenyan households faced catastrophic health spending (Ministry of Health, 2014a). The 
trend in OOP payments and the significant percentage of households suffering from 
catastrophic health expenditures call for sustainable measures to strengthen prepayment 
systems and move towards UHC. This will ensure that all Kenyans have access to timely, 
quality health services, and are neither impoverished nor experience catastrophic outcomes 
as a result of paying for health care. This study contributes towards the objective of 
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strengthening prepayment mechanisms in Kenya by way of seeking to understand suitable 
ways to provide coverage for informal sector workers in moving towards universal health 
coverage.  
 
At the moment, UHC initiatives in Kenya are in their infancy with on-going discussions on 
the best way forward. A few targeted tax-funded initiatives are currently in place including 
free care at public primary health facilities for all Kenyans , free maternity care in all public 
facilities and health insurance cover for the elderly and disabled populations. For the rest of 
the population, the official government position is that UHC would be approached primarily 
through a contributory mechanism where both formal and informal sector workers 
contribute premiums to a scheme, and the indigent are funded from government revenues. 
However, with the abovementioned problems associated with contributory approaches to 
covering the informal sector, it is not clear from government policy statements whether 
informal sector contributions will be subsidised, to what extent and through what 
mechanism. For the government to make decisions on these issues, it needs to be informed 
by evidence particularly in relation to the financial position of informal sector entities and 
vulnerabilities of informal sector workers.   
 
The need for evidence-informed policy decisions is further reinforced by the fact that the 
health system reform process towards greater prepayment and UHC in Kenya recognises 
that there are problems of access to health services and lack of financial protection for 
informal sector workers (Ministry of Medical Services, 2012). To address these problems 
reliable information is required regarding the experiences of informal sector workers with 
the current health system. This study fills this information gap and goes further to identify 
specific barriers of access to services in the informal sector and draws important lessons for 
the UHC reform process. It is worth emphasising that the experiences of informal sector 
workers in the use of public sector health system may contribute to how they perceive and 
respond to government policies for UHC hence the need to document and incorporate their 
experiences into the UHC policy agenda. Arhin-Tenkorang (2001) and Jakab and Krishnan 
(2001) agree that extending coverage to the informal sector in an inclusive process has the 
chance to increase their ability to participate in decision-making processes and break away 
from exclusion from prepayment systems. 
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By all indications the contributory policy approach to covering the informal sector in Kenya 
is a top-down strategy partly informed by the assumption that there are sufficient financial 
resources in the informal sector that can significantly contribute to financing UHC. There is 
no evidence that the views of informal sector workers were sought regarding their preferred 
prepayment design. This study fills this gap in evidence and goes on to explore preferences 
of the informal sector for alternative prepayment mechanisms. Thornton et al. (2009) 
reiterate the scarcity of evidence on the best possible design of a prepayment system that 
targets the informal sector in terms of ability to achieve high coverage or to increase 
utilisation of quality health services across different contexts. This study is therefore very 
timely as it analyses views of informal sector workers on ways to increase their coverage. 
 
The challenges associated with progress towards UHC in Kenya include inconsistent 
economic growth, inefficiencies in revenue collection and use of health resources, a very 
large population in the informal sector estimated at almost 80% of the total workforce, and 
largely inequitable access and utilisation of health services among different socio-economic 
groups (African Development Bank, 2013, Omolo, 2010, Ministry of Health, 2009). These are 
further exacerbated by an under-funded health sector where funding from government 
revenues has over the years averaged less than 29% of total health expenditure (WHO, 
2013b). This level of government funding is inadequate to provide basic health services to 
the entire population. Outside of government funding, the informal sector and indigent 
populations are substantially left out of other prepayment plans. For example, less than 7% 
out of nearly 26 million individuals in the informal sector are insured by the public insurer, 
the NHIF (KNBS, 2014b, KIPPRA, 2013)1. The formal sector, on the other hand, is nearly 
100% enrolled and benefiting from the NHIF in addition to private health insurance schemes 
as well as subsidies from government revenues. Within this context, this study critically 
analyses the reasons behind low enrolment rates of informal sector workers in the NHIF and 
ways to improve their participation in future prepayment system. 
 
                                                                 
1 KNBS : Kenya National Bureau of Statistics; KIPPRA: Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis  
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Lastly, in the proposed arrangements for UHC, even if the informal sector contributes to a 
mandatory insurance scheme, the contributions may not be adequate to provide for all their 
heath needs. What this means is that irrespective of the prepayment approach for Kenya, 
additional government revenue will be required for full subsidies to the indigent population, 
partial subsidies to informal sector workers and for infrastructure and other resource 
development to meet increased demand for services. This study helps in highlighting how 
much additional resources would be required to provide coverage over time. In addition, 
given the weaknesses of the contributory approach in contexts with large informal sector 
populations, a primarily non-contributory approach to financing UHC in Kenya is explored as 
an alternative to a contributory scheme in this study. Comparable data on feasibility and 
total financial resource needs of the two financing models for UHC in Kenya are explored.  
 
On a more general note, literature on health insurance or other prepayment mechanisms in 
relation to the informal sector is scant, and studies that have attempted to look at the 
informal sector in Kenya generally, often ignore agricultural informal sector and tend to 
concentrate in the urban areas only (Komollo, 2010, Kinyanjui, 2010, Mathauer et al., 2008, 
Orwa, 2007, Mitullah and Wachira, 2003). This study therefore fills a gap by including 
agricultural informal sector and the rural areas besides generating high quality and sufficient 
data to inform health policies that target improving access to quality services and financial 
risk protection for informal sector populations in both urban and rural areas.  
 
1.5 Research questions 
This study intended to answer the following questions: 
 
1.5.1 Main question 
In the context of universal health coverage, what are the implications of different financing 
approaches to providing healthcare-related financial risk protection for informal sector 
populations? 
 
1.5.2 Specific questions  
1. What is the nature of the informal sector in Kenya in terms of distribution, variety, size 
and sustainability?  
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2. What is the experience of members of the informal sector with the health system? How 
do informal sector members use health services and how do they pay for health care? 
3. What are the views of informal sector workers and policy makers regarding future 
prepayment system, and what is their understanding and views on different prepayment 
mechanisms? 
4. What is the total amount of financial resources required to provide coverage from now 
until 2030 and what are the implications for funding UHC through contributory and non-
contributory models?  
 
1.6 Aim and Objectives 
 
The aim of the study is to inform local and international policy debates on health care 
financing approaches for providing financial risk protection to informal sector populations in 
the context of universal health coverage. 
 
1.6.1 Specific objectives 
1. To describe the nature of informal sector activities in Kenya and how they differ 
between rural and urban settings; 
2. To critically analyse sustainability and financial potential of informal sector activities;  
3. To document experiences of informal sector workers with the current health system 
and draw lessons for universal coverage policies in Kenya;  
4. To document the views of informal sector workers regarding different prepayment 
mechanisms, and critically analyse key design features of a future health system 
within this context; 
5. To estimate the total resource requirements for UHC in Kenya, and implications for 
financing under contributory and non-contributory prepayment mechanisms;   
6. To make policy recommendations on how best to ensure that the informal sector 
can benefit from financial risk protection against health care costs.  
 
1.7 Summary of the remaining chapters 
Chapter Two provides background information on the Kenyan context and discusses the 
policy environment related to the political, economic and social conditions in the country 
  10 
 
and how these link to health care as well as an analysis of the current health care financing 
situation. 
Chapter Three is an extensive literature review including explanations of key 
concepts/terms used in the study. The literature reviewed not only gives a global picture of 
the informal sector and health care financing but also analyses health financing in specific 
developing countries from which lessons are drawn for universal coverage policies. It ends 
with an explanation of the conceptual framework. 
Chapter Four is the methods chapter and includes primary and secondary data sources as 
well as an explanation of the SimIns model. 
 Chapter Five is the first chapter on findings and explores the nature of the informal sector 
in the study areas and gives detailed information about informal sector populations and 
entities and an analysis of the financial potential of informal sector entities. 
Chapter Six presents findings on interactions of informal sector workers with the current 
health system including use of health facilities and a detailed analysis of key barriers faced 
by informal sector workers in accessing health services. Lessons learnt from the stated 
interaction are summarised at the end of the chapter to inform on-going reforms for 
universal health coverage. 
Chapter Seven analyses views of informal sector workers with regards to future prepayment 
system. It assesses the level of social solidarity among informal sector workers generally and 
specifically among different socio-economic groups in the sector. It also presents findings on 
attitudes of informal sector workers towards prepaid health care starting with the NHIF and 
gives a detailed analysis of preferred prepayment systems and specific design features of 
future prepayment mechanisms. 
Chapter Eight involves modelling of contributory and non-contributory approaches to 
financing UHC. The chapter assesses the feasibility of each of these prepayment 
mechanisms in Kenya with an estimate of financial resource needs for UHC.  
Chapter Nine summarises and discusses all the key findings in the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE KENYAN CONTEXT  
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides background information on the political, social and economic context 
in Kenya. Moreover, it provides information on the status of Kenya’s hea lth system with a 
view to providing a comprehensive explanation of the country’s health policy environment 
and to assess the Government of Kenya’s commitment to providing universal health 
coverage. The chapter begins with an examination of the country’s political context and in 
so doing, provides a brief history of the political situation and its relevance to reforms within 
the health sector. The next section focuses on the country’s economic context by providing 
insights on Kenya’s economic performance and potential fiscal space for health care 
reforms. The third section examines the Kenyan social context and dwells primarily on 
health care indicators as a measure of performance within the health sector.  The final 
section analyses the overall health system with a focus on the financing mechanisms and 
functions as well as current trends and practices within the health system. 
 
2.2 Political context 
Since Kenya achieved its independence in 1963, the political scenario has generally been 
considered to be relatively stable, irrespective of the manifestation of significant grievances 
that were suppressed in their early stages under successive authoritarian regimes. However, 
the onset of  multi-party politics in the 1990s ignited political alignments that were heavily 
shaped by historical, domestic tensions mainly associated with factors such as  the 
centralisation and abuse of power; high levels of corruption; marginalisation and ethnic 
animosities (Interactions, 2013). The post-election violence that erupted after the disputed 
2007 national elections considerably disrupted economic activities in the country, thereby  
leading to the downgrading of Kenya’s credit rating from B+ to B  (African Development 
Bank, 2008). This downgrading was interpreted by investors as there being an increased risk 
of conducting business in Kenya.  
 
According to Kasara (2011), domestic tensions have been specifically heightened by 
centralised control of resources, thus leading to skewed allocations of resources on the 
basis of ethnic affiliation of those in power. The skewed allocation of resources, among 
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other factors, has resulted in ethnic tensions. On their part, social cleavages, which manifest 
as income and ethnic inequalities are a direct result of skewed allocation of national 
resources and have constantly threatened the stability of Kenya. The causes of these 
tensions remain as unresolved violations that need to be addressed (Ndii, 2001). The 
Constitution of Kenya that was enacted in 2010, is weak on how past human rights 
violations should be addressed (Interactions, 2013). Furthermore, the socioeconomic 
tensions  existing within the country make it difficult to enhance social solidarity which is  
fundamental for Kenya to mobilise its resources to provide universal health care to its 
citizens  (Stuckler et al., 2010). 
 
According to the Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) (2014), the 
new Kenyan constitution took effect in 2010 and is progressively being implemented with 
significant achievements and  impact. The plan is that once there is full implementation of 
the constitution then the CIC will be dissolved. Full implementation of the Constitution is 
expected to take five years. One key aspect of this Constitution is the introduction of 
devolved governance as opposed to a centralised governance system. The devolved 
governance divides the country into 47 counties (sub-national governments) with the 
primary aim of addressing some of the historical injustices related to the distribution of 
national resources. The devolved governance system ensures that each county has a 
considerable level of control over its resources.  
 
Each county has the mandate of coming up with its own development priorities ; however, 
one key challenge is that the Central Government appears reluctant to match the devolved 
functions with funding to the counties (Orina-Nyamwamu, 2010). Subsequently, counties 
are likely to find themselves with unfunded mandates. In the financial year 2015/16 about 
15% of the total national budget was disbursed to all counties from the Central 
Government. Even though the Constitution states that counties should be allocated a 
minimum of 15% of the national budget, it remains silent on the maximum allocation 
amount. Currently there is agitation for a referendum to approve an increase in the 
allocation of funds to counties from 15% to 45% of the national budget. According the 
Transition Authority & Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (2013), some 
of the devolved functions include agriculture, health services, environmental conservation, 
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cultural activities, county roads and public works, among others. Meanwhile, there are also 
geographic differences among counties, with some counties having a higher capacity than 
others to generate their own revenues. Only 18 of the 47 counties can independently 
generate at least 50% of their own revenues, meaning that the majority of counties remain 
largely dependent on the Central Government (Commission on Revenue Allocation, 2013a). 
 
Counties have three sources of revenue from the central government. The first source is the 
Equitable Share Fund, which is the largest allocation to counties. This funding is allocated 
based on certain criteria such as: population size (45% of the total allocation); basic equal 
share (25% - shared equally among counties); poverty index (20%); land area (8.0%) and 
fiscal responsibility (2.0%- shared equally to manage debts at the county level).  The 
Commission on Revenue Allocation has previously made efforts to amend these criteria as 
follows: population size (45%); basic equal share (25%); poverty index (18%); land area 
(8.0%); personnel emoluments (2.0%); and 1.0% each for the fiscal responsibility and 
development factors. However, all these amendments were rejected both by the Senate 
and the National Assembly on the basis that this would perpetuate inequitable allocation of 
revenues to the counties, similar to the formula currently in operation. For example, the 
emphasis on two weights or criteria such as population size and basic equal share (a 
combined weight of 70% of the total allocation) - has been criticised for its tendency to 
perpetuate inequitable allocation of resources. This happens  because some of the richest 
counties are also the most populated and therefore have the highest capacity to generate 
their own revenues. However, the Commission on Revenue Allocation (2013a) argues that 
placing a deliberate emphasis on population is necessary in order to provide the resources 
required by each county for effective service delivery per capita. 
 
The second source of revenue from the central government for the counties is the 
Equalisation Fund, which takes up 1.5% of the total government revenue. The purpose of 
this fund is to provide basic services such as water, health facilities and electricity in 
counties classified as ‘marginalised’. The motivation for this is to bring the quality of these 
services in the marginalized counties to the same level as the other counties in Kenya 
(Kenya Law Reform Commission, 2015). Although this Equalisation Fund may correct some 
of the development imbalances as intended, it has never been disbursed since devolution 
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and the amount allocated for this purpose over a 20 year period from 2013 as stated in the 
Constitution of Kenya, is too limited. Approximately three quarters of the country’s 
geographic regions, consisting of 14 counties, is classified as marginalised (Commission on 
Revenue Allocation, 2013b). The list of marginalised counties is updated every two to three 
years. 
 
The third allocation of revenue from the Central Government to the county governments is 
the Conditional Grants. Conditional Grants include funding for free maternity health care, 
Level 5 hospitals, reimbursement for lack of user fees at primary health facilities, the health 
sector services fund (examined in a later section of this chapter) and certain donor funds. 
Funding for most of these services is based on utilisation rates. Finally, counties are also 
expected to generate their own funds through self-generated revenues, grants and loans.  
 
2.3 Economic context 
 
2.3.1 Macroeconomic and fiscal management 
 
According to the most recent World Bank ranking conducted in 2014, Kenya’s GDP per 
capita income (purchasing power parity) is about US$2,300.  This puts it in the category of 
lower-middle-income countries. Furthermore, although it is the largest economy in East and 
Central Africa, Kenya’s status as the most important destination for Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) was lost in 2008 to Uganda and Tanzania due to regulatory reforms and 
political instability (African Development Bank, 2008).  
 
On average, Kenya has maintained a 4.8% GDP growth rate per annum for over a decade. 
This rate is below the average for Africa in general, which is 5.3% and East Africa, which 
stands at 6.7% (See Figure 2.1). A country’s GDP growth rate is the most important 
macroeconomic indicator since it influences the government’s revenue and spending levels 
(Pande et al., 2013). This means that on average, African governments generally have more 
flexibility in spending than other regions of the world due to rapid GDP growth rates. 
However, the comparably lower growth rates in Kenya have been attributed to recurrent 
drought and political instability which in turn, has  contributed to an unattractive 
  15 
 
environment for domestic and external investment (African Development Bank, 2013, 
Kasara, 2011). 
 
 
Sources: Africa Economic Outlook, 2013; IMF, 2013 
 
Over the years, agriculture has remained Kenya's single largest contributor to its GDP, and 
by 2013, stood at 25.3% of the total amount. Other key GDP contributors are wholesale and 
retail trade (10.2 %); transport and communication (9.1%); manufacturing (8.9%) (KNBS, 
2014b). 
 
The overall picture from the macroeconomic indicators is promising for the country’s 
economic development. Nevertheless, there exist significant structural problems and 
macroeconomic instability. For instance, the unemployment rate in Kenya stands at 40% of 
the labour force, as compared to the average rate for Africa as a whole, which stands at 12% 
and 4.0% for low-income countries (LIC). High unemployment rates2 tend to affect fiscal 
space for health and more so, limit progress towards universal coverage. This happens 
especially when populations are expected to contribute health insurance premiums or 
earmarked payroll taxes. Inflation rates have also remained unpredictable in Kenya 
                                                                 
2 Reliable data on unemployment rates in sub-Saharan Africa is scarce and countries measure unemployment 
rates in different ways. In Rwanda for example, unemployment rates are low because informal employment is 
measured as part of overall  employment. This is not strictly the case with Kenya where employment rates tend 
to be measured purely in the formal sector.  
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particularly due to political instability; for example, inflation rose to 30% in 2008 and was 
about 14% in 2011 before falling to 6.6% in 2013. However, recent projections by the World 
Bank conducted in 2014  indicate that annual inflation rates will remain at single digits of 
about 4.5% in the coming years, all other factors held constant (World Bank, 2014a).  
 
Kenya’s fiscal performance throughout the past decade has on the whole been promising. 
According to Pande et al. (2013), the level of debt over time is a crucial indicator of fiscal 
solvency. Moreover, the level of a government’s budget deficit demonstrates whether the 
debt is controllable. On the other hand, a government’s spending patterns reflect the level 
of engagement in the economy and social development, including health care. The key fiscal 
indicators in the period from 2003 to 2013 signal an improvement in the economic 
environment, with room for government spending (see Figure 2.2). The total debts have 
declined over time - from 60% of the GDP in 2003, to 46% in 2013. These figures are 
expected to remain at less than 50% of the GDP according to the projections represented in 
Figure 2.3 as provided by Pande et al. (2013). However, the budget deficit has doubled from 
4.0% of the GDP in 2003, to about 8.0%. Generally, this level of deficit is still under control 
due to the Government’s improved revenue collection that has helped to minimize the 
budget deficits. Unfortunately, Kenya performs relatively poorly with regard to both 
indicators (deficits and debts) compared to other African and LIC averages (Figure 2.3).  
  
The rise in government spending (from 23% of the GDP in 2003 to 33% in 2013) translates 
into more public investment. This has typically been demonstrated through infrastructural 
development that has spurred Kenya’s economic growth. Furthermore, over the past few 
years, tax revenue as a share of the GDP has remained at over 20%, which has contributed 
to the total revenue at the government’s disposal, relatively low budget deficits and 
reduced dependence on foreign aid. Although the African Development Bank (2008) 
maintains that Kenya’s debt position is sustainable, this debt position remains higher than 
the average for Africa and low-income countries. The sustainable debt position alongside 
low budget deficits and minimal reliance on aid makes it possible to predict the financing of 
government programmes including health care. As demonstrated in Figure 2.3, although on 
average, Kenya seems to do better in terms of government spending and total government 
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revenue as a share of the GDP than the rest of Africa and other low-income countries, these 
differences are quite small. 
 
 
Source: Pande et al., 2013; African Economic Outlook, 2013 
 
 
 
Source: Pande et al., 2013 
 
 
2.3.2 Overview of employment in relation to the informal sector  
Employment as a macroeconomic factor requires more detailed consideration because most 
employment opportunities in Kenya are found in the informal sector, which is the focus of 
this thesis. As presented in Figure 2.4, employment within the informal sector in Kenya has 
grown considerably in the past decade, increasing from about 21% of total employment in 
1986  to 85% as of 2011 (KNBS, 2014b, Omolo, 2010). The sector grew at a yearly rate of 
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26% in the 1990s then slowed down to between 6 % and 11% annually at the turn of the 
millennium (Mitullah, 2003, Nyerere, 2009, Orwa, 2007, Wanjala and Were, 2006).  
 
 
Sources: (Omolo, 2010, Government of Kenya, 2010c, KNBS, 2014b) 
 
In 2013, the informal sector as a whole created 80.8% of total employment opportunities, 
with approximately 53% of these opportunities generated within the non-agricultural 
informal sector. However, the agricultural informal sector remains the single largest 
contributor of informal sector employment in Kenya, standing at 47% of the total informal 
sector employment figure  (KNBS, 2014). In the non-agricultural informal sector, the main 
employers include wholesale and retail outlets (including hotels and restaurants), with 59% 
of the total non-agricultural informal sector employment, manufacturing (21.7%); services 
of various kinds (9.3%); and transport and communication (3.0%) (KNBS, 2008, Salami et al., 
2010). The reason for the concentration of the non-agricultural informal sector in these 
areas is  not clear although Kinyanjui (2010) and Orwa (2007) have hypothesised that it is 
influenced by perceptions of profitability and ease of entry into particular informal 
economic activities.  
  
Despite the apparent growth in employment, many of these employment opportunities 
especially in the informal sector, may not be gainful because as many as 41% of Kenya’s 
productive workforce considers itself unemployed (UNDP, 2013a, NESC, 2011). Some of the 
reasons for the high unemployment rates in Kenya could be attributed to the country’s high 
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population growth rates matched with an economy that has over the years, been unable to 
create adequate employment opportunities. Moreover, there have been instances of 
political instability that have discouraged investment and destroyed business opportunities 
as well. Other factors include the use of capital- rather than labour- intensive technologies 
and the global economic recession (Mwalenga, 2012). Various sources of literature, for 
example Charmes (2012), also link the growth of the informal sector to high unemployment 
rates because people have to find a means of livelihood outside formal employment.   
 
2.4 Social context  
Kenya has a relatively high population growth rate of approximately 2.5% per annum. This 
structure is ‘bottom-heavy’, meaning that it is very large at the base of the population 
pyramid, with close to 70% of the population being less than 30 years old, and 43% are 
children aged less than 14 years of age. Given this population structure, there is a high 
dependency ratio which has been estimated at about 80% of the population (World Bank, 
2014a). A high dependency ratio means that a lot of socioeconomic pressure is put on a 
small working population. This often has negative consequences on the general economy 
due to the absence of domestic savings and investments. However, according to the African 
Development Bank (2008), the rapid expansion of the middle-class may alleviate some of 
the problems associated with high dependency levels, as more people get into gainful 
employment. 
  
A key feature of the Kenyan population is the high level of poverty, partly due to a heavy 
reliance on low productivity and sometimes unpredictable agrarian economy. The UNDP 
(2013b) reports that the national poverty headcount (multidimensional poverty) stands at 
47.8 % of the population, while 43.4% nationwide live below the income poverty line of USD 
1.25 a day. This indicates that a large segment of the population not only suffer from 
specific disadvantages in significant areas such as education and health, but also struggle to 
pro-actively prepare for health care, if required to do so, without substantial subsidies from 
other population groups, government and donor agencies. 
  
The African Development Bank (2008) highlights wide economic disparities in Kenya where 
with the richest 10% of the population controls 36% of the country’s total wealth, while the 
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poorest 10% own less than 2.0% of the country’s wealth. The Gini coefficient of 0.51 for 
Kenya conducted in 2006 was only lower than that of South Africa and Namibia. 
Nonetheless, there have been significant improvements in certain social development 
indicators such as literacy and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Other indicators are 
found within the health sector and include improved immunisation coverage; decreased 
infant mortality rates (IMR) and under-5 mortality rates (U5MR) and a decrease in the 
prevalence of HIV/AIDs infection rates in the last decade (see Table 2.1).  
 
As captured in Table 2.1, the current trends indicate that Kenya is unlikely to meet MDGs 1, 
4, 5 and 6 by 2015, which is the deadline set by the United Nations to meet MDG targets. 
However, life expectancy at birth has steadily improved since 2003, after HIV/AIDS control 
programmes were aggressively implemented. This has resulted in restoring life expectancy 
to about 62 years as at 2013. It should be emphasised that life expectancy at birth is an 
indicator of the quality of life in a country and also shows how much a country stands to 
gain from human capital investment. The relatively low levels of life expectancy at birth in 
Kenya can be attributed mainly to the high incidence of HIV infections in the 1990s and 
worsening economic conditions which eroded people’s purchasing power and lowered their 
standards of living (WHO, 2011d, KNBS, 2010a). This is partly attributable to the fact that 
the health sector in Kenya has been highly under-funded by the Government, thereby 
making health care less accessible to the majority of people which subsequently has 
negative implications on the country’s health outcomes.  
Table 2.1: Health indicators, Kenya (2003 - 2012)3  
Indicator Name 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Li fe expectancy at birth 
(years ) 
52.1 52.5 53.0 53.7 54.4 55.1 55.8 56.5 57.1 57.7 61.7 
Infant mortality rate(per 
1,000 l ive births) 
63.7 61.7 59.3 57.3 55.5 53.3 51.9 50.1 48.3 49.0 42.2 
Under-5 mortality rate 
(per 1,000 l ive births) 
102 98.3 94.1 90.2 86.5 82.5 79.4 76.1 72.8 73.0 --- 
Maternal mortality ratio 
(per 100,000 l ive births) 
414 550 580 320 380 490 488 390 570 600 510 
Incidence of tuberculosis 
(per 100,000 people) 
349 357 359 355 347 332 312 298 288 --- --- 
Prevalence of HIV (% of 
population ages 15-49) 
7.6 7.2 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.3 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.0 6.0 
 Sources of data: (Yego et al., 2013, World Bank, 2014a, WHO, 2013b)  
                                                                 
3 The table indicates high MMR between 2011 and 2012 but this may be as a result of differences in estimates 
because data were mined from different sources which may have had different sampling techniques.  
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2.5 The Kenyan health system 
 
2.5.1 Overview of health service provision and management 
 
The health system in Kenya includes the public sector, which consists of the Ministry of 
Health (MOH); county health departments and parastatal organizations. It also includes 
private sector players including private for-profit entities and non-profit institutions such as 
Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs). Health 
services countrywide are provided through a network of about 9936 health facilities, with 
the public sector accounting for about 51% of the total number of facilities (Ministry of 
Health, 2015). The private sector (for-profit and non-profit) provides approximately 47 % of 
health services which are mainly curative (Ministry of Health, 2014a). On their part, donors 
provide mainly financial support to NGO and FBO facilities. 
  
Before the onset of the devolved governance system in 2013, the public health system 
consisted of six levels of health care as illustrated in Figure 2.5 - ranging from community 
services at the base (Level 1) to national teaching and referral facilities at the apex (Level 6).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s i l lustration 
 
The roles of these six levels of care in terms of the scope of services they provide have not 
changed with the introduction of devolution (Figure 2.6). According to the MOH (2012), 
community outreach services include basic preventive and curative services for minor 
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conditions at community and household levels. Dispensaries too, provide a wide range of 
preventive health services and are usually the first point of contact with patients. However, 
the referral system is weak, thereby making health centres and hospitals the first points of 
contact. Moreover, health centres usually provide preventive and limited curative services 
in accordance with local health needs. The services provided by these public primary 
facilities are supplemented by private clinics, dispensaries and hospitals. District hospitals 
(now known as county referral facilities) are expected to act on referrals from health centres 
and dispensaries. For their part, provincial general hospitals were previously expected to act 
on referrals from district hospitals. Although national referral and teaching facilities are 
meant to offer high level diagnostic, therapeutic, and rehabilitative services, the referral 
system is currently weak, thereby forcing economically challenged patients to seek s ervices 
from the other levels of health care accessible to them. 
  
The fate of the former Provincial General Hospitals (PGHs) has differed from case to case. 
Initially, these hospitals were expected to function under the National government. 
However, to date, about two hospitals, namely, the Jaramogi Oginga Odinga hospital 
(formerly known as the Nyanza Provincial General Hospital) and Kisii Level 5 Hospital, have 
been transformed into teaching and referral facilities  but are still under the management of 
county government. The other hospitals seem to be accountable to their respective county 
governments. Kandie (2014) observes that the Treasury cut subsidies for the Level 5 
facilities from KSh 10.0 billion to KSh 3.4 billion in the 2013/14 budget. Since these facilities 
serve more than one county, the county governments in which each of these hospitals are 
based are generally reluctant to subsidise the health care service provisions and have 
indicated that they may have to charge patients from outside their counties at market 
prices.  
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The management of the health sector changed considerably after devolution of the 
governance system in 2012. In the previous centralised administration, duties and 
responsibilities of health workers cascaded from the Ministry of Health (MOH) to the 
provinces and districts. Within the devolved system, the former system has been replaced 
with devolved units, where respective county governments autonomously manage most 
functions of the provision of health services. Initially, the Provincial Health Management 
Teams (PHMT) had the oversight mandate in regard to the implementation of policies on 
the provision of health care at the district level. They also maintained quality standards, and 
coordinated and controlled all district health activities. In the new devolved structure, the 
roles of the PHMT have been taken over by County governments. This means that the 
management of health services and provision of responsibilities is largely controlled at 
county level. The County governments control three out of the four levels of health care, 
namely: Level 1 - Community level; Level 2 - Primary care for dispensaries and health 
Figure 2.6: Public health services management and delivery system under devolved governance 
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include: (1) Comprehensive patient diagnostic, medical, surgical, rehabilitative and 
reproductive health services; (2) Specialised outpatient services (3) Facilitate and 
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Primary Care Services (7568 units) 
Level 3 (health centres) and level 2 (dispensaries); includes non-state actors. Their 
mandate incudes: (1) Diseases prevention and health promotion; (2) Basic 
outpatient diagnostic, medical surgical and rehabilitative services; (3) Inpatient 
care for emergencies, observation and normal delivery; (4) Facilitate referrals 
from communities and to county referral facilities  
Community Health Services (8000 units) 
Community units are concerned with: (1) Promoting healthy behaviours; (2) 
Provide specifically defined health services; (3) Recognise signs and symptoms of 
conditions requiring early referral; (4) Facilitate community diagnostic, 
management and referral 
 
National Referral Services 
All tertiary referral units. These provide highly specialised services including (1) 
general specialisation (2) discipline specialisation, (3) geographic/regional 
specialisation. These facilities are meant to for (a) training and research, and (b) 
specialised health care on area of expertise 
                                           Source: Ministry of Health, 2012 
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centres; and Level 3 – County referral facilities. Consequently, the national government only 
controls specialised services provided at national referral facilities (see Figure 2.6).  
 All health-related activities are guided by MOH standards and protocols. The Ministry 
therefore continues to provide a national oversight role and acts as the regulatory authority 
which stipulates health policies and standards to be adhered to by all County governments. 
 
2.5.2 A brief history of key health financing policy development over time 
 
Since Kenya achieved its independence in 1963 right through the years until 1989, health 
services were predominantly funded through general government revenues to ensure that 
all Kenyans had free health care at the different health service points. The National Hospital 
Insurance Fund (NHIF) was introduced in 1966 through act of parliament to provide 
additional compulsory coverage to the formal sector. The NHIF was later expanded to 
accept membership from the informal sector on voluntary basis. In the meantime, rapid 
population growth, adverse economic conditions and changes in epidemiological patterns 
made it impossible for the Government of Kenya (GOK) to sustain its provision of affordable 
health care for all Kenyans (Anangwe, 2008). In 1989, user charges were formally introduced 
under the cost-sharing policy for all levels of health care. These charges were meant to 
supplement the MOH budget for the overall running and maintenance of health facilities  
(Collins et al., 1996). However, constraints imposed on access to health care by the user fees 
led to their suspension in 1990. In 1991, the user charges were again reintroduced as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) argued that the provision of free 
health services was unsustainable under the prevailing economic conditions of the time 
(Mwabu, 1992).  
  
Meanwhile, the Government sought ways to limit the effects of user fees on access to 
health services.  Hence, in 2003 prevailing user charges were reduced to the bare-minimum 
under a known as the  ‘10/20 policy’, which required those seeking health services to pay a 
minimal amount of KSh 10 (USD 0.12) for services at dispensaries and KSh 20 (USD 0.24) at 
health centres. This 10/20 policy was in force from 2003 to June 2013, when the 
Government subsequently introduced free primary health care country-wide. However, the 
success of this policy was limited because facilities still continued to charge certain us er fees 
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based on the rationale that they were not being adequately compensated by the national 
government after reducing their user charges (Chuma et al., 2009).  
 
 In 2003, the National Social Health Insurance Fund (NSHIF) bill was proposed as a major 
national strategy and legislation which was expected to provide free health care at the point 
of service to all Kenyans. However, this bill was rejected by then President Mwai Kibaki on 
the basis that it was neither politically acceptable nor financially sustainable (Wamai, 2009, 
Carrin et al., 2007, Mboya et al., 2004). After the failure of the NSHIF bill, the Health Sector 
Services Fund (HSSF) was then initiated in 2005. This initiative was mainly in response to the 
observation that up to 60% of funds allocated to primary health facilities never actually 
reached their intended destinations (Government of Kenya, 2004). The HSSF was intended 
to provide direct funding mainly to primary health facilities in an effort to eliminate user 
fees and ensure that this funding actually reached health facilities for the purchase of 
necessary health products. This initiative closed in June 2015 and was largely funded by 
donor grants. The main funding partners are DANIDA (providing 44%) and the World Bank 
(42%), with the Government of Kenya contributing 14% of the total amount (Waweru et al., 
2013). Since it was first piloted in 2005 and implemented country-wide in 2010, evaluation 
studies carried out by researchers such as (Waweru et al., 2013, Opwora et al., 2010) 
indicate that user fees continue to be demanded even in facilities that receive HSSF grants, 
either as informal user charges or due to the late disbursement of grants.  
  
In mid-2013, as part of the strategy to combat the effects of user fees and as a sign of 
commitment to UHC goals, the Government adopted a targeted approach towards 
improving access to health services and financial protection. This policy approach included 
the provision of free maternity care in all public health facilities as well as free primary 
health care services at dispensaries and health centres. In essence, this eliminated user fees 
at these facilities. For the first time, the GOK committed its budget to finance targeted 
health programmes. Hence, KSh 3.8 billion (USD 44.19m) was set aside for maternity health 
care and KSh 0.7 billion (USD 8.24m) was allocated for primary care. Currently, the funding 
for these programmes is remitted by the MOH directly to the health facilities. For instance, 
facilities offering maternity services are compensated at a flat rate of KSh. 2,000 (USD23.00) 
per delivery for dispensaries and health centres; KSh. 5,000 (USD57.50) for county hospitals; 
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and KSh. 17,000 (USD195.40) for national referral facilities  (Bourbonnais, 2013). The MOH is 
currently subsidising maternity care in NHIF-accredited low-cost private facilities. However, 
the flat rate compensation presents a challenge because it does not account for unique 
medical interventions such as caesarean deliveries, which cost twice as much as a normal 
delivery (Bourbonnais, 2013). This presents significant financial gaps at health facilities. 
Moreover, there are no mechanisms put in place to verify whether the deliveries claimed by 
the health facilities actually took place. Such gaps could easily threaten the sustainability of 
these programmes. Other challenges include the fact that this targeted funding contributes 
to further fragmentation of the health system and limits equitable distribution of benefits 
by concentrating funds in specific programmes. Nevertheless, the fact that they are funded 
from domestic revenues is important for their sustainability. 
  
Further commitments by the GOK to operationalise the new health policies included the 
allocation of funds to the counties for the recruitment of 8700 community nurses, 2900 
community health workers and building housing units for health workers (Bourbonnais, 
2013). Approximately KSh 500 million (USD 5.6 million) was allocated in 2013/2014 to 
purchase health insurance cover through the NHIF for the elderly and disabled members of 
the Kenyan populace. However, despite these signs of commitment towards meeting the 
UHC goals, an increase in the demand for maternity services following the removal of user 
charges may present some challenges; for example, the demand for these services across 
the country recorded an increase of between 10% and 100% across different facilities 
(Bourbonnais, 2013). To meet these demands, an additional 60 000 nurses were required, 
yet only 8700 were recruited (Bourbonnais, 2013). Furthermore, the 2014/15 budget for 
free maternity care minimally increased from the KSh 3.8 billion allotted in 2013 to KSh 4.0 
billion in 2014. This increment did not account for inflation rates even though there were 
surplus funds from the previous allocation. Table 2.2 provides a chronology of health policy 
interventions from 1963 to 2013.  
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Table 2.2: Key policy reforms and interventions to improve access to health care for all Kenyans since independence  
Year Policy reform/intervention Target population Impact  
1963 - 
1965 
Tax financing with s tandard user fees Al l  Kenyans  Limited utilisation because of the fees were 
unaffordable 
 
 
 
1965 - 
1989 
 
 
Exclus ive funding from general  
government revenue (user-fees 
removed) 
Al l  Kenyans at public 
faci lities 
Inadequate health services with ri sing cost burdens for 
government (and households even with removal of user 
fees) 
Establishment of the National Hospital 
Insurance Fund (NHIF) in 1966 
Compulsory for 
formal sector 
employees; 
voluntary for  the 
informal sector  
Increased inpatient financial protection for members 
only (mostly those in formal employment). Coverage is 
comprehensive for members seeking inpatient care in 
public and low-cost faith-based facilities. 
 
1989/1990 
User-fees re-introduced then 
suspended in 1990 
Al l  Kenyans in all 
public health 
faci lities 
Uti l isation of public health services decreased at re-
introduction in 1989 but increased following suspension 
in 1990 
 
1991/1993 
User fees were re-introduced in 1991 
and implemented in phases beginning 
with hospitals. Children under-5 and 
services such as immunisation, 
HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis were 
exempted from payment.  
 
Al l  Kenyans in all 
public health 
faci lities 
 
User fees are a  barrier to access and have negative 
implications for equity. 
 
2002/2003 
 
User fees were reduced to the bare 
minimum in primary health facilities 
under the 10/20 policy but remained 
unaltered in higher level facilities  
 
Al l  Kenyans  
Increasing utilisation but also increasing informal 
charges because there was not buffer-fund to take the 
place of user-fees 
In 2003, the National Social Health 
Insurance Fund was proposed as a 
pathway for universal coverage in 
Kenya  
Al l  Kenyans in a mix 
of tax and social 
insurance scheme 
funding 
Bi l l to establish the fund was rejected on sustainability 
grounds. No impact on population health 
 
2005 
Establishment of the Health Sector 
Services Fund (HSSF) as a buffer fund 
to compensate for the reduced user 
fee revenue. The HSSF was piloted in 
2005 but actual implementation 
delayed until 2010 
Al l  Kenyans in public 
health services 
HSSF provided HSSF should ideally increase utilisation 
and lower OOP payments. However, OOP payments are 
increasing 
2013 1) Government introduced free 
primary care in dispensaries and 
health centres which eliminated user 
fees at these facilities 
2) Free maternity care in a ll public 
sector health facilities  
3) Devolution of health services 
4) Health insurance for the elderly and 
disabled 
 
 
Targeted all eligible 
Kenyans  
Removal of user fees is likely to increase utilisation of 
services as had been documented earlier  
Baseline reports (Chuma & Maina, 2013) indicate 
increased number of births assisted by health workers. 
There are currently no documentations on the 
implication of devolution on health care management 
and service delivery 
 
2.5.3 Overview of current financing arrangements 
 
2.5.3.1 Main financing indicators 
Health expenditure indicators are important in providing an understanding and 
interpretation of the overall performance of health care financing system in terms of the 
priority accorded to the health sector by the Government. Moreover, these indicators 
provide insights into where there may be room to improve the health sector’s financial 
structure. The World Bank (2013c) indicates that total mandatory prepaid funds in Kenya 
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are relatively low and have decreased from 47.3% of the total health expenditure in 1996, to 
45.8% in 2010. Low levels of prepaid funds means that fewer people have access to 
affordable health care and financial protection since they have to meet some of the costs of 
health care from their own sources. Furthermore, an analysis of high- and middle-income 
countries demonstrates that over 60% of funds need to be prepaid to place the country in a 
good position for universal health coverage (McIntyre, 2012).  
  
Over the past decade, Kenya has performed below African and global averages with regard 
to key health expenditure indicators (see Figures 2.7 and 2.8). For over a decade, the 
Government’s share of total health expenditure has remained at around 29 % of the total 
health expenditure. By comparison, the average funding for health care from African 
governments increased from 44 % in 2000, to about 49 % of the total health expenditure. 
The global average of government funding as a share of the total health expenditure was 
about 59 % by 2011. These trends illustrate that in comparison to the health systems in 
other African countries, the Government of Kenya places less priority on its health sector.  
  
Kenya has heavily relied on donor funding for the health sector to compensate for 
underfunding from the Central government. Although external funding contributes to 
improved access to services and financial protection, it is less reliable and makes key health 
programmes vulnerable to external shocks, thereby making it unsustainable. As reflected in 
Figure 2.7, donors (development partners) funded about 39 % of Kenya’s total health 
expenditure by 2012 even though this has declined to about 25% in 2013 (Ministry of 
Health, 2014c). When compared to the African region in general, these sources of finance 
have been kept at less than 15 % of the total health expenditure. It must be emphasized 
that globally, donor support for health care is on the decline as presented in Figure 2.7.  
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Data sources: (World Bank, 2013c, Ministry of Health, 2010) 
 
Globally, as a proportion of government budgets, the health sector demonstrates 
reasonable prioritisation receiving an average of 15.3% of total government expenditure. 
However, in Kenya, the budgetary allocation to the health sector from the Central 
government has declined from about 11% of the total budget in 2000 to approximately 5.7% 
in 2014. This trend puts Kenya below the African average of about 9.4% of the total 
government budget. The Government’s allocations to the health sector in Kenya continue to 
negate the progress towards universal health coverage which is a national health policy 
priority and requires more public prepaid funds. Furthermore, this goes against the Abuja 
Declaration which stipulates that Sub-Saharan African governments are obliged to allocate 
15% of their budgets to their respective health sectors. In terms of the total health 
expenditure relative to the GDP, the Kenyan, African and global positions have not shifted 
much since 2000. Nevertheless, Kenya’s position is the poorest overall. The country spends 
4.5 % of its GDP on health care as compared to African and global averages at 6.0 % and 
9.2% respectively by 2011 (see Figure 2.8).  
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Data sources: (Ministry of Health, 2013, World Bank, 2013c) 
 
Private expenditures are known to be inequitable and regressive, and the more these 
expenditures are the higher the inequities in a health system (Uga and Santos, 2007, Roy 
and Howard, 2007). In Kenya, the proportion of private health expenditure remains 
unacceptably high even though there are varied estimates. According to the World Bank, 
(2014) private spending (mostly OOP payments) in Kenya was as high as 46% of the total 
health expenditure by 2011 contrary to the MOH estimates of 37% for the same period.  
 
A trend analysis of health expenditure indicators from various reports of the KNBS suggests 
that Kenya’s health sector needs to be prioritised at a similar or above the level of priority 
accorded to the sector in other African states. Furthermore, macroeconomic performance 
relative to expenditure in the health sector indicates that Kenya has the ability to increase 
funding for its health sector without this affecting the functions of other areas of the 
Government’s expenditure. 
 
2.5.3.2 Analysis of health care financing using Kutzin’s framework 
Kutzin’s framework is a tool used in the analysis of key health financing functions (revenue 
collection, pooling and purchasing) as well as “policies and interactions within an existing 
health care system” (Kutzin, 2001) (P.171).  
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(a) Revenue sources and revenue collection 
The health sector in Kenya has consistently been funded from three main sources, namely, 
through government revenue, donor funding and various private sources. By 2010, donors 
contributed the single largest share of the funding for the health system (38.8% of the total 
health expenditure) (Ministry of Health, 2010). For their part, private sources contributed 
36.7%, of which OOP consisted of 66.8% of the total private expenditure. Public sources 
such as the NHIF and the Government of Kenya contributed 28.8%, with the NHIF 
contributing 4.7% (Ministry of Health, 2010). 
 
According to the Institute of Economic Affairs (2014) the main sources of government 
revenue includes various forms of taxes such as personal income tax (29% of the total 
revenue); value added tax (VAT) (25%); corporate (company) taxes (23%); excise duty (12%); 
customs tax (7.0%); amongst other taxes (4.0%). Tax funds constitute approximately 88% of 
the national budget (Institute of Economic Affairs, 2014). 
  
Generally, taxation seems to be progressive, with the highest income brackets contributing 
about 30% in taxes and the lowest income bracket contribute 10%. However, indirect taxes 
are on the whole, proportional in Kenya (Munge and Briggs, 2013). Individuals in the formal 
sector earning less than USD 141 (KSh 12,000) per month are exempted from paying income 
tax. The Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) is the national revenue collection agency.  
  
Tax rates in Kenya are generally standardized, with VAT charged at 16% of the total cost of 
each eligible purchase and personal income taxes graduated from 10% of the lowest taxable 
amount to 30% of the highest taxable amount. Corporate taxes are proportional and stand 
at 30% of the total income for resident companies, and 37.5% for non-resident companies 
(KRA, 2009). The progressivity of VATs in Kenya is not clear although McIntyre and Kutzin 
(2014) suggest that VATs tend to be progressive in low-income countries but regressive in 
high-income and most middle-income countries. Contributions to the NHIF are highly 
inequitable (see later analysis). OOP expenditure is generally regressive with the poorest 
groups paying about 4.3% of household income on health care as compared to 2.2% for the 
highest income groups (Ministry of Health, 2009). Although exemption policies exist, 
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effective implementation is complicated by the difficulty in identifying the lowest income 
earners.  
 
According to the Institute of Economic Affairs, (2014), there has been an improvement in 
the efficiency of tax collection since 2003. However, reports from certain investigations such 
as Wrong (2009) emphasize that the high levels of corruption in Government could reduce 
compliance and thereby reduce the amount of revenue collected.  
 
From the national annual budget, the Central government allocates a percentage directly to 
the health sector through the MOH to take care of health services under the Central 
government’s mandate. However, since health care is devolved, the bulk of funding is 
allocated to county governments and it is their responsibility to independently decide how 
much should be allocated to each county’s health sector. Bourbonnais (2013) and the 
Ministry of Devolution & Planning (2013) estimate that about 99% of the domestic public 
sector health expenditure for all counties were sourced from the Central Government. This 
means that the counties are limited in generating their own revenue for their respective 
health sectors. County governments on average contributed only 0.12% of their health care 
budget from self-generated revenues (Ministry of Devolution & Planning, 2013). Firstly, the 
allocation from self-generated revenue indicates the low priority accorded to the health 
sector by County governments. Secondly, counties have limited options to generate 
adequate revenue. Kipchumba (2012) observes that county governments are limited to 
property taxes, entertainment taxes and user fees as independent sources of revenue. This 
has a significant impact on their flexibility to self-generate adequate revenue. Furthermore, 
there are fears among health sector stakeholders that most county budgets would go to 
non-health sector areas such as general infrastructure or to pay salaries which the county 
governments treat as priorities areas (Bourbonnais, 2013). When this happens, this is bound 
to reduce the funding for the delivery of health services. On the other hand, households pay 
OOP through user charges and other direct payments to providers. User fees, according to 
McIntyre and Kutzin (2014), can involve high collection costs relative to the income 
generated.  
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Revenue for the NHIF mainly comes from payroll taxes which are remitted directly to the 
NHIF accounts by employers, an arrangement which limits revenue collection costs. 
However, members of the informal sector who wish to contribute to the NHIF have to make 
own arrangements to pay and also have to bear the full costs of these contributions. At the 
NHIF, frequent media reports of corruption and misuse of funds discourages future 
compliance from employers as well as members from the informal sector who have 
voluntarily enrolled (Nation Media Online, 2013). Furthermore, the history of contributions 
to the NHIF is marked by inequities in which the lowest income earners pay the highest 
percentage of their income to the NHIF. Below is an analysis of various contribution rates by 
formal sector workers:  
 
(i) Contribution rates since inception:  
All formal sector workers earning between KSh 1,000 (USD 11.5) to 15,000 (USD 172.4) 
contribute a standard 2.0% of their salary, which in absolute figures range from KSh 30 (USD 
0.34) for the lowest income earner, to a maximum of KSh 320 (USD 3.7) for the highest 
earner per month. Beyond KSh 15,000, contributions decline below 2.0% of the salary, 
meaning that the lowest paid worker contributed 2.0% of their gross income whereas 
anyone earning KSh 1.0 million (US$ 11,494.3) contributed only 0.032% per month (Figure 
2.9) (KSh 86.5 to US$1.00 for 2013).  
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(ii) Consultant proposed rates  
The proposed rates by Deloitte Consulting Limited (2011) were never implemented but as 
presented in Figure 2.10 would have perpetuated inequities in contributions. For instance, 
the lowest paid formal sector workers in the KSh 1,000 to 5,999 salary cluster would be 
expected to contribute 15% of gross income for those earning KSh 1000 and graduated 
downwards to 2.5% of gross pay for those earning KSh 5999. On the other hand, those 
earning from KSh 100,000 to 1.0 million would contribute 2% of gross pay for those earning 
KSh 100,000 and 0.2% for those earning KSh 1.0 million.  
 
 
 
 
 
(iii) Proposed universal coverage rates 
Figure 2.11 presents an analysis of revised rates currently under discussion for 
implementation in the proposed UHC system. Using these rates, monthly contributions for 
each formal sector worker ranges from KSh 150 for the lowest paid worker earning less than 
KSh 6,000.00, to KSh 1,700 for workers earning KSh 100,000.00 and beyond. The 
contributions are capped at KSh 100,000.00 gross pay which further exacerbates the 
inequities.  These inequities are not only seen between income categories but also within 
income categories.  Across income categories, the lowest paid worker would contribute 
5.0% of their gross salaries per month, while the workers earning KSh 1.0 million would 
contribute only 0.17% of their gross pay.  Within income categories, using the example of 
the second lowest income category, those earning KSh 6,000 would contribute 5% of their 
salary, while those earning KSh7,999 would contribute less than 4% of their salary. 
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Data sources: MOH report on universal coverage (2012), NHIF website 
 
The average monthly salary for formal sector workers in Kenya is KSh 44,125 (KSh 46,793 for 
the public sector and KSh 42,457 for the private sector). This means that on average, formal 
sector workers contribute 2.4% (or KSh 1,000) of gross pay to the NHIF every month 
  
The current and proposed future NHIF contribution rates are not equitable and hence, 
should be avoided in the design of a future prepayment system. A proposed a road-map for 
universal coverage through social health insurance scheme unfortunately does not address 
these inequities in contributions  – on the contrary, it  appears to perpetuate them as shown 
in the analysis above (item iii). The MOH (2010) notes that the health system generally is 
characterised by inequities stemming from high reliance on OOP spending, poor pooling and 
lack of development of health insurance schemes, low levels of government spending and 
curative and urban bias of health services.  
 
(b) Pooling  
Whereas mandatory prepayment funding is essential for universal health coverage, the 
manner in which the prepaid funds are pooled is critical for achieving the goal of equitable 
access to health services with financial protection. The word ‘pooling’ in this context refers 
to the accumulation of prepaid funds on behalf of a section of or an entire population in a 
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country (Kutzin, 2001). Pooling enables sharing of health care costs among members of the 
same pool, where the healthy members cross-subsidise the health care needs of members 
with various health challenges. McIntyre and Kutzin (2014) explain that pooling aims to 
exploit the redistributive capacity of prepaid funds and that the redistributive potential is 
best achieved through large risk pools. 
  
Risk pooling in Kenya is characterised by fragmentation. There are three main categories of 
public risk pooling systems, namely- tax-funded services for the entire population; the 
National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF), which covers about 17 % of the population, and 
donor funds. The NHIF covers primary contributors largely from the formal sector including 
their dependants. Private risk pools are limited and currently cover about 2.0 % of the total 
population distributed as follows:  private-for-profit schemes at 1.61 %; community-based 
health insurance schemes (CBHI) at 0.22 %; and others such as coffee and tea cooperatives 
at 0.17 %. In total, about 19 % of Kenyans are members of an insurance scheme (Ministry of 
Health, 2014b).  
  
Mandatory prepaid funds from domestic revenues are very limited (less than 30% of THE). 
McIntyre (2012) states that universal coverage systems tend to have a minimum of 60% to 
70% of the total expenditure funded through mandatory prepayment mechanisms. This 
indicates the extent of public funding that the Kenyan system needs to accomplish to 
achieve universal health coverage. However, the current tax-funded pool is over-stretched 
and inadequate and as such does not guarantee access to services and financial protection 
to the population. Furthermore, portions of the pool are reserved for special services such 
as primary care, maternal and child health (Health Policy Project, 2013).  
 
While these special pools may target the poor and vulnerable members of the society, there 
is the risk that other health services may not be accessible because of the tendency to 
concentrate funding on specific areas or population groups. Although both public risk pools 
(tax funds and the NHIF) show no socioeconomic disparities in coverage, the NHIF tends to 
cover different population groups, mainly found in the formal sector. All formal sector 
workers must contribute to the NHIF, whereas contribution is voluntary for workers in the 
informal sector. However, the voluntary nature of contribution within the informal sector 
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may expose the NHIF to adverse selection where households more at risk join the scheme. 
Ultimately, this may jeopardise the long-term sustainability of the fund. Moreover, 
households who cannot afford the premiums are denied access to quality health services 
and financial protection. Furthermore, within the NHIF, a separately managed and more 
comprehensive pool exists for civil servants and members of the armed forces  (NHIF, 2015). 
Generally, fragmented risk pools severely limit cross-subsidisation and equitable access to 
care on the basis of need.  
  
There is no competition between the tax-funded pool and the NHIF largely because most 
payments into these pools are legal requirements. The tax-funded pool serves the entire 
population while the NHIF receives compulsory contributions from formal sector workers. 
The two pools therefore do not compete for members and so have no incentive to improve 
the quality of services to attract and retain more members.  
  
Donor funds are not pooled and come from different sources. Up to 90% of total donor 
funds target disease-specific programmes such as the control of HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria 
with separate reporting structures (Ministry of Health, 2010). However, these funds (both 
local and external)  that are meant for primary care services under the direct facility grants 
are pooled on their own; that is, separately from other public funded pools and with 
different reporting structures.  The concentration of large sums of funds on a few health 
services is not recommended because of the need to fund other equally important services. 
A further challenge of having separate donor-funded pools is that donor programmes often 
take skilled workers from the MOH, which disrupts efficient service delivery.  
  
Ultimately, the extent of fragmentation within the public sector risk pools is unsupportive of 
the UHC goals. Furthermore, the numerous layers of administration lead to inefficiency both 
in cost and the delivery of services. On the other hand, the extent of pooling through private 
prepaid plans remains very limited. The bulk of private expenditure on health is not pooled 
– rather, it is drawn from households through out-of-pocket payments (OOP) (Ministry of 
Health, 2010, World Bank, 2013b). Such payments further fragment and reduce the access 
to services and financial protection within the health system. 
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(c) Purchasing 
There are multiple purchasers in the Kenyan health system. They include: the central 
government through the MOH; county governments through their respective health 
departments; the NHIF; CBHIs; employers; and private-for-profit schemes. Services are also 
directly purchased out-of-pocket by individual households. This diverse group of purchasers 
serves different population groups, with the exception of the MOH, which serves the entire 
population. Private-for-profit schemes serve the formal sector under employer-sponsored 
group schemes and wealthy individuals who purchase own schemes. The private-for-profit 
schemes therefore tend to have market competition which could apply pressure for 
efficiency in these schemes. However, the tendency to limit coverage according to the 
ability to pay may force private-for-profit schemes to shift costs to public prepaid systems 
such as the NHIF and central government, especially for patients with chronic illnesses. 
Although cost-shifting is a public sector health problem, it is generally not widespread 
(Frakt, 2010).  
  
The benefits package offered are diverse; those relying on services funded through 
government revenues are all entitled to the same benefits at government facilities, 
irrespective of the fact that government funding is inadequate to offer comprehensive 
health services. Hence, individuals who do not have other forms of coverage have to pay 
out-of-pocket to get the services they need that are not available in government facilities. 
Conversely, the NHIF has a comprehensive inpatient benefits package in public facilities  but 
no outpatient services, although civil servants have comprehensive outpatient and inpatient 
services in both public and private facilities. Private-for-profit insurance schemes may 
therefore offer standard group benefit packages particularly to employee schemes or 
individual packages, depending on a member’s ability to pay. 
  
There is scant evidence of active purchasing in Kenya. County governments are not only the 
largest purchasers but are also the largest service providers. For a considerable period of 
time, the Central government’s funding for the health sector has had a curative bias, even 
though the disease burden lies among preventable infectious diseases (see Figure 2.12, 
(WHO, 2011a)). It remains unclear how these services are aligned to the health needs of the 
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population. This is because there are no reports from purchasers that would serve to update 
the epidemiological patterns and services purchased. However, since 2010, national 
government funding for preventive services has been on the rise. It is not yet clear whether 
the county governments will replicate the national government’s funding for preventive 
services. In reality, the overall direction of health policy should be targeted towards 
preventive and promotive services because a very large percentage of the population is 
youthful. Moreover, the burden of preventable, non-communicable diseases (also referred 
to as ‘lifestyle diseases’) is rapidly increasing. 
 
 
Source:(WHO, 2011d)  
 
Before devolution of health services, the practice was for service providers receiving 
government funds to be allocated a budget through the MOH to pay salaries and other 
costs. However, in the current devolved structure of governance, there has been no 
incentive to improve performance and thus, public services continue to offer relatively poor 
quality services. It is still not clear whether the county governments will eventually adopt 
similar or different purchasing strategies. However, to date, the County governments largely 
rely on budgetary allocation from the National government to pay for services using a 
structure relatively similar to the National government’s system. On the other hand, the 
NHIF uses a mix of fee-for-service and capitation to pay accredited providers. However, high 
cost private providers are reimbursed a standard rate for bed occupancy only (NHIF, 2015).  
  
(d) Provision 
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Figure 2.12: Burden of disease, Kenya and Africa (WHO, 2009)
Source: WHO, (Atlas of Health Statistics 2011)
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Provision of health services is largely in the public domain which is important in controlling 
costs as it is non-profit making. The public sector accounts for about half of all health 
facilities and also provides approximately 60% of inpatient and outpatient services (Ministry 
of Health, 2010). The health worker density is 7.6 health workers per 10000. The ratio of 
doctors and nurses vis-à-vis the population translates to 1: 15000 and 1: 2000, respectively. 
This falls short of the WHO recommended ratios of 1: 600 for doctors and 1: 300 – 500 for 
nurses (Ministry of Health, 2014a).  
  
The distribution of facilities and health personnel is skewed in favour of certain regions (see 
Figure 2.13). Whereas Nairobi has fewer facilities relative to its population size, it has more 
than half of all of the physicians in the country. Meanwhile, more than 50% of all health 
personnel and 80 % of doctors work in urban areas, where only 32% of the population 
reside (WHO, 2009a).  
 
 
Source: (Ministry of Medical Services, 2012, Ministry of Health, 2010) 
 
From this analysis of health financing functions, it is clear that certain areas need 
improvement. Admittedly, revenue collection through taxes has improved significantly over 
the years, which translates into better prospects for an increase in health sector funding. 
The informal sector provides potential for improving prepayment systems if the majority of 
the sector population can be involved in the prepayment mechanisms. It has been 
previously observed that pooling mechanisms are weak due to fragmentation, under-
funding and lack of involvement of the informal sector. Purchasing could be made more 
active with regular updates on services and disease patterns aligned to the general 
population’s health needs. This can be done with health services and a mix of provider 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Central Coast Eastern Nairobi North
Eastern
Nyanza Rift
Valley
Western
% of total facilities % of total population
Figure 2.13: Distribution of health facilities by region and population
P
e
rc
e
n
t
  41 
 
payment mechanisms. However, an analysis of the health system performance would be 
incomplete without looking at the trends in health financing and expenditure because this is 
important in understanding the level of commitment of the government in achieving the 
objectives of universal coverage. It also reveals the extent of vulnerability of the health 
system to external shocks and donor behaviour. 
 
2.5.3.3 An overview of the stated policy in terms of future financing mechanisms  
The constitution stipulates that every Kenyan has a right to quality health care. This is a right 
which could be facilitated through the implementation of a universal health system. The 
current policy direction proposes a contributory financing model to achieve universal 
coverage. The design of the future contributory system remains unclear but policy 
discussions are underway and preliminary proposals suggest risk pools for every county. This 
would create 47 or more public risk pools countrywide. Such a design would further 
fragment the health system. Moreover, some counties are financially and economically 
challenged and hence, would mean that they would not be able to provide adequate 
financial protection and access to services for their residents. Other sources indicate that a 
central pool could be created, where services would be purchased through an agency under 
the Central government although provision will largely be under county health facilities  
(KPMG, 2014). 
   
Regardless of the design of the contributory scheme, the formal and informal sectors will be 
expected to contribute premiums while the indigent will be fully subsidised by the 
government through tax funds. Within a contributory system, the presence of a large and 
unorganised informal sector may pose some problems in expanding coverage. Even though 
the law currently makes it mandatory for workers in the formal sector to contribute, 
enforcement of such a requirement for the informal sector would be very difficult. McIntyre 
and Kutzin (2014) observe that the failure to enforce mandatory prepayment in sections of 
the population increases the chances of adverse selection since only high-risk groups and 
those who can afford may enrol in the schemes. Enrolment of high-risk groups is likely to 
increase costs which ultimately have a bearing on the long-term sustainability of a 
contributory system. Moreover, those unable to afford to contribute are left out of 
coverage, meaning that large sections of the population would be unable to access quality 
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and affordable health services.  Although it appears that membership for the poor would be 
fully subsidised, this relies on having effective mechanisms for identifying the poor. 
  
The option of a non-contributory financing model (in this case funding from government 
revenues) has not received serious attention in the current debates about universal health 
coverage in Kenya. Generally, government funding has been inadequate and the KSh 95 
billion allocated to the health sector in the 2013/2014 budget was far short of the KSh 217 
billion recommended by the Ministry of Health (2012) task force report. With such serious 
shortfalls in funding from the Government, the challenge for County governments would be 
firstly, how to identify the health goals to prioritise and secondly, how to sustainably finance 
these goals and to ensure that resources are targeted at population health needs 
(Bourbonnais, 2013). 
 
Conclusion 
Despite documented reforms to improve access to services and financial protection, prepaid 
systems in Kenya remain weak and fragmented. The main domestic prepayment system is 
funding from general government revenues. Overall, public pooling is fragmented with 
general revenues, NHIF contributions and donor funding all existing in separate pools . The 
current challenge is how to bring together all public pools such as the NHIF, tax funding and 
donor funds, into one or two pools to maximise the redistribution potential of a large risk 
pool. Although the current policy direction strongly considers a contributory system in the 
mould of the NHIF, such a system would more often than not, perpetuate inequities in 
terms of financing because premium contributions tend to be flat-rated, and access to 
needed services is based on ability to pay. The policy focus on a contributory system as a 
means to UHC tends to leave out the option of tax-funded UHC even though the 
macroeconomic and fiscal indicators strongly show great potential for increased 
government spending overall and on health care in particular. Finally, it is unclear what role 
the County governments would play in a new prepayment system which would possibly 
present challenges of implementation since currently the counties have autonomy in the 
management of their respective health sectors.  
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CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW  
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter did not involve a formal systematic review of literature – rather, a 
comprehensive review was conducted with the aim of providing insights into key concepts 
and health financing for the UHC in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).  The first 
stage of the review involved a clarification of concepts such as the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ 
sectors; ‘universalism’ and ‘universal coverage’, ‘access to health services’ and ‘financial 
protection.’ The second stage involved applying Kutzin’s health financing functions 
framework (Kutzin, 2001) to compare and contrast the international experiences in UHC 
with a focus on LMIC generally. This was then followed by a summary of selected country 
experiences and the key lessons learnt in their progress towards universal coverage. Case 
studies were selected from countries in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa on the basis of the size 
of the informal sector population in the sampled countries as well as high population 
coverage and income levels.   
 
The literature review was conducted through electronic search engines and academic data-
bases including Google Scholar and PubMed, Cochrane Library, DARE (Database of abstracts 
of reviews of effects) and SCOPUS. These sources were critical in providing peer-reviewed 
journals and reports relevant to the definitions of the key concepts and analysis of  health 
financing in LMICs. Data-bases of global institutions such as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) were also searched for data required for analyses of 
trends in macroeconomic and fiscal factors as well as trends in health expenditure and 
informal sector populations. 
 
The following words and phrases were considered significant during the electronic search 
for relevant information, namely: 
 Universal, universalism + health 
 Informal economy (informal sector) + health,  
 Financial protection + health,  
 Access + health,  
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 Universal coverage (+country),  
 Health expenditure, fiscal indicators (+country),  
 Macroeconomic indicators (+country).  
All literature was screened for relevance in line with the study’s research objectives and the 
concepts considered relevant to this investigation.  
 
3.2 Some key concepts and definitions in the study 
 
3.2.1 Informality and informal sector 
In terms of the nature of employment, the terms ‘informality’ and ‘informal sector’ are 
closely related concepts. The concept of an ‘informal sector’ was introduced by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1972 in its first mission to study the informal 
economy in Kenya. Internationally, the informal sector has numerous references such as: 
‘shadow’ or ‘parallel economy’, and ‘unregulated economy’. The varied definitions and 
descriptions of the informal sector are usually determined by a specific country’s context. 
The 15th International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) drew three distinctive 
features of what would constitute an informal sector, namely: non-registration of 
enterprises (in terms of national legislation); small size (meaning few employees); and non-
registered employees. This classification implies economic activities that are unprotected by 
employment or company policy, government regulations or trade union action. What 
remains unclear is the number of employees considered to be “few.” According to van 
Rooyen and Antonites (2007), the informal sector can be considered from two main 
perspectives. Firstly, it could be a coping strategy (survival activities) and secondly, as an 
unofficial earning strategy. As a coping strategy, the informal sector involves casual jobs, 
temporary jobs, unpaid jobs, subsistence agriculture and multiple job holding. Unofficial 
earning strategies may include illegal business activities, and underground practices, some 
of which are criminal. However, most of the literature does not regard the ‘criminal 
economy’ as being part of the informal sector. There is some level of consensus in the 
literature that the informal sector is made up of legal entities. 
 
Sethuraman (1998) describes the informal sector as a small scale unit involved in the 
production and circulation of goods and services whose main aim is job creation rather than 
maximizing profits. This definition may not be entirely accurate when compared to findings 
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by Nyerere (2009) who states that some informal sector workers are actually involved in 
profit maximization, particularly those who are in the sector by preference, irrespective of 
whether or not they are able to join the formal sector. In view of the ILO guidelines on the 
definition of the informal sector, the definitions provided by van Rooyen and Antonites 
(2007) and Sethuraman (1998) are not considered to be useful to this investigation. 
  
In 2003, the 17th ICLS developed the following guidelines for defining informal employment 
and what would constitute the informal sector. It includes all types of employment in 
informal enterprises as well as in formal enterprises carried out by workers who are not 
protected by national labour laws. They also are not subject to income taxes, have no social 
protection or entitlement to certain employment benefits such as gratuity, notice of 
dismissal, severance pay and paid leave, among other factors (ILO, 2003).  
  
Bitran (2014) argues that the terms ‘informality’ and ‘informal economy’ are synonymous 
but do not necessarily refer to the informal sector. In his argument, an informal economy 
(informality) involves informal employment in three areas, namely: the informal sector, 
formal sector and domestic work. His interpretation is that the informal sector is a section 
of the informal economy and involves non-agricultural employment only (see Figure 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1: Formal and informal employment (Source: Bitran, 2014) 
 
 
Other sources garnered from the relevant literature such as the ILO (2003) and van Rooyen 
and Antonites (2007), give guidelines for the definition of the informal sector and propose 
that the terms ‘informal sector’ and ‘informal economy’ are synonymous. A significant gap 
  46 
 
in Bitran’s definition of the informal sector is that it excludes subsistence agriculture and 
also seems to draw a distinction between ‘informal economy’ and ‘informal sector’ of the 
economy, which should not be the case. 
 
The position adopted in this study is that the terms ‘informal economy’ and ‘informal sector’ 
are synonymous. However, ‘informality’, as a general term, refers to the informal state of 
work – irrespective of whether it exists in the informal or formal economy. According to 
McIntyre (2007)  the informal sector is “…the unofficial sector of the economy, in which 
income and the means used to obtain it are unregulated, and which coexists within a legal 
and social environment where similar income-producing activities are regulated” (Pg 1). This 
is a more comprehensive definition which gives the idea of a parallel economy that is 
socially and legally acceptable. Figure 3.2 is a graphic display of different types of economy 
and forms of employment. Although not explicitly referred to in the diagram, subsistence 
agriculture is regarded as a significant part of the informal sector (included in the ‘own 
account’ component). This investigation focuses on the informal sector but excludes  the 
criminal economy and informal employment in the formal sector4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
4 Informal employment in the formal sector means that within registered companies in the formal economy, 
there are people who are informally employed; i.e. not protected by existing labour laws.  
Figure 3.2: A graphical distinction of the informal sector (economy) from other sectors of the economy 
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3.2.1.1 Global distribution of the informal sector 
Figure 3.3 presents an estimate of the size of the informal sector across different regions of 
the world. It demonstrates that on the whole, developing countries have the largest 
proportion of the informal sector economy (approximately 64 % of the total amount). The 
largest share of informal sector employment as a percentage of total employment in each 
region is found in Southern Asia (with 79 %) and Sub-Saharan Africa (with 76 %). South 
Eastern Asia and the Oceania are other regions with a high presence of the informal sector 
as a share of the total regional employment.  
 
 
Source: ILO & WTO (2009) 
 
The ILO & WTO (2009) indicate that generally, there has been a regional and global decline 
in the informal sector as reflected in Figure 3.3. However, other comprehensive studies 
including one conducted by Charmes (2012) conclude that the exact trend in changes in the 
size of the informal sector for each country is difficult to assess because few countries 
consistently provide estimates of the size of the informal sector. However, on the whole, 
informality has consistently increased in the majority of developing countries. Charmes 
(2012) equates economic growth with a declining informal sector. Nevertheless, despite 
Sub-Saharan Africa registering the highest economic growth rate of 4.6 % relative to other 
regions in the past few years, there is no indication of declining informality. This trend 
excludes a few countries which have experienced a decline in informal sector growth. They 
include Tanzania, South Africa and Mali (Charmes, 2012). In the developed world, Schmid 
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(2010) and Rani (2008) report that, as a share of all employment, non-standard work 
(temporary, part-time and self-employment) depicting the informal sector, has risen 
significantly in the recent past. This is linked to changes in the structure of employment and 
the labour market under the influence of globalisation.  
  
With reference to the non-agricultural informal sector, Chen (2005) and Ncube (2013) 
estimate that Sub-Saharan Africa has the largest presence, which ranges from 72 % to 80 % 
of the total region-specific labour force. This is followed by Asia (65 %), Latin America (51 %) 
and North Africa (48 %). Such widespread informal employment is generally an indicator of 
low-income and poverty. Moreover, the frequent overlap between informality and poverty 
results from the fact that most informal workers lack a secure income, employment benefits 
and social protection (Ncube, 2013). In addition, countries with decreasing informality also 
experience decreases in the number of workers living in poverty and vice versa. Hence, the 
informal sector remains an important source of income for the majority of populations in 
developing countries and significantly contributes to the GDP of these regions. For example, 
in Sub-Saharan Africa the informal sector contributes about 55 % of the GDP (Ncube, 2013) 
with Asia registering 31 %; Latin America at 29 % and North Africa  at 27 % of the total GDP 
respectively (Chen, 2005). 
3.2.2 Universalism (Universality)  
 
The terms ‘universalism’ or ‘universality’ refer to the state of being universal. Universalism is 
a concept that embodies ‘homogeneity’ (in anything including entitlements and claims) and 
supports redistribution of specifically defined resources equitably for all (Hernandez, 2002). 
A significant number of researchers in the field of social policy such as Anttonen and Sipilä 
(2011), Stuckler et al. (2010), Kuivalainen and Niemelä (2008) and Kristensen (2007) 
perceive universalism as a purely political decision to provide broad social benefits for all 
through a mix of public and private institutions in an effort to protect people from poverty 
and other forms of social exclusion. This requires that programmes should be funded mainly 
by national governments and a centrally managed pool of funds to ensure equitable 
distribution of resources. In this sense, the aim of universalism is to create conditions where 
those with particular deficiencies (socioeconomic, physical or otherwise) have the same 
opportunity to benefit from any form of provisions as those without these deficiencies.  
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Universalism has also been defined as a class struggle by researchers such as Anttonen and 
Sipilä (2005) and Hernandez (2002) who highlight the difficulty of achieving universal social 
provision because of its redistributive effects. This occurs  when those with more resources 
are unwilling to give up a portion of their resources to benefit those who have limited or no 
resources at all.  Moreover, attempts at redistribution may spark tensions and resistance in 
sections of the population. Stuckler et al. (2010) view socioeconomic and cultural tensions 
as bottlenecks to creating social solidarity amongst different groups. Without social 
solidarity, it is difficult to implement policies that require popular support, particularly those 
that require certain resources from some groups to support others. 
 
From this position, even though universalism generally refers to something that is common 
to all, its application as far as funding and provision of social services is concerned, is not the 
same in all circumstances. When the concept is applied to social policies, different countries 
have different interpretations depending on the dominant political ideology, and sometimes 
even the level of income of the specific country plays a major role. The varied 
interpretations of universalism can be classified as either ‘residual universalism’ or 
‘institutional universalism.’  
 
3.2.2.1 Residual universalism 
Residual universalism requires that a state provides a minimum standard of services to 
those who are most in need; that is, after the breakdown of the traditional support 
structures of supply, the family and the market (Hernandez, 2002). Mishra (1981) identifies 
‘means-testing’ as a key distinguishing feature of a residual system to extend a limited range 
of benefits to those who qualify. Spicker (2005) regards a residual system as a ‘safety net’ 
for those without options. His position is that this system can be applied in two ways -firstly, 
through selectivity (negative residualism), which involves the provision of limited services to 
certain groups or individuals considered most in need and includes means -testing. The 
second method constitutes providing basic essential services to a large section of the 
population without means-testing or need-based assessment (positive residualism). Positive 
residualism sets a minimum standard below which people should not fall (Spicker, 2005). 
For instance, a country may opt to provide primary health care for everyone while tertiary 
care is based on the ability to pay.  
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Critics of residual universalism such as Mkandawire (2005), Sen (1999), Carrier and Kengdall 
(1998), Spicker (1998) and Hernandez (2002) conclude that residual systems question a 
society’s values and commitments to its members. They also create population hierarchies 
(dual societies) where those considered as ranking below the social scale are stigmatised 
because the selection criteria are based on poverty and need. The selection process is often 
intrusive, administratively inefficient and poses problems in terms of who should be 
included or excluded, more so in areas with large informal sector populations. 
Stigmatisation causes problems of access to services leading to under-utilisation of social 
programmes. However, other researchers such as Edwards and Batley (1978) and Carrier 
and Kendall (1998) consider negative residualism as necessary to deter undeserving 
applicants from accessing subsidised services. Furthermore, it could relieve public services 
of pressure by implicitly encouraging better off groups to seek alternative services. 
 
3.2.2.2 Institutional universalism  
Institutional universalism depicts social services as integral to the modern social 
environment. The state takes up the responsibility of ensuring the provision of social 
services to everyone by creating a financial and delivery context within which all members 
of the population are able to access the social services they need. It is strongly linked with 
the broad conceptualisation of universalism in the sense that it applies the s ame standards 
in social policy benefits to all. In so doing, it makes an effort to bridge social gaps. The focus 
of institutional universalism is the whole society without any means -testing. Moreover, 
services are provided outside of market forces. Hernandez (2002), Kristensen (2007), 
Kuivalainen and Niemelä (2008) observe that in institutional universalism, each state takes 
great responsibility in ensuring that all of its citizens benefit equitably from social services. 
According to McIntyre (2012) and Sachs (2012), institutional universalism brings about 
entitlement to services on the basis of citizenship. However, this entitlement requires a high 
level of collective responsibility to facilitate allocation and redistribution of resources to 
ensure equitable and efficient delivery of services of the same range and quality (van 
Oorschot, 1999, Spicker, 2005). The redistribution process would be more effective where 
social provisions are publicly funded through taxes or through mandatory premium 
contributions. This would ensure that benefits are based on need and payment is based on 
economic status.  
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The position adopted in this study is that countries should approach the provision of social 
services (including the provision of health care) from an institutional universalism 
perspective. Moreover, governments are expected to play a major role of providing partial 
or total subsidies to make health systems more equitable and efficient for all.  
3.2.3 Social solidarity 
Rusu (2012), from various sources identifies a number of conceptualisations of social 
solidarity including harmonious co-existence between different groups of people; sympathy 
for and commitment to other people, and empathy with a distressful condition affecting 
other people independent of their personal or social character. Because it involves empathy, 
sympathy and peaceful co-existence, the importance of social solidarity to UHC cannot be 
over-emphasised as it facilitates optimal income cross-subsidisation.  
Social solidarity can be measured through various construct validation methods. Abela 
(2004) for example, proposes a measurement model of social solidarity that is constructed 
on ten items that indicate the concern for the living conditions of different categories of 
people: immediate family, neighbours, people in same region, fellow countrymen, the 
elderly, sick and disabled people, unemployed, immigrants, Europeans and humankind. A 
five-point scale is used to code the answers ranging from 1 (very much) to 5 (not at all). 
Janmaat and Braun (2009) select two items that measure the importance of what a society 
needs to do to be considered just: eliminating large income inequalities among people, and 
provision of basic needs for all including food, housing, clothing, education and health. 
These are measured on a five-point scale and analysed through a principal component 
analysis. 
 
A number of threats to social solidarity exist; for example, Goodhart (2004) suggests that 
ethnocultural diversity makes it difficult for citizens to regard fellow citizens of different 
ethnic, cultural or racial background as one and the same. Goudge et al. (2012) in a study of 
social solidarity in South Africa, report very low social solidarity in the richest quintile and 
generally in South Africa. About 60% of the study population would prepay for health care 
for self and family and only about 12% would prepay to support the larger population 
particularly where they are comparably worse-off. High levels of social solidarity is an 
important prerequisite to UHC. 
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3.2.4 Universal health coverage 
 
The phrase ‘Universal Health Coverage’ (UHC); ‘Universal Coverage’ (UC) or ‘Universal 
Health Care’, are often used interchangeably. Savedoff et al. (2012) trace the origins of 
universal health coverage to western European countries such as Germany, Britain, France 
and Sweden, which have a history of providing a set of basic health care services to their 
citizens. In recognition of the fact that access to necessary health services was a right for all 
citizens, the governments of these European countries pro-actively raised funds through 
taxation and sometimes mandatory contributions to health insurance schemes. However, 
the practice of health insurance schemes originated with the administration of Otto von 
Bismarck when it established the first scheme in 1883 for the labour class to ensure optimal 
performance of the economy in a bid to safeguard the economic interests of the ruling class 
(Hernandez, 2002).  
  
In more recent times, UHC was brought to global attention during the World Health 
Assembly in 2005 where member states resolved to: “…plan the transition to universal 
coverage of their citizens so as to contribute to meeting the needs of the population for 
health care and improving its quality, to reducing poverty, to attaining internationally 
agreed development goals….” (P.30). Since then, UHC has been a high priority in the global 
health policy agenda. The WHO (2010b) World Health Report was entirely devoted to 
financing for universal coverage. The WHO (2010b) observes that for a country to have 
attained UHC, the whole population should have access to needed health services without 
the risk of financial hardship. 
  
A widely accepted definition of UHC is that it is a public health concept that involves 
prepayment funding arrangements for health care that offer financial protection and access 
to health services for all whenever the need arises (Rodin and de Ferranti, 2012, WHO, 
2010b, Lagomarsino et al., 2012). In addition, the services should be of sufficient quality to 
be effective. Sachs (2012) and McIntyre (2012) interpret UHC as an entitlement to financial 
protection and access to health services for all, meaning that all have the right to demand 
services of sufficient quality when they need them. Since the UHC funds are prepaid and 
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pooled, this financial arrangement is perceived to be fair and efficient across all population 
groups (Latko et al., 2011).  
  
In summary, UHC is a concept that typifies an integrated prepaid health system where all 
citizens of a country are entitled to protection from adverse health care costs. They also 
have access to a comparable range of health services of sufficient quality to be effective in 
addressing their needs. Stated differently, it refers to a health financing arrangement that 
guarantees both poor and rich alike, financial protection and equitable access to hea lth 
services of satisfactory quality whenever the need arises. The two elements of UHC include 
financial protection and access to health services. 
 
3.2.5 Financial protection  
 
Health-related financial protection refers to protection from the risks associated with the 
costs of using health care. There are risks related to medical costs paid out-of-pocket (OOP), 
which can lead to catastrophic expenditures and impoverishment within a household. van 
Doorslaer et al. (2005) define catastrophic medical costs as those that consume a large 
share of the household budget thereby forcing households to divert resources meant for 
other needs such as education and food into health care. Impoverishment occurs whenever 
medical OOP spending lowers households’ living standards and/or force them below the 
poverty line (Wagstaff et al., 2011).  
  
The ILO (2010) states that effective UHC aims at providing financial risk protection. . This 
means that a health system is only as good as it eliminates impoverishment and 
catastrophic health care costs, among other social problems associated with OOP payments. 
There is global consensus that effective financial protection for all can be achieved through 
mandatory prepayment financing mechanisms.   
 
3.2.6 Access to needed health services 
Access to health services is an important element in UHC and has been widely debated in 
literature. McIntyre et al. (2009), Goddard and Smith (2001) and Oliver and Mossialos (2004) 
define access as empowerment in the use of health services. Such empowerment involves 
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information as well as the interaction of health system factors on one hand, and individuals 
and communities on the other, to ensure that people get the services that are necessary 
and relevant to their health needs. The range of services includes promotive, preventive, 
curative and rehabilitative care. These services ought to be provided in the most 
comprehensive way possible and be of sufficient quality to be effective. Effective coverage 
according to the ILO (2010), can be measured in a number of ways; for example, by the 
number of people making contributions to a health insurance scheme; the number of 
people benefiting from a health scheme or some kind of income support.   
  
The concept of access to services is multi-dimensional in nature. According to McIntyre et 
al., (2009) and  Thiede et al. (2007) services need to be culturally-sensitive and of acceptable 
quality. Moreover, they need to be affordable, and available in terms of health facilities, 
personnel and drugs, among other factors. All these dimensions need to be taken into 
consideration as countries move towards UHC. The concept of ‘access’ is heavily linked to 
the delivery of health services. Effective delivery of services depends on the pooling and 
purchasing arrangements in place in a country. Large risk pools purchase more health 
services for a large number of people to equitably obtain services of sufficient quality.  
3.3 Moving forward 
Universal coverage is a long-term goal, which countries need to persistently strive to 
achieve. There is no single formula for achieving UHC and countries at varying levels of 
income are encouraged to adopt home-grown strategies in developing their health systems 
for UHC. Whatever approach a country chooses, three critical areas need to be addressed in 
expanding or maintaining coverage (Hyoung-Sun, 2010, WHO, 2010b, ILO, 2010). Figure 3.4 
presents the core areas that countries need to consider as they move towards UHC. 
Developing each of these areas involves choices and trade-offs. Moreover, policy-makers 
must decide how funds are to be raised, pooled and utilised efficiently to benefit all 
members of the population by providing quality health services and cost coverage. 
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The task involves reducing OOP payments through improved prepayment funding, 
comprehensive provision of necessary services while containing costs and extending 
coverage to the entire population. Trade-offs are inevitable as policymakers need to balance 
scarce funds with rising medical costs; competing health needs; changing epidemiological 
patterns (especially the growth of non-communicable diseases); and new technologies to 
improve care. Cumulatively, a country has to make decisions on the following: (i) the 
proportion of the population to cover; (ii) the range and amount of services to offer; and (iii) 
the proportion of the total costs to be met from prepaid funding. In explaining ‘the box’, the 
WHO (2010b) states that the shaded area in Figure 3.4 (current pooled funds) is the level of 
coverage in an imaginary country where about half of the population has coverage for about 
half of the needed services, in the context of pooled funds being too low to be able to avail 
a comprehensive benefits package. Moving to UHC would require this country to develop 
strategies on how to provide coverage to more people, while at the same time, making 
more services available. This will require additional financial resources. 
  
Trade-offs are necessary because no country could possibly achieve the goal of providing 
health care to all members of its population, avail all medical services required, 
comprehensively cover all costs, and have no waiting lists. However, services available to 
the population should be as comprehensive as costs may allow (WHO, 2010b). In reality, 
filling the box would imply that all citizens in a country have access to all necess ary services 
Figure 3.4: Coverage dimensions 
Figure 3.1: Dimensions to consider when moving towards universal health care 
Source: WHO World Health Report, 2010 
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and everyone is protected from paying out-of-pocket whenever they seek health services 
that are covered. In a way, certain expensive procedures may be funded from alternative 
sources outside of pooled funds. 
  
Approaches to ‘fill the box’ vary. For instance, countries with lower poverty levels and a 
small informal sector may attempt to reach UHC by targeting the few that are currently 
excluded. Countries with small formal sectors and large numbers of poor and informal 
sector populations may target the formal sector with coverage and move gradually to 
covering the rest of the population. This is not a straightforward process and thus caution 
needs to be taken to avoid creating a dual system that could lead to stigmatisation of 
services for those in the lower social scale.  
  
The efforts to achieve UHC in many countries face various challenges including lack of 
sustained commitment especially by political leadership, unclear roadmap to UHC, large 
populations especially in the informal sector that lack financial risk protection 
arrangements, and weak health systems that cannot provide needed health services and 
health information systems to monitor progress in UHC (Siddiqi, 2013). In countries with 
large informal sector populations, prospects for achieving UHC are weakened by ineffective 
legal institutions that fail to translate legal coverage into effective coverage (ILO, 2010). The 
challenge of obtaining financing support from informal sector populations has been 
discussed. To effectively inform policy on coverage for the informal sector, it is necessary to 
first compare the systems put in place by the global community in their efforts towards 
achieving UHC. This includes an examination of how various population groups including the 
informal sector have been covered, and also, reviewing country cases with large informal 
sector populations that have achieved or have made significant steps to achieving universal 
health coverage, to understand the financing arrangements and reforms that have made it 
possible to cover this critical section of the population.  
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3.4 Overview of international experiences in universal health coverage 
3.4.1 Introduction 
 
Mandatory prepayment is the best alternative financing mechanism for universal health 
coverage. McIntyre’s analysis of health financing in high- and middle-income countries that 
have progressed to universal coverage shows that a minimum of 60 – 70 % of the total 
health expenditure in these countries comes from mandatory prepayment sources 
(McIntyre, 2012). The WHO (2010b) declares that no significant progress to UHC can be 
made through voluntary prepaid health care. Many developing countries encounter 
challenges in extending coverage to entire populations because they not only have scarce 
financial resources but also problems of organising large informal sector populations to 
prepay for health care. The most affected regions are located in Africa and South East Asia. 
Figure 3.4 demonstrates that these regions record the lowest health expenditure relative to 
population size, which is an indication of problems in cost and population coverage.  
  
 
Source: (WHO, 2012a) 
 
Coverage for informal sector populations in many LMICs would make an important 
contribution towards achieving UHC and a number of these countries have initiated policies 
to extend coverage to the informal sector. Using the Kutzin framework, this review made 
efforts to understand the arrangements of funding health care that specific countries have 
used to cover the informal sector and make progress towards UHC. The review did not 
include Eastern European countries because, as Jenkner et al. (2012) noted, these 
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economies already have high health expenditures and near universal health systems. Hence, 
their main challenge is efficiency of spending to improve health outcomes and quality of 
services. The review focuses on the use of domestic funds because of their sustainability 
and reliability besides the need for governments to increase funding for the health sector to 
realise UHC. 
 
3.4.2 Revenue collection 
 
The main sources of revenue for health systems are tax revenue, mandatory social health 
insurance contributions, voluntary private insurance or a mixed system. Figure 3.5 shows 
the main financing sources for regional health systems across the world. Public sources 
include government revenue, social security contributions and external resources. 
 
 
Source: (WHO, 2012a)- WHO Global health expenditure atlas 
 
External sources of funding for healthcare are very limited across all the regions although 
Africa has the highest at 10% of THE coming from such sources. Other regions such as South 
East Asia and Eastern Mediterranean have less than 2.0% and the rest have between 0.1% 
and 0.2%. The European and Western Pacific regions are dominated by a combination of 
domestic mandatory prepaid funding (general government revenue and social health 
insurance schemes) comprising about 75 % and 64 % of the total health expenditure 
respectively. The high amounts of domestic mandatory sources of funding have seen many 
countries in these regions achieve universal coverage. Mandatory prepayment sources are 
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important for sustainable financial protection and access to services. On the other hand, 
health systems in the African, South East Asian and Eastern Mediterranean regions are 
predominantly funded through out-of-pocket payments and government tax revenue. These 
are the regions with the highest number of low-income countries, which according to the 
World Health Report (WHO, 2010b), also have the lowest domestic funding for the health 
sector. High incidence of OOP payments in these regions make the health systems even 
more fragile and unsustainable and expose many households to financial catastrophe and 
impoverishment.  
  
Many countries are reforming their health systems with the broader objective of UHC and a 
number of LMIC in Africa, Asia and Latin America have made significant efforts to expand 
coverage to all population groups. Some of these countries  have made serious efforts to 
move towards universal coverage including Thailand, Sri Lanka, Mongolia and Philippines in 
Asia; Rwanda, Gabon, Ghana and Gambia in Africa, and Costa Rica, Cuba, Argentina and 
Chile in Latin America. As shown in Table 3.1, these countries have varying levels of 
investment in the health sector with Rwanda spending the least at USD 63 per capita per 
annum while Costa Rica has the highest at USD 943 per capita. The difference in per capita 
expenditure is partly because of different epidemiological profiles between the two 
countries and the fact that Rwanda is a low-income country providing comprehensive 
primary care coverage for its population and Costa Rica an upper-middle-income country 
providing comprehensive primary and tertiary services. 
  
Between funding from tax revenues and  SHI, countries adopting the latter approach usually 
have phased approaches to coverage and is associated with formalisation of labour 
(Charmes, 2012), where revenue collection is made cheaper through payroll deductions. On 
the other hand, countries such as Costa Rica and South Korea that successfully funded 
coverage for the informal sector through SHIs did it in phases with the informal sector 
coming last (Gattini and Ruiz, 2012, Kwon, 2012). These countries also have comparably 
limited informal employment that is easy to target and hence, coverage laws can be 
enforced among workers. This is the case in Costa Rica where the government contributes 
substantially on behalf of informal sector workers who cannot afford to pay premiums rates.    
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Data sources: (WHO, 2011b, WHO, 2012a, Population Reference Bureau, 2010, ILO, 2012b, Government of Kenya, 2010b, Government of Rwanda, 2009, Osei-Boateng and 
Ampratwum, 2011)
Table 3.1: Revenue sources for universal coverage in selected low- and middle-income countries (%) 
 
 
 
Country 
Main financing 
sources for health 
system 
Main funding 
sources for the 
informal sector 
% Informal 
sector & 
(Subsistence 
Agriculture) 
Government 
Health 
Expenditure 
(GHE) as % GDP  
Public Expenditure 
on health % of 
Total Health 
Expenditure(THE) 
GHE % of 
Government 
budget 
OOP 
Expenditure 
as % of THE 
Private 
Expenditure 
% THE 
External 
funds % of 
THE 
Per capita 
health 
Exp. (US$) 
Ghana Government revenue 
(37%); NHIS (17%); 
NHIS (MOH) 20%; 
Donors (24%) 
Government 
revenue; NHIS 
 
42.3(80) 
 
4.8 
 
56.1 
 
11.9 
 
27 
 
44 
 
14 
 
75 
Rwanda Government revenue 
(19%), External 
sources (47%), 
Household OOP 
(21%), Private 
schemes (8.3%) & 
CBHIs  (4.7%). 
 
Donors, OOP 
payments, 
CBHIs  
 
40 (93) 
 
11 
 
56.7 
 
23.7 
 
21.4 
 
43 
 
47 
 
63 
Gabon Government revenue 
(39%); NHI (13%); 
Private funds (47%) 
Government 
revenue; OOP 
payments 
 
47.2 
3.2 53.4 6.6 46.6 46.6 1.0 358 
South 
Africa  
Government revenue 
(47.7%); private 
schemes (42.4%) 
Government 
revenue 
 
28 
 
4.1 
 
47.7 
 
10.5 
 
7.2 
 
53.3 
 
2.2 
 
649 
Sri  Lanka Government revenue; 
OOP payments 
Government 
revenue; OOP 
payments  
62.1 3.4 44.6 7.2 (45.7) 55 3.0 97 
Thailand 1. Payrol l deductions 
for SHI 
3. UC scheme (SHI 
and government 
revenue) 
Government 
revenue 
42.3 4.1 75.5 14.5 13.7 25 -- 202 
Mongolia Government revenue Government 
revenue; SHI 
17.9 5.3 57.3  (39.7) 43 5.0 161 
Phi l ippines Government revenue, 
OOP payments; SHI 
Government 
revenue; SHI 
schemes 
 
70.1 
 
4.1 
 
33.3 
 
8.5 
56  
67 
 
2.0 
 
97 
Costa  Rica SHI (57%); private 
expenditure (30%) 
SHI 26.3(43.8) 11 70.1 28 27.2 30 1.0 943 
Cuba  Government revenue Government 
revenue  
--- 10 94.7 14 5.3 5.3 -- 606 
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Argentina SHI (41%); private 
expenditure (39%) 
Government 
revenue; OOP 
payments  
 
49.7 
 
8.1 
 
60.6 
 
20.4 
 
24.7 
 
39 
 
-- 
 
891 
Venezuela Private expenditure 
(63%); SHI (11%) 
Government 
revenue; OOP 
payments 
47.5 5.2 36.7 7.2 57 63 -- 555 
Brazi l Private expenditure 
(54%); government 
revenue (19%) 
 
Tax revenue 
 
42.2 
 
8.9 
 
45.7 
 
8.7 
 
31.3 
 
54 
 
-- 
 
1121 
Kenya  Donors (39%); 
Government revenue 
(29%); OOP payments 
(24%); NHIF (4%) 
Tax revenue; 
Donor funds; 
OOP payments; 
Premium 
contributions 
 
34.5(83) 
 
4.5 
 
39.6 
 
5.7 
 
26.4 
 
60 
 
39 
 
36 
62 
 
Covering the informal sector through premium contributions in settings where the sector 
has the majority of the population comes with serious challenges associated with the sector. 
It is usually very difficult to estimate incomes in the sector. Moreover, incomes are generally 
low, and revenue collection from the sector is costly. This  makes it difficult to enforce health 
coverage to workers in the informal sector using contributory approaches.  
Tangcharoensathien et al. (2011) state that implementation of premium payment in the 
informal sector to achieve UHC is technically unrealistic. Countries such as Vietnam, 
Philippines, Ghana, Tanzania, Cambodia and Kenya that pursue contributory approaches to 
UHC have found it difficult to increase population coverage to the informal sector.  
 
It is not clear why some LMIC choose SHI as the path to UHC but historically, SHIs have been 
associated with formal employment. Tracing the history of Germany reveals that the 
country needed SHIs to protect factory workers among other workers to ensure undisrupted 
economic growth. However, in recent times, it could be a strategy to create fiscal space for 
governments by having formal sector employees insured through SHIs while using tax funds 
to subsidise the rest of the population. This strategy has been adopted in Ghana, Thailand 
and Mongolia. Generally, SHIs are not very well developed in most LMIC because of high 
levels of informal employment (McIntyre, 2007).  
  
Countries that have successfully extended coverage to the informal sector and the wider 
population at a faster rate have been able to do so with either tax revenue and/or donor 
support. The predominantly tax-funded and integrated health systems of Thailand, Sri 
Lanka, Cuba, Mongolia and (more recently) the Philippines have greater population 
coverage than most SHI systems in LMIC. Tax-funding is simpler to target the whole 
population than SHI which targets population groups beginning with those in formal 
employment. As observed by Rannan-Eliya and Sikurajapathy (2009), substantial 
proportions  of tax revenue to fund universal health systems in these countries is raised 
through indirect taxes with VAT being the most important. This is because the majority of 
the population is rural and working in the informal sector to render direct taxation difficult. 
The tax-funded integrated approach to extend coverage to the informal sector and poor 
populations has also been implemented in Argentina and Brazil, which  involves providing 
comprehensive primary health care for all citizens (Torres, 2013, Gattini and Ruiz, 2012, del 
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Rocío et al., 2010). A similar financing model for UHC is under consideration in South Africa 
(McIntyre, 2012).  
  
A significant challenge with non-contributory models of financing health care is efficiency in 
tax collection. Tax regimes in some countries require good leadership in order to be 
effective. However, other countries have been innovative in raising more funds for health 
care. Indonesia simplified its tax system and improved tax administration through clear tax 
laws and zero-tolerance for corruption (WHO, 2010b). In Kenya, the new government 
elected in 2003 improved tax compliance to significantly increase revenues  (KNBS, 2007). 
Gabon, Zambia and Gambia are committed and innovative in raising revenue for higher 
population coverage. Gabon charges a 10 % levy on mobile phone companies’ turnover and 
a 1.5 % levy on international money transfers to contribute to health care financing. Zambia 
taxes investment income to fund coverage for the poor (Tandon and Cashin, 2010, 
McIntyre, 2012).  
  
Tax-funded systems are administratively less costly than SHIs or other systems. As domestic 
resources, tax revenues are sustainable and critical, whether as complementary or primary 
to financing UHC. Generally, tax funding tends to be more progressive than other funding 
sources. For example, according to Akazili et al. (2012), overall tax-funding in Ghana is 
progressive even though indirect taxation, including 2.5% additional VAT as an earmarked 
tax for health care, is tending towards proportionality. No reasons are given for this trend 
but a reconsideration of target goods for VAT exemption has been recommended by Akazili 
et al. (2012). Tangcharoensathien et al. (2013))  observe that direct taxation for health care 
in Thailand is the most progressive followed by indirect taxation. The SHI scheme is also 
progressive as it targets mainly the formal sector although its progressivity is low because 
deductions are capped. Both OOP and private insurance are regressive in Thailand although 
the former is said to be progressive in Sri Lanka (Rannan-Eliya and Sikurajapathy, 2009). 
  
Finally, a number of initiatives for mandatory prepayments to extend population coverage in 
Africa and Asia have been highly donor dependent. According to McIntyre (2012),  more 
than half of the total health expenditure in Rwanda, Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania 
comes from donor funding. Rwanda in particular has provided coverage for the informal 
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sector and the poor through contributions from the Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, TB and 
Malaria, among other donors and NGOs. Ahoobim et al. (2012) and Logie et al. (2008) 
observe that Rwanda’s rapid expansion of population coverage is highly dependent on 
strong donor support, strong political will and the high priority given to the health sector by 
the government. In Cambodia and Laos, donor-driven Equity Funds have been used to 
increase coverage to the poor. However, because of the persistently high OOP payments in 
the two countries, Missoni et al. (2010) and Tangcharoensathien et al. (2011) doubt the 
extent to which these funds have succeeded in providing financial protection and access to 
services. Dependence on donor funds does not support the long-term stability of health 
systems and being unsustainable, it is not enough security for universal coverage because it 
is not predictable for planning purposes. Countries relying on donor funds to provide 
financial protection for the informal sector and other groups therefore need to look at all 
possibilities of developing domestic resources for health care.  
3.4.3 Pooling  
 
For purposes of attaining UHC, there are two major pooling avenues for most countries in 
the world: tax pooling and pooling through a combination of SHI and tax revenue. In most 
LMIC pooling does not fare well either because tax funds are inadequate or pooling through 
premium contributions are underdeveloped and fragmented (Spaan et al., 2012). 
Fragmentation makes health systems unable to effectively cross-subsidise for financial 
protection and access to needed services for all citizens. This is because small pools create 
problems of sustainability, are administratively inefficient and costly (McIntyre, 2007). 
However, the problems of fragmentation can be addressed through risk equalisation 
mechanisms such as in Japan and Netherlands. Where risk equalisation is non-existent, 
inequities in quality and use of health services exist, with the poor and informal workers left 
with the choice to either use the often poorly funded government services or pay out-of-
pocket. In Chile for example, Gattini and Ruiz (2012) note that 13 % of the population are 
found in the informal sector that is not covered by any scheme even though the system is 
indicated as universal at least for primary services. Table 3.2 illustrates pooling 
arrangements in some LMIC and the pools covering informal sector populations.  
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Table 3.2: Different pooling arrangements in selected LMIC 
Country Main pooling arrangements and populations targeted 
Ghana The NHIS is the main pool and funded through government revenues and contributions 
from district mutual health insurance schemes (DMHI), community-based health 
insurance schemes (CBHI) and social security. The NHIS is designed to cover all  
Ghanaian population 
 
Rwanda 
There are three distinct pools in Rwanda: 
1) Mandatory mutuelles funded by donors, government revenue and CBHI contributions 
provide coverage to the majority of Rwandans mainly in the informal sector  
2) Two separate schemes- RAMA and MMI respectively cover civil  servants and security 
forces. These are co-funded by government and employees. There also are l imited 
voluntary private schemes for private formal sector workers  
Gabon Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Maladie et de Garantie Sociale (CNAMGS) is designed to 
cover the entire population 
 
 
South Africa 
 
1. Several  private schemes cover mainly formal sector workers  
2. Government revenue provides coverage for the rest of the population 
 
Philippines The Philippines Health Insurance (PhilHealth) is the main pool and is funded through 
government revenue and SHI contributions. Private schemes cover mostly formal sector 
workers 
Sri Lanka There is one pool funded from government revenues for all  Sri Lankans  
 
 
Thailand 
1. Civil  Servants Medical Benefits Scheme (CSMBS) covers civil  servants and retirees  
2. Social Security Scheme (SSO) covers formal private sector workers  
3. Universal coverage (UC) scheme is the largest pool in terms of membership and 
covers informal sector workers and the rest of the population who are not members of 
the other schemes 
 
 
Argentina 
Argentina has four distinct pools: 
1. Government-funded services for the informal sector and rest of the poor  
2. Social security scheme for the formal sector 
3. Plan Nacer covers expectant women and children <6 (Plan Nacer) 
4. Private schemes are meant for richer individuals 
Costa Rica 1. Social Security of Costa Rica (CCSS) covers the formal and informal sector populations  
2. Voluntary schemes for self-employed individuals  are subsidised by tax funds  
 
 
Cuba 
 
One pool funded by government revenue and covers the entire population 
 
Kenya 
Three main pools exists: 
1) Government-funded services for the entire population 
2) Donor funded pools for specific health programmes especially HIV/AIDS, TB and 
malaria 
3) Social health insurance contributions through the NHIF ma inly covering the formal 
sector  
Sources: Various country sources  
 
There is a tendency for the informal sector to get some form of coverage from pools funded 
by government revenues mainly because it is the duty of the government to provide certain 
health services even though these usually are highly inadequate in many LMIC. Government 
funded pools may be separate or integrated with donor funds to purchase services. In 
countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Cambodia and Lao PDR, donor funds are in their own 
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pools for stand-alone programmes. However, in countries like Rwanda, donor funds and 
government revenues have been integrated in a single pool to cover the informal sector and 
other population groups. 
 
The decision to separate or integrate donor and tax funds  into a pool depends mostly on the 
trust that donors have in the integrity of the systems to guard against leakages and 
corruption. For example, the WHO (2011c) and Logie et al. (2008) report accountable 
governance in Rwanda leading to integration of donor funds into the MOH budget. 
Alternative contributory pooling arrangements such as SHI grow gradually even in high-
income countries (Ahoobim et al., 2012, Rao and Choudhury, 2012, Missoni et al., 2010), 
and the informal sector is usually the last to be considered in such a pooling system. In 
LMIC, only Costa Rica has successfully covered the informal sector through SHI, albeit with 
heavy government subsidies. Although private pooling arrangements feature prominently in 
Africa, they are largely unaffordable to many people and benefits are based on ability to pay 
rather than need (Figure 3.5). Moreover, this form of prepayment is extremely fragmented 
with sustainability challenges in the limited risk pools.  
 
3.4.4 Purchasing  
The range of services purchasable for a given population is influenced by financial 
constraints. This forces difficult trade-offs to provide some level of coverage for all and more 
so for the low-income populations such as those in the informal sector and the indigent. 
Decisions over what services to purchase, how and for whom, are critical for the objectives 
of UHC. According to McIntyre (2012), purchasing determines whether resources are 
properly utilised for the benefit of all and ensuring that services purchased reach intended 
beneficiaries.  
  
McIntyre (2012) and Langenbrunner and Somanathan (2011) suggest active purchasing as a 
strategy to align population health needs with available services and as a measure to control 
cost escalation. Where services and population health needs are misaligned, (for example in 
India and Vietnam), high levels of OOP spending are often recorded. India’s Arogyasri  
scheme highlights persistent problems in many LMIC where health schemes insure 
beneficiaries for inpatient care only when they could benefit more from primary services. 
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According to Gupta et al. (2012), the Arogyasiri scheme has used 25 % of the state health 
budget but addressed only 2 % of the burden of disease.  
  
Most of the LMIC listed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, have standardised and comprehensive benefit 
packages for the whole population. The package may involve primary care services only for 
the informal sector and the poor (as is the case in Rwanda and the Philippines) or both 
primary and tertiary services (as in Thailand, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Ghana, Costa Rica and 
Cuba). Although South American countries such as Argentina, Chile and Brazil offer 
comprehensive primary services through public funding, these systems are highly 
inequitable because other schemes exist with more comprehensive services for higher-
income populations. Furthermore, different benefit packages for different population 
groups can be stigmatising. In Indonesia for example, the Askeskin programme entitles the 
poor to so called ‘third class’ beds for inpatient care and outpatient services at government 
facilities while China has different benefit packages between population groups in schemes 
within provinces and counties (Rao and Choudhury, 2012).  
  
Although service delivery through tax financed systems can be equitable, Rao and 
Choudhury (2012) observe that such systems usually face a lot of pressure because services 
are comprehensive in a vaguely defined benefits package. To defuse this pressure, there are 
both implicit and explicit rationing such as queuing for services and provision of relatively 
lower quality services in the public sector to force out the well-off to seek private services. 
Although this contributes towards sustainability of prepaid programmes, it creates 
inequalities in the range, quality and speed of access to services. 
  
How providers are paid is also important for the sustainability of prepayment systems. In 
cases where the government (through the Ministry of Health) is the main purchaser as is the 
case in many developing countries mostly for public sector services, providers are allocated 
a budget and health workers are paid salaries5. Elsewhere, payment through capitation can 
be effective in controlling cost-escalation and transfer of financial risk to providers 
(Ahoobim et al., 2012). However, most provider payments involve a mix of various 
                                                                 
5 Public funding does not always involve budgets and salaries as the only provider payment mechanisms but can 
include other provider payment methods.  
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mechanisms to balance incentives for provision. This has been actively implemented in 
successful universal systems such as Thailand and Sri Lanka. Other countries are also 
considering implementing this system including Vietnam, Ghana, Philippines and Kenya. On 
the other hand, fee-for-service as is common in Ghana and Philippines, is inefficient as it 
transfers financial risks to households and purchasing organisations  and is prone to escalate 
costs through over-treatment and over-diagnosis  (Langenbrunner and Tandon, 2012, 
Ahoobim et al., 2012, Garrett et al., 2009).  
3.4.5 Provision 
 
In most LMIC, both public and private sector facilities are contracted to offer services. 
Religious mission and NGO facilities are also common in these countries in an effort to 
expand service provision. Most developing countries offer public provision to the large 
numbers of low-income groups seeking subsidised government services. However, public 
service provision in many cases is of poor quality. 
3.5 Overview of case study countries 
 
The choice of four LMIC countries as case studies on universal coverage was based on 
having made significant progress towards universal coverage and large informal sector 
populations. The four countries are: Thailand, Sri Lanka, Rwanda and Ghana. Table 3.3 
presents the macroeconomic indicators for these countries.  
 
Table 3.3: Macroeconomic contexts for case study countries (2011/2013) 
Macroeconomic indicator Rwanda Ghana Sri Lanka Thailand 
Population (Mill ions) 10.8 25.5 21.2 69.9 
GDP growth rate (%) (2013) 5.1 7.4 7.9 6.0 
Informal sector as % of total labour force & 
(subsistence agriculture) 
40(93) 42(80) 44(62.1) (42.3) 
Poverty rate (PPP US$<1.25 per day, % 
population) 
26.53 28.59 4.11 0.31 
GNI per capita (US$ Current) 1,430.0 3,880.0 9,470.0 13,510.0 
Total government expenditure as % GDP  26 26 23 23 
Total tax revenue as % GDP 14.1 15.0 12.4 17.6 
Data sources: (World Bank, 2014a, WHO, 2013b, ILO, 2012b) 
 
There are different contexts in each of the countries: Rwanda is a low-income country (LIC) 
which has relatively high population coverage at about 73% of the total population. 
Although this percentage is still considerably high, enrolment rates in the CBHIs (mutuelles) 
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have been falling from 91% of the population in 2010 to the current 73% (Government of 
Rwanda, 2013). In addition, the mutuelles are facing financial deficits that also raise 
questions about their sustainability. Ghana and Sri Lanka are lower-middle-income countries 
(LMC) with the latter having near universal population coverage but the former shows 
stagnating coverage. On the other hand, Thailand is an upper-middle-income country 
(UMIC) with coverage at 99.5 % of the population (Lindelow et al., 2012) . Significant levels 
of population coverage in Rwanda suggest that universal coverage is possible regardless of a 
country’s level of economic development. However, there is a direct link between the size of 
the informal sector and level of economic development: the poorer the country the larger 
the informal sector.  
  
An overarching characteristic among these four countries is the critical role of political 
leadership in pushing through and sustaining policies for expanding coverage. For three of 
these countries- Ghana, Sri Lanka and Thailand- free health care at the point of service 
emerged out of populist political processes geared towards winning elections (Missoni et al., 
2010, Gunatilleke, 2009, Agyepong and Adjei, 2008). Thailand and Sri Lanka have 
demonstrated strong links between policy decisions on universal coverage and research 
evidence which perhaps has contributed to the high levels of population coverage in the 
two countries at relatively low-cost. Sri Lanka has a strong evidence-based social welfare 
programme (Gunatilleke, 2009) and Thailand prides itself in innovative health system 
development including policy-driven research and retention of key personnel in running UC 
policies (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2010a, Missoni et al., 2010).  
  
Apart from political commitment to expand coverage in the four countries, macroeconomic 
factors have also played a key role in sustaining coverage. High economic growth rates in 
these countries allow governments to increase expenditure on health care without 
necessarily decreasing funding for other government functions. Data from the World Bank 
(2013c) show that for over a decade all four countries have had higher GDP growth rates 
compared to their peers although much less predictably in Rwanda. Sri Lanka maintained 
high growth rates for over two decades while Ghana and Thailand have maintained similarly 
high growth rates in the past decade. As of 2013 the annual growth rates ranged from about 
5% in Rwanda being the lowest to about 9% in Sri Lanka.  
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The unemployment rate is another important macroeconomic factor and links directly with 
the ability of a country to secure stable and predictable incomes for its citizens. Among the 
case study countries, Sri Lanka and Thailand have low unemployment rates meaning that 
their citizens have more predictable incomes and relatively able to generate substantial 
domestic resources to sustainably prepay for health care through contributory or non-
contributory financing models. Ghana and Rwanda on the hand have most of their citizens 
employed in the informal sector where work and income are not often sustainable. This 
suggests a direct link between informal sector employment and incidence of poverty. 
Rwanda and Ghana have the largest informal sector and also the highest rate of poverty; the 
opposite is true for Sri Lanka and Thailand. Rwanda and Ghana also have the lowest gross 
national income (GNI) per capita consistent with their income status but both have higher 
tax revenue as a share of GDP than Sri Lanka. As a middle-income country registering the 
lowest tax revenue as a share of GDP (12.4%) among comparable countries, it may suggest 
some level of inefficiency in tax collection in Sri Lanka. The IMF recommends a threshold of 
at least 15% of tax revenue relative to GDP. Countries falling below this threshold, that is, Sri 
Lanka and Rwanda in this case, could be facing with fiscal instability.  
  
There are some similarities in the fiscal stability of the four countries under review in terms 
of deficits, debts, total revenue and government spending relative to GDP. There are limited 
budget deficits relative to GDP with Thailand having the lowest deficit at 4.0% of GDP and 
Ghana having the highest at 4.9% of GDP.  The Ghanaian case is particularly remarkable 
because, notwithstanding benefiting from debt relief under the highly indebted poor 
countries (HIPC) initiative,  the emerging fiscal challenges and potential vulnerabilities 
including expenditure arrears and unstable revenues come in the face of high economic 
growth rates inspired by above average production in oil and cocoa (ADB, 2012). Although 
the debt positions in the four countries are sustainable, Thailand registers the highest debt 
as a percent of GDP (49%) compared to Rwanda (23%). Rwanda is  also a beneficiary of debt 
relief under HIPC, which has contributed to its sustainable debt position (Government of 
Rwanda, 2009). Overall, low unemployment rates (formal and informal), low budget deficits 
and relatively stable inflation rates in all four case study countries are general indicators of 
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the stability of macroeconomic conditions and are important in increasing fiscal space for 
health.  
  
Table 3.4 is a summary of health system indicators for the four countries reviewed. The level 
of government health spending indicates the extent to which the health sector is prioritised. 
While a threshold for government health spending as a share of total government 
expenditure could be difficult to establish, African governments have settled on health 
expenditure of 15% of total government expenditure threshold which few of them have 
met. Indications are that Rwanda has met and surpassed the Abuja threshold but with a lot 
of donor funding. Furthermore, there is no evidence yet that meeting such a target is a 
prerequisite for better health outcomes.  
 
On the other hand, Thailand is often regarded as having achieved impressive health 
outcomes at low-cost (Hanvoravongchai, 2013, Limwattananon et al., 2013). The Thai 
government expenditure on health constitutes about 3.0% of the GDP and 14.5% of the 
total government budget, compared to 5.0% and 24% respectively for Rwanda. Thailand has 
a much larger GDP compared to Rwanda so is able to spend more per capita on health. 
Under a universal health system, the higher per capita spending in Thailand means that the 
health system can afford to provide more comprehensive health services for all its citizens 
as opposed to Rwanda where the majority especially in the informal sector are restricted to 
primary health services for lack of comprehensive funding (WHO, 2009b).  
 
Table 3.4: Health systems indicators in case study countries 
Health system indicators Rwanda Ghana Sri Lanka Thailand 
General government expenditure on health as % of GDP 5.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 
Total health expenditure as % of GDP 10.66 5.17 3.15 3.93 
Per capita health expenditure (US$ current prices) 66.07 83.04 88.63 215.10 
General government expenditure on health as % of 
government budget 
23.7 12.1 7.2 14.5 
External resources on health as % of total health 
expenditure 
47 14.2 2.7 0.4 
Private expenditure on health as % of total health 
expenditure  
43.3 43.9 55.4 24.5 
Out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure on health as % of 
total health expenditure 
21 29 46 14 
Maternal mortality rate/100000 320 380 29 26 
Infant mortality rate /1000 live births  37.1 53.2 8.2 11.3 
Skil led birth attendance % of total  69.0 68.4 98.6 99.5 
Physicians/1000 population 0.056 0.096 0.68 0.39 
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There is a considerable level of reliance on domestic resources to finance health care in Sri 
Lanka, Thailand and Ghana which is important for sustainability of health programmes as 
opposed to Rwanda where almost half of health sector funding comes from external 
sources. On the other hand, although Rwanda has the lowest per capita health spending, 
such expenditure has surpassed the WHO (2010a) recommended USD60 threshold that is 
required to provide essential health services in low-income countries as at 2015. The overall 
per capita health expenditure follows a wealth trajectory where the richest country 
(Thailand) has the highest per capita spending and vice versa for Rwanda, the poorest 
country in the group. The differences in level of per capita spending between the four 
countries could also be the result of differences in epidemiologic and demographic 
transitions which shift the burden of disease to non-communicable diseases (NCDs) and a 
greater burden on health systems. This is the case with Thailand (WHO, 2012b) and Sri 
Lanka as opposed to Ghana and Rwanda for which the burden of disease lies in preventable 
infectious illnesses (Government of Rwanda, 2010a).  
  
An analysis of the level of private spending in all the four countries suggests that only 
Thailand has large amounts of public and mandatorily prepaid funds (75.5% of total health 
expenditure as of 2011) that are essential in improving access to services and financial 
protection. The other three countries show high levels of private spending contrary to the 
goals of UHC which aim at improving access to quality health services and financial 
protection. In terms of OOP spending only Thailand has met the WHO threshold of <20% of 
THE as the acceptable amount that should be paid in the form of OOP payments. Rwanda is 
very close at 21% although total private expenditure (including private prepaid plans) stand 
at about 43% of THE which means that access to services and financial protection still 
depends to a large extent on ability to pay. However, in Sri Lanka, OOP spending is not only 
progressive (Rannan-Eliya and Sikurajapathy, 2009) but its catastrophic effects are also low 
and its rate of growth is slow (van Doorslaer et al., 2007). This raises questions on whether 
the high levels of OOP spending currently being experienced were the real goal of the 
institutional universality in health care provision as envisaged by Sri Lanka.  
 
The trends in financing health care in Sri Lanka do not reflect its economic growth rate. The 
key indicators of health care financing (public prepaid funds as share of GDP, health 
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expenditure as a share of total government expenditure, among others) have either 
declined or remained at relatively the same levels over the years (see Appendix A2 for Sri 
Lanka). The overall picture is that the Sri Lankan health system could be significantly under-
funded. On the other hand Thailand (and Rwanda to some extent), show commitments to 
fund health care even in periods of economic crises. For the Thai case, the trend in growth 
of mandatory prepaid funds is a remarkable achievement and reflects the overall strength of 
the Thai UHC in terms of protection from financial risks and enhancing access  to services 
(Appendix A4 for Thailand).  
  
In terms of health outcomes such as infant mortality rate (IMR), maternal mortality rate 
(MMR), and service coverage measured by key indicators such as number of skilled birth 
attendance and physicians per a given number of people both Thailand and Sri Lanka have 
achieved great success with relatively limited spending. Sri Lanka is a particularly interesting 
case because as a lower-middle-income country (LMC), its health outcomes are comparable 
to those of high-income countries (Rannan-Eliya and Sikurajapathy, 2009) and is on track to 
achieving most MDGs (World Bank, 2013c). The government’s maternal and child healthcare 
programme is credited with improvements in health outcomes (de Alwis and Christopher, 
2013). 
3.5.1 Expanding coverage to the informal sector 
 
Literature indicates that the countries under review have used three different approaches to 
extend coverage to the informal sector, namely: (i) premium contributions with heavy 
subsidies from donors and national government (Rwanda); (ii) premium contributions with 
subsidies from ear-marked taxes (Ghana); and (iii) universalist funding from general 
government revenues (Thailand and Sri Lanka). All four countries are at different levels of 
population and service coverage although Thailand and Sri Lanka are regarded as UHC 
success stories. Stagnation or drops in enrolment into schemes in Ghana and Rwanda as 
documented by Apoya and Marriott (2011) and Government of Rwanda (2013) respectively, 
may relate to the difficulties in sustaining contributory approaches in contexts with large 
informal sector populations and/or unavailability or poor quality services under the 
schemes. This however, may require further investigation.  
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To sustain coverage in both Thailand and Sri Lanka, a number of factors have come into 
play. These include investment in evidence-informed policy-making supported by strong and 
competitive political processes (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2010a, Gunatilleke, 2009), strong 
watchdog roles of the civil society and parliament in Thailand have ensured continued 
prioritisation of health care in national decision-making (WHO, 2012b) and a dense network 
of integrated public health facilities both in urban and rural areas which has enabled most 
Sri Lankans to access health services within less than 3km (Rannan-Eliya and Sikurajapathy, 
2009). Investment in health facilities was strategic in expanding tax-funded universal 
coverage (Rannan-Eliya and Sikurajapathy, 2009). The private health sector is small and 
concentrated in the capital city, Colombo.  
 
3.5.2 Health care financing functions 
 
3.5.2.1 Revenue collection and pooling 
In all four countries, there have been significant efforts made to expand and maintain 
coverage mainly through pro-poor policies. In Sri Lanka, the tax-funded single risk pool 
ensures equity and social solidarity (Rannan-Eliya and Sikurajapathy, 2009). In Rwanda the 
main targets for expansion of mutuelles (as the mandatory health insurances schemes are 
termed) in the 1990s were people outside formal employment (Government of Rwanda, 
2009). Thailand’s UCS targets the majority of the population, who are outside formal sector 
employment, and Ghana on the other hand, consolidated risk pools at the national level to 
promote equitable access to services and financial protection for all.  
  
Thailand and Sri Lanka rely heavily on non-contributory domestic funding mechanisms to 
expand coverage to the majority of the population. Although non-contributory mechanisms 
involving direct and indirect taxes ensure equity in benefits and contributions and are 
largely progressive, indirect taxes can sometimes be regressive (McIntyre, 2012). Insurance 
premium contributions on the other hand, are regressive in most settings.  
 
Unfortunately all the countries under review with the exception of Sri Lanka have some 
form of contributory mechanisms. In Thailand, premium contribution is restricted to the 
formal sector, where the effects may be minimal in terms of inequitable contributions. The 
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informal sectors in Rwanda and Ghana are expected to make a regressive flat-rate 
contribution. However, Rwanda has initiated reforms using village poverty mapping 
mechanisms (Ubudehe) to categorise people into economic groups to address the problem 
of inequitable contributions (Government of Rwanda, 2010b).  Identifying the poor is 
complex and similar traditional poverty assessment programmes have had minimal success 
in Vietnam but failed completely in Thailand and Philippines because of nepotism and 
political patronage (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2011, Nguyen and Rama, 2007). In Ghana, 
problems in identifying indigent populations exist as most of NHIS members who are 
exempted from paying can actually afford to pay (Schieber et al., 2012).   
  
There are multiple schemes in Rwanda and Thailand providing coverage to different 
population groups but without a risk equalisation mechanism. Fragmentation across 
schemes contributes to differences in the depth of coverage among population groups. For 
example, the Civil Servants´ Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) in Thailand covering 
government employees, retirees and their dependents is the smallest of the public schemes 
but controls more funds than the others (Hanvoravongchai, 2013). In Rwanda, 75 % of 
RAMA (a scheme for civil servants) members are in the richest quintile (WHO, 2009b). 
Overall, the existence of richer public contributory schemes for formal sector workers as is 
the case with Thailand and Rwanda reduces income cross-subsidisation as people outside 
formal sector work generally have low-incomes. For Rwanda, it remains unclear why the 
government should continue co-paying premium costs for already privileged groups in the 
military and civil service instead of directing more resources to the mutuelles which cover 
over 90 % of the population. In addition, different levels of contributions and per capita 
health spending in different pools suggest differences in the range of services between 
population groups. For example, members of the UCS (Thailand) are restricted to services 
within public primary care (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2010b) while members of CSMBS can 
access services at any facility of choice.  
  
Among the four countries reviewed, the Rwandan pooling system is the most fragmented. 
With numerous small pools, Rwanda’s mutuelles together face high administrative costs at 
22 % of THE as of 2009 (Government of Rwanda, 2009). Fragmentation creates several 
problems related to costs and cross-subsidisation and McIntyre (2012) recommends either 
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integrating pools or putting in place a risk equalisation mechanism to restore some level of 
equity in benefits across various pools. The Rwandan government proposes a risk 
equalisation mechanism known as  the National Guarantee Fund (NGF) to stabilise the 
financial position of mutuelles and improve access to services for mutuelle members  
(Government of Rwanda, 2011, Government of Rwanda, 2010b). Although Ghana operates a 
single pool, the multiple layers of revenue collection and pooling stages from districts to the 
national level may present inefficiencies in revenue collection especially from the informal 
sector. 
 
An emerging problem unique to Ghana is the lack of integrity and independent reporting at 
the NHIS, not only with funds but also with actual level of population coverage. Coverage, 
according to the NHIS, is for 61 % of the population and 45 % according to the National 
Development Planning Commission (NDPC). Apoya and Marriot (2011) put effective 
coverage at 18%, Sarpong et al. (2010) at 38 % and the WHO (2011c) at 53.6 %. These large 
differences in reporting population coverage does not help in reassuring Ghanaians that 
they are on the path to UHC.   
 
3.5.2.2 Purchasing 
From the analysis, health sector reforms in Rwanda and Ghana largely targeted revenue 
collection and pooling to expand population coverage as opposed to an all -inclusive process 
that also addresses issues around purchasing for sustainable coverage. In Thailand, 
considerable debate during the reform process centred around how to provide sustainable 
health care for all at low cost and as such embarked on strategic purchasing especially in 
UCS which covers the majority of the population (Hanvoravongchai, 2013).  
  
There is no strong evidence of active purchasing in the other countries apart from Thailand 
although in Sri Lanka, Rannan-Eliya and Sikurajapathy (2009) and Langenbrunner and 
Somanathan (2011) observe that strategies such as rationing services are an element of 
active purchasing. Rationing involves queuing and allowing quality challenges in the public 
sector to implicitly force out the well-off to seek private provision and keep down costs in 
public provision. For Thailand, strategic purchasing especially in the tax-funded UCS involves 
the use of different provider payment mechanisms, creating a purchaser-provider split 
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which linked payment to performance (Hanvoravongchai, 2013) and use of the strength of a 
very large purchaser (UCS) with many members to negotiate lower costs from providers 
(McIntyre et al., 2013). Other strategies include strict control on referrals including control 
of access to specialists (Limwattananon et al., 2013, Sakunphanit and Suwanrada, 2009a). In 
Sri Lanka, lack of strictness in the referral system may improve access to services but could 
also drive up costs in the long-term besides burdening higher level facilities with patients 
who could be treated at lower level facilities. Another important element in active 
purchasing involves aligning health services with population needs. This has not been the 
case in Sri Lanka with regards to non-communicable diseases (NCD) in rural areas (Bandara, 
2011) and is partially responsible for high OOP spending. In addition to misalignment in 
population health, although Sri Lanka provides ‘free’ primary and tertiary health services, 
the high OOP payments are mainly due to use of private facilities. High OOP spending in Sri 
Lanka is a threat to its much talked about ‘health at low cost’. 
 
In Sri Lanka, the structure of cost coverage means widening differences between population 
groups in the range and quality of services that can be accessed. For Thailand the strong link 
between evidence and health care policy ensures that services are aligned with population 
health needs (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2013, Missoni et al., 2010). 
 
In the public purchasing agencies, there are multiple purchasers in Thailand and Rwanda 
and single purchasing agencies for Sri Lanka. In Ghana there are reforms underway to have a 
single purchaser under the NHIS. The advantage of having a single purchaser is its ability to 
ensure equitable services for all. Multiple purchasers serve different population groups so 
purchasers from poorer pools can only afford limited services for their members. This is the 
case with pools serving formal sector workers which have more comprehensive services 
than the informal sector pools in Rwanda and Thailand. 
  
Thailand is the richest of the four countries under review and is therefore able to provide a 
comprehensive benefits package in practice for all citizens. However, tight restrictions on 
UCS members to use of public primary care facilities reinforce the UCS as a residual 
universal coverage scheme. Restrictions on access to services also come from gate-keeper 
charges (co-payments) in Rwanda, particularly for low-income mutuelle members.  
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To draw incentives for service provision, Thailand, Ghana and Rwanda use a mix of provider 
payment systems including capitation (recent in Ghana), global budget, fee-for-service and 
case-based fees (Thailand only). For Rwanda and Thailand where multiple purchasers exist, 
the mix of provider payment systems are prevalent in mutuelles and UCS respectively. For 
CSMBS, Hanvoravongchai (2013) notes that imbalanced provider payment mechanisms 
emphasising fee-for-service has triggered cost escalation. Fee-for-service has also led to the 
unsustainable financial position of the NHIS in Ghana and forced it to introduce capitation 
(WHO 2011c).  Rwanda directly provides incentives to public providers under performance-
based financing (PBF) (WHO, 2011c) to deliver on specific health issues such as maternal and 
child health. While this is important, McIntyre (2012) reiterates that PBF could distract 
health workers from other health deliverables that do not carry incentives. At the same 
time, says McIntyre (2012), PBF tends to concentrate health resources on a few health 
issues rather than spread the resources to cover more health problems. Furthermore PBF 
contributes to fragmentation in the health system. 
  
In the four countries, services are delivered mainly through primary care facilities. However, 
Thailand and Sri Lanka have highly developed networks of public provision to ensure access 
to high quality services at various levels (WHO, 2012b, Tangcharoensathien et al., 2010a). 
Ghana has a fairly well developed network of primary health facilities but hospitals are not 
well distributed across regions (McIntyre et al., 2008). There are also capacity problems 
where providers are not paid on time leading to rejection of NHIS patients (Apoya and 
Marriott, 2011). 
  
In summary, although the four countries have demonstrated commitment to expanding and 
maintaining coverage, there are contextual factors that need to be addressed. Ghana’s 
seemingly stalled coverage could be due to fraud and cost-containment problems while 
Rwanda could strengthen its prepayment system by consolidating pools at a higher level. 
The Sri Lankan system needs to address the escalating private expenditures by increasing 
allocations to the health sector and strengthening its purchasing system.   
  
Table 3.5 is a summary of health care financing functions for the four case study countries.  
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Table 3.5: Summary of health care financing functions in case study countries 
Country Revenue collection and pooling Purchasing 
 
 
 
Rwanda 
Mutuelles:  
1) Tax funds (direct and indirect) contribute 
about 19% of total health expenditure (THE) 
2) Donor funds contribute 46% of THE. Both 
donor and government funds are used to 
subsidise mutuelles 
3) Contributions through CBHIs (4.7% of THE) 
  
Civil servants and military (4% of the 
population): 
1) Rwanda Medical Insurance Scheme (RAMA) 
covers civil  servants with contributions at 15% 
of basic salary split equally between employer 
and employee 
2) Military Medical Insurance (MMI) for the 
military and police. Contributions are at 21% of 
basic salary paid by the government (17.5%) 
and members (3.5%). 
a) Purchasing organisation: Multiple purchasers, each 
scheme independently buys services from accredited 
public and private providers  
b) Benefits package: 
Mainly basic preventive and curative services for mutuelle 
members. Curative services at district hospitals are largely 
inaccessible due to lack of comprehensive funding (WHO, 
2009b, Government of Rwanda, 2010b).  
c) Provider payment mechanisms:  
Mutuelles have a mix of capitation at primary care level 
and fees-for-service at the hospital level. This mix of 
provider payment mechanisms have contributed to 
improved financial position of some mutuelles (WHO 
2009b).  
Mutuelle members co-pay 10% of the total costs at 
hospital level or US$ 0.15 – 0.37 at primary care level; 
RAMA and MMI members pay 15% of total cost at a ll  levels 
of care. Indigents and vulnerable groups do not co-pay. 
 
 
 
Ghana 
Tax revenues provide the main source of funds 
for expanding coverage. 
 
Pooling is done at the national level through 
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) and 
targets all  Ghanaians 
Indirect taxes involving a 2.5% extra VAT levy 
(the National Health Insurance Levy (NHIL)) 
contributes 70-75% of all  NHIS funds (McIntyre 
and Mills, 2012, Mills et al., 2012a, Owusu, 
2010). 
Earmarked payroll tax at 2.5% of salary from 
the Social Security and National Insurance 
Trust (SSNIT) contributes about 20-25% of the 
funds and the informal sector contributes 
about 5% through the district mutual health 
insurance schemes (DMHIS) and the indigent 
are fully subsidised by the NHIS  
a) Purchasing organisation: 
The NHIS the only public purchaser of services through 
accredited public and private facil ities.  
Imbalanced provider payment strategies have contributed 
to cost escalation and unsustainability (Apoya and Marriot, 
2011).  
b) Benefits package: 
The benefits package is comprehensive but is pro-rich. 
c) Provider payment mechanisms:  
Heavy reliance on fee-for-service which is unsustainable 
although the NHIS rolled out a phased capitation-based 
payment early 2013.   
 
Source: (Aryeetey et al., 2012, Apoya and Marriott, 2011, 
Aryeetey et al., 2010, Jehu-Appiah et al., 2010, Jehu-Appiah 
et al., 2011, Sarpong et al., 2010, Witter and Garshong, 
2009, WHO, 2011a, Owusu, 2010, Mills et al., 2012a, 
McIntyre et al., 2008)  
 
 
Sri Lanka 
Direct and indirect taxes provide most revenue 
(65% of THE) for universal coverage. There is a 
single pool and single purchaser for all  Sri 
Lankans 
Other sources: donors (2.7%), local 
governments, the President’s Fund and other 
government agencies, ministries and 
departments 
a) Purchasing organisation: 
The Ministry of Health is the purchaser and main provider 
of services 
b) Benefits Package: 
Public provision is equitable, broad and deep with few 
exceptions such as family planning services (Bandara, 
2011) 
c) Provider payment mechanisms: Budget allocation from 
the central government 
A large network of public facilities ensures the dominance 
of public provision with more than 95% of inpatient care 
(Institute for Health Policy, 2011). 
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Thailand 
The revenue sources include the central 
government providing 71% of health care 
funds through a mix of direct and indirect taxes 
including a 7% VAT.  
 
There are three mandatory schemes: 
1) The universal coverage scheme (USC) is 
funded through general tax revenue and 
targets the informal sector and all  those not 
covered by other schemes  
2) The Social Security Scheme (SSS) involves a 
tripartite contribution: employer (1.5%), 
employee (1.5%) & government (1.5%). The 
SSS covers private sector employees excluding 
dependants as well as voluntary contributors 
such as retirees  
3) The Civil  Servants Medical Benefit Scheme 
(CSMBS) is funded through tax and covers  
a) Purchasing agency: 
National Health Security Office (NHSO) purchases services 
on behalf of UCS members while the Social Security Office 
(SSO) purchases services for SSS members. The 
Comptroller General Department (Ministry of Finance) 
purchases services for public employees  
b) Benefits package: 
The UCS benefits package is near comprehensive including 
curative, preventive, promotive and rehabilitative as well 
as services provided according to traditional and other 
alternative medicines. The SSS benefit package has minor 
differences from the UCS but the civil  servants’ scheme has 
a more comprehensive package than the others do.   
c) Provider payment mechanism: 
The NHSO uses capitation for outpatient care and global 
budget plus case-based fee. The SSO uses capitation for 
inpatient and outpatient services plus additional adjusted 
payments for emergencies and high cost care. The  
public sector employees and their dependants  
Private prepaid plans are voluntary and mainly 
for those who need additional cover (WHO, 
2012) 
Comptrol ler General Department pays providers through 
fee-for-service, direct disbursement to public providers 
and case-based fee for inpatient care 
Sources: (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2010b, Sakunphanit 
and Suwanrada, 2009b) 
Appendix A, sections A1, A2, A3 & A4 contain an analysis of macroeconomic, fiscal and 
health financing trends for the four case study countries. 
 
3.6 Lessons from country experiences in universal health coverage 
 
3.6.1 Introduction 
From the wider international experience, universal coverage is facilitated by mandatory 
prepaid funds. Countries particularly in Europe and Western Pacific with high levels of 
mandatory prepaid funds (70 % and above of total health expenditure, WHO (2011b)) have 
more advanced universal systems. Mandatory prepaid funds (specifically drawn from taxes 
and SHI) are used to extend coverage to the informal sector and to fund universal coverage 
in most countries. Although CBHI schemes once worked well in some developed countries 
such as Germany and Japan where they formed as a basis for establishment of SHI, they no 
longer exist in developed countries and are only found in the poorest countries. There are 
diverse forms of CBHI schemes, but they typically operate where informal sector 
populations purchase health services OOP and they lack access  to other health insurance 
schemes. The fact that CBHIs are voluntary makes them unable to provide coverage to 
everyone. On this note, the (WHO, 2009b) has also advised Rwanda to merge mutuelles and 
model coverage towards SHI to reduce fragmentation and administrative costs associated 
with CBHIs.  
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3.6.2 Lessons from tax-funded approach to expanding coverage 
There are a number of advantages associated with extending coverage using tax funds. First, 
tax funding supports equity in financing and benefits as they are more progressive and 
easily target the whole population from a single large pool at an administratively lower cost 
than SHI (Akazili et al., 2012, Tangcharoensathien et al., 2010b). Tax funding does not only 
target and integrate all population groups with a standard benefits package but also creates 
a situation where richer people self-select and opt for private services while still 
contributing to the tax pool for the benefit of low-income groups. In so doing, tax funding 
supports institutional universality and is more equitable when it adopts universality instead 
of targeting (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2013). Targeting includes expanding coverage to 
population sub-groups, for example, effective coverage of poor households and extending 
SHI to dependents such as spouses and children. Low- and middle-income countries opting 
for tax funding to cover the informal sector have progressed faster in UHC than countries 
using contributory schemes. Countries such as Thailand, Sri Lanka and the Philippines, have 
significantly progressed to UC using tax funds not only to cover the informal sector but also 
to extend coverage to the whole population.  
  
Expanding coverage through tax funds in some countries has involved innovative financing 
mechanisms to raise revenue. For example, Ghana charges 2.5 %  additional VAT while 
Zambia levies taxes on investment income and Gabon charges 1.5 % tax on money transfers 
and 10% tax on mobile phones (McIntyre, 2012). The amount of tax funds allocated to 
health care is often used to measure whether health care is a high priority in government 
spending plans. Besides innovative financing for health care, there is need for political 
leadership to enhance efficiency in tax collection. Kenya and Indonesia are good examples 
of countries where political commitment to improve revenue collection has borne some 
results. McIntyre (2012) and McIntyre (2005) stressed the importance of improving 
compliance and efficiency in tax collection to raise sufficient funds for health care.  
 
3.6.3 Lessons in social health insurance (SHI) coverage  
Social health insurance schemes can potentially cover large populations and besides tax 
funding, is a recommended strategy for UHC (WHO, 2005b). Many countries including those 
in Africa are considering introducing SHI as the means for financial protection and universal 
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coverage (Hsiao and Shaw, 2007, Letourmy, 2010, McIntyre, 2007, Mills, 2007). However, 
very few of these schemes currently exist in Africa (Leive and Xu, 2008, McIntyre et al., 
2005)) and the experience from countries adopting SHI to expand population coverage 
shows decades-long phased coverage extension with the informal sector likely coming last.  
  
Rao and Choudhury (2012) and Ahoobim et al.,( 2012) indicate that coverage through SHI 
schemes expand as labour becomes more formalised. Formal employment is required 
because contributions to SHI schemes are mostly implemented through salary deductions. 
Where labour is informal, it is not easy to implement SHI owing to the difficulty of enforcing 
enrolment and estimating informal sector income (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2011). 
Experiences from low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) indicate that coverage through 
SHI as the main financing mechanism has not been very successful in advancing UHC. 
Although it has been adopted in Costa Rica, it functions as a mechanism for creating a 
single-risk pool and single purchaser (McIntyre, 2005).  
 
Premium contributions to SHI are also regressive in most cases because contributions tend 
to be flat-rated for those outside the formal sector (Mills et al., 2012b). Even in countries 
with small informal sectors, contributions are still regressive. This has forced some countries 
such as Spain and Iceland to abandon SHI in favour of tax funding for UHC (Langenbrunner 
and Somanathan, 2011). The impracticality of SHI in settings with large informal sector 
populations has persuaded McIntyre (2012) to recommend alternative mechanisms such as 
improving efficiency in tax collection and introducing indirect taxes to target informal sector 
resources. The VAT in particular, as a form of indirect taxation, can be important where 
countries believe that those in the informal sector should contribute to efforts to  generate 
funds for health care (McIntyre, 2012, Tangcharoensathien et al., 2010b, Rannan-Eliya and 
Sikurajapathy, 2009). This method of taxation has been successful in raising substantial 
funds for health systems in Ghana, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Samoa, Mongolia, among many 
other countries that have high population coverage. 
 
3.6.4 Role of donor funding in extending coverage to the informal sector 
Donor funds have played an important role in extending financial protection and access to 
services to the poor and informal sector populations in some countries. Equity funds in 
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Cambodia and Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, are important examples of targeted donor 
assistance to expand population coverage. However, it is mainly in Rwanda where donor 
assistance is applied within the framework of universal coverage and fully embedded in 
government expenditure programmes. This has been achieved by transparent governance 
that has won donor confidence. The major drawback with donor funding is its 
unsustainability and unpredictability to support UHC.  
 
3.7 Factors essential to expanding and sustaining coverage 
 
3.7.1 Political leadership  
Political leadership can put health care high on the list of government expenditure 
priorities.  Among developing countries, prioritisation of health care is best demonstrated in 
(i) Rwanda, which despite being a low-income country, spends one of the highest 
percentages of government budget on health care (inclusive of general government revenue 
and donor support), and (ii) Thailand where even with negative growth during the Asian 
economic crisis in 1998 continued to increase budget allocations for health care and has 
steadily driven down OOP expenditures.  
  
Stuckler et al. (2010) suggest that universal health coverage is a political decision whose 
implementation involves political processes. Whereas the authors indicate that UHC is 
achievable in any country at any level of economic development, they acknowledge that 
important barriers to UHC may be posed by national divisions based on ethnicity, language, 
gender, income, age or religion. Other barriers include weak abilities to unionise and high 
levels of social inequality and class tensions in a country. While such divisions could pose 
barriers to UC in many countries, some countries including Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Thailand 
have progressed to greater financial protection and access to health services for their 
respective citizens despite ethnic divisions and political instability, among other sources of 
social tensions.    
  
Whichever approach a country takes to UC, whether tax funding or SHI, there is a need for 
strong political leadership not only to move UHC policies forward but also to improve 
compliance and efficiency in tax collection. 
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3.7.2 Economic growth rate 
According to Langenbrunner and Somanathan (2011) and Thomson et al. (2009), strong 
economic growth rates were partly responsible for progress towards UHC in Thailand and Sri 
Lanka. Countries such as Brazil and China have demonstrated the important role of strong 
economic growth rates in advancing towards universal coverage. High economic growth 
rates allow governments to increase health budgets without altering other expenditure 
commitments because higher economic growth rates create more fiscal space for increased 
government spending. However, universal coverage does not have a strong correlation with 
the wealth of a country. Garrett et al. (2009) and Matheson et al. (2010) cite the cases of 
countries such as Sri Lanka, the Indian state of Kerala, Gambia, Gabon, Cos ta Rica and Cuba 
which have much lower GDPs but have better prepaid health care with adequate coverage 
than the USA, China and India, which have much higher GDPs. The health systems of Cuba, 
Costa Rica, the Indian state of Kerala and Sri Lanka are not only wide in coverage but also 
are equitable in financing and benefits and have achieved good health outcomes relative to 
their levels of economic growth. 
 
3.7.3 Active purchasing 
Purchasing is critical in sustaining population coverage and McIntyre et al. (2013) have 
stressed the important role of active purchasing in the proper utilisation of health resources 
and ensuring that services reach intended beneficiaries. Active purchasing involves 
measures for cost-containment, aligning available services to population health needs, 
balancing provider payment mechanisms and a sustainable depth of benefits package. 
Thailand, through the UC scheme for the informal sector and the indigent, is an example of 
a coverage system that practices active purchasing to control costs.  
  
It is important to have a mix of provider payment mechanisms to balance incentives for 
provision. Emphasis on one type of provider payment mechanism, fee-for-service in 
particular, is likely to lead to cost-escalation. The NHIS in Ghana (Apoya and Marriott, 2011) 
and the civil servants’ scheme in Thailand (Hanvoravongchai, 2013) are two examples of 
coverage systems where cost-escalation has been linked to fee-for-service as the main 
provider payment mechanism. Costs can also be contained through bargaining involving 
large pools which use their numbers to negotiate lower prices for medicines and other 
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products from suppliers or providers. Such has been the case with Thailand’s UC scheme 
(Tangcharoensathien et al., 2013). 
  
As countries move towards universal coverage, the benefit package (BP) needs to not only 
meet population health needs but also be sustainably broad. In Thailand for example, the BP 
is regularly updated in terms of cost and population health needs to avoid misalignments 
(Missoni et al., 2010). In Rwanda, 74 % of the disease burden consists of preventable 
illnesses so the country has oriented its benefit package to primary care services (WHO, 
2012a). However, in Ghana there is an emphasis on curative/hospital services when the 
disease burden largely lies in conditions that can be addressed by primary care services 
(Apoya and Marriott, 2011). Ghana’s service coverage may also be too deep and broad 
which is possibly causing problems in sustaining effective coverage  (Apoya and Marriott, 
2011). 
 
3.7.4 Improving provision 
Provision of services of sufficient quality and quantity is imperative to progress towards 
universal coverage. Delivery of services is enhanced when the services and providers are 
available to the target population. Countries such as Cuba, Thailand and Sri Lanka have 
improved access to services through investment in facilities for physical availability. Cooper 
et al. (2006) indicate that Cuba’s successful universal coverage strategy includes accessible 
public facilities and an emphasis on public health while Sri Lanka has a large integrated 
network of health facilities to support access to services for all Sri Lankans (Rannan-Eliya and 
Sikurajapathy, 2009).  
  
Health workers also need to be available to provide services. In this regard, Rwanda rapidly 
recruited health workers to ensure services are available to support progress towards 
universal coverage (Government of Rwanda, 2009). In Sri Lanka, private practice in rural 
areas is encouraged as an incentive to retain health workers in these areas to support 
effective service delivery (Rannan-Eliya and Sikurajapathy, 2009). 
 
 
 
86 
 
3.7.5 Continuity, governance and oversight 
Among the four case studies, none demonstrates the importance of stability in policy 
making and implementation of universal coverage more graphically than Thailand. 
Successive governments in Thailand retained key personnel in the UCS to ensure that the 
programme succeeded to benefit all Thais regardless of who was in power 
(Tangcharoensathien et al., 2013). Thailand further attests to the importance of constant 
research, monitoring and updating of various aspects of its universal coverage programme 
including the benefit package, access to medicines, epidemiological transition and trends in 
OOP payments (Missoni et al., 2010). These initiatives have involved investment in local 
capacity to run the UCS based on evidence-informed policy making and drawing input from 
autonomous watchdog institutions such as civil society and the parliament 
(Tangcharoensathien et al., 2013, Missoni et al., 2010, WHO, 2012b). 
 
3.7.6 Setting targets for health care funding 
It is a challenge to set international benchmarks for UHC. However, most countries that 
have progressed to UHC have low levels of out-of-pocket payments and voluntary insurance 
and high volumes of mandatory prepaid funds of at least 60 % of the total health 
expenditure. McIntyre (2012) demonstrates that 60 % to 70 % of the total health 
expenditure in high- and middle-income countries that have progressed to universal 
coverage comes from mandatory sources. Therefore, setting a minimum target of over 60 % 
of the total health expenditure coming from mandatory prepaid funds may advance UHC in 
SSA. Although the Abuja Target is important in increasing government funding for health 
care, there is no evidence that it concretely supports progress towards UHC. Many countries 
have made significant progress to UHC with radically varied levels of government 
expenditure on health care relative to total government budget. Sri Lanka’s comprehensive 
coverage spends only 6.9 % of government budget on health care; Costa Rica spends 29 % 
and Thailand spends 14.3 %.  Other countries have the following spending patterns of 
government budget on health care: Rwanda (23.3 %); Ghana (12 %) and Gabon (6.6 %). The 
countries have high population coverage but indicate no correlations with the Abuja Target.  
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3.8 Conceptual Framework 
A country’s population can be categorised into groups in different ways. In this 
investigation, the population is categorised into three groups on the basis of work, namely: 
the formal sector population, the informal sector and the indigent population. Ability to pay 
is implicit in the conceptual framework because there is a distinction between the formal sector, the 
informal sector and the indigent population. This thesis focuses on the informal sector in an 
attempt to address questions surrounding prepayment for health care to ensure coverage 
for the informal sector. The study observes that coverage for the informal sector under a 
universal system cannot be addressed in isolation but rather in consideration of political 
factors, the macroeconomic environment, other population groups (formal sector and the 
indigent) and overall organisation of the health system.  
  
Drawing from the literature review, contextual factors (especially political and 
macroeconomic factors) play major roles in moving towards universal health coverage. 
These factors can determine whether a country approaches UHC from a targeted approach 
or from a universalist perspective. For example, it is a political decision to extend free 
maternal care at the point of service for all eligible Kenyans and such a targeted decision is 
partly out of consideration of economic realities of the country. On the other hand, Sri 
Lanka’s universalist approach to health services in general was a political decision and has 
been supported by relatively stable economic growth rate.  
  
Stuckler et al. (2010) and Tangcharoensathien et al. (2013) underscore the critical role of 
political leadership and ideology in the design and implementation of social policies to 
provide coverage to various population groups in a country whether on a contributory or 
non-contributory basis. The choice of a prepayment mechanism defines how revenues are 
sourced, collected and pooled, and to some extent the purchasing arrangements. For 
example, a contributory system would require formal and informal sector population to 
contribute a share of their income to a risk pool(s) while in a non-contributory system, 
general tax revenues could be used to provide substantial coverage to all population groups. 
  
The macroeconomic conditions prevalent in a country are as important as the pol itical 
decisions in progressing to universal coverage. The economic growth rate for example, 
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influences government spending generally and how much more can be spent on health care 
without interfering with expenditures on other government functions. A positive economic 
growth rate creates fiscal space that may allow governments to meet health expenditure 
targets such as the Abuja commitment of allocating 15% of national budget to health care as 
well as having a large pool of prepaid funds of up to 70% of the total health expenditure as 
suggested by (McIntyre, 2012). Having a large pool of prepaid funds is essential in expanding 
population and service coverage. Other macroeconomic factors such as unemployment 
rates are vital in the success of a prepayment system; for example, in contexts where the 
majority of the population have formal employment, either prepayment mechanisms  (tax or 
mandatory insurance) could be much easier to implement because more people are able to 
prepay and incomes in such contexts are also easy to identify and enforce revenue 
collection for health care.  
  
As much as the political and macroeconomic context influence choice and design of  a 
prepayment policy, all population groups (the formal sector, informal sector and the 
indigent population) need to buy into these policies. As a redistributive policy, UHC is pro-
poor and governments pursuing such policies often have the support of the masses (Herd, 
2005, Kristensen, 2007). However, the support may be diminished when services are of poor 
quality and generally inaccessible. Besides, corruption in the system makes people reluctant 
to buy into government programmes. For example, in Ghana (Apoya and Marriott, 2011, 
Salisu and Prinz, 2009) and Kenya (Wafula, 2012), the reports of widespread 
mismanagement of funds meant for health care erode trust and social solidarity to make 
people reluctant to prepay for health care. On the other hand, countries such as Rwanda 
with transparent governance have not only won donor confidence, but also the confidence 
of citizens who have successfully enrolled into health schemes (Logie et al., 2008). 
  
Across the different population groups, the level of social solidarity is essential for optimal 
redistribution of resources from the rich to the poor for sustainable UHC policies. For the 
target group (informal sector populations) the issue of redistribution is particularly critical 
because not all of them are poor and so do not expect to be fully subsidised. Moreover, 
given scarcity of financial resources, many governments have debated how informal sector 
resources can be tapped to prepay for health care. In view of such debates, regardless of the 
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prepayment approach, it is necessary to assess financial potential of informal sector 
activities to understand if they could provide a predictable source of funding for universal 
coverage, the specific constraints or problems informal sector populations experience with 
the health system as it is, as well as their views on an appropriate future prepayment 
mechanism. These are important factors with regard to prepayment for health care by the 
informal sector because the design of an appropriate prepayment system should consider 
these dimensions to provide coverage for the informal sector.  
 
Figure 3.13: Conceptual framework 
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This study adopted mixed-methods, cross-sectional and grounded theory approaches, 
involving both quantitative and qualitative data respectively. The rationale for using a 
mixed-method approach was because it facilitated the use of both statistical measurements 
as well as an in-depth understanding of variables of interest and was therefore best suited 
for generating rich data in line with the study objectives.  
  
The investigation was initiated by mapping activities within the informal sector, particularly 
with regard to the location and type of industry. This activity was then followed by 
conducting exploratory qualitative investigations on informal sector workers. Thirdly, a 
quantitative cross-sectional survey was designed, drawing on insights from the qualitative 
work. More investigations were undertaken with the aim of collecting qualitative data from 
policymakers particularly with regards to the health financing policy trajectory. Lastly, an 
assessment was carried out using the Simulation Insurance (SimIns®) software with a view 
to estimating the resource requirements and feasibility of contributory and non-
contributory financing models. 
 
4.2 Study setting 
 
The study was carried out in two counties within Kenya, namely, Nyeri County (located in 
the Central region of Kenya) and Mombasa County (based at the coastal region). These two 
regions were strategically chosen to represent rural and urban areas respectively. Mombasa 
County is sub-divided into two economic zones - the Central Business District (CBD), which is 
the commercial hub of Mombasa County, and the urban periphery, which mainly comprises 
residential estates and other commercial ventures. The Island district of Mombasa therefore 
represented the CBD in the study, whereas the estates were represented by the other 
districts.  Nyeri County is sub-divided into seven administrative districts, namely: Kieni East, 
Kieni West, Mukurweini, Nyeri East, Nyeri Central, Nyeri South, Mathira East and Mathira 
West. This investigation was conducted in Mathira East district, where a related study by 
colleagues at KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Research Programme, was taking place. This was 
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meant to minimise costs by using the same logistical network. Figure 4.1 shows a map of 
Kenya (in the main picture), Nyeri and Mombasa counties respectively, highlighting the 
actual locations where data was collected. (Maps of the districts in Nyeri County were not 
readily available and hence, have not been highlighted on the county map). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Brief comparative profiles of the two study sites 
 
Mombasa and Nyeri counties show similarities in that the economically active age bracket 
(from age 15 to 65 years) represents the highest percentage of both county populations 
(Mombasa at 68 % and Nyeri at 59.7 %, respectively)  (KNBS, 2010b). Mombasa County is 
classified as 100 % cosmopolitan urban area, where the main economic activity is tourism 
that accounts for over 75 % of the wage employment. Other economic activities include 
food processing and fishing (KNBS, 2010b). Conversely, Nyeri County is classified as 76 % 
rural area and ethnically homogeneous. The main source of income is subsistence 
agriculture, where the majority of the county population is employed. Farming activities 
include the cultivation of cash crops such as tea and coffee; subsistence crops like maize and 
potato production, animal husbandry and horticulture.  
Figure 4.1: Maps of the study sites 
1 
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Nyeri County, Karatina District 
(3) study site  
Mombasa County, Island (1) 
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KENYA  
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 Table 4.1 summarises the demographic, social and health indicators for both study 
counties.  
Table 4.1: Socio-demographic comparisons of Mombasa and Nyeri counties 
Indicators Mombasa Nyeri Kenya 
Population    
Population in mill ions (2011) 1.031 0.762 44.4 
Population density/ km2 4292 208 66 
Poverty rate % (Gini coefficient) 37.6 (0.365) 32.7 (0.365) 47.2 (0.445) 
Share of urban population (%) 100 24.5 32.3 
Health financing (2013)    
Per capita expenditure on health (KSh) (US$1= KSh 86) 935.0 3,315.0 3,145.0 
Insurance Coverage (% population) 20.9 32.9 17.1 
Maternal and child health    
Delivered at health facil ity 82.8 89.0 62.0 
Contraceptive prevalence (%) 47.4 66.4 58.0 
Fully immunized <1year (% 2010/11) 83.8 94.4 71.1 
Infant mortality rates/1000 births  43 27 52  
Under-5 mortality rates/1000 --- 34 74  
Maternal mortality rates/100000 --- -- 488 
Health personnel (public sector)    
Nurses per 100,000 people 62 105 49 
Doctors per 100,000 people 11 15 7 
Clinical officers per 100,000 people 9 11 8 
Disease specific indicators    
Malaria (% of all  outpatient visi ts) 31.5 3.2 27.7 
TB prevalence per 100,000 (2012) 535 234 223 
People l iving with HIV/AIDS (% county population) 7.48 2.73 3.9 
Number on antiretroviral treatment (% HIV+) 34.3 44.02 30.82 
Health facilities (Numbers)    
Public 51 103 4039 
Faith-based/NGO (FBO/NGO) 25 46 1258 
Private for-profit 270 231 2721 
Education    
Population with primary education (%) 56.9 61.4 66.6 
Population with secondary education (%) 15.3 19.8 12.7 
Sources: (Ministry of Health, 2013, KNBS, 2010a, KNBS, 2010b, Ministry of Health, 2014a) 
 
Both Mombasa and Nyeri counties perform better than the rest of the country with 
reference to most of the indicators. They manifest lower inequalities as compared to the 
other Kenyan counties in that they have identical Gini coefficients (0.365) as compared to 
the national average of 0.445. The two counties also demonstrated slight differences in their 
capacity to generate their own revenue and yet are classified as two of the eighteen 
counties considered to have strong revenue bases to meet most of the delivery costs of all 
services. Despite being largely rural, Nyeri County performs better than Mombasa with 
regard to all key indicators. However, although it has lower poverty rates than Mombasa, it 
registers a wider poverty gap of 11.6, as compared to Mombasa’s 8.7 rate. Consequently, 
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more effort needs to be concentrated on raising the standard of living in Nyeri in order to 
push those languishing in poverty in Nyeri above the poverty line. Nyeri County is also 
better off in terms of maternal and child health, financing of health care activities (including 
insurance coverage and per capita health expenditure), human resources for health, and 
educational attainment. The factors  likely to have contributed to better maternal and child 
health outcomes in Nyeri County (as compared to Mombasa County) include: the combined 
effect of higher levels of education; lower poverty rates; lower disease burden; and better 
resourcing of health personnel and financing in Nyeri County. 
 
In terms of access to health services and financial protection, the indicators including 
number of public and FBO/NGO health facilities relative to population density, per capita 
health expenditure (Nyeri= US$ 38.6 and Mombasa= US$ 10.9) and health insurance 
coverage, show better performance in Nyeri County than Mombasa County.  The two 
counties registered above average in terms of the health worker to population ratio.  
Nevertheless, there are inadequate numbers of health workers in Kenya, including in these 
districts, which subsequently affects the access to health services. On the national scale, the 
doctor to population ratio is approximately 7:100000; the ratio in Mombasa County is 
approximately 11:100000 and Nyeri is 15:100000. All these are far below the WHO 
recommended 1:600 (Ministry of Health, 2014a).  
 
4.3 Sampling and sample size determination  
4.3.1 Choice of the two counties 
 
The choice of Mombasa County was based on the fact that major studies about the informal 
sector conducted by a number of authors (Kinyanjui, 2010, Mathauer et al., 2008, Orwa, 
2007, Mitullah, 2003), were concentrated in Nairobi. Consequently, the choice of a different 
setting other than the capital city therefore offered diversity in the type of data collected 
and information gathered concerning the informal economy of urban environments. The 
rationale to select the exact areas to sample for primary data was based on the expert 
opinions provided by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, the Mombasa County Council 
and local community leaders regarding sub-counties with the highest concentration and 
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diversity of informal sector businesses. On the basis of this information, Kisauni and 
Mombasa Island districts were selected for the study.  
  
It was considered necessary to include a rural setting for investigation in this study because 
numerous studies conducted previously tended to leave out subsistence agriculture and 
confine their definition of the informal sector only to the non-agricultural informal sector. 
Approximately 68 % of Kenyans reside in rural areas, where the main informal sector activity 
is subsistence agriculture. This was the justification for including the farming dimension as 
part of the investigation of the informal sector. The choice of Nyeri County was purposive 
based on the fact that it has a long history of having Community Based Health Insurance 
(CBHI) schemes. This was a clear indication that the population was potentially aware of 
health insurance issues and hence their insights and experiences would be important for 
this study, particularly in relation to exploring alternative prepayment mechanisms. 
Furthermore, Nyeri County is a high potential agricultural zone, which was essential for 
interpreting the income potential and diversity of the agricultural informal sector in a rural 
area. In addition, a related study was conducted in the area KEMRI-Wellcome Trust 
Research Programme which explored the distribution and burden of health financing and 
health care benefits among rural communities. The linkage between the two investigations 
was meant to increase efficiency and minimize data collection costs.  
 
4.3.2 Sampling stages  
After identifying the two study sites, a stratified five-stage and four-stage sample design was 
applied for the rural and urban sites respectively, to arrive at Primary Sampling Units (PSU). 
The rural site was stratified into the existing administrative zones comprising of divisions, 
locations and villages (see Figure 4.2). The village, as the smallest sampling unit, was 
selected as the Enumeration Area (EA). Since the divisions were on the whole, 
homogenously engaged in subsistence agriculture, one division with a large market was 
purposively selected to obtain a mix of the agricultural and non-agricultural informal sector 
activities in rural areas. From this division, a list of locations and villages were obtained and 
randomly selected. Two locations and six villages participated in the study. From these 
villages economic units were mapped and randomly selected.   
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From the village EAs, informal economic units were mapped and a random sample selected 
from the final list. For the agricultural informal sector, households represented economic 
units (farms) and were screened during the mapping stage to ensure that no one engaged in 
formal work was recruited for the survey. The owners or managers working within the 
agricultural informal sector were interviewed at home except for the few who were found 
at the farms and preferred to be interviewed on site.  
 
Figure 4.2: Five-stage sampling in the rural study site 
 
 
 
 
 
In the selected urban site, a list of ten estates with high concentration of informal sector 
entities was obtained from the town authorities. From this list, four estates were 
purposively selected based on expert opinion as having the largest concentration of 
informal economic units. The estates including the CBD made up a total of four enumeration 
areas (EAs) for the urban area. Others were Bombolulu, Kisauni and Bamburi. The 
justification for this was the need to capture a large diversity in the type and size of informal 
activities. From the estates, a list of 13 locations, the equivalent of villages, was obtained 
out of which eight were randomly selected (two from each estate) and economic units were 
mapped and thereafter randomly selected.  Figure 4.3 illustrates the sampling stages for the 
urban study site. The areas where informal activities were concentrated in the urban area 
included the main streets of the CBD and estates, along other major roads, and central 
locations such as markets and other designated areas.  
 
Figure 4.3: Four-stage sampling in the urban study site  
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units 
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Locations 
(Purposive sampling)            (Random sampling)         (Random sampling)            (Random sampling)    
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The sampling procedure did not wholly undertake the frequently used mixed survey method 
of first identifying households, followed by the identification of informal sector operations 
because, such a procedure would increase the sampling errors in a study that involves the 
informal sector. The said sampling procedure assumes that the informal sector players 
resided in the same cluster as the household member, which was not always the case, 
particularly in the urban area. The Delhi Group Dheli Group (2005) recommends a listing of 
informal sector activities, sampling and conducting interviews at the work place as the most 
viable option. However, when it comes to identification of the agricultural informal sector, a 
listing of households followed by home interviews was the only viable option because it was 
logistically impractical to list down farms and interview at the same places.  
 
The random samples were selected using Excel spreadsheet. The units of analysis were 
individual informal economic entities. Owners of these units were interviewed as first 
priority; otherwise, their representatives assumed to have full information for the study 
were interviewed. 
4.3.3 Sample size for quantitative data  
 
When designing this study, it was unclear what proportion of informal sector groups in 
Kenya had the capacity to prepay for health care on a regular basis. Consequently, in order 
to calculate the sample size, a conservative approach that maximized the N, based on 
previous studies (Mitullah and Wachira, 2003) was to assume an estimate of 50% as the 
proportion of informal sector groups that could sustainably prepay for health care. This 50% 
estimate was taken with a precision of ±5.0% and the sample size powered at 80%. The 
Principal Investigator (PI) decided upon 5% as a good value for precision. Because of the 
sensitivity of interrogating the informants about their investments, income and expenditure, 
the chances of non-responses were expected to potentially be high. Hence, in order to cater 
for the non-responses, the calculated sample size was scaled up by 30% with all non-
responses being recorded. 
 
Given the information above, the following formula was used to calculate the sample size 
(plus 30% non-response rate): 
  (Zcrit)
2 p(1 – p) 
  
D2 
 
N =  = 499 (≈500) economic units 
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-where N represented the sample size of the study group, the Zcrit value is = 1.96, p (=0.5) is a 
pre-study estimate of the proportion to be measured (that is, the proportion of informal 
sector entities that have financial potential) and D (=0.05) is the total width of the expected 
confidence interval (CI).  
  
More weight was given to the urban area because it represented greater diversity and 
density of informal economic activities and was therefore expected to record higher non-
response rates than the rural area. Moreover, the fact that rural EAs were predominantly 
subsistence agriculture (75 % of the economic units); a smaller sample size was required to 
achieve reliability and ensure the validity of data. In view of this, the urban sample consisted 
of 350 economic units, while the rural sample size was made up of 150 economic units. The 
allocation of sample sizes for rural and urban areas was based on the near-homogeneity of 
the informal sector activities in the rural area which therefore required a smaller sample 
size; secondly, it was based on the observation that nearly 80% of new informal sector 
employment created is non-agricultural and in the urban area (Government of Kenya, 
2010a). For this reason a conservative estimate of 75% of the sample size was allocated to 
the urban area in line with current employment trends in the informal sector. This relatively 
fair distribution of the sample size allows for comparative analysis between rural and urban 
study sites. 
4.3.4 Sample size for qualitative data 
Sample size for qualitative data was not fixed but a conservative estimate was given as 12 
focus group discussions (FGDs), 17 in-depth interviews at community level and five at 
national level. Purposive and snow-balling sampling strategies were used to collect the 
qualitative data from the informants during the interview sessions. However, this largely 
depended on the type of information required. A case in point is that the sampling of key 
informants to interview at the community level was based on recommendations from local 
contact persons based on characteristics prescribed by the PI. These characteristics included 
variables such as level of education; social standing in the community; and level of 
engagement with various activities such as health, education, politics and social organisation 
at the grassroots level. The objective was to identify key informants who had a holistic view 
of their society as well as a mix of experiences gained elsewhere. Moreover, they had to be 
residents of the study sites and actively working in the informal sector. Sampling for the 
FGDs involved ordinary members of the study sites with the only eligibility criteria being 
that the individual had worked in the informal sector as the main source of livelihood and 
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therefore could sustain a credible discussion on the sector. The FGDs were stratified into 
male and female groups to allow for free discussions.  
  
At a policy level, managers in government and organisations such as the World Health 
Organisation (WHO), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
German Technical Agency (GTZ) were purposively sampled to provide an overview of the 
health policy direction, challenges and feasibility of policy proposals in providing financial 
risk protection for the informal sector. Their views were also elicited on alternative 
mechanisms to move towards universal health coverage in general and specific coverage of 
the informal sector.  
4.4 Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
 
Adult owners or managers of informal economic enterprises (which includes ‘solo’ 
enterprises, i.e. those without any other employees) were included in the study. Those 
excluded were children below the age of 18 years.  
4.5 Data collection approaches 
4.5.1 Initiating contact with the study sites 
Individuals working for the Government of Kenya and NGOs were contacted either through 
contacts that existed before the study or scheduled appointments through phone calls and 
e-mails. In total 11 people were contacted prior to the start of data collection as  part of 
mobilisation of study participants that targeted individuals that were considered as having 
the capacity to assist in the mobilisation process. These included two health policy heads at 
the MOH, four community leaders in the rural area and five in the urban site. 
  
The urban study site potentially posed more challenges in terms of penetration and 
establishing contacts because it was a new study site with no previous contacts. 
Consequently, establishing contacts in this site was initiated slightly longer than a month 
before the commencement of data collection. In contrast, the rural study site was easily 
engaged because of previous or on-going research activities by the group in which the 
Principal Investigator (PI) was based. 
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Prior to the commencement of this study, the very first contacts for both study sites were 
made with the county health managers and county statistics offices. The purpose was 
mainly to inform them about the proposed study and also to obtain relevant documents 
necessary for conducting a desk review and for sampling purposes. In addition, crucial 
contacts to assist in getting informants from the grassroots level were made with respective 
county local authorities (chiefs and village elders). This was to inform them of the intention 
to conduct the study and get their verbal authority to do so. Furthermore, it was necessary 
to seek logistical help in identifying venues to train the research assistants on interviewing 
strategies and FGDs, as well as recruitment of study participants and interviewers.  
  
The logistical and political challenges posed in the urban area called for at least six meetings 
with leaders of various groups identified through local authorities. These groups included 
welfare, savings and investment groups, youth political leaders and leaders of vigilante 
groups. Following a month of mobilisation, a large meeting was organized comprising of the 
study PI and community representatives. The purpose of the meeting was to explain the 
nature of the investigation and to identify potential challenges and community expectations 
of the study. Some of the pertinent issues raised by the audience included the following: 
 In Mombasa County, the recruitment of interviewers was complicated by the 
leaders who insisted that they had to be natives of the coastal region. This was 
resolved by sharing the names of all interviewers with the local leaders to 
ascertain that 10 out of 12 interviewers were natives if the Coastal region. 
 Interviewers for the study had to be introduced to the key informants by the 
local leaders; otherwise the informants were hostile to strangers unfamiliar to 
them. Moreover, there was a general suspicion that the Government wanted to 
make the informal sector pay income taxes. Hence, anyone asking questions 
about activities within the informal sector was treated with suspicion as being a 
government agent sent to make members of the informal sector pay income tax. 
This was resolved by holding meetings with local leaders and explaining 
ourselves clearly as researchers from KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Research 
Programme. 
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 The timing of the interviews was considered crucial. For instance, it was 
recommended that the workers in the informal sector food industry should be 
interviewed from mid-morning onwards because they were very busy serving 
customers early in the morning. Other workers in the clothing and beauty 
industry could be interviewed at any time of the day whereas open market 
traders could be only be interviewed towards noon.  
  
There were no major incidents during the study except in the urban area where a political 
group stopped the study for a day pending verification of the ethnic origins of interviewers. 
Some local leaders insisted that all of the interviewers had to be natives of the region. Out 
of the twelve interviewers, two were not natives of the coastal area. This was motivated on 
the basis that there was a need to embrace other regions as a sign of progress towards 
national unity. Ethnic tensions remain a major problem in Kenya.  
  
A standardised questionnaire was administered to all individuals who were directly involved 
in the management of sampled informal economic activities on a day-to-day basis. All of the 
interviews for the non-agricultural informal sector activities were conducted at various 
places of work specifically to improve response rates.  One key feature of the informal 
sector is that it has high mobility and turnover, which means that replacing non-contact 
economic units by other units should be avoided because it leads to biased results. 
4.5.2 Recruitment and training of interviewers 
 
Two groups of interviewers administered a standardised questionnaire. They were recruited 
from within the respective study sites and each group was trained for ten days, which 
included lectures and role-plays after which the questionnaire was piloted before actual 
data collection. As a basic requirement, the interviewers had to be proficient in local 
languages (Kikuyu for rural area and Swahili for the urban site). Although the minimum level 
of education for potential interviewees was set at secondary school level, most applicants 
and eventual interviewers were university graduates or students and other middle-level 
college graduates. The calibre of interviewers ensured that high quality data were collected. 
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The PI could not effectively communicate in the local language in the rural area so an 
experienced FGD facilitator (a lecturer at a local university) was recruited and briefed on the 
study and FGD tool. He then facilitated all rural FGDs with the support of a note-taker. The 
PI facilitated all urban FGDs and conducted all in-depth interviews in both sites because 
participants were proficient in Swahili and sometimes English. All study tools were piloted 
and any inconsistencies that arose, for example in translations from English to Kiswahili or 
another language, were resolved with the help of interviewers. Data were collected for 
about nine months in 2012. 
 
4.5.3 Data collection methods  
Data were collected in phases using different methods including document reviews, 
mapping, focus group discussions, in-depth interviews and questionnaire survey. The 
questionnaire was the main tool for quantitative data collection. Data collection phases are 
outlined in Figure 4.4 followed by a detailed description of the methods in each phase. 
Appendix B (numbers B1 – B4) has all the data collection tools. 
 
Figure 4.4: Data collection processes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5.3.1 Phase 1: Document reviews and mapping informal sector activities 
Phase 1:  
Document reviews (throughout 
the s tudy): include policy 
documents, government reports, 
peer-reviewed and grey l iterature 
 
Mapping informal sector activities 
(N=2721): geographical locations, 
types  of activi ties.  
Phase 3: Survey [N=455 (Rura l=129; 
Urban=326)]. Samples drawn from 
informal sector economic units or 
households representing farms as 
economic units  
Information collected: 
- Abi l ity to prepay for health -care 
- Preferred prepayment system 
- Experiences with the health system 
- Priori ty health services to informal 
sector workers 
 
Phase 4: In-depth interviews (N= 9)  
Officials from development partners, MOH, NHIF and MOF 
 
Information collected: Health Policy tra jectory; fi scal space; 
pol itical commitment to financial protection and universal 
coverage; taxation designs for informal sector; priority health 
services; characteristics of informal sector groups that can 
prepay for health care 
 
Phase 2:  
Focus group discussions [N= 16 (Rura l=7, 
Urban=9)] with informal sector workers;  
In-depth interviews with informal sector 
workers (N=26) 
Information collected: Various income 
generating activities and their 
sustainability, main health concerns, 
characteristics of groups with ability to 
prepay for health care, views on 
prepayment  
 
 
Phase 5:  
Data  search and review for SimIns 
modelling and fiscal space analysis 
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Document reviews continued throughout the study. The reviews were meant to provide 
information on global, regional and national economies and trends in informal sector 
growth, the status of health financing and universal coverage. The national data were 
important in guiding purposive sampling for in-depth interviews with policymakers at 
selected institutions and for developing study tools. The documents were obtained online 
from international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
as well as from local ministries of Health, Finance, Economic Planning and Vision 2030, and 
the Central Bank, the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), the Kenya Revenue 
Authority (KRA) and the NHIF.   
 
Importantly, secondary sources were instrumental in getting data used in modelling the 
feasibility of contributory and non-contributory mandatory prepayment financing 
mechanisms in Kenya and estimating the financial resource requirements for universal 
coverage. The model required data on the population and workforce structure, macro 
economy, health care unit costs, health care utilisation rates, social health insurance 
coverage, public finance, MOH and private health expenditures.    
  
Initial stages of the study involved mapping of informal sector activities in each of the study 
sites. The mapping exercise was crucial in establishing sampling frames for both rural and 
urban study sites and getting to know the range of non-agricultural informal sector 
economic activities.  Mapping also helped to mobilise informal sector workers for 
participation in FGDs and in-depth interviews. A research team physically walked around the 
whole area, undertaking a complete census and marking the location of each informal entity 
on hand-drawn maps. Existing informal sector entities were classified according to industry 
type. It is noteworthy that these entities have high concentration in along major roads and 
designated areas, which were used as the basis for selecting the study sites. Informal 
businesses were identified through screening questions during mapping (100% were 
informal). The screening was done with regard to name and gender of owner/manager, type 
of business, location and telephone numbers to enable future follow up. 
 
 
4.5.3.2 Phase Two: Exploratory focus group discussions (FGDs) and in-depth interviews 
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The FGDs were done on an exploratory basis to help in understanding vulnerabilities in 
informal sector work, the workers’ engagement with the health system and their views on 
prepaid health care and universal coverage. The FGDs were also used to understand what 
the informal sector preferred in terms of on-going health sector reforms for universal 
coverage so as to build scenarios to test in the survey. Separate discussions were held with 
purposively selected groups of men and women who were directly in charge of different 
informal economic entities (See appendices B1 & B2 for tools).  
  
The decision to conduct FGDs with informal sector workers in this study was driven by the 
need for a large diversity of views on various topics about the health system. As Lewis 
(2009) suggests, the advantage with FGDs is that they give participants time to refine what 
they say since the interactions involve discussion and hearing from others. They also 
encourage verbal communication and are efficient in discovering underlying attitudes and 
motivations towards a phenomenon (Lofland and Lofland, 1995, Patton, 2002). Mack et al. 
(2005) also support the use of FGDs to explore a phenomenon because FGDs ensure free 
flow of information and allow for agreements and disagreements. The participants for the 
FGD were selected with the help of local leaders who were asked to select participants 
representing various informal sector entities from all corners of the study sites.  
 
The first round of in-depth interviews was conducted at community level with informal 
sector workers purposively selected as key informants. The aim of these interviews was to 
provide individual insights into key issues arising from the FGDs with regards to informal 
sector vulnerabilities, sustainability, prepaid health care and choice of prepayment 
mechanisms. The objective was to elicit rich and detailed material that could be used to 
inform universal health financing policy targeting the informal sector. Lewis (2009) agrees 
that in-depth interviews provide an opportunity for a detailed investigation of each person’s 
perspective. Besides, they emphasise verbal communication and are preferred because of 
their efficiency at discovering underlying attitudes and motivations towards an intervention 
or situation (Lofland and Lofland, 1995, Patton, 2002).  
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In-depth interviews and FGDs were conducted until the researcher noted no new 
information was being added in the subsequent interviews. A decision to stop further 
interviews was made on this basis.  
 
4.5.3.3 Phase 3: Cross-sectional Survey  
The aim of the survey was to provide data that could be statistically tested while collecting 
information on various aspects of the informal sector including socio-demographic 
characteristics, experiences with public sector health provision, preferred prepayment 
mechanisms and sustainability or vulnerabilities in informal sector work. Moser and Kalton 
(1979) observe that a survey is the ideal method in a study that aims to describe the 
characteristics of a large population (such as the informal sector) because it facilitates a 
study of large samples, which makes the results statistically significant even when analysing 
multiple variables. The survey used a questionnaire and because this is a standardised tool, 
it is quite reliable because observer subjectivity is minimised (Moser and Kalton, 1979). The 
primary respondents in the survey involved a randomly selected sample of informal sector 
workers who were directly in charge of daily affairs of the informal economic entities (See 
Appendix B3 for tool). Explanatory variables were developed from qualitative interviews. 
The qualitative tools were developed from a review of the literature on the informal sector. 
As an exploratory study, there were no prior studies looking at factors determining 
sustainability of enterprises and so the variables emerged from qualitative interviews . 
 
4.5.3.4 Phase 4: In-depth interviews at government policy level  
The last phase of interviews was at national policy level targeting individuals at 
management level from various government departments/ministries and non-government 
organisations (Appendix B4 for tool).  
 
Table 4.2 is a summary of the actual number of participants involved in the study. 
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Table 4.2: Details of the actual number of participants involved in the study 
Interview Tools Number in Rural Number in Urban Total 
Male Female Male Female 
1. Number of focus group 
discussions (Participants) 
3(23) 4(29) 5(49) 4(27) 16(128) 
2. Number of individual in-depth 
interviews (IDI), community 
level  
8 6 9 3 26 
3. Number of individual in-depth 
interviews (IDI), national policy 
level  
--- --- --- --- 9 
4. Questionnaire based cross-
sectional survey 
65 
 
64 234 92 455 
 
 
4.6 Data analysis 
 
4.6.1 Quantitative data 
 
Initial steps in the analysis involved the PI cross-checking questionnaire data immediately 
upon being returned by interviewers to ensure that all data were correctly captured and 
that no questions were omitted.  The questionnaire data were then coded numerically by 
the PI and double-entered into predesigned data entry spread-sheets in FoxPro and 
Microsoft Excel by trained data entry clerks. All data were saved in password-protected files. 
  
Data were transferred to Stata Version 11 for analysis. They were categorised and grouped 
to give a summary of results using descriptive statistics. The descriptive statistics used 
included frequency distribution and percentages, measures of central tendency (mean), and 
measures of dispersion (standard deviation). This kind of analysis was meant to estimate the 
relative importance of the key factors of all variables (dependent and independent). 
Pearson’s correlation and T-tests were conducted to define the association between 
selected variables that were critical in explaining specific results.  
  
A binary logit regression was used to develop a model to predict lifespan of informal sector 
enterprises using independent variables arrived at through step-wise analysis. Since 
stepwise regression is best suited in the exploratory phase of research, there were no a-
priori assumptions regarding the relationships between the variables. The objective was to 
discover relationships between dependent and independent variables. Backward stepwise 
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regression was used in the analysis where a saturated model was employed and variables 
were eliminated in an iterative process. The fit of the model was tested afterwards to 
ensure that the model adequately fitted the data.  
  
The independent variables in the saturated model were as follows: age; gender; marital 
status; level of education; household size; household head; socioeconomic status (self-
assessed); employment status; monthly expenditure; number of employees; location of 
business; type of structure in which business is conducted; business registration status; 
owning a bank account and land ownership. The regression equation below was used for 
advancing the model as used in the analysis: 
  
Logit (p) = log (p/(1-p))= β0 + β1*X1 + β2*X2 + β3*X3 ... + βk*xk 
 
Where: 
p = Expected value of the dependent variable; that is, the probability of a business surviving 
for more than 5 years as a measure of success. 
β1, β2, β3, βk = Slope parameters  
X1, X2, X3, Xk = independent variables  
  
The regression model assumes the following: the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables is not linear; the dependent variable is dichotomous; the 
independent variables need not be interval, nor normally distributed, nor linearly related, 
nor of equal variance within each group, and the categories (groups) are mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive. Significance levels were measured at 95% confidence level with significant 
differences set at an alpha level of 0.05 (p< 0.05). Tests for multi-collinearity, tests for 
combining outcome categories as well as link test were conducted to ensure rigour in the 
model.  
4.6.2 Qualitative data 
 
All qualitative data were captured through audio-recordings. All recordings that were in 
Kikuyu, an ethnic language not properly understood by the PI, were translated into English 
by the university lecturer who facilitated the FGDs. The data were later transcribed by 
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colleagues trained for this purpose. The PI transcribed all policy-level and some key-
informant interviews. The PI took time to listen to a number of recorded 
interviews/discussions with informal sector workers and compared the audio-interviews and 
interview notes with transcriptions to ascertain consistency and accuracy of transcriptions. 
All transcriptions were processed electronically. 
  
Using both deductive and inductive methods, intensive analysis of qualitative data began as 
soon as they were collected to avoid backlogs and to get data to inform the survey design. 
Key thematic areas were developed prior to analysis in line with study objectives that 
helped in organising data for analysis. These were as follows: the range of activities and 
experiences of work in the informal sector, experiences with current health services, 
concepts about and preferred design of prepaid health care, and financial potential of 
informal sector activities. At the policy level, data concentrated on four thematic areas: the 
state of health financing, health financing policy direction and prepayment designs, and 
possible sources of funding for universal coverage.  
  
Data were organised and coded using QSR NVivo 7.0. Analysis was performed by developing 
a matrix of emerging categories and themes. Data from each theme or category was 
identified and analysed using constant comparison (Thorne, 2000). Concepts and themes 
identified from various qualitative data sources were compared. The analytical categories 
were then explained and interpreted in line with the research objectives and the themes 
developed from the data (Malterud, 2001). The researcher took note of his role in producing 
certain categories of knowledge; how and why certain conclusions were arrived at and how 
the results function to shape informal sector knowledge, understanding and demand for 
financial risk protection.  
  
4.6.3 Modelling using Simulation Insurance (SimIns)  
(See Appendix C for model assumptions and justification) 
The WHO/GTZ Simulation Insurance (SimIns®) software comes in two versions - SimIns Basic 
and SimIns Plus which is the more advanced and data intensive version. The modelling used 
SimIns Basic, Version 2.1. The initial intention was to use SimIns Plus, but the SimIns manual 
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does not provide sufficiently detailed information on key variables and on the functioning of 
the model.  After endeavouring to produce interpretable results with SimIns Plus over an 
extended period of time, the decision was made to use SimIns Basic instead.  
 
The modelling involved an assessment of feasibility and financial resource requirements for 
universal health coverage through contributory social health insurance in Kenya in line with 
government health financing policy direction. Further modelling was done to assess the 
feasibility of a non-contributory financing system as an alternative to the contributory 
model. Inputs to SimIns Basic drew on secondary data from various data-bases including 
international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, relevant national government 
data from various ministries as well as peer-reviewed and grey literature from across the 
globe.  
  
The primary use of SimIns® is financial projection of SHI schemes but can also forecast for 
CBHIs, which fits Kenya government policy on contributory health insurance for UHC. As a 
policy simulation tool, SimIns projects financial resource needs based on certain 
assumptions over a 10-year period. From its manual, SimIns works by varying key variables 
in health insurance: population coverage, incomes, health insurance contributions, co-
payments, health care unit costs and utilisation rates- according to population groups and 
up to 15 health service categories. SimIns has four principal uses as indicated in Box 1. 
 
Box 1: Principal uses of SimIns 
1. To il lustrate the impact of initial policies with respect to key health insurance variables, 
thus informing about the financial implications of different policy options (as opposed 
to setting them). 
2. To determine what combination of health insurance contributions, health service 
util isation patterns and health care costs can ensure financial equilibrium in a dynamic, 
changing environment. 
3. To il lustrate the impact of health insurance on the overall  structure of health financing. 
4. To il lustrate the impact of health insurance on public finance. 
 
Source: SimIns manual 
 
 
Trend analysis and projections for the data fed into the SimIns Basic model were carried out 
in Microsoft Excel worksheets before being transferred into the model for analysis and 
interpretation of output. Data from various sources (national, regional and global) were 
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triangulated to strengthen assumptions and arrive at credible data as used in the model so 
as to predict, as closely as possible, the future resource requirements for universal 
coverage.  
  
One limitation is that although SimIns only projects over a 10-year period, the model is less 
realistic where economic uncertainty is greater. To make up for this limitation, data inputted 
in the model have been triangulated involving analyses of similar contexts and trends in 
various countries and regions of the world. A detailed description of the model assumptions 
and data sources is given in Chapter Eight. For clarity, SimIns is designed to do projections 
for 10 years but this study did a 17-year projection with initial 10 years and using data for 
the 10th year to do projections for another 7 years. 
4.7 Measures of reliability and validity 
 
A number of steps were taken to ensure that the data obtained and analysed, were reliable 
and valid. These checks and balances included the following: 
 A relatively large sample size was selected from the outset to reduce sampling error. 
 A mixed methods approach involving quantitative and qualitative data was used to 
capture statistically measurable data as well as seek a detailed understanding of 
informal sector workers’ views on important aspects of financial risk protection and 
universal coverage. 
 Tools were piloted to ensure that inconsistencies in the tools were eliminated and that 
all individuals using the tools clearly understood what kind of information they were 
meant to collect.  
 Selection bias was eliminated through random sampling and by not replacing non-
responses.  
 Interviewers in both study sites were thoroughly trained on the study and the 
questionnaire tool in order to reduce the incidence of non-sampling errors. 
 The study had manageable recall periods for the participants (maximum six months) 
to reduce non-sampling errors. The recall capability of the study participants was 
also enhanced by regular events such as routine expenditures. Liedholm (1991 ) 
acknowledges that such events that occur regularly over a period of time create a 
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pattern of experience for the respondents and enables them to remember these 
events more easily.  
 Employment of multiple analytical strategies as explained earlier for the results to be 
as objective as possible.  
4.8 Ethical consideration 
 
Ethical approval was sought from the ethics review committees of the Kenya Medical 
Research Institute (KEMRI) and the University of Cape Town, before commencement of data 
collection.  
  
Participation in the study was voluntary and written informed consent was sought from all 
participating adults. The consent process was done in the participants’ mother-tongue for 
accuracy of information. Participants were assured of confidentiality regarding information 
arising from the interviews and how such information would be managed and used. It was 
explained to the respondents that the benefits of the study were not immediate and would 
be more communal than individual especially in its potential contribution to understanding 
of health care financing strategies to progress towards universal coverage. However, those 
participating might have felt inconvenienced with time spent in the interviews. Participants 
who had spent money on transportation to the interview site were reimbursed. All 
interviews were scheduled at a time that least interfered with respondents’ economic 
activities. 
 
4.9 Limitations of the study 
 
This study had the following limitations: 
 The study only considered two locations- rural and urban, but the rural area may not 
be representative of typical rural areas for two reasons: (i) it had high agricultural 
potential so naturally was economically better-off than many other rural areas in 
Kenya; (ii) it had a long history of CBHIs which could possibly have influenced the 
findings.  
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 The study was exploratory and so it did not engage in complex quantitative analysis 
but rather concentrated on more descriptive and some inferential analysis of 
primary quantitative data.  
 Since there was more focus on defining a desirable future health system from the 
perspective of the informal sector, this study did not provide much detail of 
utilisation of services by the informal sector.  
 There were only two counties involved in the study out of a poss ible 47 counties and 
the counties studied were relatively economically better-off than most counties in 
Kenya so there should be some caution in generalising the results particularly in 
relation to very poor counties.  
A larger study of this nature could help in addressing some of these limitations. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE INFORMAL SECTOR- DIVERSITY AND FINANCIAL POTENTIAL 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The chapter is an analysis of informal sector work in terms of the range of economic entities, 
their income potential and demographic characteristics of the workers. The analysis is 
important because the informal sector plays an important role in economic growth and job 
creation in many developing countries across the world. Secondly, in situations where 
informal sector workers are expected to contribute financial resources to move towards 
universal coverage, it is important to understand the nature of economic entities and the 
extent to which they are able to support a prepaid health system. The findings in this 
chapter are presented in five parts: (i) an overview of the sampled informal sector 
enterprises in terms of the range and classification into specific industries as well as 
descriptions of their locations, legal status and role as sources of livelihoods; (ii) the socio-
demographic characteristics of informal sector workers in terms of their household 
characteristics, age, gender and level of education; (iii) the structure of employment in the 
informal sector; that is, categories of workers, employment by type of industry and by 
gender and level of education; (iv) the factors that influence choice of work in the informal 
sector and, (v) an analysis of financial potential of informal sector enterprises taking into 
consideration such factors as key indicators of financial potential, sustainability and 
expenditure patterns of the enterprises. The words ‘entities’, ‘enterprises’ and ‘units’ have 
been used interchangeably to denote informal sector work, both agricultural and non-
agricultural. 
 
5.2 Overview of informal sector entities involved in the study 
 
5.2.1 Forms and classification of informal sector work 
 
A mapping exercise was conducted to identify and classify types of informal sector 
enterprises (industries) in the study sites. The mapping also served as a platform for 
mobilising informal sector workers for FGDs and in-depth interviews as well as acting as a 
sampling-frame for the questionnaire survey. About 2537 informal enterprises were 
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mapped in both urban and rural study sites (urban= 1739 and rural=798) and classified into 
various industries (Table 5.1).  
 
Table 5.1: Identification and classification of various informal economic entities 
Groups of enterprises  Industry classification 
1. Retail  and wholesale shops sell ing a variety of mostly basic household 
consumables 
Shop-keeping 
 
2. Sports-bars; pubs; audio and video centres; electronics including radio, television 
sets and music systems, and photo studios  
Entertainment 
3. Small scale sale of vegetables and fruits, potatoes, nuts, buns, maize, among 
others  
Food vending 
4. Mobile money transfer services, internet and photocopy shops  Telecommunication 
5. Workshops for repair of motor vehicles and electronics, plumbers, painters  Repair & maintenance 
6. Local clothes, imported new and used clothes and shoes, salons, barber -shops, 
various beauty products including perfumes, necklaces;  and massage parlours  
Clothing & beauty 
industry 
7. Informal medical facilities for humans and livestock, chemists, herbalists, 
traditional healers 
Health & medical  
8. Wood products (carpentry, wood-carving); pottery and all  other forms of 
handiwork 
Manufacturing & Craft 
9. Eateries including restaurants and food kiosks as well as butcheries and 
fishmongers  
Hotel & food kiosks 
10.  Public motor transport system not registered under the companies act as well as 
transportation by motorcycles  
Transportation 
11.  Small scale agricultural entities including crop farming and livestock  Subsistence farming 
12.  Brick and block making, sale of construction materials including hardware shops  Construction 
13.  Fuel such as paraffin, charcoal and firewood Energy 
14.  Stationery products, bookshops  Stationery 
15.  Scrap-metal, water-vending, housing estate agencies  Others  
 
 
A total of 455 entities (rural= 129 and urban= 326) were recruited out of a target sample of 
500 economic units (Table 5.2). From this table, food vending (20.6%) is the dominant non-
agricultural informal sector entity in the urban area followed by manufacturing/craft 
(16.6%) and hotel and food kiosks (10.4%). In the rural area, transportation dominates  the 
non-agricultural informal sector followed by manufacturing and crafts. These findings may 
not be comparable with those by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) (2007) 
because of different methods of classification and the fact that the KNBS did a nation-wide 
study. Whereas the KNBS classified informal sector work into six categories: manufacturing 
(21.7%), building and construction (2.9%), wholesale, retail, hotels and restaurant (58.7%), 
transport and communication (3.0%), community, social and personal services (9.3%), and 
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others (4.5%), this thesis has identified 15 industry categories which provide a finer 
breakdown of informal sector entities (Table 5.2).  
 
5.2.2 The informal sector as a source of livelihoods 
 
Most workers in the informal sector relied on their enterprises as their main and often the 
only source of livelihood. For example, 85% of study participants in the urban site and 89% 
in the rural site stated that they depended wholly on the respective entities as their main 
source of income, which may mean that the enterprises and farms were somehow 
financially dependable to sustain informal sector populations. For those who did not depend 
on the sampled economic units as their main source of income, some of them relied on 
formal jobs (rural= 25% and urban= 48%); other informal sector work (rural= 25% and 
urban= 18%); and remittances (rural= 56.3% and urban= 33.3%). Findings on the informal 
sector as the main source of livelihoods for most workers in the sector are similar to Mbaye 
(2014) who noted that across Africa, between 80% and 90% of informal sector operators 
depend on their enterprises as the main source of livelihood. In Nepal, Timalsina (2007) 
observes that 85% of informal sector workers in the rural area fully depended on their 
respective economic entities as the main source of income.  
Table 5.2: Number and proportion of informal sector entities participating in the survey 
Industry category Rural Urban Total 
No. % No. % No. % 
Food vending 1 0.8 67 20.6 68 15 
Shop-keeping 3 2.3 27 8.3 300 6.6 
Entertainment 1 0.8 25 7.7 26 5.7 
Telecommunication 1 0.8 11 3.4 12 2.6 
Manufacturing/ crafts  7 5.4 54 16.6 61 13.4 
Cloth & beauty 1 0.8 49 15 50 11 
Health & Medical  3 2.3 2 0.6 5 1.1 
Repair & maintenance  0 -- 10 3.1 10 2.2 
Hotel/food kiosk 6 4.7 34 10.4 40 8.8 
Transportation 8 6.2 16 4.9 24 5.3 
Farming & livestock 97 75.2 1 0.3 98 21.5 
Construction 1 0.8 9 2.8 10 2.2 
Energy 0 -- 11 3.4 11 2.4 
Stationery 0 -- 3 0.9 3 0.7 
Others 0 -- 7 2.2 7 1.5 
Total 129 100 326 100 455 100 
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Most of the economic units in the sample were small-scale, owned and operated by single 
individuals. In the agricultural informal sector for example, about 62% of farmers reported 
owning less than an acre of farmland.  The small sizes of these economic units indicated 
limitations in their income generating potential even if they were sustainable.   
 
5.2.3 Location of informal sector entities 
In the urban area, 54% of enterprises were located on the roadside including road reserves 
and street pavements. Informal economic units in such locations are often disrupted by road 
expansions and forceful relocations by county authorities in a bid to decongest streets. 
Some of the operators may have licences but others operate illegally which renders them 
highly vulnerable to evictions and harassment by county authorities. On the other hand, 
about 32% of the enterprises were in commercially designated locations such as open-air 
markets and commercial premises; 12% were at residences and 0.9% of enterprises were 
mobile. The rural area had mainly farms comprising about 80% of informal economic 
entities and others were located in commercially designated market premises.  
5.2.4 The legal status of informal sector entities 
Non-agricultural informal sector economic units were likely to be registered with the local 
authority. In the rural area 61.1% of these entities were registered compared to 53.7% in 
the urban area. Most of those that were not registered reported paying daily rates to the 
local county council to be able to operate. These included mainly small-scale operators in 
make-shift structures or none at all, and involved such entities as food vending, cobblers 
and street hawking among others. The payment rates ranged from KSh 10 (US$ 0.11) to KSh 
30 (US$ 0.33) per day depending on the space occupied.  
 
5.3 Socio-demographic profiles of informal sector workers 
Table 5.3 shows that in both study sites, most workers (73.2%) in the informal sector were 
household heads and the majority (70.6%) were married. Household sizes ranged from one 
to five members for about 81% of the workers in the rural area and 87% in the urban site. 
There was no significant difference (P=0.50) in household sizes of informal sector workers 
but workers in the urban site tended to have smaller household sizes. The mean household 
size was 4.8 members and 4.4 members respectively for rural and urban areas, which 
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showed that workers in the informal sector particularly in the rural study site tended to 
have larger households than the national average of four members per household.  
 
Table 5.3: Socio-demographic characteristics of informal sector workers 
Variables  Rural (%) Urban (%) Total (%) 
Household heads 
 
84 (65.1) 249 (76.4) 333 (73.2) 
Marital status 
Married 
Single 
Divorced/Separated 
                Widowed 
 
98 (76) 
15 (11.6) 
  4 (3.1) 
12 (9.3) 
 
222 (68.5) 
  87 (26.9) 
    8 (2.5) 
    7 (2.2) 
 
320 (70.6) 
102 (22.5) 
  12 (2.7) 
  19 (4.2) 
Household size 
1 – 2 members 
3 – 5 members 
6 – 10 members 
                11+ members  
 
45 (34.9) 
60 (46.5) 
22 (17.1) 
  2 (1.2) 
 
124 (38.0) 
159 (48.8) 
  38 (11.7) 
    5 (1.5) 
 
169 (37.1) 
219 (48.1) 
  60 (13.2) 
    7 (1.5) 
Gender 
Male  
Female 
 
65 (50.4) 
64 (49.6) 
 
234 (71.8) 
  92 (28.2) 
 
299 (65.7) 
156 (34.2) 
Employment status 
Owner 
                Employee 
 
119 (92.3) 
  10 (7.7) 
 
240 (73.9) 
  85 (26.1) 
 
359 (79.1) 
  95 (20.9) 
Age 
<24 years 
25 – 50 years 
50+ years  
 
  7 (5.4) 
59 (45.7) 
63 (48.8) 
 
  55 (16.7) 
254 (77.9) 
  17 (5.2) 
 
  62 (13.6) 
313 (68.8) 
  80 (17.6) 
Level of education 
None or preschool  
Primary 
Secondary 
Post-secondary 
 
  8 (6.2) 
61 (47.3) 
48 (37.2) 
12 (9.3) 
 
  15 (4.6) 
137 (42.2) 
135 (41.5) 
  38 (11.7) 
 
23 (5.1) 
198 (43.6) 
183 (40.3) 
  50 (11.0) 
 
 
There were more males (65.7%) than females (34.2%) working in the informal sector overall, 
however, the difference in gender of informal sector workers was significant only in the 
urban site (P= <0.001) where an overwhelming majority of workers (71.8%) were male. In 
the rural area, the gender of informal sector workers was about 50% for either gender.  
There was no clear explanation for the dominance of men in urban informal sector entities 
but a key informant explained that the urban area involved non-agricultural informal sector 
work such as manufacturing and crafts, transportation, repair and maintenance, among 
others which favoured men. Some FGD participants also explained that since the study 
involved questions around expenditure in the informal sector, some female own-account 
workers preferred their spouses to respond to the questionnaire because of cultural factors 
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which presumed that the male spouse was the head of the household and so had 
responsibilities in dealing with issues that concerned household welfare.   
 
Most of the workers in the informal sector (79%) owned their economic entities either as 
employers or own-account workers. Employees comprised about 21% of informal sector 
workers (rural= 7.7% and urban= 26.1%), which showed that informal sector work in the 
urban area created more employment opportunities than those in the rural area.  
 
In terms of age, the informal sector involved younger workers in the urban area compared 
to the rural area. The mean age of owners/managers of informal sector entities in the rural 
area was 51.7 years with the majority aged between 50 – 75 years (49%) and those aged 25 
– 50 representing about 46%. In the urban area, the mean age was 36.4 years and those 
aged 25 – 50 years represented the largest single share at about 78% of the workers. The 
difference in the mean ages of informal sector workers between the two study sites was 
significant (P=<0.001). This difference could be explained by existing literature (Meng, 2001, 
Nyakaana, 1997, Omondi, 1987) which suggest that urban areas attract mostly youths in 
search of employment after completing school and that due to lack of formal employment 
opportunities, the majority of them end up in informal sector work. 
 
Educational attainment in the informal sector was relatively low with most workers in rural 
and urban locations having a mean of about eight years  of schooling (7.5 years of schooling 
for the rural area and 8 years for the urban site). This means that in terms of educational 
attainment, informal sector workers generally did not go beyond primary level education. 
Level of education therefore seems to be an important determinant of work in the informal 
sector. However, as shown in the Table 5.3, about 11% of informal sector workers in total 
had post-secondary education and 40% (37% rural and 42% urban) had some secondary 
school education. Chi-square test showed no significant relationship between level of 
education and socioeconomic status in the rural area (P=0.90) but the relationship was 
significant in the urban area (P=0.01), which suggests that in the urban area higher levels of 
education in the informal sector lead to better socio-economic status. Since low levels of 
education limit chances of finding formal employment, it could partly explain why the 
majority in the informal sector (54% rural and 42% urban) considered themselves in the 
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second wealth quintile while about 30% for both sites considered themselves in the third 
wealth quintile. Few considered themselves in quintiles four and five, which combined gave 
a total of 0.8% for rural and 4.4% for the urban area. From a global perspective, educational 
attainment in the informal sector is generally low; for example, Ndiweni et al. (2014) show 
that in Zimbabwe about 80% of informal sector workers had a maximum Ordinary level 
certificate. 
 
Findings of this study further show no significant differences in educational attainment 
between men and women in both rural and urban sites (P=0.09 and P=0.40, respectively) 
although a considerably higher percentage of women than men in the rural area had 
secondary level education and more men than women had post-secondary education in 
both sites (Figure 5.1).  
 
 
 
5.4 Structure of employment in the informal sector 
5.4.1 Categories of workers in the informal sector 
As demonstrated in Table 5.4, there were five types of workers in the informal sector: (1) 
own-account worker, who owned and operated their enterprises as individuals; (2) the 
employer, who engaged other people (employees) to help in running their economic 
enterprises; (3) the employee and (4) unpaid household worker. The fifth category relates to 
a few enterprises (1.3%) that were co-owned through partnership with friends, relatives or 
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Figure 5.1: Level of education by gender and location (rural and urban)
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spouses and the partnership could be by employers or own-account workers. The 
differences in the forms of employment in the informal sector between urban and rural 
study sites were found to be statistically significant (P= <0.001); that is, the urban area for 
example, had more employees (26%) than the rural area (6%) but there were more own-
account workers in the rural area (88%) than there were in the urban site (70%). 
 
Table 5.4: Informal sector employment status in urban and rural areas 
Employment type Rural (%) Urban (%) Total (Average) 
Own-account worker 88.4 70.3 75.4 
Employer 2.3 2.5 2.4  
Paid employee 6.2 25.7 20.2  
Unpaid worker  1.6 0.3 0.7  
Co-ownership 1.6 1.2 1.3  
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  
          Pearson chi2(4) = 24.28   Pr = <0.001 
 
In total about 75% of informal sector entities in both rural and urban study sites were own-
account mainly because either the entities could not afford an employee or were too small 
to require extra manpower. Employees on the other hand, formed the second largest group 
of workers in the informal sector (6% rural and 26% urban). They had short- to long-term 
engagements without any written contract or time limits as to when the employment terms 
could be reviewed if at all. According to one employee, the only job security could have 
been the fact that they were relatives of the employer or had been recommended by a close 
friend of the employer. Employers in the informal sector were people already working in the 
informal sector or were employees in the formal sector with investments in the informal 
sector. Most FGDs submitted that any employer in the informal sector had more capital 
investment and potentially was much better off financially than other workers in the 
informal sector. Accounts from most FGDs in the urban area indicated that investment 
capital for own-account workers may range from street-side food-vending with capital as 
low as KSh 4,000 (US$ 48) to investments worth hundreds of thousands of shillings. 
5.4.2 Employment by type of industry  
As shown in Table 5.5, about 70% of informal economic units in the urban area were own-
account. The mean number of employees per enterprise in the informal sector was 0.4 for 
rural and 1.0 for urban areas, which means that only a small percentage of the informal 
sector was able to employ anyone other than the owner. For example, in the urban area, 
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out of the 30% of enterprises that could employ an extra person, 21% had only one to two 
employees. Antoine (2004) and Mitullah and Wachira (2003) express similar findings in 
which up to 70% of informal enterprises are own account workers. However, a World Bank 
survey in Kenya by Daniels et al., (1995) gave a slightly different picture where 57% of non-
agricultural enterprises had one worker, 31% had two workers, 11% had three to five 
workers and only 0.2% had between 11 and 50 workers. The slight differences in the 
findings could be attributed to the time period when the studies were conducted and 
possible differences in sampling. 
 
Table 5.5: Number employed by type of industry in the urban area (%) 
Industry category Own account 
(No.) % 
1 -2 (No.) % 
employees 
3 – 4 (No.) % 
employees 
5 – 10 (No.) % 
employees 
10 – 20 (No.) 
% employees  
Total (No.) 
% 
Clothing & beauty               (36) 75.0 (10) 20.8 (2) 4.2 0.0 0.0 (48) 100.0  
Food vending  (52) 77.6 (12) 17.9 (3) 4.5 0.0 0.0 (67) 100.0  
Health & Medical  (2) 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   (2) 100.0  
Hotel/food kiosk     (23) 67.7 (8) 23.5 (1) 2.9 (1) 2.9 (1) 2.9  (34) 100.0  
Repair & maintenance  (9) 90.0 0.0 (1) 10.0 0.0 0.0 (10) 100.0  
Manufacturing/ crafts (36) 66.7 (10) 18.5 (3) 5.6 (4) 7.4 (1) 1.9  (54) 100.0  
Telecommunication  (7) 63.6 (4) 36.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 (11) 100.0  
Entertainment    (18) 72.0 (5) 20.0 (1) 4.0 (1) 4.0 0.0 (25) 100.0  
Farming & livestock                 (1) 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   (1) 100.0  
Transportation  (9) 56.3 (2) 12.5 (3) 18.8 (2) 12.5 0.0 (16) 100.0  
Shop-keeping  (19) 70.4 (7) 25.9 (1) 3.7 0.0 0.0 (27) 100.0  
Stationery  (2) 66.7 0.0 (1) 33.3 0.0 0.0   (3) 100.0  
Construction           (3) 33.3 (5) 55.6 (1) 11.1 0.0 0.0   (9) 100.0  
Energy           (6) 54.6 (4) 36.4 0.0 (1) 9.1 0.0 (11) 100.0  
Others  (6) 85.7 (1) 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0   (7) 100.0  
Total  (229) 70.4 (68) 20.9 (17) 5.2 (9) 2.8 (2) 0.6  (325) 100.0. 
 
 
Some urban informal economic enterprises in such areas as hotel and food kiosks, 
manufacturing and crafts, telecommunication, entertainment and transportation exhibited 
a higher potential to employ several people but further statistical analysis revealed that the 
differences in the number of employees per industry is not significant (P= 0.59). However, 
such differences were significant in the rural area (P=<0.001) because of the dominance of 
agricultural informal sector which was the only major economic activity that was likely to 
have employees. In the rural area, 88% of workers were own-account and the remaining 
12% employed either one or two people mostly in subsistence agriculture and 
transportation industries.  
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5.4.3 Employment by gender and level of education 
The informal sector is dominated by men (72% for urban and 50.4% rural). In the urban area 
men almost exclusively dominated specific industries such as transportation (94%), 
manufacturing and crafts (91%), energy (91%), repair and maintenance (90%) and 
construction (89%). These industries were either perceived as masculine or required higher 
capital start-ups, which conventionally favours men. Women had a large presence in specific 
informal sector entities including food vending (46%), hotels and food kiosks (44%), clothing 
and beauty (33%), and shop-keeping (30%). The large presence of women in the low-capital 
food-vending industry could suggest that more women than men in the urban informal 
sector were likely to be of lower socioeconomic status. Tshuma and Jari (2013), in the South 
African context have similar findings in which men dominated certain industries considered 
masculine including mechanics and welding while women dominated clothing and beauty, 
hair-dressing and street vending. With regard to employment by gender, Ndiweni et al. 
(2014) and (ILO, 2002b) indicate that more women than men work in the urban informal 
sector. This is different to the findings of this study and other than contextual differences, 
the opposite findings could not immediately be accounted for and require further research. 
 
In the rural area, there were more men than women in manufacturing and crafts (100%), 
health and medical (67%) and transportation (100%). Women were dominant in subsistence 
agriculture (55%) and shop-keeping (100%). Gender differences in employment by type of 
industry were found to be significant (P=<0.001 for urban and P=0.007 for rural).  
 
In terms of education, a few industries such as health and medical and telecommunication 
tended to have more workers with post-secondary education. For example, 100% of urban 
and 66% of rural workers in the health and medical industry had post-secondary education, 
and 45% in the urban informal telecommunication industry had similar levels of education. 
The differences in employment in each type of industry by level of education were 
significant (P=0.04 for rural and P=0.009 for urban). Entities in the rural area that had 
participants with higher levels of schooling were health and medical, and manufacturing and 
crafts. The lowest levels of education were found among workers in industries such as hotel 
and food kiosks and transportation.  
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5.5 Factors influencing work in the informal sector 
 
Both quantitative and qualitative components of the study revealed some important factors 
that contributed to choice of the informal sector as an employment destination (see Table 
5.6 for the quantitative component). Of these factors, lack of formal employment 
opportunities (39.3% for urban and 30% for rural) stood out as the main reason for 
engagement in informal sector work. This meant that a large number of workers in the 
informal sector did not choose to work in the sector but were forced by circumstances of 
having to look for an alternative source of livelihood. Other factors included specific skills 
training in a given industry (only urban= 30%) and the need for better income (urban= 23.2% 
and rural= 24%). Engagement in the informal sector as a family trade (30%) was the third 
major driver of informal sector work in the rural area largely because farming was the main 
economic activity and farms were said to be passed on from one generation to the next.   
 
Table 5.6: Reasons for choosing to work in the informal sector 
Reason  Rural (%) Urban (%) Total (Average) 
Could not find formal work 30.3 39.3 34.8 
Trained in it   8.5 30.0 19.25 
Family trade 30.2   2.5 16.35 
Better income 24.0 23.2 23.6 
Easy to start   5.4   3.1 4.25 
Influenced by others    1.6   1.9 1.75 
Total    100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
In other literature, Tshuma and Jari (2013) identified three key reasons that motivated 
people to work in the informal sector in South Africa: lack of formal jobs (41%), the need for 
more income (40%) and to work from home (10%). In a sense, inability to find formal 
employment and need for more income seem to be the two main drivers of informal sector 
work in both South African and Kenyan contexts. The UNDP (2013a) report on youth 
employment in Kenya acknowledges that up to 41% of informal sector workers are seeking 
formal employment. Similarly, the qualitative component of this study in the urban area 
confirmed that lack of employment opportunities in the mainstream economy was the main 
driver of work in the informal sector. At least four FGDs clarified that risks such as unstable 
income, lack of career training and growth as well as lack of social protection provisions 
such as health and pensions, prompted a number of informal sector workers to be in 
constant search for formal work as long as they had competitive skills.  
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The problem of lack of competitive skills to work in the formal sector was discussed in six 
FGDs (urban=4 and rural= 2) as a driver of work in the informal sector. Poor skills training 
was linked to low levels of education among the majority of informal sector workers as 
explained by a key informant: “…you realise that you never went far in schooling but life 
must continue: you want your own house, eat without begging, get married and have 
children…. You cannot do these without a source of income, so what do you do? Get a piece 
of land and make sense out of your life or else live as a beggar…”  (KI3, Rural). 
 
Qualitative interviews identified other important factors that contributed to growth in 
informal sector work. Such factors included formal and informal training programmes 
geared specifically for work in the informal sector. According to a policymaker participating 
in the study, some formal training programmes in youth polytechnics such as dress -making, 
carpentry, welding and weaving were specifically designed to create self-employment, 
which in most cases ended up as informal sector entities.  
 
The government, non-governmental organisations as well as influential individuals, 
specifically politicians, also play key roles in encouraging work in the informal sector. 
According to 10 community key informants (rural=1 and urban=9) and two urban FGDs, 
cases of mostly youths (and in some cases women groups) being mobilised regardless of 
skills to engage in some income-generating work were common. Such work included barber-
shops, car-wash equipment, welding, carpentry, tailoring, transportation and various 
aspects of the entertainment industry. However, an urban key informant mentioned that 
most of these lines of work are masculine and tended to favour men than women and could 
partly explain the disproportionately high numbers of men in the urban informal sector.  
5.6 Analysis of financial potential in the informal sector 
 
The main idea behind the analysis of financial potential of informal sector entities was to 
measure their ability to support a prepaid health system whether under a contributory or 
non-contributory system. The objective is not to get to know how much money is in the 
informal sector but rather to understand whether the earnings are regular for workers and 
whether the enterprises are able to maintain regular fund flows for a prepaid health system 
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regardless of the amounts involved. An important consideration in a prepaid health system 
is the predictability of funding to ensure that service provision is not interrupted for lack of 
funds. 
5.6.1 Indicators of financial potential  
During focus group discussions, study participants were asked to state what shows that an 
informal sector entity is better or worse off financially compared to the others. The list of 
indicators were used in the survey questionnaire and study participants were asked to 
respond whether they ‘Strongly agreed’, ‘Agreed’, ‘Disagreed’ or ‘Strongly disagreed’, with 
each of the indicators identified through FGDs. The results are presented in Table 5.7 for the 
urban area. 
 
Table 5.7: Indicators of financial potential in urban informal sector enterprises 
Indicator of financial potential % Strongly 
agree 
% Agree % 
Disagree 
% Strongly 
disagree 
Total (%) 
1. Physical structure in which business is 
conducted (permanent, temporary) 
37.0 28.7 27.8 6.5 
 
100 
2. Licensed as opposed to unlicensed 
enterprises  
43.8 26.5 23.2 6.5 100 
3. Enterprises with employees  
 
62.0 23.8 12.0 2.2 100 
4. Legal location of enterprise 
 
53.9 25.4 13.6 7.1 100 
5. Membership of a health scheme or a 
saving scheme, formal or informal  
61.7 28.7 8.0 1.5 100 
6. Businesses with util ity costs  
 
70.7 23.2 4.9 1.2 100 
7. Ownership of more than one 
enterprise 
76.8 20.4 2.5 0.3 
 
100 
8. Size of space occupied by enterprise 
 
68.1 18.0 10.2 3.7 100 
 
 
From Table 5.7, the majority of respondents strongly agreed that the indicators as discussed 
during the FGDs were accurate measures of financial potential among urban informal sector 
entities. Strong indicators of financial potential in the informal sector include ownership of 
more than one business (77%), businesses with utility costs such as electricity, water and 
telephone (71%), businesses occupying large spaces (68%), enterprises with employees 
(62%) and enterprises whose owners belonged to a savings or health scheme (62%). Overall 
77.2% of respondents either ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ that the listed variables were 
accurate measures of financial potential of urban informal economic enterprises.  
125 
 
 
Analysis of financial potential for rural informal sector was divided into non-agricultural and 
agricultural informal sector because they had different indicators. Indicators of financial 
potential for rural non-agricultural informal sector were similar to those of urban informal 
sector. Overall, the findings show that about 67% of study participants either ‘strongly 
agreed’ or ‘agreed’ that the characteristics of rural non-agricultural informal enterprises as 
stated were appropriate measures of financial potential. 
 
The most agreeable indicators of financial potential for rural non-agricultural informal sector 
included ownership of more than one business, businesses with utility costs, enterprises 
with employees as well as those whose owners/managers were members of a health 
insurance or savings scheme (Table 5.8).  
 
Table 5.8: Indicators of financial potential in rural non-agricultural informal sector 
Indicator of financial potential % Strongly 
agree 
% Agree % Disagree % Strongly 
disagree 
1. Physical structure in which business 
is conducted 
25.0 18.8 43.8 12.5 
2. Licensed as opposed to unlicensed 
enterprises  
31.3 28.1 25.0 15.6 
3. Enterprises with employees  
 
59.4 21.9 15.6 3.1 
4. Legal location of enterprise 
 
25.0 37.5 28.1 9.4 
5. Membership of a health scheme or 
a saving scheme, formal or informal  
56.3 18.8 15.6 9.4 
6. Businesses with util ity costs  
 
78.1 12.5 6.3 3.1 
7. Ownership of more than one 
enterprise 
87.5 3.1 6.3 3.1 
 
8. Size of space occupied by 
enterprise 
53.1 25.0 18.8 3.1 
 
 
For agricultural informal sector (Table 5.9), interviewees were asked to discuss indicators of 
lack of financial potential because it was what they were comfortable with. As 
demonstrated in Table 5.9, strong indicators of lack of financial potential included lack of 
land, and structure of the household where large households and those having elderly 
members or children were more financially strained. Enterprises whose owners had children 
not able to attend school or whose households skipped certain meals of the day also 
strongly indicated lack of financial potential. In summary,  67% of the study population 
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either ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ that the indicators as presented in Table 5.9 were good 
indicators of lack of financial potential in the rural agricultural informal sector. 
 
Table 5.9: Indicators of lack of financial potential in rural agricultural informal sector 
Indicator  % Strongly 
agree 
% Agree % 
Disagree 
% Strongly 
disagree 
1. Lack of land 
 
56.7 16.5 15.5 11.3 
2. Households with the elderly and 
children  
52.6 21.1 19.0  7.4 
3. Residents of rented dwellings  
 
41.7 16.7 15.6 26.0 
4. Non-membership of a health scheme 
or a saving scheme, formal or informal  
28.1 18.8 16.7 36.5 
5. Inability to attend school  
 
61.9 26.8 10.3 1.0 
6. Small size of land under cultivation 
 
29.9 26.8 23.7 19.6 
 
What these tables (5.8 and 5.9) suggest is that the indicators identified through qualitative 
methods were, to a large extent, likely to be accurate measures of financial potential of 
informal sector entities. Some of these indicators were further analysed and presented in 
Table 5.10 to best understand the actual financial potential of agricultural and non-
agricultural informal sector entities in rural and urban areas. 
 
Table 5.10: Proportion of informal sector entities with key indicators of financial potential 
Indicator: Rural (%) 
(Agricultural) 
Rural (%)  
(Non-agricultural) 
Urban (%) 
Permanent structures (*Land) (*87.3) 61.1 43.8 
Licensed entities --- 61.1 43.7 
Enterprise has at least one employee 23.6  50.0 29.6 
Enterprise located at legally designated area  93.7 72.2 43.7 
Owner of enterprise belongs to a health 
insurance scheme 
38.1 50.0 22.3 
Owner of enterprise has other enterprises  18.7 27.8 21.0 
Household has no children <18 and/or elderly 52.3 55.6 33.1 
*Land was considered as a permanent structure and only applied to rural agricultural informal sector 
 
From Table 5.10, the rural area shows greater financial potential but this result is greatly 
influenced by ownership of productive agricultural land which is not found in many parts of 
Kenya. In the case of non-agricultural informal sector, enterprises in the urban area were 
most vulnerable: less were found in permanent structures, were licensed or located in 
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designated areas as compared to those found in the rural area. A higher proportion of rural 
non-agricultural enterprises have indicators of financial potential than those in the urban 
area as demonstrated in Table 5.10, however in terms of sustainability, the enterprises in 
both sites are about the same. This is discussed in the next sub-section.  
5.6.2 Sustainability of enterprises as a measure of financial potential 
Given the cross-sectional design, the study first acknowledges limitations in determining 
sustainability in relation to entities that were less than five-years old. However, judgement 
on the sustainability of such entities was based on the level of capital investment as judged 
from size of the stock. A sustainable informal sector entity was defined in this study as one 
that had lasted at least five years at the time of the survey. The 5-year period was based on 
findings by  Wanjala and Were (2006) which showed that informal enterprises have a short 
lifespan with 40% having operated for less than two years and the rest were about five years 
old. At the same time, the Kenya government operates on a 5-year development plan after 
which a general election is held that potentially heralds new health policies. It is important 
to understand sustainability of informal enterprises because universal coverage requires 
predictable funding and if the informal sector has to prepay for health care their sources of 
income need to be sustainable for predictability in financial resources. Table 5.11 gives the 
proportion of agricultural and non-agricultural informal sector entities in rural and urban 
study sites that met the threshold of sustainability.  
 
Table 5.11: Proportion of sustainable enterprises in the informal sector  
Informal sector Sustainable (%) Unsustainable (%) 
Rural (agricultural) 83.5 16.5 
Rural (non-agricultural) 44.4 55.6 
Urban (non-agricultural)  43.2 56.8 
 
The table shows that agricultural informal entities were more sustainable than non-
agricultural enterprises. Sustainability of agricultural informal sector was assessed based on 
questions about whether a farmer had experienced loses such as total crop failure or death 
of a milk-cow that made them unable to meet their expenses. The proportions of 
sustainable non-agricultural informal sector entities in rural and urban sites were almost the 
same (44% and 43%, respectively), meaning that they were exposed to more-or-less similar 
conditions that made them vulnerable to collapse. Since more rural non-agricultural 
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informal sector entities had the attributes qualitatively identified as key indicators of 
financial potential, they were expected to be more sustainable than those in the urban area. 
This is not the case and could be linked to the macroeconomic factors (discussed elsewhere 
in this chapter) including business competition and lack of market which could make rural 
non-agricultural vulnerable to collapse. The other reason could be that there are other 
indicators of financial potential for rural non-agricultural enterprises not fully captured in 
this study.  
  
The study further analysed specific industries that were likely to be more sustainable than 
others. These are presented in Table 5.12, which demonstrated that the five most 
sustainable industries in the urban area included stationery (67%), repair and maintenance 
(50%), food vending (49%), shop-keeping (48%), and clothing and beauty (43%). The least 
sustainable were energy (18%), telecommunication (18%) and health and medical. In the 
rural area, the most sustainable were farming and livestock (90%), manufacturing and crafts 
(86%) and health and medical (100%). The least sustainable in the rural site were clothing 
and beauty (none sustainable), entertainment (none), hotel and food kiosks (17%), 
telecommunication (none) and transportation (about 13%).  
 
 
 
For certain industries (marked *), although showing 100% sustainability or unsustainability, 
their true positions could be weak because only a few, sometimes just one member, was 
Table 5.12: Sustainability by type of informal sector industry 
 
Industry category  
Sustainable (5+ years)  % Unsustainable (< 5years) 
Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Food vending  49.2 100.0* 50.8 0.0 
Clothing & beauty  42.6 0.0 57.5 100.0* 
Construction  33.3 100.0* 66.7 0.0 
Energy  18.2 0.0 81.8 0.0 
Entertainment  40.0 0.0 60.0 100.0 
Farming & livestock  100.0* 89.9 0.0 10.1 
Health & Medical  0.0 100.0* 100.0* 0.0 
Hotel/food kiosk  41.2 16.7 58.8 83.3 
Manufacturing/ crafts  40.0 85.7 60.0 14.2 
Repair & maintenance  50.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 
Shop-keeping  48.2 33.3 51.9 66.7 
Stationery  66.7 0.0 33.3 0.0 
Telecommunication 18.2 0.0 81.8 100.0* 
Transportation 33.3 12.5 66.7 87.5 
Others  44.4 0.0 55.6 0.0 
Total 43.2 77.7 56.8 22.3 
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represented in the sample. These include health and medical services (both rural and urban 
sites), farming and livestock in an urban area, and food-vending and construction in the 
rural site, each of which showed 100% sustainability but their representation in the sample 
was very low.  
 
5.6.2.1 Measuring sustainability of informal sector entities 
In analysing predictors of sustainability of enterprises, the lifespan of an enterprise was 
taken as the dependent variable. Using stepwise logistic regression, a number of 
independent variables were included in the analysis and the results  are presented in Table 
5.13. The model: logit(p) = log (p/(1-p))= β0 + β1*x1 + ... + βk*xk. The base categories are as 
follows: Female (gender); Married (marital status); Households (with children); Entities with 
‘No employees’; Number of businesses (One); Monthly expenditure (KSh <5,500.00), and 
Socioeconomic status (Quintile 1). 
  
Table 5.13: Analysis of sustainability of urban informal sector entities 
Variables measuring sustainability Odds Ratio P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval 
(Gender) Male 2.12 0.01 1.18   -    4.01 
(Marital status)   Single  0.16 <0.001 0.08   -     0.35 
Divorced/Separated 1.83 0.47 0.35   -    9.60 
Widowed  0.67 0.65 0.12    -   3.66 
(Household structure) No children 0.53 0.05 0.28    -    1.01 
(Number of employees) 1 – 2 workers 4.19 0.03 1.13    -   15.47 
3 – 4 workers 2.24 0.35 0.41    -  12.15 
5 – 10 workers 1.65 0.14 0.84  -   3.22 
11+ workers 0.92 0.96 0.04  -   19.03 
(Number of businesses) Two  0.52 0.28 0.16  -    1.69 
Three  0.05 0.01 0.005  -   0.50 
(Monthly expenditure) KSh 5,500 – 10,000 0.35 0.002 0.18  -     0.68 
KSh 10,000+ 0.46 0.03 0.23  -     0.92 
(Socioeconomic status) 2nd Quintile 0.21 0.001 0.10  -    0.42 
3rd Quintile 0.40 0.02 0.19  -   0.84 
4th Quintile 0.40 0.24 0.09  -   1.83 
5th Quintile 1.04 0.99 0.01  -  85.99 
Number of observations  = 312; LR chi2(20)= 84.5; Prob > chi2= <0.0001; Pseudo R2 = 0.198; Log l ikel ihood = -171.7 
 
The likelihood ratio chi-square of -171.7 with a p-value <0.0001 means that the model as a 
whole fits significantly better than a null model.  
 
In the urban area (Table 5.13), gender significantly influenced sustainability of enterprises; 
that is, enterprises that were owned/managed by men were 2.12 times more likely to be 
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sustainable than those owned/managed by women (P=0.01, CI= 1.18 – 4.24). The difference 
in sustainability could also explain why the urban informal sector was predominantly male. 
 
To some extent, marital status of urban informal sector workers had an impact on 
sustainability of the enterprises because, as suggested in the table, enterprises 
owned/managed by single workers were 84% (0.16 times) less likely to be sustainable than 
those run by married workers. This difference is significant (P= <0.001) and the narrow 
confidence interval (CI=0.08 – 0.35) indicates a very close association. However, for widows 
and separated workers, there was no significant difference in sustainability of informal 
sector enterprises. One reason highlighted during FGDs on why enterprises owned/run by 
workers who were not ‘single’ were more sustainable was that the non-single groups 
probably had greater social responsibility in that they were likely to have children who relied 
on them for support so had to ensure that they had a sustainable source of income. Such an 
observation could be supported by the finding that enterprises that were run/managed by 
workers whose households had no children were found to be 47% less sustainable than 
those managed by workers whose households had children. This difference was significant 
(P=0.05 and CI=0.28 – 1.01).  
 
Having at least one employee was also found to be a strong predictor of enterprise 
sustainability. However, as the table shows, an enterprise with more than ten employees 
reduces its sustainability. Although this may appear as a contradiction, it could be explained 
by the fact that there were very few of such relatively large informal sector enterprises in 
the sample, which reduces chances of accurate prediction of their sustainability. Measured 
against own-account enterprises (enterprises with owner as the only worker), enterprises 
with one to two employees were 4.2 times more sustainable than own-account enterprises 
and this was the only difference that was significant (P=0.03 and CI=1.13 – 15.47). For the 
other categories (that is, enterprises with 3 – 4 employees and 5 – 10 employees) although 
they showed the likelihood of greater sustainability than own-account enterprises, the 
differences were not significant. Having employees was earlier cited as an important 
indicator of financial potential of an informal sector enterprise.  
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The findings in the urban area further suggest that enterprises whose owners engaged in 
more than one type of industry (diversified entrepreneurship) at the same time were less 
sustainable than those whose owners concentrated on one type of industry. For enterprises 
whose owners engaged in two or three different types of industries sustainability decreased 
by 48% and 95% respectively, the differences with the latter being significant (P=0.01 and 
CI= 0.01 – 0.5).  There was an attempt in the FGDs to explain failure of enterprises whose 
owners diversified businesses. First, it was noted as a risk and insurance in that an 
entrepreneur could try to diversify investments with the hope that one would succeed; for 
example, a shop-keeping enterprise may also be a water-vendor. However, as noted in the 
FGDs, problems in management of a number of enterprises and the cost of renting space for 
the businesses could be factors against their sustainability.  
 
Analysis of sustainability with regards to expenditure patterns and socioeconomic status 
(SES) was also conducted. Expenditure was measured in terms of money generated from the 
sampled informal economic units and spent at enterprise level, household level or individual 
level. Socioeconomic status (SES) was self-reported with study participants being asked to 
rank themselves using the pictorial depiction of SES in Figure 5.2. However, the self-
reported SES was validated by comparing the results with monthly expenditure reports. The 
comparison is presented in Table 5.14.  
 
Figure 5.2: A pictorial depiction of socioeconomic status presented to informal sector workers during the survey 
   
Lowest 3 Highest 
 
 
Table 5.14: Cross-tabulation of monthly expenditure and self-assessed SES  
Monthly 
consumption(KSh) 
Social economic status (1-lowest; 5-highest)% 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5           Total 
<5500 49.7 29.7 18.8 1.2 0.6 100.0 
5500 - 10000 22.2 46.4 28.1 2.6 0.7 100.0 
>10000 5.2              37.1              35.3 22.4 0.0 100.0 
2 4 
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The table indicates that about 50% of respondents who spent the least amount identified 
themselves in the lowest quintile. The overall expenditure patterns tend to follow SES which 
indicates that the self-reported SES largely successful in depicting actual SES. The study 
refrained from using asset indices because the study was not at household level which made 
it difficult to control the validity of responses. Bitran (2014) explains that in most informal 
sector work there is usually little or no distinction between expenditure at household level 
and expenditure at enterprise level since these are not usually separate entities. 
Furthermore, close to 90% of informal sector workers indicated that the entities were their 
sole source of income.  
 
The results of tests of association between expenditure patterns and SES were somewhat 
contradictory in that enterprises with higher expenditures and higher socioeconomic status, 
which were assumed to have a stronger financial base, were not as sustainable as expected. 
However, the opposite is true in the rural area (analysed in the next sub-section). Table 5.13 
shows that, compared to enterprises that spent less than KSh 5,500 per month, 
sustainability of enterprises in the monthly expenditure categories of KSh 5,500 to 10,000 
and over KSh 10,000, significantly decreased by 65% and 54% respectively (P=0.002; CI= 0.18 
– 0.68 and P=0.03; CI= 0.23 – 0.92, respectively). In terms of SES, compared to Q1, 
sustainability decreased for enterprises ranked in Q2, Q3 and Q4 but increased for those 
ranked in Q5. These differences were significant only for Q2 and Q3 (P=0.001; CI=0.10 - 0.42 
and P=0.02; CI=0.19 – 0.84, respectively). Possible explanations for these contradictions 
were: first, there was the likelihood of inaccurate estimates of true expenditure levels and 
socioeconomic status among informal sector investors in the urban area mainly for fear of 
attracting taxes because the informal sector in the urban area is often very apprehensive on 
issues of taxation. Secondly, the FGDs suggested that monthly consumption did not 
necessarily translate into SES because of other factors such as size of households and 
illnesses that could push up expenditures.  
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5.6.2.2 Predictors of sustainability of rural informal sector enterprises 
An important predictor of sustainability of informal sector economic entities in the rural 
area was ownership of land. As shown in Table 5.15, there is a close association between 
owning land and sustainability (P= <0.001; CI= 0.01 – 0.14)6.  
 
Table 5.15: Analysis of sustainability of rural informal sector entities 
Sustainability Odds Ratio P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval 
Ownership of land 0.04 <0.001 0.01  -   0.14 
  (Socioeconomic status) Q2 9.95 0.003   2.21  -   44.70 
          Q3 2.31 0.252  0.55   -   9.63 
Number of observations = 127; LR chi2(3)= 43.88; Prob > chi2 = <0.0001;  
Pseudo R2= 0.3408; Log likelihood = -42.43 
 
The FGDs had indicated that owning land is crucial even among non-agricultural informal 
sector workers because land was a fall back plan if other non-agricultural informal 
enterprises failed and lack of it would mean the risk of losing almost all means of livelihood 
in the rural area. On the other hand, although socioeconomic status to some extent was a 
significant predictor of sustainability in the rural area, the large confidence intervals rule it 
out from being a credible measure of sustainable of informal sector entities.   
5.6.3 Financial potential of employees as opposed to enterprises 
Different from enterprise owners, employees in the informal sector would also be expected 
to prepay for health care and so how regularly they earned their wages was important in 
understanding the predictability of financial resource flows into the prepaid system from 
the employees. Three variables identified through FGDs and in-depth interviews, namely 
employee status, days worked per week and regularity of pay, were used to test financial 
potential and the likelihood of sustainable income for informal sector employees (Table 
5.16). Employees working full time, full week and were paid monthly or bi-weekly were said 
to be working for more stable enterprises and had more predictable income compared to 
employees on casual engagement, paid daily or occasionally or did not work a full week. 
 
 
                                                                 
6 There were no entities that reported to be in Q4 and Q5 in the rural area. 
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  Table 5.16: Indicators of financial potential of informal sector employees  
Indicator Rural (% ) Urban (%) 
Employee status Full time employee 37.5 52.4 
Casual/Temporary 62.5 47.6 
Days worked per week 
by employee 
<5 days 16.7 22.0 
Full week (5 – 7 days) 83.3 78.0 
 
Regularity of employee 
payment 
Occasionally  12.5 20.0 
Daily 50.0 28.3 
Weekly 0.0 20.0 
Monthly 37.5 31.7 
 
As demonstrated in Table 5.16, 63% of employees in the rural area were casual labourers 
who were paid daily or occasionally unlike in the urban area where 52% of employees were 
full time and paid mostly on a monthly basis. What this means is that payments for informal 
sector workers in the rural area were less regular compared to payments for the urban area 
such that, in terms of sustainably funding universal coverage, the urban informal sector 
employees would be more consistent in payment than their rural counterparts.  
 
5.6.4 Expenditure patterns as a measure of financial potential 
In the context of Bitran’s findings regarding expenditure in the informal sector (Bitran, 
2014), expenditure was analysed broadly to include workers and enterprises since the large 
majority of informal sector workers depended on their respective economic entities as the 
only source of income. Such broad analysis  of expenditure would also capture other income 
sources for example other enterprises elsewhere not in the sample. 
 
5.6.4.1 Mean monthly expenditure by industry 
The minimum recorded monthly expenditure coming from money generated by an informal 
sector enterprise was KSh 1,500 (US$16.7) and the maximum was around KSh 70,000 
(US$786.5) (Table 5.17). Urban informal enterprises spent more than rural entities with a 
mean monthly expenditure of about KSh 17,626 (US$195.8) compared to about KSh 7,009 
(US$77.9) for the rural area. A smaller percentage (about 28%) of the urban informal sector 
spent less than KSh 5,500 (US 61.1) per month compared with the rural area where about 
65% spent less than KSh 5,500 per month. Expenditure among urban informal sector entities 
was much higher than their rural counterparts; that is, about 34% of urban informal sector 
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workers were spending over KSh 10,000 (US$ 111.1) per month compared to 6% in the rural 
area. The differences in expenditure among informal sector entities between rural and 
urban was found to be strongly significant (P=<0.001), which suggests that in terms of 
financially supporting universal coverage, the urban area enterprises would be stronger 
sources of revenue than the rural ones. The differences in expenditure by industry were 
significant [Pearson chi2 (28)= 57.45 and P=0.001 within the urban site, and Pearson chi 2 
(20)=66.45 and P=<0.001 within the rural area]. [Exchange rate: US$1.00= KSh 90.00] 
 
Table 5.17: Mean monthly expenditure by type of industry (KSh) 
Industry category Rural Urban 
Food vending 3,500 14,629 
Cloth & beauty 3,500 19,208 
Shop-keeping 7,375 24,433 
Manufacturing/ craft 17,667                    16,717 
Hotel/food kiosk 5,050 13,810 
Entertainment 20,000 23,065 
Telecommunication 3,500 29,825 
Farming & livestock 4,925  3,500 
Health & Medical  41,167 40,000 
Repair & maintenance ---- 19,361 
Transportation 11,036 14,150 
Stationery ---- 43,875 
Energy ---- 19,300 
Construction 35,00 24,313 
Others ---- 12,350 
Average total  7,009 17,626 
 
There were striking similarities as well as differences in monthly expenditures for specific 
informal sector industries between rural and urban study sites. For example in both study 
sites, industries such as manufacturing and crafts, entertainment, health and medical, and 
transportation had very narrow differences in expenditure meaning that whichever their 
location (rural or urban) they generated more-or-less about the same amounts of income 
(expenditure being a proxy for income).  
 
In contrast, major differences in expenditure were noted in industries such as food vending, 
clothing and beauty, shop-keeping, hotel/food kiosk, telecommunication and construction. 
In these informal economic entities, higher expenditures, by large margins, favoured the 
urban area; that is, investing in these particular entities had higher financial potential in the 
urban area than the rural area.  
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A few studies had assessed monthly incomes of informal sector entities.  In Kenya, 
Budlender (2011) noted that the average monthly income is KSh 12,000 for all informal 
sector entities and KSh 18,500 for non-agricultural informal sector. These are strikingly 
similar with this study findings where monthly incomes average KSh 12,317.5 overall, and 
KSh 17,626 for non-agricultural informal sector. In Zimbabwe, Ndiweni et al. (2014) show 
that average incomes in the informal sector are slightly higher than they are in Kenya with 
45% of informal sector enterprises generating the equivalent of KSh 36,000 per month, 30% 
earn between KSh 22,500  and 36,000 and 10% at less than KSh 9,000 a month. In South 
Africa, Tshuma and Jari (2013) have recorded average monthly incomes in the informal 
sector ranging from the equivalent of KSh 10,000 to 40,000 for 40% of enterprises and less 
than KSh 5,000 for 12% of enterprises. 
 
There were contradictions between qualitative and quantitative findings with regard to the 
mean expenditures particularly in the urban area. For example, while quantitative findings 
suggested otherwise, FGDs in the urban area were largely unanimous that food-vending, 
retail shop-keeping and energy were some of the lowest expenditure industries in the 
informal sector. Food-vending in particular was mainly perceived as a survival mechanism 
and a last resort activity but this could be in reference to specific types of food-vending 
especially those that involved low-capital investment and the products were hawked from 
one street to the other. Also, the FGDs regarded hotel and food-kiosks as one of the highest 
expenditure industries but quantitative findings indicated it was one of the lowest in the 
urban area. A possible reason for the contradiction could be explained by the fact that some 
owners of enterprises may deliberately give lower expenditure estimates for fear of 
attracting taxes, an issue that is common in the informal sector.  
 
Qualitative data mainly in the urban area also indicated that industries such as 
entertainment, telecommunication, health and medical, transportation, repairs and 
maintenance and, manufacturing and craft were popular because they were more 
profitable. However, while transportation in particular was perceived as profitable, 
competition within the sub-sector greatly reduced its income margins. On the other hand, 
relatively higher expenditures in the construction and manufacturing and craft industries 
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were explained by the boom in the formal construction industry. A key informant explained: 
“The informal manufacturing and construction industries supplement the demands of the 
country’s formal construction industry and since there is a boom in the construction industry, 
the two informal industries benefit from a trickle-down effect…” (KI8, Urban). A notable 
finding is the relatively very high expenditures in the health and medical entities which is 
hardly surprising given the rising costs of health care everywhere in the world. 
 
Despite the possibility of profitable industries in the informal sector, there were a number 
of challenges facing various industries in the sector with direct and indirect financial 
implications. These are discussed below. 
5.7 Factors limiting financial potential in the informal sector  
There are a number of challenges facing informal sector industries that can render them 
vulnerable to financial ruin and even collapse. Specific challenges identified through FGDs 
and tested quantitatively are summarised in Table 5.18.  
 
Table 5.18: Main causes of vulnerability in the informal sector 
Main threats to informal sector work Urban (%) Rural (%) 
1. Harassment/bribes by authorities  13.2  2.3 
2. Eviction by authorities or landlord 37.7    3.9 
3. Theft 16.7  2.3 
4. Business competition /Oversupply 16.7 22.5 
5. Natural disasters (e.g. adverse weather, 
crop, animal diseases) 
 7.6 20.2 
6. Low capital and debts   6.9 35.7 
7. Unstable commodity prices   1.3 13.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 
 
Similar constraints on informal sector incomes have been identified by Tshuma and Jari 
(2013) in South Africa. In the South African context however, lack of storage facilities 
emerged as the main challenge in the informal sector. Other key constraints were business 
competition and low profits, and lack of credit facilities.   
 
Qualitative findings on challenges facing informal sector work identified some key issues, 
most of which were macroeconomic in nature and included unpredictable inflationary 
tendencies, high tax rates of imported products, high labour supply and stiff business 
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competition in the informal sector. Other challenges were health-related and also 
concerned the physical working environment in the informal sector.  
 
5.7.1 Macroeconomic factors 
The study was conducted during a period of unstable macroeconomic conditions, 
particularly with regards to inflation. Fluctuations in product prices made it difficult for 
informal sector entities such as in construction, and manufacturing and craft to estimate 
prices based on prior contractual agreements with clients. This often led to losses because 
when prices of raw materials rise after a contractual agreement, the informal sector worker 
had to absorb the extra cost. A key informant explained: “When a client makes an order for 
windows or doors or beds, we calculate the cost of all the requirements on current prices but 
after making the quotation the next day prices increase but our clients don’t want to hear 
about changes in pricing, so at times we go at a huge loss because we don’t want to lose 
customers” (KI4, Urban).  
 
Tax rates on imported materials used in manufacturing and craft, repair and maintenance, 
and clothing and beauty industries, were said to be particularly high leading to lean profits 
and making business expansion difficult. A key informant explained: “When we adjust our 
prices to cater for the taxes imposed by the government, our customers find our prices to be 
too high and this affects the rate of sales” (KI4, Urban).  
 
The last macroeconomic factor that led to poor financial performance in the informal sector 
was high unemployment rates which directly contributed to over-supply of labour. Cheap 
labour in the informal sector made not only finding work difficult but also poor pay for the 
employees in the sector. In an FGD a worker said: “You leave in the morning hoping to find 
some work but sometimes you go for a full week without anything and when you find 
something the pay is pathetic...” (Male, FGD1 Urban). 
5.7.2 Health-related challenges 
Lack of financial protection for most informal sector workers featured prominently during 
qualitative interviews. Study participants highlighted the burden of paying for health care 
out-of-pocket, which in many cases meant they could only afford poor quality services 
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because the alternative was unaffordable. Long-term illnesses in particular, required 
sustained spending and when done out-of-pocket had the real danger of bankrupting 
informal economic entities. A key informant in the rural area explained that: “…there are 
growing cases of illnesses such as diabetes, high-blood pressure and cancer and these have 
long-term financial implications for households…. Where a business is the only source of 
income it could collapse and such cases are common here...”  (Female, FGD6, Rural).  
 
Apart from the cost of treating an illness, study participants pointed out that inability to 
work as a result of ill health, particularly for own-account workers, led to losses where an 
economic activity had to be shut down or operated sub-optimally until the operator got 
well. The alternative of substitute labour was often characterised by poor returns because 
of the inexperience of the substitute labour and their costs. Bio-mechanical health problems 
also featured in the discussions and were said to be brought about by poor working 
conditions including lack of appropriate gear for entities such as welding and carrying heavy 
items. Certain health conditions such as respiratory illnesses were also precipitated by poor 
working conditions including congestion and pollution of the physical environment as well 
as exposure to adverse weather conditions. Forastieri (1999) recognises health problems in 
the informal sector and recommended a healthy working environment for sustainable 
development. 
 
The last crucial factor affecting financial potential of informal sector entities was business 
competition mainly resulting from duplication of economic entities or products considered 
as either fast selling or easy to start. For example, an FGD participant stated: “I knew there 
were many others selling vegetables, but what else could I sell? I did not have money to 
invest in a retail shop so whatever money I had I bought some vegetables to try my luck….” 
(Female, FGD5, Urban). Business competition specifically contributed to low earnings 
because either the buyers were thinly spread among many competing businesses  or 
businesses lowered prices to attract customers. In coping with competition, some owners of 
some economic entities adopted flexible approaches such as selling on credit to attract and 
retain customers. However, credit sales sometimes led to high indebtedness for some 
economic entities leading to inability to re-stock, which jeopardised their very existence.  
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Conclusion  
The informal sector has many types of industries which employ a large number of people 
but the employment or work situation in the sector is fluid particularly in the non-
agricultural informal sector where problems of labour mobility and oversupply, lack of job 
security and lack of specific skills as well as problems in the wider socio-economic and 
political context combine to make non-agricultural informal sector entities more vulnerable 
and less sustainable than the agricultural informal sector.  On the other hand, while the 
agricultural informal sector could be more sustainable, its productivity is low because in 
most cases, the sizes of farms are quite small. In other words, in terms  of financing universal 
coverage, the vulnerabilities in the informal sector including irregular income mean that 
very few of the non-agricultural informal sector can regularly prepay for health care. For the 
agricultural informal sector, despite more sustainability, the resource base is quite limited.  
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CHAPTER SIX: INFORMAL SECTOR WORKERS’ EXPERIENCES OF HEALTH SERVICES 
UTILISATION: LESSONS FOR UNIVERSAL COVERAGE 
6.1 Introduction 
 
A major health policy debate current in Kenya is how to progress towards universal 
coverage where the use of health services is based on need regardless of population group 
and socioeconomic status. Under most universal coverage systems, public health facilities 
are the main providers of services because of the nature of funding, advanced 
infrastructural development including physical facilities and human resources, non-profit 
motivation and cost considerations. Improving public services is therefore paramount to the 
success of universal coverage policies in Kenya. A successful universal coverage system 
improves access to quality health services and provides financial risk protection for all.  In 
Kenya, the health policy proposals for universal coverage prioritise access to public sector 
services for all population groups. For various reason highlighted by Tangcharoensathien et 
al. (2011), it is difficult to provide health insurance coverage for informal sector populations 
through a contributory system that is proposed by the Kenya government. Extending 
coverage to the informal sector in Kenya could be even more difficult because of the 
perceived poor quality of public sector health services. Improving public provision is central 
to making progress in universal coverage and so it was essential in this thesis to document 
the strengths as well as the problems and constraints in public services as experienced by 
informal sector workers and then draw key lessons for universal coverage.  
 
To contextualise public sector services and utilisation, this chapter first analyses the most 
recent use of government health facilities by those in the informal sector and whether the 
use was for inpatient or outpatient care. Then using the ‘Access framework’ of availability, 
affordability and acceptability of services (McIntyre et al., 2009), the chapter proceeds to 
analyse the challenges faced by informal sector workers while seeking health services more 
generally but emphasising public sector health services. The analysis considers the strengths 
and weaknesses in public services as stated by informal sector workers, and what should be 
maintained or improved to promote use of public services and progress towards universal 
coverage. This chapter therefore, does not consider in much detail service utilisation and 
the cost associated with using services because it first needed to address qualitatively what 
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needs to be improved or maintained in public sector services for a future universal coverage 
system. Secondly, understanding the current experiences with public services among 
informal sector workers substantially informs their knowledge and attitudes towards 
prepaid health care and UHC, which are discussed in Chapter Seven. 
 
6.2 Most recent use of public sector health providers 
Study participants were asked in the survey to state the very last time they sought health 
services from a public provider, type of services sought and type of public facility used. 
Figure 6.1 shows that the single largest majority of respondents on average 47.5% (rural= 
43% and urban= 52%) had used a public provider more than six months ago at the time of 
the survey and another 3.6% (rural= 2.3% and urban= 4.9%) had never used public facilities.  
 
 
 
A total of about 55% and 43% in rural and urban sites respectively, had used a public 
provider ‘less than six months ago’ at the time of the survey which signalled a slightly higher 
utilisation of public services in rural than urban areas. However, a T-test conducted on the 
differences in utilisation between the two study sites was highly insignificant (P= 0.996), 
meaning that the usage of public sector health services among informal sector workers were 
more-or-less the same in the urban and rural areas.  
 
There was no significant relationship between use of public facilities and socioeconomic 
status among informal sector workers given that about 32% of those who had never used 
the facilities were in the lowest quintile, 42% in Q2 and 26% in Q3. There were no 
observations in quintiles four and five. Further, Pearson’s Chi2 test for association between 
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various economic entities and the type of public sector facility used by informal sector 
workers was also not significant (P=0.88 and P=0.75 for rural and urban sites respectively). 
 
With regard to the types of services (outpatient versus inpatient) that informal sector 
workers sought from public providers, outpatient care was the most frequent and 
accounted for about 87% and 86% of all visits to public facilities in rural and urban sites 
respectively. This is common everywhere around the world because utilisation of outpatient 
services is always higher than that of inpatient services.  Most inpatient care as expected 
were referral hospitals (urban=85% and rural= 72%) (Figure 6.2).  
 
 
 
A clear pattern of utilisation of services by informal sector workers in both study sites is that 
the nearest referral hospitals (district hospital for the rural site and provincial hospital for 
the urban area) were the most used for either service. From the findings, most informal 
sector workers seeking outpatient care in public facilities did not use primary level facilities 
and this could be explained, first on the weak referral system, a characteristic of many 
health systems in low-income countries as indicated by Bossyns et al. (2006) and Bryan et al. 
(2010). Two other reasons for this pattern of use were highlighted during FGDs and in-depth 
interviews: the one was the likelihood of availability of services generally including drugs 
and perceived high quality diagnostic services even if one was to wait for a longer time. As a 
result many people self-referred with the knowledge that they were more likely to receive 
needed services at secondary facilities than at primary health facilities. Mahinda (2009) had 
expressed similar findings on why patients engage in self-referrals in Kenya. Most 
government funds for the health sector, according to various government reports, go to 
secondary level facilities hence the likelihood of availability of more services in these 
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facilities. The other reason was that the secondary facilities were considerably not far away 
from the population which minimised the cost of travel. County referral hospitals consist of 
level 4 and 5 facilities (formerly district and provincial hospitals) and national hospitals are 
the teaching and referral hospitals in Kenya.  
 
The least used providers in the urban area were district and national hospital facilities, 
which from the researcher’s own observation and information from the FGDs, were 
respectively far away and involved sometimes unaffordable transport and treatment costs. 
In the rural site, for similar reasons, the least used facilities were provincial and national 
hospitals. The FGDs also revealed that visits to higher level hospitals were only necessary 
when carers perceived an illness as serious without any referral from first-contact facilities.  
 
The next section examines in some detail the access factors determining choice of facilities 
generally (both private and public), specific problems and constraints in public provision and 
improvements needed to facilitate progress towards universal coverage. 
6.3 Quantitative summary of experiences with public provision 
 
During the questionnaire survey, specific variables in service provision were listed and study 
participants were asked to state either ‘True’ or ‘False’ what their experiences were with 
each variable the very last time they used a government facility.  The analyses of these 
experiences, both quantitative and qualitative, have adopted the Access Framework 
(McIntyre et al., 2009): availability, affordability and acceptability.  
 
To explain the three dimensions of the ‘Access Framework’: Availability is concerned with 
whether providers and services are delivered at the right place and time. It embodies the 
physical location of facilities, ability and willingness of providers to offer services, hours of 
service and whether the type, range, quality and quantity of services meet population 
health needs. Affordability involves full cost of services (direct and indirect) to an individual 
and whether the individual has the ability to pay. It includes direct costs such as price of 
services at the facility, cost of transportation and special diets. Indirect costs include lost 
income for the time spent at the facility. Acceptability entails expectations of health workers 
and patients and include mutual respect, cultural beliefs and perceptions of patients 
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including perceptions of provider competence (McIntyre et al., 2009). Table 6.1 gives a 
summary of the experiences of informal sector workers with public provision. 
 
 
A key feature in the above summary is the high number of informal sector workers who 
reported that needed drugs were unavailable at the facilities (rural= 87% and urban= 75%). 
For informal sector workers in the rural area, unaffordability of services was also a problem 
experienced by a large percentage (75%). A lot of out-of-pocket expenditure goes into the 
purchase of pharmaceuticals and since these were unavailable at the facilities it means that 
a large number of these workers spent OOP and were potentially exposed to catastrophic 
expenditures. Unaffordable services means that many informal sector workers could either 
postpone treatment or opt for low-cost, low quality services.  
 
The differences in the experiences, stated as ‘True’ or ‘False’ between rural and urban areas 
was not significant for all the three areas of the access framework: availability, affordability 
and acceptability (P= 0.809). However, when tested separately, only differences on issues 
about acceptability were found to be significant (P= 0.029); that is, informal sector workers 
in the rural area found public sector services more acceptable than their urban 
counterparts. What the test results mean is that in case of any interventions to improve 
service provision, while there could be no differences in approach, the urban area would 
require more emphasis on interventions related to acceptability of services. 
 
6.4 Choice of health providers among informal sector workers 
 
A number of factors were identified in the qualitative component of the study as 
determining the choice of a provider. The providers in question included public sector 
Table 6.1: Summary of experiences with government health providers 
Experiences with government providers Rural (%) Urban (%) 
True False True False 
 
Availability  
Services were quick (No long queues) 40.3 59.7 23.9 76.1 
Facil ity was near 77.3 22.7 58.9 41.1 
All  needed drugs were available 12.4 87.6 24.6 75.4 
Affordability  Services were affordable 25.0 75.0 57.9 42.1 
 
 
Acceptability 
No bribes paid 86.6 13.4 76.5 23.5 
Health workers were respectful  86.7 13.3 74.3 25.7 
Health worker explained nature of  i l lness  74.4 25.6 71.9 28.1 
Facil ity was clean 95.3 4.7 82.7 17.3 
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health facilities, private hospitals and clinics (both high- and low-cost), traditional healers, 
chemists and other drug shops. Broad discussions during FGDs and in-depth interviews 
about key constraints and facilitators for choosing public providers and various types of 
private providers have been summarised in Table 6.2.  
 
Table 6.2: Summary of factors considered in the choice of a provider by informal sector workers  
Provider type Who uses what providers and why? Key constraints/problems 
Publ ic health 
faci lities 
(government 
hospitals, health 
centres, 
dispensaries) 
Used mostly by low-income earners. The main reasons for use are: 
a) Relatively low-cost treatment  
b) Proper diagnosis of illness which is ideal for children 
c) Treatment by qualified s taff including specialist care 
a) Lack of drugs 
b) Long waiting time   
c) Lack of commitment 
on some health 
workers 
Faith-based and NGO 
faci lities (these are 
cons idered as public 
faci lities) 
Used by both poor and well-off usually from targeted communities. The main 
reason for use are: 
a) Relatively low-cost 
b) High quality health services including proper diagnosis 
c) Respect for patients 
Geographically sparse so 
may not be accessible to 
many people 
Small low-cost 
private health 
faci lities 
Used by low-income groups often with low-levels of education. Main reasons for 
use are: 
a) Eas ily accessible (close to the population, easy payment terms, short time to 
get treatment) 
b) A patient does not have to undergo any tests that they are uncomfortable 
with, e.g. HIV test 
a) Lack of diagnostic 
equipment 
b) Treatment by 
unqualified s taff 
c) Generally low quality 
of care  
High cost private 
faci lities 
Used by well-off individuals and those with medical cover. High quality services is 
the main reason for use 
 
 
a) Very expensive  
 
Chemists/Pharmacies 
and other drug shops 
Used by people who have enough money to buy drugs from the pharmacy Main 
reasons for use are: 
a) Familiarity with illness/condition 
b) I l lness is perceived as not serious and poses no threat to normal daily l ife  
c) Easy terms of payment (e.g. credit) because buyer and seller are from the 
same locality and probably know each other 
d) Lack of enough money to go to a formal health facility 
 
a) Cannot treat illness 
perceived as serious  
b) Lack diagnostic test 
ki ts  
 
Traditional healing 
including herbalists 
Used by conservative cultures such as in coastal Kenya. Main reasons for use are: 
a) Herbalists and other traditional healers are easily accessible 
b) Easy payment terms 
c) Desperation with a  long-standing illness; last resort when all else has failed 
a) Not much confidence 
on their ability to treat 
and healing is often 
based on faith  
 
Emphasis was given to public providers which merited more detailed analysis because of its 
relevance to health policy in Kenya. Using the Access Framework, the study explored the 
strengths and weaknesses in public services while identifying key constraints for 
improvement in a universal coverage system.  
 
6.4.1 Availability of services 
6.4.1.1 Skills of health workers  
In terms of availability, two important issues were raised in both study sites that highlighted 
the strength of public sector services and seemingly attracted informal sector workers to 
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public providers. The first was that services at public facilities were offered by skilled health 
workers with adequate training and qualifications for their jobs even if their numbers may 
not be adequate. From most FGDs in both urban and rural areas, study participants 
expressed their confidence in public health workers to offer proper diagnosis and 
treatment. A participant in one FGD stated: “…In a government hospital one can get a good 
doctor who would serve you well at once unlike in private clinics where they will treat in 
stages so that one is forced to keep going back” (Male FGD4, Rural).  
 
6.4.1.2 Availability of diagnostic and other equipment  
The second strength in the public sector services as perceived by study participants in FGDs 
and in-depth interviews was availability of diagnostic and other equipment which made 
informal sector workers prefer public to private services. Such equipment, as indicated by 
some of those interviewed, were important in the diagnosis and management of various 
illnesses ranging from infectious to non-communicable diseases.  
 
Despite the key strengths in availability of services which attracted informal sector workers 
to public providers, there were also a number of weaknesses in the public sector that 
informal sector workers had to cope with or avoided by opting for private sector services.  
 
6.4.1.3 Drug shortages 
Lack of drugs in public facilities was perhaps the most outstanding weakness in public 
services according to both qualitative and quantitative findings. This was the most discussed 
problem in public provision in both rural and urban locations and was said to contribute to a 
number of informal sector workers with stable incomes choos ing private facilities. It also 
made a number of workers distrust the public sector to provide necessary services in the 
envisaged universal coverage system. From the quantitative findings, the number of 
informal sector workers who visited government facilities and indicated that they received 
all the prescribed drugs was very low (12% in the rural and about 25% in the urban), which 
indicates that drug supply remains a major weakness within public health system. Most 
study participants acknowledged that they would be unwilling to go to a public facility when 
they were unsure of finding the necessary drugs at the facility. The study participants were 
particularly concerned about situations where patients have spent most of the day waiting 
for services and paid all the basic charges such as consultation (card) fee then are told at the 
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end of the queue that there are no drugs and that they have to purchase from a private 
pharmacy. A male FGD participant in the rural area explained: “…people give up on 
government services because you may queue for long hours but after consultation with a 
health worker, you are told that the prescribed drug is not available; so why waste a whole 
day at a government facility queuing for services that are not there?” (Male, FGD7, Rural).  
 
Concerns over lost income and indirect costs as a result of going to a public provider and 
getting no services also featured prominently in the discussions. However, in three of the 
FGDs (two rural and one urban), there was a general feeling that availability of drugs was a 
key factor in the public sector services and that many people would make the long queues 
as long as they were assured of getting the drugs that they needed. An FGD participant said: 
“My observation is that as long as people are assured of good quality care which involves 
availability of all the prescribed drugs, anything else including long waiting hours are not so 
much a problem” (Male FGD6, Rural). 
 
Lack of drugs in public facilities may appear as a supply problem beyond the control of 
health workers but findings from FGDs and in-depth interviews noted that the shortages 
sometimes were artificially caused by corruption at the health facilities. Corruption and 
other financial malpractices such as unofficial (informal) payments were discussed in almost 
every FGD and among some key informants in both study sites. According to one FGD 
participant, artificial shortages of drugs in public facilities are meant so that a 
patient/caretaker is forced to purchase a drug even when it should have been free or at a 
subsidised rate. The FGD participant said: “If you have money you will receive treatment at a 
government hospital and get all the drugs you need. What happens is that the health worker 
will prescribe drugs for you and tell you that in case you do not get the drugs, you should 
come back and inform him. When you go back, he will tell you that there is another health 
worker who can help and asks you to come back after ten minutes with money...” (Female, 
FGD6, Rural). To emphasise the point on artificial shortages caused by corruption, a study 
participant said: “… the pharmacists tell you that prescribed drugs are out of stock but as 
you leave, they inform you about this other person with the same drug who could sell it at 
half the cost at a private pharmacy. Since you are suffering and you see a chance to save 
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money, if at all, you agree to the deal but you know that is not the right thing to do because 
there are notices alerting people to pay at designated places”  (Male, FGD4, Urban).  
 
6.4.1.4 Long waiting time 
The second most discussed problem with public services was delayed services as a result of 
long queues. There were two types of queuing for services that were identified from 
qualitative interviews: queuing for services on a day-to-day basis which takes hours, and 
queuing for specialist services such as surgery and diagnostic tests for some illnesses which 
could take days, weeks or months. From the survey findings, waiting hours (on a day-to-day 
basis) were more of a problem in urban areas where 76% indicated that services were slow 
and had to wait long hours to receive them as compared to the rural area where about 60% 
said they waited for many hours for services. The lower reporting of long waiting time in the 
rural area could be attributed to the high presence of health facilities as 77% in the rural 
area compared to 59% in the urban site indicated that health facilities were not far away. 
However, it must be recognised that this reflects respondents ’ perceptions on waiting times 
and physical accessibility of facilities. 
 
From the FGDs and in-depth interviews, long queues in public facilities stem from actual 
shortage of health workers but there are also shortages caused by absent health workers 
who get engaged in private practice. An FGD participant observed that: “…movement 
between private and public health facilities makes particularly services by doctors 
inaccessible in public facilities and the workload on other health workers such as nurses 
could be too high which compromises the quality of services.”  (Male, FGD3, Urban). 
 
On queuing for services, some FGD participants and in-depth interviewees were particularly 
concerned with emergency situations such as accidents or urgent surgery where they said 
that waiting for medical attention in a public facility could be fatal. Said a key informant in 
the rural area: “My daughter needed urgent tonsillectomy and the hospital told me to wait 
for a week for the next ENT specialist visit…. After a month, he had not come and I had to sell 
my calf to get the surgery done at a private hospital,” (Male, FGD2, Rural). In some cases, 
patients or carers who felt delayed could resort to bribery to get faster medical attention as 
expressed in this statement: “Sometimes one may feel that a child needs immediate medical 
attention and so if there is a long line and one has money, one will bribe the health worker to 
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jump the queue…” (Female, FGD2, Rural). While the problem of bribery should concern 
policymakers, quantitative data revealed that it was not highly prevalent although it was 
much higher in the urban area where about 24% of individuals admitted to having paid a 
bribe compared to 13% in the rural area.  
 
6.4.1.5 Opening hours 
Usually, the closest public facilities to most of the population are primary health facilities 
(dispensaries and health centres) but most of these operate during the day only. The 
opening hours of these facilities featured as a problem across both study sites where 
participants in qualitative interviews stated that in emergency situations such as accidents 
and abrupt illness at night when the closest primary facilities are closed, the alternative is 
always low-cost private facilities within the vicinity. The advantage with these facilities in 
such situations, as noted by qualitative study participants, is that health worker(s) are 
flexible and available any time of the night to attend to emergencies.  
 
6.4.1.6 Delays in providing needed services 
This was not reported as very common and most of the discussions were based on 
information from third-parties.  A few participants in the FGDs however, reported that some 
health workers, particularly nurses, deliberately ‘dragged their feet’ in providing needed 
services and as such contributed to the poor image of public provision. Although most study 
interviewees indicated that they had not experienced such problems with public providers, 
they agreed that based on third party information, inpatient care is particularly poor such 
that having an inpatient case at a public facility often gives the feeling that the patient is not 
well attended to so there is the need for constant visits by relatives. During an FGD, a 
participant narrated how an inpatient was deliberately neglected by nurses at a public 
health facility: “….the catheter was blocked and he could not pass urine so I alerted the 
nurses about the problem but two days later, the catheter had not been changed. I became 
very angry and asked them if I had brought my husband to hospital for them to kill. That is 
when they removed the catheter…. From then onwards I kept asking myself whether we or 
the nurses should be the ones around patients for 24-hours and what do we pay them for…?” 
(Female, FGD1, Rural).  
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Explaining the cause for the reluctance of some health workers to offer timely services, a 
key informant stated that certain levels of negligence in the public sector were due to lack 
of  accountability among health workers. Said a key informant: “You find that health 
workers, particularly nurses are so negligent in their duties such that they know very well the 
right thing to do but you find them seated and chatting as if they have no work... there is no 
one to put them to task and there is no one patients can complain to...”  (KI3, Urban). The key 
informant observed that lack of accountability among health workers was caused by poor 
reporting structures within public facilities  where sometimes nurses of the same calibre may 
work in one location without an organogram. 
 
On another case of unwillingness to offer timely services, an FGD participant reported 
having experienced deliberately delayed services as “punishment” from health workers for 
demanding to be attended to. He said:  “One day I came across someone who had been 
badly beaten by thugs in the night and had to rush him to the nearest hospital. At the 
hospital, the watchmen told me that the nurses were sleeping so I had to look for them and 
wake them up. That was my crime: waking up nurses to attend to an emergency. The nurses 
ordered me out of their room and told me that I will face the consequences. Can you imagine 
from dawn at 5.00am my patient was treated at 11.00am in the morning. That was my 
punishment for demanding to be seen by a health worker” (Male FGD5, Urban). 
 
In a few cases as reported in two FGDs, unwillingness to offer timely services could have 
extreme consequences for patients. For example, an FGD participant reported a case of a 
woman left alone to give birth at a facility with no health worker to attend to the newborn 
after delivery. The participant said of his experience: “There was a time I took my wife to 
deliver at the local hospital and I filled all the necessary forms and made full payment as 
required then I left for home knowing fully well that she was now in good care at a hospital. 
When I came back to visit her the following day I found that the baby had inhaled the 
amniotic fluid and had respiratory problems just because the mother was not attended to 
during delivery,” (Male FGD1, Urban).  
 
At least on one ocassion, death was reported to have occured out of neglect of patients as 
demonstrated in the following statement: “...I personally went to the nurse and informed 
her that there was a mistake with one of the patients with the way oxygen tubes were 
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inserted but the nurse retorted, ‘Go away, do you think I do not know? Go help her yourself.’ 
The thing is that the patient was not taking in oxygen as she should have because the tubes 
had come out and she died right there in our full view” (Female FGD3, Urban). 
 
From these narratives about lack of timely services, while it is widely acknowledged that 
public providers are understaffed and often overwhelmed by work, there are also problems 
of staff attitude that are well-documented to suggest that improving public provision needs 
to actively involve health workers in refining how they engage with patients.  
 
6.4.1.7 Physical location of facilities 
Physical location of public facilities did not feature so much as a major problem particularly 
in the rural area but as observed under 6.2, a number of people in the rural area mentioned 
distance to government hospitals, not primary care facilities, as a hindrance to thei r use of 
public health services. A key informant explained: “…one might argue that health facilities 
are just around the corner but in actual sense a lot of people would like to use the hospital 
which is not as close as the dispensaries, so the distance to hospital may delay treatment 
seeking for a number of people here” (Key informant, Male3). A quantitative summary 
(Table 6.3) indicates that fewer informal sector workers in the urban area (59%) perceived 
health facilities to be close to them compared to 77% in the rural area.   
 
6.4.2 Affordability of services 
Throughout qualitative discussions and interviews in both study locations, affordability of 
services emerged as the main reason many informal sector workers endured the 
inconveniences of public services. Asked why most informal sector workers still seek health 
services at government facilities when services were unsatisfactory, the response was that 
the alternative was too expensive or lacked some basic medical equipment and of poorer 
quality compared to government services. Asked who in particular goes to government 
facilities, a number of study participants submitted that public facilities are for low-income 
groups, an observation which reflects a skewed health system where use of certain health 
services are based more on ability to pay than need. A participant in an FGD in the rural area 
stated: “People like us who are not formally employed are the ones who go to government 
facilities because we do not have much money to go to private facilities. When you go to the 
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dispensary you just pay KSh 20 or 50, so we go there because it charges less than other 
facilities even though we take a whole day on the queue.”  
 
Comparing quantitative views on affordability of public health services between the two 
study sites, the survey showed that a lower percentage (25%) in the rural area found the 
public services to be affordable compared to 58% in the urban site who viewed the same 
services as affordable. From earlier findings in Chapter Five, an explanation to this 
difference in views on affordability of services between the study sites is likely to be the 
income gap in the informal sector entities which favoured the urban area. More specific 
analysis of affordability involved perspectives on direct and indirect cost of services. 
 
6.4.2.1 Direct cost of services 
Decisions on where to seek services among informal sector workers involved cost-
comparisons between private and public sector services. From qualitative findings, careful 
cost comparisons by patients or carers suggested that public services are not always cheap 
and private is not always expensive. Where service costs between public and private 
providers were the same or not very different the natural option was a private provider 
because of quicker services. An FGD participant said: “If an X-ray costs the same amount in 
public and private hospitals and you know that in private hospitals you will not be bothered 
by their health workers, you go to a private hospital” (Male, FGD7, Rural).  
 
At small private clinics which offered outpatient services only, a key informant in the urban 
area explained that sometimes it was cheaper to use their services because the combined 
cost of a public hospital including cost of transportation, opportunity costs, paying for 
hospital card, among others, was more than what a small private clinic nearby would 
charge. However, the main concern with the small private clinics was the likelihood of poor 
quality services. The key informant stated: “It is easy to calculate the cost differences 
between public providers and these local private clinics and if one wants a cheap quick fix, 
the private clinics offer a better alternative. The problem however, is the poor quality of 
services one is likely to receive because some of these clinics are not licensed to operate, lack 
basic equipment and the quality of people running them is questionable,” (KI3, Urban).  
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Small private clinics however, can enhance affordability of services based on their easy 
payment terms. For instance, the clinics could treat without having to pay immediately and 
offer easy payment terms including payment in-kind and in small instalments. People 
treated on credit and offered easy payment terms were often familiar with the clinic 
managers who needed assurance that the debtor would not default. A FGD participant 
observed: “Sometimes we go to private facilities when we have no cash at hand to pay at 
government facilities because we know the health worker who owns the clinic and so we can 
get treated on credit. However, not all who know the health worker get similar treatment 
because the health worker must be assured that a patient or carer has some source of 
income to repay the debt, otherwise a substantial deposit will be required,” (Male, FGD6, 
Urban). This indicates that private facilities are more accessible to people with some sources 
of income than they are to those without. For instance, the findings show that having a 
regular income may encourage some informal sector workers to go to private facilities 
because they could borrow money from colleagues if they did not have it at hand while 
assured that they have a source of income to repay the debt. In a sense, the findings show 
that affordable services (low cost or easy payment terms) other than drawing some people 
from public to private facilities, can also avoid counterintuitive and costly measures such as 
postponing treatment for lack of money.  
 
Highlighting the problems of cost of services at a health facility, a casual worker 
participating in an FGD explained: “…to be sick as a casual labourer is a very big problem but 
to be very sick as a casual labourer could be equated to the end of your world because you 
have no employer to run to and since you cannot work, it means there is no money to go to 
hospital, and most importantly to eat…one can easily die.” (Male, FGD1, Urban). 
 
Apart from direct facility costs, the cost of transportation was a hindrance to the use of 
public facilities for some people in both study sites and sometimes patients could not afford 
crucial return visits for lack of money for transportation. A female FGD participant 
explained: “…transport costs are unaffordable such that when a health worker requests for a 
return visit some of us cannot honour it because there is no money.” Often, the alternative 
for people who could afford cost of transportation was to purchase drugs from nearby 
chemists or informal drug shops. Transport costs associated with having to make several 
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trips to a public facility by carers visiting patients was often found to be costly to informal 
sector businesses both directly and indirectly because making the visits involved taking 
funds from businesses and/or closing down business to attend to patient needs.  
 
6.4.2.2 Indirect costs 
Indirect costs for informal sector workers mainly involved the potential of income or job 
losses as a result of spending many hours waiting for health services. The length of time 
spent at a facility involved lost opportunities which had direct consequences for the 
earnings of informal sector workers because some of the earnings depended on the amount 
of money raised in a day and since there are no leave days or sick leave, absence from work 
not only causes loss of income but also could lead to job losses or collapse of a business. A 
key informant observed: “…to be honest, an informal sector worker almost has no right to 
be sick because if one is paid on commission or is a lone-worker, where will money come 
from when they are sick and not working? First, the one paid on commission will not be paid, 
instead someone could be immediately hired in their place; secondly, if you are an own-
account worker and you have no support when ill, it means the business cannot open and 
when illness takes long, there will be no business…” (KI3, Urban). 
 
The anxiety over potential loss of a source of income sometimes forced some informal 
sector workers to abandon treatment to return to their income-generating entities and 
resort to self-treatment in the process. During the FGDs, men were particularly identified as 
having greater preference for self-treatment with fewer visits to facilities because of their 
cultural roles as household heads and had to spend their time in income generating entities 
to provide for the needs of the household. At least two FGDs in the urban area revealed that 
the thought of possible income losses as a result of time spent at a facility also contributed 
to bribery of health workers for faster services because when all is considered, the losses 
would be greater than the bribe to the health worker.  
 
While there may not be lessons for UHC in such findings as easy payment terms because this 
would be mainly out-of-pocket, there could be vital lessons in cost-comparisons as these 
may help in defining and costing the benefits package under a universal coverage system. 
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6.4.3 Acceptability of services 
 Acceptability-related issues were raised in both study sites and mostly highlighted the 
strengths of public services although there were also a few problems relating particularly to 
the behaviour of some health workers towards patients and carers. The issues raised were 
trust in public provision, perceptions of health worker competence and relationship with 
patients as well as facility environment. 
 
6.4.3.1 Trust in public provision 
Information mainly from qualitative interviews shows that informal sector workers to a 
large extent trust public providers in two main ways: to deliver only necessary yet adequate 
treatment because they are not motivated by profits, and to offer the correct diagnosis and 
explanation for the nature of their illness and recommend appropriate treatment. A study 
participant explained: “At private facilities, making money is the top priority but in a 
government facility your medical history is carefully taken and explained and you receive 
appropriate and adequate treatment...” (Female, FGD1, Urban).  
 
The quantitative survey confirmed that a high percentage of study participants (74% rural 
and 72% urban) had their illnesses diagnosed and explained to them at a government facility 
and adequate treatment offered, which gave them confidence in public services. 
 
6.4.3.2 Perceptions of provider competence 
The trust in public sector health services by informal sector workers was further enhanced 
by their belief that public health workers were properly trained and therefore competent to 
deliver quality services. A male FGD participant observed: “We acknowledge problems with 
the behaviour of some health workers at government hospitals but one thing for sure is that 
they are all well-trained and competent health workers because the government does not 
employ non-qualified health workers” (Male, FGD6, Urban).  
 
On the other hand, disrespect for patients and carers as reported during FGDs in both study 
sites tend to erode the confidence that informal sector workers have in public sector health 
workers. However, cases of disrespect for patients were few with only five participants in 
total reporting to have experienced disrespectful health workers. Furthermore, the 
quantitative component of this study indicated that respect for patients and carers was high 
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with about 87% and 74% of respondents in rural and urban locations respectively indicating 
that they were treated with respect by a public sector health worker. In total, 22% of study 
participants stated that they had been disrespected health workers.  
 
6.4.3.3 Cleanliness of facilities 
Cleanliness at facilities seemed not to be a major problem in public services as confirmed in 
the quantitative survey where up to 95% of respondents in the rural site and 83% in the 
urban agreed that the facilities were clean. It also featured less prominently in qualitative 
discussions, an indication that health facilities were acceptably clean.  
 
Earlier studies on access to health services in Kenya particularly by Chuma et al. (2010) had 
similar findings. The authors identified problems with all dimensions of access: availability 
(drug shortages, problems with opening hours and staff shortages); affordability (direct 
costs of services, informal payments and indirect costs including transportation), and 
acceptability (poor patient-provider relations, distrust in quality of services and 
effectiveness of treatment). Problems of access to services in Kenya are widely recognised 
and documented in various government reports (Government of Kenya, 2004, Ministry of 
Health, 2010, Ministry of Health, 2014a). 
 
6.5 Summary of lessons for universal coverage and conclusion 
 
Incentives to use public providers among informal sector workers in rural and urban areas 
are more-or-less the same, which merits broad-based interventions to facilitate progress 
towards universal coverage. Such usage among this population group is to a large extent not 
based on socioeconomic status or type of informal economic activity but is driven mainly by 
issues of affordability and availability of specific services. Some key highlights in public 
provision are the break-down in the referral system and inadequate services at primary level 
facilities which have contributed to large numbers of informal sector workers seeking care 
at secondary level facilities instead of primary facilities. 
 
Of note also, although this is often an obvious fact, is the lack of financial risk protection in 
the informal sector since key services such as drugs were unavailable and generally all 
services remained unaffordable to the majority of informal sector workers, especially those 
in the rural areas. Further, unavailability of specialist care was also noted to lead to 
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potentially impoverishing health care costs when some people had to sell important assets 
to access such services. 
 
An important component of universal coverage is that services need to be of sufficient 
quality to be effective. While informal sector workers indicated that public providers have a 
high potential to meet their health needs given their skilled manpower and diagnostic 
equipment, the sufficiency of overall services still needs to be further improved so that 
public provision could effectively launch universal coverage in Kenya.  
 
More generally, it is not always a straightforward choice for many informal sectors workers 
regarding where to go for health services. Getting treatment or other health services often 
involves gambles and opportunity costs. In choosing government facilities for example, 
while relatively low-cost and treatment by skilled staff are attractive options, there is always 
the problem of long waiting hours to receive services and not getting the necessary drugs. 
For low-cost private facilities, they are accessible and settling medical bills can be in ways 
that are acceptable to the provider and convenient to the patient but one is at risk of poor 
diagnosis and generally low-quality medical care. Regardless of the inconveniences, 
government facilities still remain the most popular providers for the majority of informal 
sector workers for reasons already mentioned but this does not mean that government 
facilities are the providers of choice because private facilities are often seen as having better 
services but as being high cost.  
 
With the current quality of services in the public sector, it would be difficult to convince 
informal sector workers to prepay for health care but this could change with overall 
improvements in service provision that emphasises availability of services, particularly in 
terms of the number of health workers (to reduce waiting times) and the routine availability 
of medicines. Such improvements would increase the chances of having a successful 
universal health system.   
  
159 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: VIEWS OF INFORMAL SECTOR WORKERS IN RELATION TO FUTURE 
HEALTH SYSTEM 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
Chapter Six explored in-depth the nature and quality of health services in the public sector 
and highlighted key issues that influence access to public sector services for the informal 
sector. The issues highlighted were believed to be some of the major barriers to the 
adoption of prepaid health care by informal sector workers. Chapter Seven now 
concentrates on the analysis of the nature of a future prepaid health system that would be 
acceptable to the informal sector and some of the key improvements needed in the public 
health sector to anchor prepaid health care and universal coverage. The chapter first 
explores the level of social solidarity in urban and rural areas to measure the potential for 
support for redistributive policies and then seeks to understand what prepaid health care 
means to the informal sector, their current knowledge and experiences with the public 
health insurer- the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF), as well as potential barriers to 
compulsory prepaid health care. In the envisaged future health system, Chapter Seven also 
explores design preferences by the informal sector including sources of funds, the benefit 
package, pooling arrangements and management of the prepaid funds.   
 
7.2 Social solidarity in the informal sector 
 
Social solidarity as defined here is more in terms of empathy and commitment to the 
welfare of fellow citizens as far as health care is concerned, particularly at the national level 
rather than at the level of sub-national groups linked with kinship, religious, ethnic or 
regional ties. The first step in measuring solidarity among informal sector workers was an 
attempt to understand the level of support for redistributive health care policies that 
benefit all Kenyans. In this regard, study participants were given a list of statements and 
asked to choose one that they most agreed with. The choices were then analysed to 
understand whether they were driven by altruism or self-interest. The results are presented 
in Figure 7.1 and show that most Kenyans (about 64%) would support redistributive policies 
such as prepaying for health care to contribute to the improvement of health benefits for all 
Kenyans. However, the rural study site at 77% of all study participants, exhibited stronger 
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support for redistribution that brings health care benefits to all Kenyans compared to 59% in 
the urban site. Those opposed to redistribution at the national level were mainly in support 
of statements that served self-interests. Among this group, about 26% in total were either 
supportive of prepayment for health care only if it benefited their families (rural= 11% and 
urban= 25%) or were altogether opposed to redistribution (rural= 4.7% and rural= 5.8%). 
They favoured the individualist idea that everyone should be responsible for their own 
health. Although the percentage supporting an individualist view appears small, it could 
have some implications in nurturing community solidarity to support redistributive policies. 
About 10% in total for rural and urban study sites supported prepayment at sub-national 
level; that is, beyond the family level to include friends and neighbours hence basically 
supporting redistribution at community rather than national level. The differences between 
rural and urban areas in terms of the most agreeable statement were strongly significant 
(P=0.003) where solidarity with the rest of the country was stronger in rural than urban 
areas (Figure 7.1). 
 
 
 
A multi-country study by Goudge et al. (2012) expressed more-or-less similar results where 
62% of South Africans and 55% of Ghanaians supported progressive financing to support 
those least able to pay. In the same study over 75% of South Africans particularly among the 
insured were willing to prepay for health care but mainly for themselves and immediate 
family. Only 11% would prepay for those who are badly off. Among the wealth quintiles in 
South Africa, similar to this study findings, Goudge et al., (2012) show that social solidarity 
was lowest in the wealthiest quintile but highest in quintiles two and three as opposed to 
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the lowest quintile in this study. A similar pattern was reported in Ghana where more rural 
than urban dwellers favoured progressive financing. 
 
The lower levels of altruistic values in the urban area could be explained by the diversity of 
cultures and ethnic groups, lack of kinship ties and loose connection of individuals and 
groups residing in urban areas. As the FGDs revealed, the urban area population, particularly 
those in the informal sector, do not form strong neighbourhoods as they tend not to live in 
one location for long, which makes it difficult for them to develop long-term relationships 
with one another. James and Savedoff (2010) and Stuckler et al. (2010) among other authors 
have stressed the importance of social solidarity to sustain redistributive policies such UHC. 
To further measure the level of social solidarity within the study sites, an altruistic 
statement was given to the study participants who were asked to indicate whether they 
‘Strongly agreed; Agreed; Disagreed or Strongly disagreed’ with the statement. The results, 
as presented in Figure 7.2, show that the rural area (81%) again had the largest number of 
those strongly in agreement with the following statement: “Agree to prepay for health care 
because the payment could help me or someone else in future”  compared to 67% in the 
urban area. About 3.9% and 3.4% for rural and urban respectively strongly disagreed with 
the statement. The difference between the study sites in terms of agreement or 
disagreement with the statement was significant (P = 0.010) indicating that the level of 
social solidarity is stronger in the ethnically homogenous (rural) than the diverse urban site.  
 
 
Pearson chi2= 11.3; P = 0.010 
 
Social solidarity across socioeconomic groups in each study site was also assessed for 
association but no significant differences were noted (P=0.19 urban and P=0.57 rural). 
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Specific to the urban area, about 72% in Q2, 69% in Q3 and 67% in Q5 strongly agreed to 
prepay to help themselves in future and anyone else. In the rural area, quintiles two (76%) 
and three (84%) had the majority in strong agreement to prepay to help themselves and 
anyone else in future. These results largely indicated high levels of support for redistribution 
policies in both study sites although this support was much stronger in the rural areas. This 
could be explained by three reasons: the rural area had a history with CBHIs and 
considerable NHIF activity so had relatively better familiarity with prepaid health care than 
urban areas as shown in the survey where 94% of rural respondents were aware of a 
prepayment scheme compared to 77% in the urban area. The other reason draws from the 
researchers’ own experience of the study area. The rural area is ethnically homogeneous 
and bound by kinship ties where most people in a locality are somehow related by a 
common ancestor.   
 
Social solidarity was further tested to understand who would support income-related 
redistributive policies in rural and urban areas. Overall, the results (Figure 7.3) show greater 
social solidarity with poorer groups because 69% in the rural and 61% in the urban study site 
supported prepayments that are income-related and a further 26% in the rural and 38% in 
the urban sites indicated that the very poor should not pay for health care at all. This 
suggests stronger unity among different income groups for equitable payments for health 
care. A small minority was in favour of everyone prepaying the same amount regardless of 
income status.  
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Even though there is evidence of strong social solidarity with the poor as demonstrated in 
Figure 7.3 with high support for payments according to income, this is limited among upper 
quintiles. Additional scrutiny showed that quintiles four and five were least supportive of an 
income-related prepayment system but support for such graduated payment was highest 
amongst the middle quintiles (Q2 and Q3). For example, in the rural area support for 
prepayment according to income was highest in Q2 (54%) and Q3 (31.5%) but lowest in the 
highest quintile (1.1%). Likewise for the urban area, among the highest quintiles - Q4 and Q5, 
only 3.1% and 1.5% respectively were in favour of income-related prepayments compared 
to 37% each in Q2 and Q3, and 22% in the lowest quintile. What this means is that social 
solidarity is stronger among low-income groups than it is in the high-income quintiles. Low 
social solidarity in the richest quintiles can negatively affect the principle of redistribution in 
UHC that requires income cross-subsidies from the richest to the poorest. 
 
From qualitative findings, most respondents exhibited altruistic values as the main reason 
why they would prepay for health care. As suggested by one respondent in the urban area, 
it really does not matter whether the prepaid funds benefit a friend, a family member or 
someone they would never know but the important element was being able to help: 
“People should help each other regardless of their differences…after all we are all human 
beings...one is not better or worse because they are different [ethnically] from us. If my 
prepayment for health care would help someone who is sick and does not have the means to 
access health care then I will feel happy for being able to help…” (Male, FGD3 Urban). 
 
Asked if ethnic differences could hinder social solidarity among Kenyans in pursuit of 
prepaid health care, a number of FGD participants in both sites agreed that ethnic divides, 
particularly under the current devolved governance system, could make a contributory 
prepayment mechanism unfeasible. A FGD participant said: “We are a very united country 
and we would all want to contribute to a common good for all of us whether in helping each 
other access health care or any other contribution…but that is before politics mess up 
everything… (lots of laughter)… yes mess up, because some counties will feel that they are 
contributing more and not benefiting as much….” (Male, FGD5 Rural).   
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A few people however, were less altruistic and stated that they would be reluctant to 
prepay for health care if they do not benefit from it at a personal or family level. Although 
this appeared as self-interest, the key concerns of this group of respondents could be linked 
to their experiences with the current prepayment schemes especially the NHIF and the 
scope of its benefit package as revealed in the following statement: “I was a member of the 
NHIF for almost 10 years and never once benefited from their services because I was never 
an inpatient; so I clearly did not see the point of continuing my membership because I could 
not continue paying for something I did not benefit from” (Male, FGD3).  
 
In other qualitative findings, the uncertainty of illness occurrence and the possibility of 
falling into a medical poverty trap was a key driver for some people to prepay for health 
care in solidarity with others as captured here: “Illness does not tell anyone when it is 
coming or of its magnitude that is why I would prepay for health care. You know, if I have 
contributed so little and my illness requires a lot of money way beyond my means, other 
people will pay for me because we are one in the same pool of funds. Likewise, if I do not fall 
ill my contribution will benefit someone who would otherwise die from lack of money to pay 
for health care” (Female, FGD6 Urban). 
 
The importance of social solidarity in UHC cannot be overstated. A number of authors 
(Oxfam, 2013, Harris et al., 2011, Ataguba and Akazili, 2010, Carrin and James, 2005) 
emphasise that social solidarity is necessary for optimal redistribution and effective cross -
subsidisation. Oxfam (2013) further states that social solidarity between formal and 
informal sectors is necessary for progress towards universal health coverage. Such solidarity, 
according to Carrin and James (2005), should be innate within a society rather than imposed 
by policymakers to be able to implement and sustain cross-subsidisation. In summary, 
findings for this study show that the level of social solidarity in the informal sector is high 
especially among low-income groups. This should concern policymakers because income 
cross-subsidisation should target the rich and there is a real danger in nurturing, 
implementing and sustaining prepaid health care where wealthier populations are not 
supportive of redistributive policies. Hernandez (2002), Anttonen and Sipilä (2005) and 
Stuckler et al. (2010) have all argued for cohesive societies among all income groups as a 
condition for the success of redistributive policies. 
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The next sub-section discusses the experiences of informal sector workers with prepaid 
health care, underlining their knowledge and attitudes towards prepaid health care and 
concrete experiences with the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) which is the national 
public health insurer. The idea was to understand how current knowledge and experiences 
with existing prepayment schemes could influence the design of future prepayment 
mechanisms including potential constraints in translating high social solidarity noted above 
into actual prepayment now and in future.  
 
 
 
7.3 Experiences with prepaid health care among informal sector workers 
 
7.3.1 Attitudes towards prepaid health care  
The questions around this topic focused on what it means to prepay for health care and 
what its advantages are. As learnt from the broader literature, the main objectives of 
prepaying for health care are to improve access to quality health services and to provide 
financial risk protection. These objectives were well understood and described by study 
participants who discussed them in some detail. In general, prepaying for health care was 
understood by the informal sector in terms of cross-subsidisation, an enabling factor in 
access to services and insurance against poverty if one were to sell one’s assets to pay for 
health care on an out-of-pocket basis. These were captured in the following statement: 
“What I heard about paying for health care in advance is that your money is used to pay for 
someone else’s medical bill when you are not ill and when it is your turn then your medical 
expenses are paid for by other people and this would save you a lot otherwise if the medical 
bill is too high you would have to sell some of your property…” (Female, FGD3 Rural). 
 
On the importance of prepaying for health care, six key issues were raised in the FGDs and 
in-depth interviews from both study sites. These were the following: prepayment gives a 
sense of security, is a source of empowerment, a means of saving money, securing social 
relations, a means to promote quality health care and improved access to health services.  
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In terms of prepayment as a form of security, this was interpreted as some form of 
guarantee against the socioeconomic consequences of falling ill especially because illness is 
unpredictable. This was captured in statement from an FGD participant: “Illness is like the 
devil and prepaying for health care is like getting saved, so by prepaying for health care one 
does not fear the devil…” (Male6, FGD2 Rural). Besides, study participants stated that 
prepayment would help in maintaining social relations and avoiding conflicts because one 
would not have to borrow to pay medical bills. Defaulting in repaying debts was depicted as 
a source of social tensions and conflicts in the community. Chuma et al. (2007) had similar 
findings with regards to borrowing as a source of social conflicts in Kenya. Prepaying for 
health care was also seen as a guarantee of security to the mind; that is, recovery from 
illness was perceived as a combination of medicines and the state of mind. A peaceful mind, 
as noted by participants, is important if one is to recover quickly from illness: “Prepaid 
health care is be good because when one is hospitalised they do not have to worry about 
mounting hospital bills and this state of mind will aid their recovery” (Female, FGD3 Rural).  
 
In the same context, prepaying for health care was regarded as a way of saving costs in the 
long term because, according to study participants, one does not have to meet health 
expenses on their own. Prepaid health care as a cost-saving measure would be more 
applicable to lower-income groups if it is progressively funded, but not for higher-income 
groups, which perhaps explains the lack of social solidarity amongst higher income groups. 
Overall, prepaid health care for most informal sector workers was a cheaper option than 
paying out-of-pocket as stated by a key informant: “It is not a good thing to just sit there 
with the hope that when one is ill the neighbours will contribute towards costs of 
hospitalisation. One has to decide quite early to prepay for health care because paying OOP 
can be very expensive…” (Male, IDI2 Rural). The lower costs of prepaid health care result 
from the capacity of a large pool to cross-subsidise and to bargain for lower prices. McIntyre 
et al. (2013) refer to Thailand’s universal coverage scheme (UCS) which uses the strength of 
its membership size to negotiate lower prices. 
 
Prepaid health care was also understood by most study participants in the qualitative 
component as a way to improve access to health services generally and as a means of 
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entitlement to specified services at designated health facilities that guarantee a minimum 
standard of quality, as observed by two study participants:  
a) “Prepaid health care will encourage people to visit a health facility at the earliest 
time possible and therefore improve the health status of all….” (Male, FGD3 Urban).  
b) “Once people have prepaid for health care, they will not be afraid of the costs of 
visiting a health facility because they have paid and expect quality services. The 
facility visited will have to be formal where we expect better medical services as 
opposed to informal facilities…” (Male9, FGD2 Rural).   
 
Prompt access to health services was noted to be particularly important during illness 
emergencies where services would otherwise be inaccessible without money at hand. A 
participant noted: “One can be in need of health care services at any time and if there was 
no money at hand it can be very difficult accessing health care… I believe that to be on the 
safe side prepaying for health care is important  because there is a high level of guarantee 
that one will receive needed services” (Female, FGD1, Urban). 
 
Lastly, prepaying for health care was regarded by the majority of study respondents as a 
source of empowerment and improving both social and financial accountability at health 
facilities and in the government as a whole: “Once we prepay for health care we will know 
what we have paid for unlike now when even with poor health services no one has the power 
to complain but when we prepay and do not find services that we have paid for we will have 
a voice to demand for adequate and improved quality services…. That way, the authorities 
will know better not to misuse our money, instead ensure that what is paid for is available 
when required…. It will be power to the people” (IDI8, Rural). Jakab and Krishnan (2001) and 
Arhin-Tenkorang (2001) acknowledge the aspect of empowerment when extending 
coverage to informal sector populations as it increases their ability to make public 
institutions more accountable.  
 
Based on the solidarity expressed for redistributive policies and the largely positive attitudes 
towards prepaid health care, study participants were asked to clarify why only a few of 
them were members of existing prepaid schemes. The responses revealed key barriers to 
prepayment ranging from lack of proper information regarding who can be a member of a 
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scheme, affordability of premiums, limited benefit package, reservations about proper 
management of funds and poor quality services. These issues are extensively discussed in 
subsequent subsections on experiences of informal sector populations with the NHIF and 
their recommended improvements that should define a future prepaid health system. 
 
7.3.2 Experiences with the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) 
The NHIF as a public entity is the largest health insurer in Kenya and being proposed to 
provide a platform for UHC in the country. The analysis of experiences of the NHIF by the 
informal sector concentrated on informal sector knowledge and membership of the NHIF to 
gauge their future expectations of a prepaid health system.  
 
 
7.3.2.1 Knowledge and membership of the NHIF by the informal sector 
From Figure 7.4, the rural area showed very high levels of awareness about the NHIF (94% 
compared to 77% in the urban area). One reason for the high awareness may be because 
the rural area had a long history of community-based health financing schemes so this 
familiarity with prepayment schemes aided their knowledge of other existing schemes such 
as the NHIF. High levels of knowledge about the NHIF also translated into higher 
membership in the rural area (40%) compared to 22% in the urban area. Together, the study 
sites record on average membership of about 31% which is above the national average 
given by the NHIF at about 7.0% of informal sector workers being members of the NHIF. 
According to key informants in both study sites, the above national average membership in 
the informal sector could be a misrepresentation because some alleged members were no 
longer contributing and so were ineligible for any benefits (i.e. this may reflect the 
percentage of the population who had ever been members of the NHIF). In the rural area, a 
key informant mentioned that many people who were previously members of the NHIF 
stopped contributing when the NHIF proposed increased contribution rates from KSh 160 
(US$ 1.78) to KSh 500 (US$ 5.56) per month for informal sector populations. The key 
informant said: “There were a number of people who were members of the NHIF here but 
since that time the NHIF announced their intention to more than double contribution rates 
many of us stopped contributing…we have stopped being members of the NHIF because we 
will not be able to afford the new rates….” (KI7, Male, Rural). 
169 
 
 
 
 
Further descriptive analysis shows that most members of the NHIF belonged to the upper 
two quintiles; for example, about 60% of Q4 and 33% of Q5 in the study were members of 
the NHIF compared to 12% for Q1 and 16% for Q2. This gives a strong indication of an 
existing relationship between SES and membership of the NHIF in both sites and suggests 
that many informal sector workers find the current NHIF rates unaffordable. Barriers to 
NHIF membership were extensively explored in the survey questionnaire and the results are 
presented below.  
 
7.3.2.2 Main reasons for non-membership of the NHIF 
“The fund, like a fish, rots from the head....”(Vulture, 2013). 
During the survey, each respondent was asked to state two main reasons which made them 
not contribute to the NHIF. The results are presented in Figure 7.5.  
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The two main reasons for not joining the NHIF in the rural area in order of priority were high 
premium rates (38%) and the NHIF offices being too far away (25%). A third reason was 
concern over reported mismanagement of collected funds (16%). The NHIF has tried to 
address the problem of office location by decentralising membership registration centres 
and automating contributions either online or through mobile phone money transfers and 
so one does not have to be at the NHIF offices to contribute. However, the requirement for 
photographs and copies of identity documents for contributors and beneficiaries means that 
one has to be physically present at an NHIF office or representative to be registered. In the 
urban area, two key barriers to joining NHIF were: the suspicion that funds would be 
mismanaged (23%) and the fact that NHIF membership is voluntary (21%). About 19% of 
respondents indicated high premium rates as a third reason for not being members of the 
NHIF. Considering the total average, the two main barriers to NHIF membership in both 
study sites were high premium rates (25%) and concerns over mismanagement of NHIF 
funds (19%) although the fact that membership is voluntary also remains an important 
reason for not joining the NHIF particularly in the urban area. Voluntary membership is 
often an incentive for adverse selection where people most in need of health services are 
likely to enrol into the scheme. This is likely to place financial strain on the insurer because 
cross-subsidisation between healthy and sick and between rich and poor is limited through 
such adverse selection.  
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The disincentive to enrol in the NHIF was also highlighted in qualitative interviews which in 
addition suggested that punitive fines on defaulted payments and poor quality of public 
sector health services, where the NHIF covers all costs, were also other important 
hindrances to being members of the current contributory prepayment mechanism. The NHIF 
recently revised the punitive charges on defaulters from 500% to 25% of the defaulted total. 
Overall, qualitative findings suggested high premium rates, lack of outpatient coverage and 
corruption at the NHIF as the key barriers to NHIF membership. Below is a statement in the 
discussions that highlighted corruption at the NHIF: “Everyone is hungry in this country but 
not people such as the ones employed to manage our funds at the NHIF. Between an NHIF 
officer and me, a hungry man, who should steal from whom? It happens the opposite way so 
we can never pay any money to the NHIF” (KI7, Urban). 
 
Evidence of corruption at the NHIF is in public domain and several media reports such as the 
ones in the newspaper posts presented below have concretised public opinion about the 
NHIF as a corrupt institution. 
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7.4 Preferred design features of a future prepaid health system 
 
The design features of an acceptable future health system as visualised by informal sector 
workers in both study sites is presented in four parts: the choice of a financing mechanism 
by the informal sector; population coverage (who pays and who is covered?), broad 
definitions of the benefit package, and choice of organisation to manage collected funds. 
 
  
DAILY NATION WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 2012 
MPs’ probe finds shocking details on NHIF 
scheme 
 
 
Then Minister for Medical Services, Prof 
Anyang Nyongo with former permanent 
secretary Mary Ngare before the House 
Committee probing the NHIF saga on 
May 15, 2012. Photo/SALATON NJAU   
 
 
Why NHIF may be too sick to provide 
healthcare to Kenyans 
By Ma vulture On June 05, 2013   
“The fund, like fish, rots from the head, and the man at the helm, ironically, oversaw 
the mess that has consigned the insurer to intensive care” 
 
 
DAILY NATION FRIDAY, JULY 20, 2012 
Fresh scandals unearthed in health scheme 
 
Ph oto|FILE Clinix Healthcare Ltd Chief Executive officer Toddy Madahana (left) and  chairman 
Jay esh Saini before the Parliamentary Committee investigating the NHIF scandal on May 15, 2012.  
173 
 
7.4.1 Design element 1: Choice of financing mechanism 
Study participants were asked what type of prepayment mechanisms would be most 
preferable if all Kenyans were to receive quality health care under a universal system. The 
choices were given in four categories: non-contributory (with the explanation that this 
largely involves financing from taxes); contributory (with examples being given of NHIF and 
CBHIs as the main financing agencies); a choice of both (for those non-committal on either 
financing arrangements) and choice of neither (for people not for any of the above). The 
results were presented in Figure 7.6. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6 shows significant differences (P= <0.001) in the preferences between prepayment 
mechanisms between rural and urban populations. The rural area clearly favoured a 
contributory arrangement with about 73% of survey participants in favour compared to 28% 
in the urban area where non-contributory mechanisms were favoured by the majority 
(58%). Part of the explanation for this differential is the relatively long history of 
contributory schemes, mainly CBHIs, in the rural study site as had been mentioned 
previously. Other reasons for the choice of one over the other were apparent in the 
qualitative discussions (FGDs and in-depth interviews). There were however, general 
agreements on two issues: the one that both SHI and tax funded systems were capable of 
generating large amounts of funds in a single pool and the other that both systems are 
prone to embezzlement of funds. Study participants who favoured a non-contributory 
(general government revenue) financing mechanism discussed important reasons guiding 
their choice:  
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(i) Ease of implementation and revenue collection: A non-contributory system would 
be easier to implement because taxes are easily collected directly or indirectly as 
compared to collecting insurance premiums. Also there would be no requirement for 
extra administrative structures and costs of collection. A key informant observed: 
“We would like health care for all to be funded through a tax system because taxes 
are much easier to collect than insurance contributions. Only the law needs to 
change, which does not cost much, and then people will be knowingly or unknowing 
paying for health care without the government having to more employ people to 
collect such money... ” (Male KI7, Urban). Developing countries that have attempted 
to expand coverage through contributory mechanisms have experienced difficulties 
which suggests that implementing non-contributory systems is likely to more 
successful than contributory systems in settings with large informal sector 
populations. Writing in the context of low- and middle-income countries, 
Tangcharoensathien et al. (2011) observe  that implementing contributory schemes 
among large informal sector populations is not feasible. 
(ii) Less controversial: A tax system would be less controversial as opposed to a 
contributory insurance scheme, which by design requires compulsory membership, 
was likened to ‘head taxes’ in the colonial days. A FGD participant argued thus: 
“When I was growing up there was what the colonialists and immediate post-colonial 
government used to call ‘head tax’ whose collection was to be enforced by local 
chiefs. This kind of tax used to make villagers…terribly run away whenever the chief 
came calling. Now if you talk about compulsory contribution to the NHIF or 
something like that, you are saying that the chief will follow its implementation. Let 
us not go there because it was such a bad experience” (Male3, FGD Urban). 
(iii) More sustainable: A non-contributory system has a firmer foundation for 
sustainability for the following reasons: first, the chances of defaulting or dropping 
out as with the case with contributory schemes are limited; secondly, it is a 
government programme and citizens are entitled to certain levels of care whose 
provision they would hold the government accountable: “I would support a tax 
system because all the taxes will be going to the government which will be expected 
to provide an agreed upon package of care whether we pay or not pay because it is 
already a deal…. But come to think of it, no one can claim to drop out of a tax system 
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because money for health care will be based on taxes on consumables, among 
others” (KI3, Urban).  
(iv) Protects the poor and those with irregular income: A tax funded system was 
believed to favour people with irregular income (informal sector) and poor people 
because they only pay upon consumption of specific taxable goods and services. In 
so doing the poor are likely to be more protected from inequitable payment 
compared to the contributory system. An FGD participant said: “In one way or the 
other we all pay taxes directly or indirectly and the more one buys the more one pays. 
So I think a tax system will protect the poor who are likely to buy less of the taxable 
items or services” (Male8, FGD Urban).  
(v) Less likely to be scuttled by political schisms: This was documented in three FGDs in 
the urban site in which study participants argued that sharp political divisions 
current in the country could make a national contributory scheme difficult to 
implement because of the seemingly low levels of national integration. A participant 
explained: “I am a Kenyan; I was born here and know this country very well. There 
are rich counties and very poor counties and these may not like each other for purely 
political and ethnic reasons. If people are going to be told that their contributions 
could be used anywhere in the country, you will see how politicians twist everything 
into a mess. So to me taxation would the best way forward” (Female, FGD1 Urban).  
 
Informal sector workers who preferred a contributory mechanism had two main reasons:  
(i) Familiarity: Mostly in the rural area, study participants acknowledged that they were 
more familiar with contributory arrangements such as the NHIF and could not figure 
out how a tax-funded system would work. An FGD participant said: “We are used to 
the schemes and they are what we would like to provide health care for all…” 
(Female FGD1, Rural). Another participant added: “We have several questions 
regarding a tax-funded system: how does it work? How will we know how much is 
collected for health care? Who will keep the money?” (Female FGD3, Rural). A lot of 
these concerns about tax funding mirror a certain level of mistrust with the potential 
collecting agency (government) regarding proper use of tax funds for health care.  
(ii) Sense of disenchantment: One could easily feel a sense of disenchantment with the 
government among study participants who were opposed to a non-contributory 
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mechanism. The general feeling in this population group was that there was nothing 
good that would come from the government. Although they supported a 
contributory mechanism, they preferred one that does not involve the government 
and emphasised that community organised schemes would be much better as they 
were more accountable to their members. One key informant observed:  
“We do not feel a part of this government…and so we cannot give  it any more money 
to keep under pretence of providing free health care because we will never get free 
health care or anything from the government” (KI3, Urban). 
Although the discussions on contributory and non-contributory mechanisms may appear 
polarising, within the Kenyan context however, premium payments would place a heavier 
burden on those without ability to pay but indirect taxes (for a non-contributory system), 
since they tend to be relatively equitable compared with premium contributions at least in 
some LMICs, would place more of the burden on those with ability to pay. This is the reason 
why a non-contributory system would be relatively less controversial. 
 
Informal sector workers opposed to either mechanism were mainly concerned with 
corruption in government and indicated that they would rather pay for health care out-of-
pocket to avoid their money being embezzled. Anxiety over mismanagement of funds, 
distrust in the ability of the government to deliver on the agreed upon package of care and 
affordability of premiums were some of the key issues that were mentioned in most FGDs as  
potential barriers to prepaid health care. 
 
Further views on contributory mechanisms were elicited, given that the government policy 
is to introduce such a mechanism to finance UHC. Opinions from informal sector workers 
were sought on revenue collection strategies and types of pooling arrangements that they 
would prefer under such a scheme even if they did not support it. On strategies to collect 
revenue, most study participants both in the quantitative and qualitative components of the 
study stated that revenue collection should involve easy means of prepayment including 
devolved payment units and use of wireless technology such as mobile phones and internet. 
The NHIF is currently implementing these methods of revenue collection. Study participants 
were then asked to choose two premium payment strategies that they preferred most. 
Figure 7.7 illustrates the preferred premium payment strategies as proposed by informal 
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sector workers. The differences between rural and urban study sites on the preferred 
premium payment methods were significant (P=0.02).  
 
 
Pearson chi2 P=0.02 
 
In the rural area, the two most preferred premium payment methods were small-scale 
businesses acting as agents for the insurance agency (27%) and through organisations such 
as savings and other informal community groups (22%). In the urban area, use of mobile 
telephony was most preferred (38%) followed by savings and other informal community 
groups (17%). Overall, use of mobile telephony to pay premiums was most popular (34%) 
followed by savings and other informal groups (18%).  
 
The least preferred premium payment method in both study sites was use of scratch cards 
but this was mainly because scratch cards as a means of premium payment were, at the 
time of the survey, still a relatively new concept being rolled out by the NHIF and so was not 
well known by the study population. Overall, these are new findings that will help shape 
revenue collection policy for UHC under a contributory system. 
 
With regard to how regularly the informal sector would like to pay their premium rates 
under the proposed contributory system, the results are presented in Table 7.1. This was 
intended to identify the most financially convenient way for the informal sector to make 
prepayments while accounting for income irregularities in the sector.  
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 Table 7.1: Preferred frequency of premium contributions 
Strategy Rural (%) Urban (%) Total (%) 
Contribute lump sum once a year 30 (23.3) 
 
54 (16.7) 84 (18.6) 
Contribute lump sum once every month 64 (49.6) 
 
182 (56.4) 246 (54.4) 
Pay monthly contributions in two 
instalments  
0 (0) 11 (3.4) 11 (2.4) 
Pay monthly contributions in weekly 
instalments 
2 (1.6) 13 (4.0) 15 (3.3) 
Pay monthly contributions in daily 
instalments  
3 (2.3) 13 (4.0) 16 (3.5) 
Pay monthly contributions in instalments 
any time in the course of the month  
30 (23.3) 50 (15.5) 80 (17.7) 
Total 129 (100) 323 (100) 452 (100) 
 
 
On average, the table shows that more than half of informal sector workers (rural=, 50% and 
urban= 56%) would like to contribute health insurance premiums once a month; that is, pay 
in monthly lump sum. This response suggests two things: the one that the majority in the 
informal sector have regular income (monthly or bi-weekly as demonstrated in Chapter Five) 
even if the income is short term, and the other is that the current national insurance 
arrangement all along emphasised monthly contributions before the recent changes. 
Contributing a yearly lump sum was chosen by a total of about 19% of the informal sector 
workers (rural= 23% and urban=17%) indicating that most informal sector workers are 
unable to save substantial amounts of money and set it aside to prepay for health care once 
a year. People who chose to pay yearly lump sum in the rural area were mostly coffee and 
tea growers who expected to earn tea and coffee bonuses at the end of each year. Equally 
important is the relatively large numbers of informal sector workers who would like to 
contribute their monthly premiums in as many instalments as their income would allow; 
that is, 18% overall (rural= 23% and urban= 16%). This group would prefer to contribute 
their monthly premiums in small instalments at any time of the month whenever they had 
money. This choice indicates that a good number of informal sector workers face income 
uncertainties and are unsure when they could pay their premiums.  Monthly instalments 
and an open number of instalments in a month were the most popular choices while 
fortnightly, weekly and daily instalments were least preferred in both study sites. The 
reasons for these preferences were not clear from the data but a statement from one study 
participant summarised the desire of some informal sector workers to contribute at any 
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time during the month when money is available: “If there is a rule that everyone pays 
monthly lump sum then there will be a problem because not all of us earn regularly- 
sometimes we earn but sometimes we do not and so it will be difficult to set aside money for 
premium payment at the end of the month because our immediate needs would not allow us 
to do so…” (Female, FGD6 Rural). 
 
The NHIF has instituted reforms allowing informal sector workers to pay their monthly 
premiums in up to three instalments. Elsewhere the difficulty of prepaying yearly lump-sum 
premiums has been recorded in Rwanda (Government of Rwanda, 2010b) where timing of 
contributions coincided with other household obligations such as school fees which 
together made yearly contribution expensive, leading to defaults in payments. 
 
Still under a contributory prepayment financing mechanism, the study sought to find out 
what pooling arrangement between social health insurance scheme and community-based 
schemes would be preferable to those in the informal sector. This was qualitatively explored 
and the key issues related to feasibility and sustainability of schemes, access to a large 
number of health facilities, economies of scale and breadth of coverage, as well as 
accountability to contributors. Most of the views on these issues favoured SHI except in the 
area of accountability where mostly rural area study participants observed that a CBHI is 
easy to manage because it involves a few people within a specific locality. 
 
Opposition to the CBHIs in the urban area was very strong on one aspect: that such pooling 
arrangement would not be feasible because of the mobility of informal sector workers. A 
study participant observed that: “We (informal sector) tend to migrate a lot to any part of 
the country in search of work or business opportunities, so I would prefer a scheme that is 
available everywhere of which CBHIs are not…” (Male FGD6, Urban). In this context, SHI was 
defined as having a national reach with a network of health facilities that are accessible to 
any member anywhere in the country. Most study participants also stated that SHI is more 
sustainable because it is anchored by national legal statutes and so it remains the 
responsibility of the government to ensure that SHI works in the long term to safeguard the 
health of all Kenyans. As a national pool, study participants observed that SHI has the 
potential to generate more money for its expenditures without the risk of bankruptcy. 
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Beyond bankruptcy, a large pool of funds was seen as ensuring more benefits to the 
contributors as explained by a FGD participant: “As a large pool, it (SHI) would have more 
money to purchase a wider range of services to members…” (Female, FGD6 Rural).  
 
Finally, by arguing that “little efforts brought together would lift a heavy load”, study 
participants showed awareness that SHI has the potential for greater economies of scale 
than CBHIs and would support such a mechanism to be able to provide comprehensive 
services to all Kenyans: “When we all contribute a little strength here and there, we will be 
able to lift a huge load. The collective contributions from all of us will be able to provide 
comprehensive health services for all Kenyans including those who are too poor to 
contribute…” (Male12, FGD3 Urban). 
 
7.4.2 Design element 2: Population and cost coverage- who gets covered, who pays? 
There was considerably high social solidarity with the poor and other vulnerable groups as 
observed early on. With a general view that all should benefit from services even if they had 
no money to pay, informal sector workers were asked to indicate where funds to provide 
services for everyone should come from and which population groups should not pay for 
health care even as they benefited from the same services. The dominant opinion 
particularly in the urban area was that the government should be the one paying for health 
care for everyone. This was partly because most study participants in this area supported a 
non-contributory system over a contributory mechanism, and partly because of the feeling 
that there is too much money going to waste within the government and improving 
efficiency in spending would generate money to pay for health care for all. The latter view 
was particularly expressed strongly in most qualitative discussions , which outlined the need 
for the government to do more to support citizens in terms of health care. Asked whether 
they were aware that government funding of health care for all would mean increased 
taxes, the general feeling was that such taxes had to be quite minimal and increases should 
be implemented only after the government implements governance measures such as 
efficient use of resources and eliminating corruption from the public sector. These are very 
important findings as they reflect recommendations by the WHO (2005a) and WHO (2005b) 
for countries to effectively and efficiently use resources at their disposal to facilitate 
progress towards universal coverage  
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Quantitative findings (Figures 7.8a and b) also indicated the desire by most study 
participants in both sites for the government to pay for health care for everyone as a matter 
of priority. In Figure 7.8a, about 73% in the urban area supported such an initiative 
compared to 55% in the rural area. For the rural area, lower enthusiasm for government 
intervention could be linked to their familiarity with a contributory mechanism and had 
expressed support for the same over a non-contributory arrangement.   
 
  
Pearson chi2 (17.45) P= 0.001 
 
The rural area also showed higher support (about 35%) for a mix of funding involving the 
government and individuals who can afford to pay compared to about 19% in the urban 
area who had a similar view. About 9% from both study sites agree everyone should pay for 
health care which suggests no concern for those who cannot afford to pay. The differences 
between rural and urban areas in the choices regarding who should pay for health were 
significant (P= 0.001).  
 
The concern for people who cannot afford to pay for health care is clearly demonstrated in 
Figure 7.8b where 38% overall (rural= 31% and urban=45%) agreed that the very poor 
should not pay for health care. The results also indicate that other groups who should 
possibly be exempted from paying for health care include the disabled, children and the 
elderly. However, pregnant women received the least support from those to be excluded 
(rural =0.8% and urban= 7.6%). This was because any pregnant woman who is unable to pay 
for health care would be poor who are already proposed for exemption.  
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7.4.3 Design element 3: Benefit package  
This area was broadly presented as it is one that requires more technical considerations 
beyond the views of informal sector workers. As shown in Table 7.2, four scenarios were 
presented to study participants during the survey in which they were asked to choose one 
scenario that they felt was most appropriate and affordable for them. This was aimed at 
guiding the design of a benefits package in a future universal coverage system at least with 
input from potential beneficiaries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The choice of the status quo in the rural area by the majority (49%) was not surprising given 
that they had emphasised high premium rates as the main reason for not being members of 
existing prepayment schemes and so higher rates in the scenario that was the most popular 
overall (2) was a deterring factor. The urban area on the other hand, had their major 
concern in the management of funds not affordability per se and as indicated in the table, 
the majority (51%) of them would prepay for a comprehensive outpatient and inpatient 
benefit package that is provided at public sector health facilities. A significant number (35%) 
in the rural area would also prefer to prepay for a similar benefits package. Overall, Table 
7.2 suggests that 46% of informal sector workers would prefer tax increases or the proposed 
NHIF premium rate of KSh 500 per month if that would accord them access to 
comprehensive outpatient and inpatient services at public health facilities. However, the 
majority (51%) of those who preferred such an option were in the urban area compared to 
35% in the rural area, probably due to urban informal sector workers being better off 
economically than their rural counterparts, as demonstrated in Chapter Five. About 31% in 
Table 7.2: Broad design of a benefits package 
Choice of scenarios Rural 
(%) 
Urban 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Scenario 1: Status quo with current NHIF rates for 
comprehensive inpatient care at public facilities only 
63 
(48.8) 
75 
(23.2) 
138 
(30.5) 
Scenario 2: Comprehensive coverage for outpatient and 
inpatient services in public sector health facil ities but 
with increased prepayment either at proposed NHIF 
rates (KSh 500 per month) or increased taxes               
 
45 
(34.9) 
 
165 
(50.9) 
 
210 
(46.4) 
Scenario 3: Choice to use private health facil ities but 
pay most of the bil l  out-of-pocket or from a private 
insurance arrangement 
10 
 (7.6) 
71 
(21.9) 
85 
(17.9) 
Scenario 4: None of the above 11  
(8.5) 
13  
(4.0) 
24  
(5.3) 
Total 129 
(100) 
324 
(100) 
453 
(100) 
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total would stick with the status quo not necessarily because it meets their health needs but 
most likely because they cannot afford other options. The differences in the choices of the 
benefits package between the two study sites ware statistically insignificant (P=0.91).  
 
7.4.4 Design element 4: Accountability measures in the management of prepaid funds 
From the findings discussed before, one of the major concerns among informal sector 
workers who would want to prepay for health care was the management of prepaid funds 
particularly with reference to the NHIF. As a follow up to these concerns, study participants 
were asked to state how the management of a future prepaid system could be made more 
transparent to avoid corruption. From mainly focus group discussions, the areas that 
needed improvement in terms of managing a prepaid health system included the following: 
the type of institution to manage the funds and how the head of such an institution is 
appointed, transparency particularly with financial information but more broadly on 
information that the informal sector considered as critical for transparent manag ement and 
the channels through which such information should be delivered. 
 
These critical areas for transparency according to informal sector workers were followed up 
in the survey. In terms of preferred institution to manage prepaid funds, there were 
significant differences between urban and rural study sites (P= <0.001). In Table 7.3, the 
rural area preferred, by about 56%, that the institution to manage prepaid funds should be 
semi-autonomous (part government-part private) such as the NHIF. On the other hand, the 
single largest group in the urban area (about 41%) preferred the government to fully 
manage such an institution compared to 30% of the rural informal sector that preferred 
management by the government. The least preferred institutions for each s ite were a 
private entity in the rural area (14%) and a semi-autonomous state organ in the urban area 
(24%). Overall for both study sites, the national government was most preferred institution 
(38%) to manage prepaid funds followed by a private entity (29%). Considering the two 
most preferred institutions in order of priority for each study site, the rural area preferred a 
semi-autonomous organ and the national government and the urban preferred the national 
government and a private institution.  
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Table 7.3: Most preferred institution to manage prepaid funds for universal coverage 
Type of institution   Rural (%) Urban (%) Total (%) 
National government 39 (30.2) 133 (40.8) 172 (37.8) 
Private institution 18 (14.0) 115 (35.3) 133 (29.2) 
Semi-autonomous state organ 72 (55.8) 78 (24.0) 150 (33.0) 
Total  129 (100) 326 (100) 455 (100) 
Pearson chi2 (45.60); P= <0.001 
 
The explanations for such differences were found in the FGDs and through inference. The 
main reason for strong opposition to a private management institution in the rural area was 
that such an institution would increase costs of prepayment, which in the rural area was the 
main discouraging factor from prepaying for health care. In the urban area, the strong 
opposition for a semi-autonomous body such as the NHIF was linked to mismanagement of 
funds by the NHIF, which in the urban area was the key factor that discouraged prepayment 
for health care.   
 
The choices receiving the greatest support of a semi-autonomous entity such as the NHIF 
and the national government to manage a prepaid system by rural and urban informal 
sector workers respectively, was somewhat surprising because public sentiments largely 
perceive both the government and the NHIF as corrupt and untrustworthy with public 
funds. In the view of the researcher drawn from contextual experience, the choice of 
government and an entity such as the NHIF were to some extent driven by compromise. For 
instance, the rural area had already indicated their preference for a contributory system so 
an institution moulded along the lines of the NHIF would clearly be their choice because a 
private entity would drive up costs. Likewise, the urban area, as demonstrated earlier, 
strongly preferred a non-contributory system so their choice of the government as  the 
manager of prepaid funds was not unexpected. However, a private entity was also popular 
among urban informal sector workers (and had no significant difference with choice of the 
government, P= 0.07). In the opinion of the researcher judging by the statement below, the 
choice of the government over a private entity by urban informal sector workers was based 
on perception of sustainability and a sense of obligation (as captured in the following 
statement): “Our idea is better the devil you know…! A private institution could decide one 
day that it is tired of managing our funds and just fold up leaving behind a host of problems 
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but for the government…it will always be there and once it is agreed with the public that 
health care would be free because it is prepaid, there is that sense of obligation to honour its 
part of the deal. If that does not happen then the public will give it problems…”  (Male, FGD4, 
Urban). 
 
The second factor in transparent management, according to the perceptions of informal 
sector workers, was the appointment of the individual to head the institution to manage 
prepaid funds because they believed that the head of such an institution was highly 
responsible for its performance. As presented in Table 7.4, open processes of appointment 
of the head of the management institution, either through public vote or merit-based 
interviews, were most preferred.  
 
Table 7.4: How to appoint head of institution managing prepaid funds 
Appointment strategy  Rural (%) Urban (%) Total (%) 
Public vote 58 (45.0) 198 (60.7) 256 (56.3) 
Appointment by political 
authority e.g. president 
22 (17.1) 26 (8.0)   48 (10.6) 
Open appointment through 
interviews 
49 (38.0)    98 (30.1) 147 (32.3) 
Other 0 (0.0)    4 (1.2)   4 (0.9) 
Total 129 (100) 326 (100) 455 (100) 
Pearson chi2 (14.69); P = 0.002 
 
Overall a 56% majority (rural= 45% and urban= 61%) would like the appointment by public 
vote even though this may not be a political office and 32% prefer open interviews. Only 
about 11% prefer political appointment. There is a clear revolt against political appointment 
of the head the management institution because such appointments, according to study 
findings and other reports, have immensely contributed to the mismanagement problems 
experienced with the NHIF. An interviewee in the urban area explained his experience with 
the NHIF in the following statement: “We are the ones to choose the person to lead the 
institution managing our funds because it is our money they manage… I mean look at people 
chosen for us in the NHIF. Instead of serving us they steal from us and we cannot do anything 
about it because we did not appoint them…” (KI3, Urban). 
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The third issue among those suggested by the informal sector to improve transparency in 
future prepaid health system involved the demand for various kinds of information and the 
most preferred channel to deliver them. Table 7.5 presents a list of information needs that 
would be required by the informal sector from a future prepaid health system. For each 
item of information, study participants were asked to classify them as ‘Very important or 
Important; Somewhat important or Not important’.  
 
Table 7.5: Information required from the management of the prepaid funds by the informal sector  
 
Type of information required 
Rural Urban 
Very important 
or important 
(%) 
Somewhat 
important or Not 
important (%) 
Very 
important or 
important (%) 
Somewhat 
important or Not 
important (%) 
Financial statements 91.5 8.5 97.5 2.5 
Service costs 89.1 10.9 94.2 5.9 
Measures to avoid fraud 93.8 6.3 97.5 2.5 
Improvements on quality 87.5 12.5 89.5 10.5 
Service entitlements 93.0 7.0 94.4 5.6 
Problems and resolutions  81.3 18.8 94.8 5.2 
Making important appointments  77.0 23.0 96.3 3.7 
Hospital accreditation 89.8 10.2 90.1 9.9 
Average 87.9 12.2 93.3 5.7 
 
There were no significant differences between rural and urban informal sector with regards 
to how they perceived respective types of information (P= 0.11). On average, about 88% 
and 93% in the rural and urban sites respectively regarded the information demands 
identified during the qualitative interviews as ‘very important’ or ‘important’.  These forms 
of information included information on financial statements, measures to eliminate fraud, 
health services that the public are entitled to, the costs of services  purchased and steps 
taken in improving quality of services, among others. 
 
Study participants were then asked to state their most preferred channels through which 
they would like to receive the specified information. There was no significant difference in 
the choices made by rural and urban informal sector (P= 0.33). From Figure 7.9, the 
electronic media especially the radio was the most preferred channel of information 
delivery with an average 40% (rural= 39.5% and urban= 40%) preference for both study 
sites. Community leaders were the second most preferred delivery channel in the rural area 
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(21%) while the second most preferred choice for the urban area was the print media  (21%). 
Surprisingly, health workers were least preferred to pass  on critical information about the 
management of prepaid health care. As discussed previously in Chapter Six, health workers 
were to some extent perceived negatively as either unfriendly to patients and caretakers or 
aiding corruption in public sector health facilities and these factors could have played a key 
role in the decision of the informal sector to leave them out on measures targeting 
corruption. 
 
 
P= 0.33 
 
From the FGDs and key informant interviews in both sites, radio communication was most 
preferred because of its wide reach. The advantage of the wide reach was that false 
information would be challenged especially by civil society groups which would verify its 
accuracy and in the process increase the chances of transparent management. A key 
informant explained: “The radio is the best channel because nearly everyone listens to the 
radio and whenever false information is given, some big people especially in the NGOs will 
not let it pass. They will instead move to court to challenge it. That way, the managers of our 
funds will not be tempted to steal….” (KI8, Urban). Previous findings on communication 
channels most preferred by the community showed a stronger preference for interpersonal 
communication than radio (Okungu and Gilson, 2014) but this was focused on drugs and 
involved a very small sample. 
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7.5 Summary of views on prepayment mechanisms 
 
The choice of a prepayment system seems to be influenced by a number of key issues 
including familiarity and a system that guards against corruption and is sustainable for 
posterity. Secondly, in a contributory system, issues of affordability, particularly among 
informal sector workers with irregular income and the inability of such a mechanism to 
properly protect the very poor from inequitable contributions, emerged as important 
concerns for the informal sector. Thirdly, while the choice of comprehensive cover for 
outpatient and inpatients services was popular, affordability remains a key barrier where 
more than half of the informal sector indicated their inability to either pay actuarially-based 
contributions or agree to a tax increase to provide comprehensive coverage. Whichever the 
prepayment mechanism, the key issues to encourage public participation, according to the 
findings, include transparent management, affordability (in total cost or favourable 
contribution methods), quality of services (qualitative data) and equitable prepayments 
based on income. The quality of current services was extensively discussed in the FGDs and 
in-depth interviews and follow up made during the survey component of the study. It 
emerged that improved quality of public sector health services would best anchor universal 
health coverage. In this context, study participants were asked to identify and discuss 
further recommendations, based on their current experience with the health system, as a 
basis for improvements needed in future prepayment system.   
 
7.6 Specific recommendations to inform a future prepayment system  
 
Study participants were asked to indicate in the survey questionnaire the first, second and 
third priority issues that they would like improved in the public sector for a successful future 
prepayment system. These priority areas, as listed in Table 7.6, were identified during focus 
group discussions. From the table, there were only two critical areas where improvements 
are urgently required within the public health system. These are improvements in the time 
spent waiting for services and the supply of drugs. A total of about 49% on average (rural= 
29% and urban= 58%) regarded waiting time as the first priority issue to be improved in 
public sector health provision.  The problem waiting time was perceived by respondents to 
be more pronounced in the urban study site. Twice the percentage of respondents in the 
urban than in the rural area regarded waiting time as the first priority for improvement. In 
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the rural area, the greatest problem identified was lack of drugs with 69% of survey 
participants feeling that it was a first priority problem compared to 50% in the urban. 
Overall more than half (56%) of survey participants indicated lack of drugs as their first 
priority problem. 
 
The rest of the perceived priority areas seemed not very critical as they were regarded as 
third priority issues by the majority in both study sites. What this means is that the last six 
issues listed in Table 7.6, while they persist, their perceived relative importance is low.  
There were no significant differences between rural and urban areas regarding issues given 
first, second or third priority (P= 0.17). 
 
Table 7.6: Priority areas to improve in public sector health provision for universal coverage 
 
Priority areas 
Rural priorities (%) Urban priorities (%) Total (%) 
1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd  3rd  
Reduced waiting times 31 
(29.3) 
55 
(51.9) 
20 
(18.9) 
139 
(58.2) 
67 
(28.0) 
33 
(13.8) 
170 
(49.3) 
122 
(35.3) 
53 
(15.4) 
Necessary drugs to be made 
available  
86 
(69.4) 
35 
(28.2) 
3  
(2.4) 
152 
(50.0) 
137 
(45.1) 
15  
(4.9) 
238 
(55.6) 
172 
(40.2) 
18 
(4.2) 
Health workers to respect 
patients 
2 
(7.4) 
7  
(25.9) 
18 
(66.7) 
7 
(8.1) 
34 
(39.1) 
46 
(52.9) 
9  
(7.9) 
41  
(36.0) 
64 
(56.1) 
The facil ity should be clean 
inside and outside 
1 
(7.1) 
3 
(21.4) 
10 
(71.4) 
4 
(4.6) 
22 
(25.0) 
62 
(70.5) 
5 
(4.9) 
25 
(24.5) 
72 
(70.6) 
Eliminate informal payments 
at facil ities 
4 
(10.8) 
12 
(32.4) 
21  
(56.8) 
1 
(3.0) 
9 
(27.3) 
23 
(69.7) 
5 
(7.1) 
21 
(30.0) 
44 
(62.9) 
Health workers to explain 
nature of i l lness to patients  
1 
(3.6) 
8 
(28.6) 
19 
(67.9) 
4 
(5.6) 
13 
(18.3) 
54 
(76.1) 
5 
(5.1) 
21 
(21.2) 
73 
(73.7) 
More facil ities to be nearer 
to populations 
2 
(11.1) 
2 
(11.1) 
14 
(77.8) 
2 
(2.7) 
16 
(21.9) 
55 
(75.3) 
4 
(4.4) 
18 
(19.8) 
69 
(75.8) 
Others 0 
(0.0) 
7 
(25.0) 
21 
(75.0) 
12 
(21.1) 
21 
(36.8) 
24 
(42.1) 
12 
(14.1) 
28 
(32.9) 
45 
(52.9) 
P= 0.17 
 
From the qualitative component of the study, there were strong feelings among 
respondents that people generally would be unhappy with a health system that offers 
unacceptable standards of care. For example, the two problems of drug stock-outs and long 
queues featured prominently during the study and were noted as the most urgent problems 
worth attention within the public health sector. In the urban area, the suggested solution to 
long waiting time was hiring of more health workers. For drug stock-outs, a few 
recommended solutions included what already has been catered for in the current 
constitution; that is, cutting the supply bureaucracy by devolving purchase of drugs to 
health facilities. Another recommendation was a method to monitor health workers so that 
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they do not misuse facility drugs and that facilities themselves take steps to pre-empt drug 
shortages by placing orders in time. Curbing corruption in public facilities was also a 
recommended solution to the persistent drug shortages. A key informant observed: “Health 
services in public facilities can greatly improve if corruption is eliminated…because it is not 
that there are no drugs but corruption among health workers create artificial shortages…” 
(KI9, Urban).  
 
Another way to improve services in the public sector, as noted by study participants, was to 
enhance accountability among health workers through establishing channels for complaints 
by patients and carers so that cases of disrespect, neglect of patients and absenteeism 
among health workers could be addressed. Highlighting lack of such channels, a FGD 
participant said: “If we could have a platform where patients can register their complaints 
and ensure that they are followed up, then we could be heading somewhere but the current 
situation is that the head nurse for example, has been negligent or rude and the only person 
with whom you could follow up the matter is the same head nurse...” (Male FGD1, Urban).  
 
The suggested channels for complaints could be enhanced by a structured supervision of 
health workers so that problems such as absence from facilities can be minimised. A FGD 
participant explained: “What we should have in public facilities is that in every shift should 
be a supervisor to do rounds ensuring that all patients are attended to, not that the nurses 
are sleeping and patients on the other hand are suffering” (Male FGD3, Urban). Absenteeism 
did however not feature as a serious problem in primary health facilities.  
 
Public sector services, according to a number of FGDs, could also be improved by changing 
employment contract terms especially for nurses from a permanent and pensionable basis 
to performance-based contracts. Study participants said that the current terms of contract 
(permanent and pensionable) do not commit health workers to regard patients as their 
clients. To emphasise the need for a change in employment terms, a study participant said: 
“Salaries for private providers are paid depending on how many patients come to the facility; 
that is, how much money is made, and therefore private health sector employees often have 
better public relations than those in the public sector because of the need to attract more 
customers (patients)” (Male, FGD6, Urban). 
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Conclusion  
 
The element of social solidarity in support of redistributive policies is quite strong in both 
study sites but this could be put to the test where income-related prepayments are 
required, principally within a contributory prepayment system. Importantly, while there is a 
clear understanding of the concept of prepaying for health care and why this is important, 
this together with considerable social solidarity have not translated into actual prepayment 
participation by informal sector populations. The reasons for this could be based on the 
choice of a prepayment mechanism, its design as well as a number of social, economic and 
political factors that require interventions sometimes from outside the health system. In a 
nutshell, there are specific recommendations or demands by the informal sector including 
improved quality of services, better design (such as an acceptable prepayment mechanism, 
benefit package and accountability measures) that need to be considered in a future 
prepaid health system if informal sector workers are expected to be a part of it.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS FOR COVERING THE INFORMAL SECTOR  
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides estimates of total financial resource requirements for UHC in Kenya 
using two financing scenarios and compares the financing implications for each scenario. 
The scenarios considered are: (i) a contributory mechanism (social health insurance- SHI) 
emphasising premium payments by all population groups; (ii) a non-contributory financing 
mechanism with funding from general government revenues, supplemented by premium 
contributions from the formal sector. In both scenarios pooling is under one entity, likely to 
be the NHIF which would serve as a strategic purchasing organisation.  
 
The official government policy is that Kenya adopts a SHI to progress towards UHC. Under 
this financing scenario, all Kenyans including formal and informal sector workers, pensioners 
and the indigent belong and contribute premiums into one pool. Within this pool, formal 
and informal sector workers contribute premiums on a regular basis whereas the indigent 
are paid for by the government. The informal sector would contribute a flat-rate of KSh 500 
(about US$ 5.44) per household on a monthly basis. The NHIF classifies pensioners under 
the informal sector. Contributions from the formal sector are based on salary scales and as 
presented in Chapter Two, these are highly inequitable. On average however, contributions 
from formal sector workers are about 2.4% of their gross pay.  
 
Reflecting on the findings in earlier chapters related to a contributory financing mechanism, 
the indications are that this is a system that: (i) requires predictable incomes from the 
contributing populations in order to sustain health programmes; and (ii) needs strong 
popular support and social solidarity because, as highlighted in Chapter Three, SHI is difficult 
to enforce in the informal sector where incomes are difficult to estimate. The findings 
presented in earlier chapters indicate that incomes, particularly for the non-agricultural 
informal sector, are quite unstable. For this reason, under a contributory scenario, regular 
premium payments will most likely be disrupted as these enterprises struggle to sustain 
themselves and raise income for the workers. Likewise, although the agricultural informal 
sector shows less disruption in income, the earnings are very low and the workers in this 
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sub-sector might find it difficult coping with regular premium payments. As discussed in 
Chapter Seven the main concern with a contributory scheme for informal sector workers, 
particularly those in the rural area, is high premium rates. An increase in these rates by the 
NHIF from KSh 160 to KSh 500 per month effective April 1st 2015, even though it includes an 
expanded benefits package, is likely to put more financial pressure on many informal sector 
workers. In terms of popular support, the majority of the study population preferred a  non-
contributory financing mechanism which implies that the government’s chosen contributory 
approach to UHC may prove unpopular with many people.  
 
Based on the potential problems associated with a contributory financing mechanism in 
Kenya, it is advisable to also consider a non-contributory scenario as an option for financing 
UHC. Under this scenario, the government pays contributions directly to the NHIF on behalf 
of informal sector workers, the indigent and pensioners. The formal sector on the other 
hand, contributes premiums to the NHIF under statutory deductions on salaries. The 
contribution rates are similar to the ones under a contributory scenario. Findings in Chapter 
Seven suggested that, at least in the two study sites, a non-contributory mechanism, based 
on the method of revenue collection would be less controversial compared to the 
contributory mechanism even though the rural area preferred a contributory system owing 
to its past experience. However, these were just two study sites which could l imit 
generalisation to reflect the national mood. 
8.2 Introducing SimIns model methodology  
 
SimIns ® Version 1.2 (WHO/GTZ, 2008) was used in the simulation. The SimIns ‘User Guide’ 
explains that SimIns makes it possible to analyse the relationships between expenditures 
under health insurance and other expenditures. Table 8.1 summarises data requirements 
for the simulation between 2013 and 2030 and what the final output looks like. SimIns 
models for a 10 year period, so the study first modelled from 2013 to 2023 and then used 
the 2023 data as second round input to extend the model to 2030. 
 
The study did not consider any sensitivity analysis because the interest was in modelling the 
existing government plans. Although sensitivity analysis with different rates of enrolment, 
hence reaching full coverage over a far longer time period, would have added valuable 
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information to the study, the limitations of SimIns only allowing modelling for limited time 
periods made this unfeasible. 
 
 
The SimIns ‘User Guide’ indicates what SimIns Basic ® is able to model; for example, in a 
health financing policy that intends to expand insurance coverage to the informal sector, 
SimIns Basic® demonstrates the mix of contributions from government workers, formal 
private sector employees and informal sector workers as well as subsidies from government 
revenues required  to balance expenditures and revenue. Secondly, SimIns Basic illustrates 
the financial effects of exemptions for the indigent as well as changes in co-payment rates 
and the breadth of the benefit package. 
 
As a consequence of expanding coverage under a contributory mechanism, health facilities 
will be expected to gradually meet most of their expenses from payments by the health 
insurance organisation, meaning that there will be less funds going directly from general 
government revenue to support public sector facilities. In this context, SimIns Basic is able 
to demonstrate the trend in health insurance funding as it gradually replaces the flow of 
government funds into public sector health facilities. The aim of the simulation is therefore 
to demonstrate separately, the feasibility of UHC through (i) social health insurance 
supplemented by government revenues and, (ii) funding from general government revenues 
and supplemented by premium contributions from the formal sector.  
 
Table 8.1: Data input and output for SimIns Plus 
Data input Data output 
1. Population structure including total population at baseline and 
growth rate, proportions of formal sector workers, informal sector 
and formal sector pensioners. Others include dependency ratio 
and workforce wages and pensions 
2. Macroeconomy includes real GDP growth rate and interest rates  
3. Health care costs involves unit costs for OP and IP services at 
various public and private facilities  
4. Utilisation rates include use of OP visits and IP days per capita per 
year for various types of public and private facil ities  
5. Health insurance: Insurance coverage trends, contribution rates, 
subsidies and co-payments as well as administrative costs – note 
that for flat contributions or subsidies, SimIns requires the flat 
amount per person (rather than per household). The average 
household size in Kenya consists of five people. 
1. Population structure (formal, informal, the 
indigent and pensioners) and trends in insurance 
coverage 
2. Health care util isation by insured and uninsured  
3. Health insurance expenditure and revenue per 
annum 
4. Health expenditure per capita- insured and 
uninsured 
5. Private health expenditure and private 
expenditure per capita at facil ities  
6. Total health expenditure (THE) at facil ity level 
including real growth rate,  THE per capita 
7. Structure of THE at facil ity level including public 
and private health spending 
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A notable weakness with SimIns Basic is that it does not provide a complete picture of the 
total health expenditure as it does not include private health expenditure outside of health 
facilities (e.g. on self-treatment).  
8.3 Details of the financing scenarios as used in SimIns model 
 
Box 1 presents details of each financing scenario considered in the model. 
 
Box 1: Summary of two financing scenarios explored in the SimIns Basic model 
 
Scenario 1: Contributory system: SHI scheme 
This scenario mirrors the government policy direction for UHC in which all  Kenyans are expected to contribute 
premiums to a national health insurance scheme. This financing scenario retains most of the design features of the 
current public insurer, the NHIF, which is to be used by the government to anchor UHC. In this financing model, 
coverage through government funding plays a complementary role to premium contributions. With the majority of 
formal sector workers already covered by the NHIF, the design of a future scheme is targeted at gradually enrolling and 
retaining informal sector workers through a mix of strategies including wireless premium payments, devolved 
registration centres, and an expanded benefits package to include both outpatient and inpatient services. Formal and 
informal sector workers are expected to pay standardised premium rates but the indigent, identified through means-
testing, are expected to be funded by the government. A means -testing strategy in identifying the indigent has been 
problematic in many settings as discussed in Chapter Three. All  the population groups (formal sector workers, informal 
and indigent) are expected to be under a single national pool which is envisaged to achieve universal population 
coverage by 2030. The benefit package as proposed is comprehensive including basic outpatient and inpatient 
services, maternity and last expense cover. Outpatient services include consultation fees, laboratory investigation, 
drug administration and radiological examination, among others. Inpatient services include bed and theatre charges, 
nursing care, fees for personnel (physicians and surgeons) and drugs, among others.  Util isation of these services is 
expected to increase gradually as more people get covered.  There will  be no co-payments for using public sector 
facil ities but those who choose to use private sector services are expected to co-pay between 2% of the costs for low-
cost private sector facil ities to 90% of the cost for high-end private facil ities. Although the option of using private 
providers with co-payments exists, the NHIF is currently assessing the option of restricting its services to public sector 
facil ities only to address cost-escalation. Should this be the case, there is expected to be pressure to significantly 
improve public sector services because as indicated in Chapter Seven, these services are perceived to be of low qua lity 
and lack value for money.  
 
Scenario 2: Non-contributory system involving general government revenues as primary source of financing 
This is an alternative scenario to SHI that is proposed for UHC in Kenya. Under this scenario, there are statutory 
premium deductions from formal sector workers including formal sector pensioners to complement government 
revenues in financing UHC. The rest of the population, that is informal sector workers and the indigent population 
would be covered through funding from general government revenues. What this means is that there will  sti l l be a 
single pool under the NHIF into which formal sector workers and the government pay their contributions. The non -
contributory scenario is expected to rapidly increase population coverage and util isation of services and should 
therefore be accompanied with rapid improvement in public sector services. Public spending on health care is also 
expected to grow rapidly to meet rising demand for health services for the entire population. The benefit package 
considered is comprehensive consisting of essential services similar to the SHI model but with more restrictions to 
public sector facil ities. The assumption is that there will  be no co-payments for those who use public facilities. On the 
other hand, wealthier individuals are more likely to use private services to complement those that they are entitled to 
from the public sector. 
 
Table 8.2 provides a brief summary of key input data and assumptions for SimIns Basic but 
more details about these are presented in Appendix C, sections C1 to C5. 
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Table 8.2: Key input data and assumptions for UHC financing scenarios  
Input Contributory scenario Non-contributory scenario 
Population 
(Appendix C, C1) 
1. Baseline total population size is 44.4million and growing at an annual rate of 2.5% to reach 56.8million and 67.6million in 
2023 and 2030 respectively.  
2. At baseline, the size of non-dependent population as a share of total workforce: formal sector workers (23.2%), pensioners 
(5.5%) and informal sector (71.3%). The annual growth rate in formal sector employment is estimated at 0.5% on average 
from the baseline until 2030, a lthough private sector employment would grow at a  much faster rate than in the public 
sector. The informal sector workforce was estimated to decline at an annual rate of 0.37% between 2013 and 2030 based 
on trends since 2004. 
3. Estimates on growth rates of wages were set at 5% per annum for the formal sector and pensioners at 3% per annum.  
Macroeconomy 
(Appendix C, C2) 
1. Real GDP growth rate is estimated at an average of 5.0% per annum between 2013 and 2030 and interest rates were set at 
5% per annum on average.  
Health care unit 
costs  
(Appendix C, C3) 
 
Unit costs for outpatient and inpatient services for public, non-profit and for-profit facilities were estimated based on evaluation 
of s tudies on unit costs. The unit costs were inflation-rated for 2013 prices and projected to estimate prices for 2030. However, 
a  higher growth rate (14.6%) in unit costs was used for public sector services because these are currently under-resourced and 
s ignificant increase in public funding is required to make services available and affordable for a ll.  
Uti l isation rates 
(Appendix C, C4) 
Uti l isation rates were based on analysis of government documents and comparative analysis of the rates in other LMIC. The 
rates  were set on average at 3.1 outpatient visits per capita per annum at the baseline and increasing to 4.0 in 2023 and finally 
to 4.3 OP vis its per capita per annum in 2030. Average annual inpatient days p er capita were at 0.255 at baseline, 0.287 by 2023 
and 0.305 IP days per capita per year by 2030.  
Health insurance 
(Appendix C, C5) 
1. Formal sector contributions gradually increased from the current level of 2.4% of 
gross  pay at the baseline to a more realistic contribution rate of 6.5% from 2017 
onwards. (Premium contribution rates of 6.5% would be difficult to implement in 
Kenya and likely to generate a  lot of public resistance). 
2. Pens ioners contributions were varied from 2.4% of monthly pensions at the 
baseline to 4% from 2017 onwards 
3. Contributions from the informal sector were set at KSh 6000 per household per 
annum at the baseline (or KSh 1200 per insured adult, child and principal 
contributor considering that the average household size consists of five people). 
These increased with inflation 
4. Annual government subsidies per exempted individual were put at KSh 3000 per 
annum at baseline.  This is based on estimated current government health 
expenditure per capita.  With an average household size of 5, this would be 
equivalent to KSh15000 per household at the baseline. The subsidy amount was 
automatically increased in the model in l ine with inflation. 
NB/ The KSh6000 is the new NHIF contribution amount as from April 2015 and already 
seems like it could be high for many informal sector workers and the KSh15000 is based 
on current government spending on health, divided by the ‘uninsured’ (informal sector 
& indigent population). Government contribution per exempted person is higher than 
contributions from the informal sector because contributions from the latter are 
regarded as what they can afford and not necessarily what should adequately fund a 
given package of care. 
5. Administrative costs gradually decreased from 12% of total revenue at the baseline 
to s tand at 8% by 2023 and 7% from 2024 onwards. Al though the NHIF 
administrative costs are currently very high (over 35% of total revenue) the s tudy 
opted for a more realistic figure of 12% at the baseline given that NHIF data 
va l idity and reliability i s questioned; i .e. large surplus is subsumed under 
administrative costs (Nicolle and Mathauer, 2010). The 12% estimate at the 
baseline is also within the range of 2% - 17% of total expenditures on 
administrative costs in middle-income countries (Nicolle and Mathauer, 2010) 
1. Formal sector contributions 
gradually increased from 2.4% 
of gross pay at the baseline to 
s tand at 6.5% from 2017 
onwards 
2. Pens ioners contributions were 
varied from 2.4% of monthly 
pensions at the baseline to 4% 
from 2017 onwards 
3. Government subsidies per 
exempted individual were put 
at KSh 3000 per annum at the 
baseline and automatically 
increased in the model in line 
with inflation 
4. Al l  informal sector workers and 
indigent populations were 
exempted  
5. Administrative costs reduced 
from 12% to s tay at 5% 
throughout the simulation 
cons istent with estimates by 
Nicolle and Mathauer (2010) for 
such costs. 
 
8.4 Modelling results 
 
8.4.1 Trends in population coverage 
The study acknowledges that achieving 100% population coverage is an ideal situation and 
may not be practical under the circumstances, and the pace of coverage is also likely to be 
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unrealistic, but the study explicitly uses government assumptions  in the modelling. Figures 
8.1 and 8.2 depict trends in coverage for different population groups (informal sector and 
indigent populations, formal sector workers and formal sector pensioners) under 
contributory and non-contributory scenarios, respectively. The contributory scenario shows 
gradual coverage increasing from about 0.1% of total informal sector and indigent 
populations at the baseline to about 54% in 2023 and 97% coverage of this group in 2030. 
The slow coverage of informal sector and indigent populations is often linked to the 
difficulties in identifying who is able or unable to contribute to a health insurance scheme 
(Schieber et al., 2012, Tangcharoensathien et al., 2011, Nguyen and Rama, 2007). The 
difficulty of enforcing laws on mandatory contributions in the informal sector has als o been 
one of the main contributors to the slow pace of coverage of informal sector populations 
under a contributory scenario (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2011). The formal sector on the 
other hand, has high coverage (about 83% on average) at the baseline which immediately 
increases to 98% upon implementation of UHC policies and remains at about 99.9% for the 
remainder of the simulation. Coverage for pensioners also immediately rises from 0.1% at 
the baseline to immediately reach the level of coverage for formal sector workers on 
implementation of UHC policies. The rapid coverage for formal sector workers and 
pensioners is linked to the ease of identifying their incomes which makes them relatively 
easy to enrol into a mandatory scheme.  
 
 
 
Under the non-contributory scenario (Figure 8.2), coverage for informal sector and indigent 
populations as well as formal sector pensioners rapidly increase from about 0.1% at the 
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baseline to 98% upon implementation of the UHC policy and remains around this figure for 
the entire simulation. Non-contributory systems achieve universal population coverage in a 
short time because government subsidies are targeted at the entire population outside of 
formal sector employees. Trends in coverage for formal sector workers and pensioners in 
both scenarios follow similar patterns because coverage laws for these two populations 
groups are fairly easy to enforce. 
 
 
 
The trends in total population coverage in both scenarios is given in Figure 8.3 where 
coverage increases from about 19% at the baseline7 to universal status in the second year of 
UHC implementation under non-contributory scenario. Total population coverage for the 
contributory scenario is gradual from about 19% at the baseline to 58.5% within a decade 
and finally to universal status in 2030. The slow pace in population coverage under the 
contributory scenario is often to the disadvantage of vulnerable groups who cannot afford 
premium payments. Oxfam (2013) confirms that contributory schemes often leave out the 
poor and other low-income groups who cannot afford to pay premiums. 
                                                                 
7 The Kenya Household Health Expenditure and Utilisation Survey (KHHEUS) 2014 indicates that the p roportion of the 
total population insured is about 17% (+ or – 5) so the study estimates at the baseline are within this range.  
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8.4.2 Trends in utilisation of OP and IP services among insured and uninsured8  
Figure 8.4 is a projection of annual outpatient visits and inpatient days per capita among 
insured and uninsured in both scenarios.  On average, at the end of the simulation 
utilisation of OP services will stand at 4.3 visits per capita per year and 0.2685 inpatient days 
per capita per year. Low utilisation rates of IP services in particular, among the uninsured 
are strongly linked to the high costs of IP care where households could be required to pay 
large amounts of OOP payments at short notice.  
 
 
 
                                                                 
8 The utilization rates may appear to be very high but these were benchmarked with current trends in Kenya and 
the utilization patterns in universal systems such as Thailand so the study regards them as achievable rates. 
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There are also marked differences between contributory and non-contributory scenarios in 
the total number of outpatient visits and inpatient days, particularly in the initial period 
(Figure 8.5 for OP services and Figure 8.6 for IP services).  The figures indicate that as a 
greater percentage of the population will be uninsured in the contributory than in the non-
contributory scenario until 2030, and as average per capita utilisation rates are lower 
amongst the uninsured than the insured, there are considerably fewer total outpatient 
visits, and particularly inpatient days, under the contributory than the non-contributory 
scenario. However, at the end of the simulation, utilisation of both OP and IP services is 
about the same in both scenarios because both have achieved near-universal population 
coverage (Figures 8.5 and 8.6).   
 
Figure 8.5: Trends in total annual outpatient utilisation between the two scenarios 
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Figure 8.6: Utilisation of inpatient services between the two scenarios (millions inpatient days) 
 
 
 
8.4.3 Health insurance revenue and expenditure (Constant prices) 
As shown in Figure 8.7 both scenarios are unsustainable with the level of financing as 
inputted in the model and would be running into large deficits as more people get covered 
and utilisation rates and unit costs increase. In total, the contributory scenario in 2030 
would have about KSh 395 billion in revenues compared to about KSh 619 in expenditures. 
The non-contributory scenario on the other hand would have about KSh 505 billion in 
revenues compared to about KSh 706 billion in expenditures.  
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The non-contributory scenario shows potential to generate higher total revenues 
throughout the simulation. This is because contributions from the informal sector under the 
contributory scenario are very limited compared to what the government pays in subsidies 
on behalf of this population group under the non-contributory scenario. What this means is 
that in circumstances where informal sector workers would be required to contribute, the 
revenue generated would be minimal as contributions are not based on amounts that can 
finance a given package of care but rather on the economic circumstances in the informal 
sector. Second, as noticeable in the second year of implementation, revenues under the 
non-contributory scenario dramatically increased because the government had to put in 
more money in subsidies for informal sector and indigent populations as opposed to the 
gradual increments in contributions from informal sector workers in the contributory 
scenario. For further clarity, under the contributory scenario only indigents are exempted 
from contributions whereas informal sector workers contribute only KSh 6000 per year per 
household as opposed to KSh 15000 per household contributed by the government on 
behalf of the exempted population.  
 
In terms of expenditure, the non-contributory scenario has nearly full population coverage 
in the second year of implementation and since far more people than in the contributory 
scenario are covered and receiving free services at the point of use,  there is higher 
expenditure as opposed to the gradual population coverage expans ion in the contributory 
scenario. Towards the end of the simulation, the gap in expenditure between the two 
scenarios is narrowed because both have achieved near-universal population coverage and 
costs and utilisation levels are the same. Total expenditure in the non-contributory scenario 
however, remains slightly higher because of slight differences in total population coverage 
between the scenarios (99% and 98% coverage respectively, for non-contributory and 
contributory scenarios).  
 
Noting that the non-contributory scenario was unsustainable from the beginning as 
opposed to the contributory scenario which lasted a few years before running into deficits 
(Figure 8.7), it implies that government subsidies for the informal sector and indigent 
populations as modelled are insufficient and would have to be increased for sustainable 
financing. A comparative analysis of levels of key sources of revenue (subsidies and 
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contributions) is given in Figure 8.8 in which total government subsidies under the non-
contributory scenario were higher than contributions only in the first five years of UHC 
implementation. As demonstrated later in Figure 8.12 under sustainable financing, 
government subsidies exceed contributions throughout the simulation. In the contributory 
scenario, total subsidies are very limited because they only target the indigent populations 
which form a small percentage of the total population and which are gradually identified for 
subsidies. A notable point is that there is not much difference in total contributions in both 
scenarios and they tend towards convergence at the end of the simulation which indicates 
that while the informal sector accounts for the largest share of the workforce (71% at 
baseline), it is only able to contribute a relatively small share of total contribution revenue.  
 
 
 
Expenditures per capita (Figures 8.9 and 8.10) suggest that a non-contributory scenario 
would cost less overall with total health expenditure (THE) per capita at health facilities 
coming to about KSh 15,700 at the end of the simulation compared to about KSh 16,200 for 
the contributory scenario. Although total health insurance expenditure figures in Figure 8.7 
suggest otherwise, at the end of the simulation, there are almost a million more people 
insured under the non-contributory than contributory scenario. A two-tailed T-test on the 
differences in THE per capita are however, not statistically significant (P= 0.323) and are 
largely due to administrative costs and private health expenditure per capita which are 
higher in the contributory scenario than in non-contributory scenario. Government (non-
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health insurance) expenditure per capita are distinctly higher in the contributory than in the 
non-contributory scenario but the differences from a two-tailed T-test are insignificant 
(P=0.485). Higher government (non-health insurance) spending in the contributory scenario 
is in line with overall higher THE in the contributory scenario. It indicates that the 
government would have to spend more money in non-health insurance areas to support a 
contributory scenario. Private health expenditure per capita reduces rapidly in the non-
contributory scenario from KSh 1985 at the baseline to KSh 48 in 2023 but increases slightly 
to KSh 59 by 2030. On the other hand, private spending in the contributory scenario steadily 
reduces from KSh 1985 at the baseline to KSh 703 at the end of the simulation. It is not clear 
why private spending in the non-contributory scenario increases towards the end of the 
simulation.  
 
 
 
Finally, the non-contributory scenario has higher health insurance expenditure per capita 
than the contributory scenario throughout the simulation because there is universal 
population coverage in the former scenario from the very beginning. With more people 
insured, it means that the government through the MOH spends more in subsidies to 
provide health services to the entire population and consequently much higher service 
utilisation levels given higher utilisation rates among the insured. A test of significance 
reveals that the differences in health insurance expenditure per capita between the two 
scenarios is significant (P= 0.006). 
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It is important to also consider what additional funding would be required to cover the 
deficit in each scenario. The non-contributory scenario requires that the government 
accounts for about 76% of the total health insurance expenditure (or KSh 424 billion in 
subsidies) by 2023 and increases to about KSh 431 billion in 2030 to ensure that all health 
insurance expenditure is covered and financial equilibrium achieved. On the other hand, 
under the contributory scenario the government would need to contribute about KSh 
259.25 billion in subsidies (about 63% of the total of health insurance expenditure) by 2023 
for financial equilibrium, which increases to about 271 billion in 2030. The non-contributory 
scenario has higher total government subsidies for health insurance because of the large 
population that is exempted from contributions and because government subsidies would 
need to be at a rate higher than the informal sector would have been able to personally 
contribute in premiums under the contributory scenario.  
 
8.4.4 Towards sustainability in both scenarios 
Noting that the two scenarios have large deficits a few years into implementation and are 
therefore unsustainable under prevailing levels of contributions and subsidies, there are a 
few options to increase revenues to ensure sustainable financing: 
i) Restricting provision to public sector health services only. In the modelled 
arrangement, utilisation of private health services in both scenarios is quite low for 
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OP and IP services at about 25% of total for all the services at the end of the 
simulation. 
ii) The other option is to increase contributions from beneficiaries as well as 
government subsidies. Significant increases in government subsidies will require that 
the government looks for new and innovative sources of revenue to sustainably 
finance effective UHC. This includes an analysis of fiscal space with a view to 
improving efficiency in tax collection and in the use of available resources, and 
coming up with innovative taxes to increase revenue generally and for health sector 
in particular.  
 
This study explores the second option without analysing fiscal space in much detail but 
significantly increased contributions from both formal and informal sector as well as 
government subsidies to the exempted populations (Table 8.3).  
 
Table 8.3: Increased payments for sustainability 
Scenario Strategy for sustainability 
Contributory 
scenario 
1) Formal sector contributions increased from 2.4% at the baseline to 6% then 
7.5%, 8% and finally 11% of gross pay from 2019 onwards  
2) Pensioners’ contributions were varied from 2.4% to 4% and finally 5% of 
pensions from 2019 onwards  
3) Annual subsidies were put at KSh 4500 per exempted person at the baseline 
and reached KSh 15000 per exempted person within a decade 
4) Annual contributions from the informal sector were started at KSh 2000 at 
the baseline and increased to KSh 3401 in 2023 and KSh 4536 in 2030 per 
insured adult, child and principal contributor. 
5) Administrative costs were varied from 12% of total revenue at the baseline 
to 11%, 10% and 8% by 2023 and 7% from 2024 onwards.  
Non-contributory 
scenario 
1) Same as 1 – 3 above  
2) All informal sector workers and indigent populations were exempted  
3) Administrative costs reduced from 12% to stay at 5% throughout the 
simulation.  
 
Given the above levels of contributions and subsidies, a non-contributory scenario shows 
considerable sustainability throughout the simulation with total revenue exceeding total 
expenditure by about KSh 67 billion in 2030 (Figure 8.11).  
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The main reason for sustainability in a non-contributory mechanism is the large amounts of 
government subsidies paid into the health scheme on behalf of informal sector and indigent 
populations. Total subsidies from tax revenues amount to about 58% of total health 
insurance revenue and total contributions from formal sector workers and pensioners 
accounting for about 41% of total revenue (Figure 8.12). From OECD literature, government 
spending on health as a percent of total health spending are as high as 80% in many non-
contributory systems (OECD, 2014). It follows that at 58% of revenues coming from 
government subsidies as presented in the non-contributory scenario, more government 
subsidies may be required to ease the pressure of contributions from the formal sector and 
pensioners. 
 
Figure 8.12: Percent share of total revenue (Non-contributory scenario) 
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On the other hand, the contributory scenario is unsustainable after 2021 with total 
expenditure exceeding total revenues by about KSh 74.8 billion by 2030 (Figure 8.13). The 
reason for these differences in revenue and expenditure is that whereas contributions from 
the formal and informal sector workers are high (91% of total revenues), government 
subsidies on the other hand, are very low at only 8.2% of total revenue (Figure 8.14). 
Although data from OECD countries indicate that government subsidies may be as low as 
5.0% of total health expenditure in contributory systems (Rovere and Skinne, 2012), the 
Kenyan case is different because the majority of potential contributors are in the informal 
sector where incomes are not only low but difficult to target in a contributory health 
financing system.  
 
 
 
 
Less government subsidies and more in contributions is counterintuitive given the evidence 
of problems of affordability of premiums in Chapter Seven. The suggested levels of 
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contributions particularly from the informal sector are quite high and probably not 
sustainable given the nature of income flows in the sector. It is therefore imperative that, 
for sustainable contributory financing mechanism, the government needs to significantly 
increase its subsidies in order to lower contributions from both formal and informal sectors.  
This is a limitation of the SimIns model as it assumes that government will only make 
contributions for those who are exempted whereas the reality is that government often 
subsidises those who could make some contribution but only a small amount. The need to 
address levels of contributions is because persistent and significant increases in 
contributions would be unaffordable and likely to cause resistance from the entire 
population and each time will have to be strongly justified to be effected. As highlighted in 
Chapter Seven, increased NHIF rates led to dropouts from the fund by voluntary 
contributors, which is an indication that when contributions are mandatory people will 
resist any significant increases as they will have no option of dropping out. High premium 
rates were also cited by informal sector workers as a key barrier to enrolment into health 
schemes.  
 
The huge difference in contributions between contributory and non-contributory scenario is 
that the informal sector populations are exempted from contributions in the latter but not 
in the former scenario. Despite contributions from the informal sector, the contributory 
scenario is still unsustainable meaning that the contributions  from the informal sector are 
quite limited. 
 
8.4.5 Potential expansion of fiscal revenue for financing healthcare 
There is a major problem with regard to budget allocation for the health sector in Kenya. As 
highlighted in Chapter Two, the health sector receives  a relatively low percentage of total 
government expenditure leaving it severely underfunded and the population exposed to 
potentially catastrophic OOP health expenditures.  A number of ways may be used to 
increase fiscal space for healthcare in Kenya including shifting expenditure from other 
government functions to the health sector, increasing health insurance premium rates as 
well as tax rates, innovative financing, and efficiency in revenue collection and use of 
available resources, among other measures.  
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Increasing premium and/or tax rates may look unavoidable under the circumstances of 
unsustainable financing discussed above in an effort to provide necessary health services 
under UHC. Interviews with most policymakers seemed to support increased premium rates 
with the argument that the fiscal space is too limited to support a non-contributory system. 
One policymaker said: “Look at the fiscal space...we hardly have enough money as a 
government to provide the most basic of needs; where will all the money to fund free 
healthcare for all come from if the  informal sector is not made to contribute to funding 
healthcare?” (Policymaker 3, MOH). However, the pattern of government spending suggests 
that before considering increased taxes or premium rates there is the possibility of 
increased government funding for the health sector under prevailing budgetary conditions 
mainly by shifting funding from other government sectors to the health sector. A 
comparative analysis with developing countries such as Ghana, Rwanda, Costa Rica, Brazil 
and Thailand indicates that Kenya ranks poorest in terms of key health expenditure 
indicators outlined in Table 8.4.   
 
Table 8.4: Comparative expenditure indicators 
Indicators Kenya Costa Rica Brazil Ghana Rwanda Thailan
d 
Total health expenditure % GDP (2013) 4.5 9.9 9.7 5.4 11.1 4.6 
Government health expenditure % THE 
(2013) 
41.7 75.0 48.2 60.6 58.8 80.1 
Government health expenditure % total 
government expenditure (2013) 
5.9 28.0 8.0 10.6 22.3 17.0 
Social security expenditure % 
Government health expenditure (2013) 
13.1 79.3 0.0 22.2 11.2 9.1 
Government health expenditure % GDP 
(2014) 
2.0 8.0 4.0 3.0 6.0 3.0 
Government expenditure % GDP (2014) 31.0 27.0 57.0 30.0 28.3 21.0 
Sources: (WHO, 2014, WHO, 2015)  
 
The countries used in the comparison have either taken steps towards high population 
coverage or have already attained UHC status. Given that total government expenditure in 
Kenya accounts for 31% of its GDP, which is well above countries such as Costa Rica and 
Thailand both with universal health systems, it should be a question of more priority to the 
health sector than increasing premium or tax rates. Compared to Costa Rica, Ghana, 
Rwanda and Thailand which have high population coverage, government health expenditure 
as a share of the national budget in particular needs to more than double if Kenya aspires 
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for UHC. Comparative data on expenditure by functions of government also show that 
Kenya spends least on health but devotes a higher proportion of the national budget to 
general public services9 (17%), economic affairs (22%), defence (5.3%) and public order and 
safety (7.6%) (KNBS, 2014a).  These are higher expenditure figures compared to a country 
such as Costa Rica which has a universal SHI financing system and spends less on general 
public services (3.3%), economic affairs (8.9%), and public order and safety (5.7%) (IMF, 
2013). The EU also, on average, spends comparably low percentages of the budget on the 
same functions: general public services (14%), economic affairs (8.8%), defence (2.9%) and 
public order and safety (3.8%) (Eurostart, 2014). The expenditure patterns build a strong 
case for Kenya to re-evaluate its expenditure on various government functions with the view 
to giving greater priority than at present to the health sector similar to developing countries 
with UHC systems.  
 
Two particular targets may be considered in highlighting the potential for higher revenue 
allocation to the health sector: (i) the government to allocate at least 5% of GDP for 
healthcare from domestic resources as suggested by McIntyre and Meheus (2014). The 5% 
is the financial estimate required to adequately finance UHC; (ii) honouring the Abuja 
commitment by SSA governments to allocate at least 15% of the national budget to the 
health sector (based on analysis of Kenya’s budgets for financial years 2013/14, 2014/15 
and 2015/16) (Table 8.5).  
 
Table 8.5: Estimates of potential fiscal resources for healthcare 
Financial 
Year 
GDP (KSh 
billions) 
5% of GDP for health 
(KSh Billions) 
National Budget 
(KSh Billions) 
15% national budget 
for health (KSh Billions) 
2013/14 4760.00 238.00 1640.00 246.00 
2014/15 5481.00 274.05 1700.00 255.00 
2015/16 5755.05 287.75 1911.00 286.65 
 
From Table 8.5, spending 5% of GDP on health or 15% of the budget potentially generate 
more funds beyond the KSh 217 billion recommended by the MOH Taskforce (2012) as the 
amount required to provide necessary health services to all Kenyans. In other words, if 
either strategy of increasing funding for the health sector were to be implemented, both 
                                                                 
9 General public services include internal security, infrastructure development, and electricity supply, among 
others.  
212 
 
have the potential to sustain UHC in Kenya. There is also the potential of allocating more 
than 5% of GDP to the health sector in Kenya because recent data by the World Bank 
(2014a) indicate that considerably poorer governments such as Afghanistan, Burundi and 
Cambodia spent up to 8% of GDP on healthcare.  
 
There are a number of approaches to improving government revenue and increase funding 
for the health sector. Improving compliance in tax collection increases government 
revenues without necessarily having to increase tax rates. Kenya KNBS (2007), Indonesia 
(WHO, 2010b) and South Africa (Hausman, 2010) are some of the countries that have 
improved tax compliance to improve overall fiscal space. Closely related is the need to curb 
capital flight which is estimated by Boyce and Ndikumana (2012) to have cost Sub-Saharan 
Africa in excess of US$ 1.0 trillion as of 2010. McIntyre and Meheus (2014) suggest more 
global cooperation and improving transparency in reporting business activities among other 
measures in limiting capital flight.  
 
In some cases, tax rates may have to be increased, for example in Kenya, mandatory social 
contribution as a form of dedicated tax is comparably low for a country that aspires to fund 
UHC on contributory basis. Premium contribution rates in developing countries such as 
Thailand (4.5% of gross pay for formal private sector workers) (Tangcharoensathien et al., 
2010a) and Costa Rica (23% of gross pay) (Saenz et al., 2011) are relatively high. In high-
income countries such as Germany and France premium contribution rates are as high as 
14% of total wages and are able to provide needed coverage (2010). Some level of upward 
adjustments in premium contribution rates may be explored in Kenya.  
 
McIntyre and Meheus (2014) also point to the potential of raising more government 
revenues from non-tax resources such as oil and other natural resources in countries  with 
such resources. Recent oil and gas discoveries in Kenya could therefore be important 
sources of revenue to expand fiscal space particularly for healthcare once extraction begins.  
Some countries such as Zambia, Ghana, Gabon and Gambia have initiated innovative 
taxation to raise more revenues specifically for the health sector. These have been 
extensively discussed in Chapter Three and include such measures as levies on mobile 
phone companies, tax on international money transfers and surcharge on VAT, among 
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others (Tandon and Cashin, 2010, McIntyre, 2012). These may be replicated in Kenya to help 
in sustainable financing for UHC. 
 
In a qualitative assessment of the reasons for low budgetary allocation to the health sector, 
policymakers at the National Treasury were quick to point out that the health sector already 
receives a lot of funds from donors. Although this may be true, donor funds, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, are concentrated in three disease areas- malaria, HIV/AIDS and TB, which 
leaves many other health programmes to share the funds that are left. The absorptive 
capacity of the health sector was also raised by two policymakers who argued that a lot of 
funds allocated to the health sector often go unused. Analysis of the absorptive capacity of 
the health sector from the period 2009 to 2012 showed that the sector on average utilised 
85.3% of its budgetary allocation (Government of Kenya, 2012). There is room for 
improvement with respect to absorptive capacity but it is not the lowest among government 
sectors and it would be unrealistic as a basis for underfunding the health sector.  
 
At least one policymaker confirmed during interviews that the health sector was not a 
priority expenditure area for the government. He explained that government spending was 
aligned to the delivery of Vision 2030 which aims to make Kenya a newly industrialised 
country by 2030. This is the reason the government consistently allocates large shares of the 
budget to the development of roads, railways and other infrastructure which it views as key 
to the delivery of Vision 2030.  
 
An important finding during the interviews with policymakers was the lack of a united front 
among the health sector stakeholders. The lack of unity could affect the bargaining power 
for more funding for the health sector and the push for UHC. Subtle conflicts between 
officials at the NHIF and the MOH, between ministry technocrats and the executive arm of 
government, and between the MOH and non-government actors in the health sector mainly 
revolved around pooling and control of financial resources. Policymakers particularly at the 
NHIF felt that there were duplicated roles in improving financial risk protection and cited 
some initiatives such as fee waivers for children under five years, free maternal care, free 
treatment from HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB, which needed to be directly controlled by the 
NHIF to avoid the costs of having a fragmented health system. Duplicated administrative 
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costs associated with a fragmented system leads to health system inefficiencies which limit 
fiscal space for health. 
 
Limitations of SimIns model 
A notable limitation with SimIns is that it only models for 10 years and although the 
modelling work extended to 2030, there are problems in transition between the two models 
especially with regard to financial estimates. This was resolved by manually calculating 
revenue and expenditure based on trends from 2013 to 2023. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Both financing scenarios considered in the model require significant subsidies to be 
sustainable. In the contributory scenario, even though total direct contributions are higher 
than in the non-contributory scenario, the total revenues are minimal. This is because the 
amount contributed by the majority of the population (i.e. those in the informal sector) is 
quite limited but increasing premium contribution rates for this population group may not 
be feasible because they may not be affordable to the majority of the workers. It means that 
the informal sector in its current form, economically and structurally, may not be relied 
upon to make significant financial contributions to support UHC efforts. The easiest option 
would be for the government to subsidise the informal sector and the indigent populations 
not only for rapid population coverage but also to mobilise more revenue to finance health 
services for all. However, this financing strategy would come at a high cost to the 
government which will be obligated to find quick means of raising revenues to finance 
increased demand for health services. There is the potential to raise adequate revenue 
mainly through non-contributory mechanisms to sustainably finance UHC in Kenya. 
Prioritising the health sector with increased budgetary allocations and innovative financing 
involving dedicated taxes to the sector as well as efficient use of available resources are 
important steps towards sustainably financing UHC in Kenya.  
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CHAPTER NINE: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
9.1 Introduction  
This chapter brings together key findings in the study to draw out conclusions and 
recommendations that are aimed at informing UHC policy reforms in Kenya and similar 
contexts elsewhere. The chapter provides a summary of the state of affairs in the informal 
sector in terms of aspects of its diversity and sustainability that are relevant to health 
insurance contributions and general healthcare financing. It also gives a clear picture of 
some of the needs and expectations of informal sector workers with regard to prepayment 
for healthcare, and ends with some critical insights on the merits as well as challenges of 
contributory and non-contributory financing mechanisms within the Kenyan context as 
emerging from the findings. 
 
9.2 Reality of informal sector work  
The informal sector is characterised by a large diversity of economic entities which are most 
manifest in the urban area. Among the various informal sector enterprises in the urban 
area, street vending is quite visible and consists of some of the lowest capital investments 
hence generally synonymous with poverty. That street vending is often seen as synonymous 
with poverty has also been documented by Adhikari (2011) in a study of street vending in 
Nepal. Generally, global literature has tended to associate the informal sector with poverty 
and low-incomes. Apart from the manifestations of urban poverty through street vending, 
low-income as a characteristic of the informal sector was  evident from the findings of this 
study. Most informal sector entities were small-scale with almost 90% of all enterprises in 
the study employing not more than two workers and about 75% owned and run by 
individuals. The sizes of most of the entities suggested low-incomes to concur with other 
findings; for example, Becker (2004) estimated that nearly ¾ of informal enterprises globally 
are individually owned and operated. A notable point is that given the small scale 
operations of informal sector enterprises, they largely offer no realistic competition to the 
formal sector which is more likely to benefit from economies of scale and superior qual ity of 
goods and services. Nevertheless, the importance of informal sector economic entities at 
household and national levels cannot be over-emphasised. The entities are the main sources 
of livelihoods for the majority  of workers in the sector (in this case 87%) and, according to 
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various literature sources, contribute significantly to employment and GDP in many 
developing countries (Ndiweni et al., 2014, Ncube, 2013, ILO & WTO, 2009, Chen, 2005).  
 
Despite the important role of the informal sector in social and economic development, 
questions have been raised regarding the financial potential of the informal sector to prepay 
for healthcare particularly on a contributory basis. A contributory financing mechanism is 
the government’s preferred policy for financing UHC in Kenya. The critical question is 
therefore whether informal sector entities can be relied upon to sustain a regular flow of 
funds for UHC. The findings of this study suggest widespread irregularity of incomes in the 
informal sector where only about 44% of entities can be regarded as sustainable and only 
about 35% of all employees reporting regular monthly pay. In essence, the majority of 
informal sector workers may not have a regular income. This could have financial 
implications for health programmes funded on a contributory prepayment basis because it 
would be difficult to predict periods when the majority of informal sector workers are able 
or unable to afford premiums costs.  
 
Incomes in the informal sector are not only irregular but also low and this has implications 
for the amount of resources that can be realistically generated from the informal sector to 
support financing for UHC. The average income in the urban non-agricultural informal sector 
in the study sites is 61% lower than the average income in the formal sector. The ILO 
(2002a) indicates that incomes in the informal sector are on average 44% lower than those 
in the formal sector on a global scale; hence, the informal sector in Kenya has even more 
precarious incomes relative to the formal sector than the global average. These findings 
seem to validate the common notion of prevalence of low-incomes in the informal sector. 
Low-income can be relative but in circumstances where such income is irregular as was the 
case with a significant number of study participants, it may mean that a large number of 
informal sector workers struggle to raise enough income to meet basic household 
consumption on a day-to-day basis. What this suggests is that additional financial demands, 
especially those that require payments at regular intervals, could impose a considerable 
burden on many workers in the informal sector, particularly among the poorest or lowest 
income informal sector workers. Unless there are proven means to effectively exempt the 
217 
 
poor from making payments, it would be prudent to consider financing options that target 
exemptions to the entire informal sector population rather than sections of it. 
 
There are a few studies that have disputed the generalisation that the informal sector is 
characterised by low-income and raised the prospects of raising income tax revenue from 
the informal sector. Graham et al. (1998), in a baseline study of women street vendors in 
Kenya, argue that the informal sector is able to pay income tax. While this may be possible 
for some informal sector workers and could contribute to sustainable financial flow for UHC 
and other government programmes, a number of factors would work against income tax 
collection from the informal sector in most developing country settings where the sector is 
largely unorganised. The difficulty in identifying and estimating income from the informal 
sector has been documented by others (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2011, Bargain and 
Kwenda, 2010). Despite these difficulties, monthly expenditure data used as proxy for 
income in this study show that most non-agricultural informal sector both in rural and urban 
study sites actually met the monthly taxable income threshold of about KSh 12000. 
However, incomes varied greatly between urban and rural areas and between the 
agricultural and non-agricultural informal sector. On average, income from non-agricultural 
informal sector entities in the rural area was found to be 30% higher than that of the 
agricultural informal sector. Expressing similar findings, Fox and Gaal (2008) acknowledge 
that generally incomes in the non-agricultural informal sector are higher than in the 
agricultural informal sector by up to 50%. The difference between this study and Fox and 
Gaal’s conclusions could be related to sample size and study contexts. On the other hand, 
average cash income from the rural informal sector (both agricultural and non-agricultural) 
was 43% lower than the average for urban informal sector.  
 
The overall observation is that there is income potential in the informal sector, an indication 
that when innovative approaches are put in place to tap financial resources from the sector, 
there is the possibility of raising significant funds for UHC. To achieve such a goal, McIntyre 
(2012) suggests that if the informal sector is to contribute to funding prepaid health care 
then measures such as indirect taxes, if designed appropriately to minimise regressive 
impacts, would be more effective and can contribute to larger fiscal space for general 
government expenditure and expenditure in health care in particular.  Given that these 
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indirect tax mechanisms already exist, it would be less costly and administratively easier to 
increase indirect taxes than attempt to identify informal sector workers falling above the 
income tax threshold. Innovative taxation approaches including a simplified tax 
administration system in Indonesia (WHO, 2010b), levies on mobile phone companies and 
international remittances in Gabon as well as taxes on investment income in Zambia 
(McIntyre, 2012, Tandon and Cashin, 2010) are some ways of improving fiscal space for 
healthcare. On the whole, the recommendation for indirect taxes as a measure to draw 
resources from the informal sector confirms the belief that getting the informal sector to 
prepay directly for healthcare on contributory basis would be difficult. 
 
Whereas fiscal measures such as indirect taxes could be used to generate additional 
government revenue from the informal sector, the sector faces various challenges that 
contribute to poor financial performance of many of the entities. As an indicator of poor 
performance, the findings in Chapter Five showed that less than half of informal sector 
entities, particularly non-agricultural enterprises, lasted more than five years. Noting that 
the non-agricultural informal sector has higher income than the agricultural informal sector 
yet is the most unstable further supports the notion of limited resource output and 
unpredictability of income in the sector.  
 
Poor economic performance in the informal sector could be linked to several factors that 
emerged from the findings. These include harassment by local authorities, stiff competition 
within the sector, an unpredictable economic environment, hostile physical work 
environments and low levels of education alongside lack of formal training in skills such as 
management. Lack of formal training and low levels of education for example, were 
confirmed by study participants to lead to a deficit in skills in the sector. As highlighted in 
the qualitative findings, lack of skills makes the sector not only low-paying but also one 
where there are no distinct entry criteria; that is, anyone can work in the informal sector in 
the majority of the entities regardless of level of education. For example, as the findings 
demonstrate, there are both post-secondary school and non-schooled workers in similar 
entities such as informal manufacturing and hotel/food-kiosk industries. Moreover, the 
sector acted more as a last-resort for many who could not find formal employment with just 
about 19% of all workers having any form of training in their work.   
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Lack of distinct entry criteria and relatively low set-up costs makes entry into the informal 
sector quite easy. Such findings concur with conclusions by Verick (2006) who also identifies 
small scale operation and low technology in the list of some of the key reasons for the 
relative ease of entry into the sector. However, certain entities including health and medical 
involving conventional medicine, and telecommunication, have distinct entry criteria 
defined by the level of education. Given that the two types of entities had low 
representation in the survey, it means that low level of education in the informal sector is a 
likely barrier to certain types of investment in the sector especially those that require 
specialised skills, high set-up costs and high levels of technology.  
 
The main reason for harassment of informal sector workers by government authorities is 
often illegal operations associated with lack of an operating license. Affordability of license 
fees was cited during the study as one of the reasons that discourage informal sector 
workers from registration and in the process expose their enterprises to demolitions and 
harassment by government authorities. Orwa (2007) and Mitullah (2003) have noted that 
apart from the level of license fees, the other major reason for entities operating without 
licenses is that operators find the registration process long and cumbersome without 
significant benefits.  
 
9.3 Prerequisites for participating in prepaid healthcare by the informal sector  
 
Some informal sector workers may have the economic power to prepay for healthcare but 
key issues that are not necessarily financial emerged in the study as important determinants 
of willingness to prepay for healthcare among the informal sector.  Although legislation may 
make it mandatory for everyone to make prepayment contributions towards funding 
healthcare, the reality is that it is difficult to enforce such contributions in the informal 
sector.  Therefore, it is important to make prepayment attractive in terms of the benefits 
associated with contributions.  The issues identified in this study include accessibility and 
overall quality of public health sector provision, experiences with current prepaid systems 
(NHIF and government revenues) as well as social solidarity between different 
socioeconomic groups and under a devolved governance system.  Many of these issues are 
as relevant to the success of a contributory as for a non-contributory system. 
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9.3.1 Access and quality of public sector health services  
Most informal sector workers indicated that they often chose government facilities when 
seeking health care. The choice however, involved significant uncertainty related to the 
availability of services particularly drugs, timely services and specialist personnel as well as  
acceptability of the behaviour of some health workers. What this means is that although 
many informal sector workers choose public sector health facilities, the services are in many 
ways inaccessible and are of poor quality. The quality of services from government facilities, 
according to the majority of study participants, was lower than most mainstream private 
sector services. Other private services were informal and low-cost where the majority of the 
poor sought poor quality services. The choice of government facilities is therefore based on 
relatively low cost but at greater inconvenience compared with other providers. Concurring 
with these findings, Demery and Gaddis (2009) observe that the public health sector in 
Kenya cares for the majority (53%) of patients in the poorest quinti le and the private sector 
provides for about 47% of this group but the private sector in this case is mainly informal 
where services are likely to be of poor quality.  
 
As already noted, the trade-offs in healthcare seeking among informal sector workers 
reflects a major problem of access to public sector health services more generally. Access to 
quality services is an essential component in the progress towards UHC because as indicated 
in the findings people would be more responsive to prepaid health care with the guarantee 
of receiving adequate services of sufficient quality. In particular, the population would pay 
greater attention to value for money under a mandatory prepaid healthcare system and if 
this condition is not met there is the likelihood of public resistance to prepaid health care. 
Therefore, in the on-going UHC reforms, more attention should be paid to improvements in 
access and quality of public sector services as much as in its financing. In its current form, 
poor access to quality services generally has resulted in inequitable utilisation of health 
services across different socioeconomic groups and between geographical regions in Kenya. 
Surveys by the MOH (2009, 2004) indicate that the lowest income groups and those in rural 
areas use fewer services and are less likely than the well-off and urban dwellers to seek care 
when ill. This would need to be addressed in moving towards UHC.  
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The Government of Kenya has in a number of ways acknowledged and responded to some 
of the systemic problems within the public health sector that have limited access to quality 
services. Apart from initiating financing reforms for UHC, the government recently began 
equipping key hospitals throughout the country to improve quality of care. However this 
process has generated a lot of controversy with some stakeholders arguing that there are no 
personnel to operate some of the equipment. The devolved governance system has also 
been an important milestone in an effort to improve service delivery and quality. Devolution 
has given county governments the responsibility of health care delivery wherein they have 
the mandate to design health programmes that correspond with local health needs as well 
as independently draw budgets for financing these programmes. The extent to which these 
reforms have been successfully implemented within the counties is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Other access problems identified in the findings require drastic changes in health 
worker attitudes because whereas quality services may be available at some facilities, 
deliberate delays by health workers in providing these services lead to serious 
dissatisfaction with public facilities. Changes in staff attitudes, for example in providing 
prompt services without deliberate delay, and respect for patients, would complement 
noted strengths in public provision such as availability of basic diagnostic equipment and the 
trust the public has in government facilities to provide only necessary services and well-
trained health personnel, where they are available, to provide quality care. 
 
9.3.2 Paying attention to experiences with current prepayment systems 
There are seemingly genuine political efforts in support of UHC which the public should be 
receptive to. However, the findings suggest that experiences of the general public with 
existing public prepaid mechanisms, both contributory and non-contributory, would play an 
important role in accepting government initiatives for prepaid health care and progressing 
toward UHC. Particular attention therefore needs to be paid to these experiences whether 
positive or negative. The findings indicate that although the general understanding and 
attitudes toward prepaid health care among informal sector workers is supportive of UHC, 
their experiences with current publicly prepaid health care are largely negative. For 
example, despite high levels of awareness of the NHIF in the rural area very few informal 
sector workers were members. The key barriers cited for lack of membership included 
mismanagement of funds, unaffordable premium rates, limited benefits package and the 
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fact that membership is voluntary in the informal sector. A number of these barriers  are 
related to the design of the prepayment system. Giedion and Bitran (2003) advise that 
appropriately designed prepaid systems help to improve sustainability of health insurance 
schemes by retaining members and ensuring regular flow of contributions.  
 
The issue of corruption within the government and in the NHIF and the general  perception 
that there is a lack of commitment to take action on corruption could be counter-productive 
for government-led efforts toward UHC. The current resistance by a number of trade unions 
and employers on an expanded NHIF mandate with increased premium rates is partly based 
on the lack of accountability in the NHIF (Oduor, 2015). Corruption as documented by 
various authors such as Wafula (2012) and Wrong (2009) as well as nearly all local media 
outlets in the country would make the public distrust government-led efforts to provide free 
healthcare at the point of service whether on a contributory or non-contributory basis. 
Corruption not only erodes trust but takes away large amounts of resources that could 
provide a wide range of services to a large number of people. The EU and AU (2011) joint 
report on social protection suggests that controlling corruption among other measures 
would improve fiscal space to advance coverage for informal sector populations in Sub-
Saharan Africa. From the findings, the public clearly sees their role in fighting corruption and 
expressed their readiness to hold the government or institution entrusted with managing 
prepaid funds more accountable. A list of information demands including financial reports 
and mode of recruitment at management level, were suggested as measures of securing 
transparency in the management of prepaid funds and delivery of services.  
 
9.3.3 Enhancing social solidarity 
The literature recognises social solidarity as one of the important prerequisites for 
prepaying for health care. Although the study results showed strong social solidarity across 
the study sites, it was mainly concentrated among the lower socioeconomic groups. The 
level of social solidarity is a measure of support for redistributive policies such as UHC and 
its concentration among the poorer groups negates the element of cross -subsidisation 
between the rich and the poor in a prepayment system. Stuckler et al. (2010) emphasise 
that social solidarity among all population groups is essential in sustaining UHC. The 
apparent unwillingness of those in higher socioeconomic groups to use some of their wealth 
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to pay for poorer groups is unsurprising. Higher income groups are most affected by 
redistributive policies as they pay more to support the poor who may not be able to pay at 
all. Therefore, the implementation of redistributive policies creates the possibility of 
tensions among different socioeconomic groups especially where one feels taxed at the 
expense of the others. Anttonen and Sipilä (2005) and Hernandez (2002) have expressed 
similar views and argued that wealthier groups often resist redistributive policies which 
makes such policies prone to resistance and difficult to implement and could jeopardise 
progress towards UHC. Strong political leadership has often been mentioned as an 
important component to not only overcome resistance to redistributive policies such as UHC 
from some sections of the population but also to rally more financial resources to support 
UHC initiatives (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2013, Stuckler et al., 2010, Hernandez, 2002).  
 
9.4 Contributory versus non-contributory financing mechanisms 
A number of issues would influence UHC reforms whether under contributory or non-
contributory financing. A few of these issues are cross-cutting and others are specific to the 
type of financing mechanism. Table 9.1 summarises  some of this issues: 
 
Table 9.1: Some key issues relevant to reforms for UHC in Kenya 
Contributory financing Non-contributory financing 
 Difficult to implement and sustain due to low and 
unstable incomes in the informal sector, which are 
also difficult to identify 
 Most sustainable and preferred by informal 
sector workers  
 Raises potentially greater public resistance and is 
less politically acceptable.  
 The potential for resistance from informal 
sector workers and high-income groups and 
their networks is considerably lower than a 
contributory approach to UHC 
 Social solidarity could be particularly difficult to 
harness across the country because direct 
premium payments are very ‘visible’ 
 Easier to implement than a contributory 
mechanism due to its potential  indirectness 
in revenue collection 
 Improved access to quality public sector health services, improved health sector governance and 
transparency would hasten the pace of UHC  
 Complexities arising from devolved governance system may pose some challenges i n revenue 
collection and pooling for UHC across the country  
 The health sector needs to be given greater priority in government expenditure plans as UHC requires 
large amounts of money to be sustainable 
 
9.4.1 Contributory financing 
The contributory scenario is the preferred government financing strategy for UHC in Kenya 
even though the evidence, both from primary data and modelling results, suggest that it 
may not be the most feasible to implement or the most sustainable option. Authors such as 
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Hsiao and Shaw (2007), McIntyre (2007), Mills (2007) and Letourmy (2010) observe that for 
historical reasons and the perception that tax revenues alone cannot finance UHC, many 
governments in developing countries are in favour of contributory schemes. However, a key 
observation from the study findings is that a contributory financing mechanism would be 
more difficult to implement than a non-contributory mechanism under the prevailing 
circumstances involving greater preference for non-contributory financing, large informal 
sector populations and resistance to increased premium rates, among others. The wider 
literature suggests that implementation of contributory mechanisms in countries with a 
large informal sector is problematic. Hyoung-Sun (2010) and Camara and Louisa (2013) 
report on problems of covering informal sector populations in the Philippines and Laos, 
respectively while Tangcharoensathien et al. (2011) is emphatic that a contributory system 
is impossible to implement because it is difficult to effectively collect premiums from the 
informal sector.  
 
The contributory scenario could also experience higher public resistance given that negative 
past experiences with mandatory tax collection. For example head-tax in the colonial and 
immediate post-colonial administrations bear similarities with mandatory premium 
contributions. This would be a concern to the public as several study participants suspected 
that government officials would be harassing people in an effort to enforce mandatory 
premium contributions. This is likely to make a mandatory contributory financing 
mechanism more difficult to implement than a non-contributory system unless concerted 
efforts are made to educate the public on how it would operate. The design of a 
prepayment mechanism therefore needs to be carefully considered in ensuring that the 
concerns and expectations of informal sector workers are addressed. 
 
The modelling results indicate that for a contributory system to be sustainable, premium 
contribution rates for both formal and informal sector populations would have to drastically 
increase. Such increases would prompt even greater resistance from the public. First, the 
informal sector generally has low and irregular income and many of them would be 
burdened by regular premium contributions that are considerably higher than at present. 
Secondly, there is extensive resistance to the current NHIF rates both from employers and 
contributors through their trade union representations (Oduor, 2015). Increasing premium 
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rates from 2.4% to 11% of gross pay for the formal sector and by almost 50% for informal 
sector workers to effectively anchor UHC as shown in the results of the model is likely to 
add to the social acrimony that has emerged under the newly implemented NHIF rates. It is 
also important that any increase in contribution rates should be carefully assessed in terms 
of the burden it will place on contributors. However, the contribution rates should be 
realistic in terms of financing a given package of services. The reality in the Kenyan context 
is that, as demonstrated in Chapter Eight, the current premium rates under the NHIF are 
unrealistically low at 2.4% of gross pay and the public needs to be made aware that such 
rates cannot sustainably finance UHC and would either have to be increased or the 
government needs to step in with significantly increased funding to the health sector.  
 
9.4.2 Non-contributory financing 
The non-contributory financing mechanism is the most preferred financing mechanism by 
informal sector workers. This is largely because of its potential indirectness in revenue 
collection where payment is likely to be based on ability to pay and its ease of 
implementation as has been documented elsewhere in the thesis. Indirectness in revenue 
collection makes the non-contributory system potentially less controversial than a 
contributory approach, although there is likely to be some resistance to tax increases from 
the public.  Nevertheless, careful consideration of which taxes to increase or what types of 
innovative financing to pursue could reduce the potential for public resistance. 
 
A distinct advantage of the non-contributory financing mechanism over the contributory 
one is its potential for sustainability at a relatively lower cost.  A centrally managed non-
contributory health financing system also has considerable potential to promote equity 
across geographic regions and socioeconomic groups McIntyre and Gilson (2005).  
 
The other advantage of a non-contributory approach is its ability to increase population 
coverage to universal levels over a short period of time. However, increased population 
coverage comes with the challenge of very high costs in the initial stages because more 
people will use more services. Addressing this challenge of a high revenue requirement 
upon implementation could employ several strategies. Some of the strategies could include 
prioritising the health sector in the government budget, increasing tax rates, increasing 
premium contribution rates and implementing a phased coverage of certain services.  
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9.4.3 Cross-cutting issues 
 
The need for increased government funding for the health sector has been demonstrated in 
chapters Two and Eight and is key to making progress toward UHC whether on a 
contributory or non-contributory basis.  While the requirement for government funding may 
be more evident in a non-contributory system, it is critical to recognise that unless there are 
substantial government subsidies, population coverage will simply not increase as planned 
in a contributory system due to lack of affordability of insurance premiums for the majority.  
 
It is no secret that the health sector is under-funded and would require greater priority in 
government spending to anchor UHC. Unfortunately, the health sector is currently not seen 
as a priority for government spending. Senior policymakers strongly believe that there is no 
fiscal space to increase funding for the health sector through general government revenues. 
In this respect, there has been considerable support from senior government policymakers 
for increasing NHIF premiums and to pursuing a contributory system to draw funds from the 
informal sector. The strength of government support for a contributory system could make 
the feasibility of pursuing a non-contributory approach quite difficult even though the 
evidence suggests it is the better of the two prepayment options in a number of respects.  
 
Increased funding of the health sector is inevitable if meaningful progress is to be made in 
UHC efforts. However, the funding must be translated into improved access to quality 
services. The need to improve access to quality services to get the support of informal 
sector workers has been discussed but it is equally important for formal sector workers, 
particularly if they are expected to contribute more (whether through higher premiums or 
through increased taxes).  
 
In terms of pooling resources for UHC either on a contributory or non-contributory basis, 
the Kenyan situation could prove politically complex. In the context of the devolved 
governance system, counties not only have semi-autonomous governance systems but also 
independent control of their budgets and have expressed the desire to run their health 
programmes according to their own design. The implication of devolution in this case is that 
the aspiration to have a central national pool for UHC, despite the health sector being one 
of the most devolved functions, is likely to create problems between the central and county 
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governments regardless of whether the financing approach is contributory or non-
contributory. Furthermore, in circumstances where well-off groups are reluctant to support 
redistributive policies in an ethnically polarised country, richer counties may be reluctant to 
pool their resources to subsidise poorer ones especially where payments are direct as is the 
case with a contributory system. The findings pointed to potential problems associated with 
the political acceptability of a contributory mechanism and as such the fluid socio-political 
relations in the country can be easily exploited by politicians who are against redistribution 
across counties, especially where some counties will feel that they are contributing more 
funds than they use while others are utilising more services than the amount of money that 
they contribute.  
 
The potential for resistance to redistribution under a contributory or non-contributory 
financing system for UHC would not be a new phenomenon especially from middle- to high-
income groups and has been documented elsewhere (Anttonen and Sipilä, 2008, 
Hernandez, 2002). It is not just the higher income groups in the informal sector that are 
expressing individualist attitudes against redistributive healthcare financing but such 
attitudes have been documented among better resourced formal sector workers through 
their employers and trade unions in Kenya (Oduor, 2015). This implies that regardless of the 
financing approach, there is the potential that well-off groups and individuals could use 
their networks such as trade unions to make UHC implementation quite difficult. However, 
Stuckler et al. (2010) have suggested that such networks could be reined in by the political 
leadership. 
 
9.5 Conclusion and recommendations  
There is clear evidence that historically the government has given insufficient priority to the 
health sector in relation to government funding. For example, the health sector budget as a 
share of the national budget has consistently remained at less than 6% on average over the 
years compared to 15% which is the global average and the target recommended by the 
Abuja Summit. It is very clear that to sustainably finance UHC the health sector requires 
substantial financial input to be able to provide access to quality health services for all. It is 
noteworthy that any mandatory prepayment in this context– whether a premium to NHIF or 
taxes – are regarded as ‘government funding’ (e.g. both are included in government 
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expenditure on health measures in national health accounts). So whether contributory or 
non-contributory, increased government/mandatory prepayment funding is required. 
Recommendation 1: Concerted efforts should be made to increase fiscal space specifically 
for healthcare. A starting point would be to critically examine government spending 
patterns particularly how the funds are allocated across sectors relative to other countries 
with the aim of identifying sectors whose expenditures can be reduced and reallocated to 
the health sector.  
Recommendation 2: Even though total government expenditure as a share of GDP is 
relatively high at 31%, a long-term solution to increasing fiscal space and sustainably funding 
UHC would be seek additional domestic revenue sources. Towards this goal, innovative 
financing for the health sector needs to be seriously explored. Approaches such as indirect 
taxes on selected products and services (particularly those not consumed by the poor), 
taxes on tobacco and innovative financing mechanisms such as taxes on mobile phone 
companies, are among many options that could be explored in Kenya. Other measures such 
as increased efficiency in tax collection are crucial in enhancing overall fiscal space. Kenya 
has been credited with improved tax compliance in the past years and a recent report by 
Reuters (2015) indicated a 3.9% improvement in tax revenue collected for the fiscal year 
2014/2015. Such improvements could be crucial in financing UHC. 
 
Even though the government prefers a contributory system to a non-contributory one and 
has initiated policies to move towards UHC through a contributory approach, there is still 
the need to explore the non-contributory option to UHC. The government’s main concern is 
the heavy financial responsibility that comes with a non-contributory approach but this 
financing strategy should be seen in the long-term where it comes at a lower overall cost 
than a contributory approach.  
Recommendation 3: One of the main lessons learnt in Chapter Three as essential to 
expanding and sustaining coverage is that governments should set funding targets for the 
health sector. Two such targets discussed in Chapter Eight are the Abuja Commitment in 
which 15% of national budgets should dedicated to the health sector and 5% of GDP being 
used to fund healthcare. As the analysis prove in Chapter Eight, if Kenya Government could 
commit to any of these targets there is the likelihood of adequate funding for UHC in the 
short- to long-term.  
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Recommendation 4: There is a need to generate adequate evidence on the potential for 
expansion of fiscal space for UHC and the feasibility of a non-contributory financing 
mechanism.  The high start-up costs associated with the non-contributory approach may be 
addressed through shifting expenditure from other sectors of the government, innovative 
financing, improving efficiency in spending including curbing corruption and other leakages 
as well as initiating phased coverage of specific services.  
 
The current UHC proposals envisage a central risk pool for all Kenyans but as highlighted 
before, there are potential challenges with a central national pooling mechanism because 
the health sector is devolved and counties are keen to control their financial resources. 
Political differences bordering on ethnicity may come to play and scuttle national efforts for 
UHC. 
Recommendation 5: A broad-based public consultation forum might be necessary to 
identify and resolve some of the potential problems associated with revenue collection and 
pooling in the on-going UHC reforms. In the same forum it would be worth discussing how a 
contributory scheme would be enforced among informal sector workers. Although the NHIF 
has come up with innovative ways of enrolment and revenue collection from the informal 
sector including decentralised offices, telephonic and other forms of wireless money 
transfers, it is unclear how these will be implemented to ensure increased enrolment and 
contributions from informal sector workers.  
 
The relationship between the informal sector on the one hand, and local and national 
authorities on the other, has an impact on income, employment, growth and sustainability 
of informal sector entities. In the ongoing UHC-related reforms, it is necessary to recognise 
the income uncertainty in the informal sector and take specific measures to try to stabilise 
the sector to be more supportive of a contributory mechanism that the government prefers.   
Recommendation 6: To help the informal sector, governments (national and county) could 
for example, create specially designated places for informal sector entities and issue 
operators with title deeds as well as make the licensing process of the entities shorter and 
more affordable to avoid harassment and demolitions by local authorities. Sparks and 
Barnett (2010) emphasise the need for an agreeable relationship between the informal 
sector and governments and suggested that the latter could improve the performance of 
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the informal sector by creating a supportive environment, improving infrastructure and 
basic amenities, as well as improving access to titles and credit. These measures are 
important for sustaining informal sector entities and in so doing create an environment for 
financial predictability from the sector’s enterprises and empower its workers to be able to 
prepay for healthcare, whether in the form of insurance contributions or through indirect 
taxes that informal workers already contribute to.  
Recommendation 7: It is difficult to identify informal sector incomes and enforce a 
mandatory contributory system among this population group. To be effective, measures 
such as identifying informal sector workers falling above a certain income threshold will 
have to be established even though such initiatives have proven difficult in many contexts 
such as Thailand and Philippines (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2011, Nguyen and Rama, 2007) 
and are unlikely to be successfully implemented in Kenya. The alternative would be to take 
steps to formalise labour in the informal sector. Swaminathan (1991) concurs that the 
absence of regulation and state recognition is the defining characteristic of the informal 
sector and if this can be rectified it would make incomes easier to target for either financing 
mechanism. The Kenya Revenue Authority has been in the forefront in advancing certain 
aspects of labour formalisation by requiring all small scale operators to have electronic cash 
registers (ETR) in order to bring some order and regulation in the profit-making informal 
sector. There are currently no policies to formalise informal sector labour which might make 
it even more difficult to enrol informal sector workers into a contributory scheme.  
Recommendation 8: In rare cases, some level of ‘coercion’ could be necessary to enrol 
people into a contributory financing mechanism. In Costa Rica for example, in order to 
advance population coverage, people who failed to enrol in the SHI scheme were made to 
pay the full cost of services without subsidies (Enrique and Schieber, 2006). In South Korea 
coverage for informal sector workers was initially targeted towards employers to ensure 
that employees contribute to a scheme (Jeong, 2010).  
 
Other problems including shortage of skills in the informal sector could be addressed 
through a skills development programme by the government and non-government actors to 
improve key entrepreneurship skills such as management in the informal sector and help 
towards product quality and sustainability of the entities. 
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The informal sector is highly receptive toward prepaid healthcare and have expressed the 
desire to pay even if they are not immediately using services so as to benefit those most in 
need. However, such positive gestures coming from informal sector workers need to be 
complemented with improved governance of the health sector to be sustainable.  
Recommendation 8: Policymakers and other health sector actors should build on the 
positive attitudes of informal sector workers towards prepaid health care by first and 
foremost dealing with corruption to convince informal sector workers that prepaid funds 
would be transparently used.  Secondly, issues around availability and affordability of 
services as highlighted in the findings will need to be closely addressed so that the 
population gets value for their money. Availability of diagnostic equipment, improved drug 
supply chain with products that meet population health needs and transparent financial 
reporting would go a long way in supporting the UHC course.  
 
There is no doubt over the desirability of UHC but initiatives towards this goal particularly in 
Kenya need to account for a number of issues in the design of a prepayment mechanism, 
improvements in the quality of services in the public health sector and deliberations on the 
best strategies to raise more money for healthcare. While getting these three key issues 
right is essential, the adoption of either of the financing scenarios would need to resolve the 
main problems involving lack of financial protection and a situation where the greatest 
burden of paying for health care rests on the poor and low-income earners. In a nutshell, 
provision of financial protection and improving access to services, particularly to the 
informal sector as a basis for universal health coverage, is likely to improve health outcomes 
and other measures of social performance.  
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A 
A1: RWANDA 
Rwanda: Macroeconomic indicators, 2003 – 2013  
 
Source: Pande et al., 2013; Government of Rwanda, 2010; Schneider et al. 2010 
 
Rwanda: Comparison of macroeconomic and fiscal indicators  
 
Source: Pande et al., 2013; Government of Rwanda, 2010 
 
Rwanda’s commitment to economic transformation has seen it operate above average in 
key fiscal and health system indicators compared to low-income countries in Africa. Per 
capita income was US$530 compared to US$428 on average for Africa’s LIC as of 2013 and 
life expectancy is 59 years while Africa’s average is 54 years. Maternal mortality remains 
high at 320/100000 although still above the average for Africa’s low-income economies at 
655/100000 (WHO, 2012a). The trend in MMR means that Rwanda is unlikely to meet the 
MDG for maternal health.  
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Figure 1a: Macroeconomic indicators (Rwanda, 2003 - 2013)
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Rwanda: Trends in health system indicators  
Table A.1: Rwanda- Health financing situation as depicted by selected indicators (2006-2011) 
 Indicators 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
General government health expenditure 
(GGHE) as % of government expenditure 
22 22 22 22 23 24 
Total health expenditure (THE) % GDP 10 10 9.2 9.8 10.4 11 
GGHE % GDP 5.2 4.8 4.4 5.2 5.7 5.6 
Out of pocket expenditure as % of THE 22 24 24 23 22 21 
Private prepaid plans as % of THE 28 29 28 23 23 22 
Total expenditure on health / capita at 
exchange rate 
33 36 44 51 55 63 
Social security funds as % of GGHE 3 3 3 3 9 11 
Sources: WHO, 2012. Health expenditure series; WHO, 2012. Health expenditure atlas; World Bank, 
2012. World development indicators 
 
Prioritisation of the health sector has significantly contributed to the amounts of prepaid 
funds which in turn have translated into reduction of OOP spending almost to the levels 
recommended by the WHO. By 2012, over 60% of total health expenditure was from public 
prepaid funds which reflected in high levels of population coverage even though most of 
these funds are from external sources.  
 
Comparison of health system indicators between Rwanda, Africa and LIC 
Rwanda performs better with THE representing 10% of GDP while the government 
contributes 50% of THE compared to 42% for LIC. The level of OOP spending in Rwanda at 
23% is also lower than averages for Africa (39%) and LIC (45%).  
 
 
Source: WHO, 2012; Pande et al., 2013 
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APPENDIX A2: SRI LANKA 
 
Sri Lanka- Macroeconomic and fiscal indicators  
  
 
Inflation trends seem to suggest a stable macroeconomic environment and are comparable 
to the averages in lower-middle-income countries. However, it is not clear why the tax 
revenues are considerably low but given the economic growth rate, there is room to 
improve revenue collection.   
 
  
 
As a share of total government expenditure, mandatory prepaid funds have not increased 
beyond 7% on average indicating some level of non-commitment from the government to 
sustainably finance and provide universal health services. 
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Sri Lanka- Health financing indicators  
 
 
APPENDIX A3: GHANA 
Ghana- Macroeconomic and fiscal indicators  
There are evident fiscal challenges, for example in 2002 tax revenues relative GDP were 
21.8% but dropped to 13.3% in 2010 despite higher economic growth rates.  
 
Source: World Bank, 2012. World development indicators 
 
Ghana’s economic growth rate is consistent with LMC average, indicating that the 
government can afford to increase health spending without altering other sector 
expenditure budgets. 
 
Ghana- Trends in health financing indicators, 1992 – 2012  
Figure 3b indicates inconsistency in funding from public sources: funds from mandatory 
prepaid sources (public health expenditure), have either remained the same or increased 
marginally or insignificantly from 2000 to 2012 compared to the rate of inflation. Total 
health expenditure as a percentage of GDP has remained at 5% (2000 – 2012) although this 
is at the WHO recommended level of 5% of GDP.  
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Source: World Bank, 2012. World development indicator 
 
As a share of total government expenditure, government health expenditure (GGHE) at 12% 
has declined below the Abuja target (Figure 3c).  However, compared to LMIC in the African 
region, Ghana continues to perform better in most financing sources including less reliance 
on donor funding. Figure 3c demonstrates that amounts paid OOP directly respond to any 
fluctuations in the level of mandatory prepaid funds. It means that even with the current 
weaknesses in the NHIS, more prepaid funds will reduce OOP payments, currently at 28% of 
THE. 
 
 
Figure 3c also reveals problems of cost coverage because total private resources as a share 
of total health expenditure overtime remain high (currently at 44% of THE).  
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APPENDIX A4: THAILAND  
Thailand- Macroeconomic indicators  
Apart from the disruption of the Asian economic crisis in 1998, Thailand has continuously 
registered high growth rates as indicated in Figures 4a1 and 4b1. The GDP growth rate 
compares with the averages for low-and-middle-income countries (LMIC) and the East Asia 
and Pacific (EAP) region but the Thai unemployment and inflation rates are much lower than 
the averages for its contemporaries, which potentially guarantees it more fiscal space.  
 
  
Sources: World Bank, 2012; Pande et al. 2013 
  
 
There is relative efficiency in the Thai financing systems. The WHO (2012) noted that 
modest amounts of resources- total government expenditure (23%) and government 
expenditure on health as a share of GDP (3%), were used to achieve high population, service 
and cost coverage, and better health outcomes. Outcomes such as declining OOP spending 
on a yearly basis mean better financial protection and access to services. Out-of-pocket 
spending has decreased from 42.5% in 1996 to 13.9% in 2010. Further, Tangcharoensathien 
et al. (2010b) note that incidence of catastrophic health sending reduced from 5.4% in 2000 
to 2% in 2006 and the predominantly tax-funded universal system is progressive.  
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Source: World Bank, 2012; Pande et al., 2013 
 
Table A2 is a summary of purchasing arrangement including agencies contracted for 
purchasing health services in Thailand. 
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Table 1.2: Purchasing agencies and provision for each of the pools 
 
Pool 
Purchasing agency Provider payment 
mechanisms 
Provision Per capita expenses 
in Bahts (US$) 
Universal 
Coverage 
Scheme (UCS) 
National Health 
Security Office 
(NHSO) 
Capitation for outpatient 
care and global budget plus 
case-based fee 
Registered public 
providers in the 
district health 
system 
 
1899 (61) 
 
Social Security 
Scheme (SSS) 
 
Social Security Office 
(SSO) 
Capitation for inpatient and 
outpatient services plus 
additional adjusted 
payments for emergencies 
and high cost care 
Registered public 
and private 
competing 
contractors 
 
1900 (61) 
Civil  Servants 
Medical Benefits 
Scheme (CSMBS) 
Comptroller General 
Department 
(Ministry of Finance) 
Fee for service, direct 
disbursement to public 
providers and case-based fee 
for inpatient care 
Free choice of 
public providers; no 
registration 
required 
 
5000 (161) 
Private voluntary 
scheme 
Individual companies  ----- Mainly private 
provision 
---- 
Sources: Tangcharoensathien et al., 2010b, Sekumphanit et al. 2009, Wilbulpolpraset and Thaiprayon, 2008  
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Appendix B: Data collection tools 
Tool B1: Focus Group Discussion Guide 
 
INFORMAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES AND CHALLENGES FACED BY WORKERS 
 
For people not employed by the government or private companies, i.e. self-employed people 
e.g. farmers, small-scale businesses, jua-kali, vegetable vendors and other businesses:  
 
1. Let us begin by talking about what people in this area who do not have formal jobs 
do to earn a living:  
2. What are the INCOME generating ACTIVITIES in the area?  
3. What are their SIZES? (e.g. land, shops, number employed, range of products, etc) 
4. Who OWNS the activities (single / group ownership)? 
5. What income generating activities have the majority of the area population? WHY? 
6. What are some of the major challenges faced by people engaging in the income 
generating activities that you have mentioned? 
7. When are DIFFICULT TIMES to carry out the activities? WHY? 
8. Are there months of the year when money is difficult to come by? What happens? 
What do people do? 
9. What PROBLEMS are encountered when carrying out the activities? 
 
UTILIZATION OF HEALTH SERVICES, PAYMENT FOR CARE AND PRIORITY SERVICES 
 
1. People have different choices on where to go for treatment or for any other health 
service. Where do most people in the informal sector around here go for medical 
services? 
2. (What kind of people) Who goes to PUBLIC health facilities; WHY? 
3. Who goes to PRIVATE facilities; WHY? 
4. Who goes to TRADITIONAL healers; WHY? 
5. Of these providers, which one would most people want to go to? WHY? 
6. Which are the most commonly used services from these providers? 
7. Who in the household decides where to seek treatment? 
8. At each of the places where informal sector workers go for health care, what is the 
MOST COMMON METHOD of paying for the services? 
9. What is your opinion about this method of paying for health care? Are there 
PROBLEMS with this method of payment? Which ones? 
10. How else do people pay for health care?  
11. How would most people in this area PREFER TO PAY for health care? WHY? 
12. Which of these methods of paying for health care would you recommend for people 
in the informal sector? Why? 
 
We discussed the kind of services that informal sector workers receive at the providers that 
you mentioned:  
1. If you were to draw a list of the most important health services for the informal 
sector, which ones should come first? Explain  
2. Are these services currently available at each of the providers you mentioned? 
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3. How do most people in the informal sector pay for these services? 
4. How would most people want to pay for these important services? 
5. Which health services cost people a lot of money? Why? 
 
241 
 
VIEWS HEALTH INSURANCE, WILLINGNESS TO PREPAY FOR HEALTH CARE AND PREFERRED 
PREPAYMENT DESIGN  
 
We have discussed how most people in the informal sector pay for health care. There are 
different ways of paying for health care including paying out-of-pocket at the point of service 
and payments made in advance through the government or other organizations. By paying 
for health care in advance, one receives health services any time one falls ill without having 
to pay again. 
 
1. In your opinion, is it a good idea to pay for health care in advance? 
2. What sorts of health services do you think the informal sector would like to pay for 
in advance? Why? 
3. In Kenya, there is NHIF that accepts advance payments for health care. Do you know 
about NHIF? What is good about NHIF? What don’t you like about NHIF? 
4. What should be done to get more people from the informal sector to join an 
organization like the NHIF? 
5. What is the maximum that informal sector members would be willing to regularly 
pay in advance to such an organization?  
6. Apart from NHIF, there are small community groups that also pay for health care in 
advance; do you know of any such groups? What is good about them? What is bad 
about them? 
7. Which do you prefer between an organization such as the NHIF and the small 
schemes? Why? 
8. Would you prefer a large group with many members or a small one? Why? 
 
Both NHIF and small community health financing groups (CBHI) are examples of how health 
care can be paid for in advance. The other method of paying for health care in advance is 
TAXATION. In taxation, the government collects taxes from people who can pay then uses it 
to pay for everything including health care, education, military, etc. 
1. Do you know of any FORMS OF TAXATION that people like you and others pay? How 
do people pay these taxes? 
2. Do you think the health sector receives adequate funding from the government? 
Explain 
3. What can be done to get more money to the health sector? 
4. If the government were to increase funding for health care, everyone will need to 
pay higher taxes. Are you willing to pay more taxes so that more money can be 
raised for health care for all? 
5. In what ways would people around here prefer to pay tax? 
6. Which of these methods of paying for health care in advance (Taxation; NHIF; CBHI) 
is best for the informal sector? WHY? 
7. The law may require that everyone pays for health care in advance by making regular 
payments for future illness costs. What is your opinion about compulsory payments 
for health care in advance? 
 
 [For payments made in advance for health care, there are two main ways how this can be 
done: Tax (where a small part of one’s income is paid to the government, and which is then 
used to pay for health services and other social services like education); and Insurance 
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schemes (where people contribute regular amounts to a group/organization, then the 
collections are used to pay for health care costs for those who contribute. In health insurance 
schemes, people may organize themselves at community level; for example, some people in 
this area may decide to form their own group where they make regular contributions for 
future health care costs. Alternatively, everyone in this country can get involved in one large 
health group into which everyone contributes]. 
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VIEWS ON UNIVERSAL COVERAGE AND ABILITY TO PREPAY (ATPP) FOR HEALTH CARE 
 
If the government together with some donors were to ensure that everyone has access to 
quality and timely health care, it would require that all of us who have some money make 
financial contributions to pay for health care in advance. This means that no one will pay for 
health care from their pockets at the facility. The essence of such a plan is that some would 
pay but may take a long time before getting ill meaning that people who need more health 
care but have no money would use other people’s payments. 
 
1. As members of the informal sector, what do you think of such a plan? How would 
you like to be involved? 
2. Some informal sector workers can support such a plan by making regular 
contributions to pay for health care in advance. What would you look for so that you 
can tell that someone self-employed in a business or farming can afford to pay for 
health care in advance?  
3. Among the main informal economic activities that you mentioned, which of them 
are more likely to make regular payments for health care, i.e. monthly, bi-monthly, 
etc? WHY? 
4. What can make it difficult for self-employed people to pay for health care in 
advance? 
5. Do the informal sector activities bring regular income however small? Which ones 
have reliable income? Which don’t? Why? 
6. What do we do with people who are too poor to pay for health care in advance? 
7. How do we know that they cannot afford to pay for health care? 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE FINANCING 
 
1. What changes would most people like to have to make paying for health care in 
advance attractive to the informal sector? 
2. What challenges are expected in trying to persuade the informal sector to pay for 
health care in advance? 
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Tool B2: Guide for In-depth Interviews at Community Level 
 
NATURE OF INFORMAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 
 
1. There are many income generating activities that people engage in as self-employed 
or employees if they are not employed by the government, companies or any other 
formal jobs. Which are the most common income generating activities for people 
with no formal employment in this area? 
2. Which income generating activities do most people engage in? 
3. SIZES of the various activities (e.g. land, shops, number employed, range of products, 
etc) 
4. Who OWNS these activities (single / group ownership) 
5. What major problems are faced by people engaging in these activities? 
 
UTILIZATION OF SERVICES, PAYMENT FOR HEALTH CARE AND PRIORITY HEALTH SERVICES  
1. Health care can be sought in different places. Which are the main service providers 
in this area? 
2. What kinds of PUBLIC service providers are available? Who are the main users of 
these providers? Why? 
3. Are there PRIVATE providers? How much do they cost? Who uses them most? Why? 
4. What other service providers are in the area? Who uses them most? Why? 
5. Among these providers, which one has the majority of people seeking care? WHY? 
6. Which providers are MOST PREFERRED by most people here? WHY? 
7. How do MOST PEOPLE PAY for health care when they visit these providers? 
8. What do you regard as the MAIN PROBLEMS with this method of payment for most 
people? 
9. What OTHER METHODS of payment exist for the rest of the people?  
10. Which of these payment methods would you recommend for informal sector 
workers? WHY? 
11. What are the MAIN HEALTH PROBLEMS presented by both children and adults 
visiting these providers? 
12. Are services for these health problems available? Are services SATISFACTORY? 
13. Which health services would most people like to have at the health facilities in this 
area? WHY? 
14. What health services are MOST IMPORTANT to women? Children? Men? 
15. How do most people pay for these services? 
16. Do you think there are problems with this method of payment? Which ones? 
17. How would you like to pay for the most important health services? Would you 
recommend all people to pay for such services the same way?  
[If not clear, explain that health care can be paid for from the pocket at the point of service 
or prepaid i.e. paid for in advance]. 
 
 
VIEWS ON HEALTH INSURANCE, WILLINGNESS TO PREPAY FOR HEALTH CARE AND 
PREFERRED PREPAYMENT DESIGN  
1. In your opinion, which, between direct (out-of-pocket) payment and payment in 
advance for health care, is better? WHY? 
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2. Which organizations accept payments for health care in advance in this area?  
3. What kind of people are members of each of these organizations? 
4. What is good about an organization such as the NHIF? What don’t most people like 
about NHIF? What about CBHI? 
5. How can we make each of these organizations better for all people to pay for health 
care in advance?  
[Explain that NHIF is a country-wide organization with many members while CBHI is a small 
one mainly involving people in a small area] 
 
6. Which do you think most people in this area prefer between NHIF and the small 
schemes? Why? 
7. What do you think most people here would prefer: a small scheme or a large one? 
Why? 
8. The NHIF would like its members in the informal sector to pay between Ksh300 and 
Ksh500 per month. Are these rates affordable in this area?  
 
You may already know that we can pay for health care in advance through organizations 
such as the NHIF and through small community health financing groups (CBHI). Taxation is a 
third way of paying for health care in advance, wherein the government collects taxes from 
people and companies then uses it to pay for everything including health care, education, 
military, etc. 
9. Do you know of any FORMS OF TAXATION that people usually pay? 
[Explain various forms of taxes] 
10. Do you think the health sector receives adequate funding from the government? 
Explain 
11. What can be done to get more money to the health sector? 
12. If the government were to increase funding for health care, we will need to pay 
higher taxes. Do you think people in this area would be willing to pay more taxes so 
that more money can be raised for health care for all? 
13. What kinds of taxes would be more appropriate for people without formal 
employment?  
14. Of the various methods of paying for health care in advance: Taxation, NHIF and 
CBHI, which do you think can work best for the informal sector? WHY? 
15. The law may require that everyone pays for health care in advance by making regular 
payments for future illness costs. Do you believe it is advisable to make it mandatory 
for everyone to have health care paid for in advance? 
16. What should be done to encourage people in the informal sector to pay for health 
care in advance? 
 
 [For payments made in advance for health care, there are two main ways how this can be 
done: Tax (where a small part of one’s income is paid to the government, and which is then 
used to pay for health services and other social services like education); and Insurance 
schemes (where people contribute regular amounts to a group/organization, then the 
collections are used to pay for health care costs for those who contribute. In health insurance 
schemes, people may organize themselves at community level; for example, some people in 
this area may decide to form their own group where they make regular contributions for 
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future health care costs. Alternatively, everyone in this country can get involved in one large 
health group into which everyone contributes]. 
 
VIEWS ON UNIVERSAL COVERAGE AND FINANCIAL POTENTIAL TO PREPAY FOR HEALTH 
CARE 
By encouraging people to pay for health care in advance, the government would like to make 
sure that everyone, including the very poor who cannot pay, gets quality and timely health 
care. This means that people, who can pay some money however small, may help in paying 
for those who are less able. With this kind of payment, no one will pay for health care from 
their pockets at the facility.  
 
1. In your opinion, is it acceptable for most people who contribute to also cater for the 
health of those who cannot contribute?  
2. Who should pay for poor people who cannot afford to pay on a regular basis? 
3. How does the community identify these very poor people? What do they have/not 
have that we consider them as too poor to pay anything? 
4. There are people in the informal sector who are able to pay for health care in 
advance. What can tell that someone self-employed in a business or farming can 
afford to pay for health care in advance?  
5. Among the main informal economic activities that you mentioned, which of them 
are more likely to make regular payments for health care, i.e. monthly, bi-monthly, 
etc? WHY? 
6. What is likely to make it difficult for self-employed people to pay for health care in 
advance? 
7. Do most self-employed people have regular income, even if low? Which informal 
economic activities have regular income? Which don’t? Why? 
8. How much can most people afford to pay on a monthly basis? 
 
9. What OTHER INFORMATION would you like to share? 
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SECTION 0: INTRODUCTION 
0.0 Economic Unit No.  
0.1  District Mathira East                                                            [____|____] 
Mombasa                                                                 [____|____] 
 
0.2  Vil lage 
       
Name:                                                                                          [____|____] 
0.3  Date of interview DD MM YY 
   
0.4  Name of respondent  
 
0.5  Name of interviewer/Fieldworker  
 
0.6  Start time _____________________AM/PM 
 
0.7  End time  
_____________________AM/PM 
0.8  Results of interview (CODE) Interview completed 
 
 
Refused to participate 
 
 
Partly completed 
 
 
Respondent not found on third visit 
 
 
Economic unit unattended 
 
 
Not eligible 
 
 
Supervised/Checked by:   
 
 
FOR DATA ENTRY ONLY 
Entered by: 1st ENTRY  
Name:………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Date:…………………………………………………………………………… 
Entered by: 2nd ENTRY  
Name:………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Date:…………………………………………………………………………… 
Financial Protection for the Informal Sector Survey Questionnaire 
 
District [___]    Site number [___|___|___]  Economic Unit number [___|____|____] 
Informal Sector Survey Questionnaire 
Interview the owner or a worker who is involved in the day-to-day running of the informal economic unit 
 
Tool B3: Questionnaire 
248 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
SECTION 2: EXPERIENCES WITH PUBLIC PROVISION 
Now I would like to know about your experiences in using public health facilities. 
1. 0 NAME of respondent:[If more than one unit/department, interview all unit/department heads]  
1.11 Gender M=1    /    F=2 [___|___] 
1.12 Age [Codes] [___|___] 
1.13 Are you the head of your household? Y=1    /     N=2 [___|___] 
1.14 Mari ta l status  [Codes] [___|___] 
1.15 Your highest level of education  [Codes] [___|___] 
1.16 Is  this business your main source of income? Y=1   /   N=2 [___|___] 
1.17 [If NO above] What i s the main source of income? [Codes]  
1.18 Employment s tatus? (Probe with the codes) [Codes] [___|___] 
1.19 How many people including children are in your household? No.____________
____ 
[___|___] 
1.20 How many are aged 5 years and below? No.  
1.21 How many out of this number is aged below 18 years?  No.____________
____ 
[___|___] 
1.22 How many are aged above 75 years? No.____________
____ 
[___|___] 
1.23 Do you s ingularly own and operate this business? Y=1    /   N=2 [___|___] 
1.24 How many are employed in this business?  No._______ [___|___] 
1.25 What i s the business category (Interviewer to categorise industry)  [Codes] [___|___] 
1.26 How many sections does your business have? (Interview head of each section) No._______  [___|___] 
1.27 Why did you choose this type of business?  [Codes] [___|___] 
1.28 How long have you operated this particular business? [Code] [___|___] 
1.29 How many other businesses does the owner of this business have? No.________ [___|___] 
1.30 Has  any of your businesses collapsed in the last 5 years? Y= 1    /     N=2 [___|___] 
1.31 Is  this business registered? Y=1    /     N=2 [___|___] 
1.32 What i s the main reason for non-registration? [Codes] [___|___] 
1.33  Location of the business (Interviewer to record without asking) [Codes] [___|___] 
1.34 Type of s tructure ( Interviewer to record without asking) [Codes] [___|___] 
1.35 Who owns this business premises? (Probe and select from the codes) [Codes] [___|___] 
1.36 What do you consider as the biggest threat to your business?  [Codes] [__|___] 
1.37 Do you get pa id per:  DAY (1); WEEK (2); MONTH (3); OCCASIONALLY (4) [Don’t ask own 
account business-person or employer] 
[Codes] [___|___] 
1.38 If pa id DAILY, how many days a  week do you work? No.________ [___|___] 
1.39 In tota l how much do you spend in a  normal month? [Codes] [___|___] 
1.40 For your economic s tatus, where would you rank yourself in this picture?  Show Card [___|___] 
1.41 Does  this business have an account where profits are regularly saved? Y=1   /    N=2 [___|___] 
1.42 Size of land under cultivation (acres) [Codes]  
1.43 Main crop grown  [Codes]  
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Could you please recall the very last time you used a public health facility?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Was the last use for:  
 
Outpatient care? 1  
 Inpatient care?  2 
 
 
What type of public health facility did you last use? [RECORD name of facility] 
 
Type Facility Name  
Dispensary  1 
Health centre   2 
District hospital  3 
Provincial hospital  4 
National hospital  5 
 
2.4 I would like to read to you some of the experiences that people who visit public facilities sometimes talk 
about. You may answer ‘True’ if you have faced a similar experience or ‘False’ if you have not.  
Q2.4 In the facility that you used  TRUE FALSE 
Services were quick (I did not have to wait too long on the queue) 1 2 
All  the drugs I needed were available (I did not have to buy prescriptions) 1 2 
Health workers treated me with respect  1 2 
The facil ity was clean including its environs and bed-linen 1 2 
I did not have to bribe the health worker to get quick and good treatment 1 2 
The health worker explained to me the nature of my il lness and gave me appropriate 
treatment  
1 2 
 
 
  
I had no transport problems because the facil ity is near my home  1 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Less than one  month ago 1 
One to Three months  2 
Four to Six months ago 3 
More than 6 months ago  4 
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2.5 Based on the experiences that you and other people you know have had at public health facilities, could 
you choose THREE key areas in order of priority, which you would like to be improved to make services 
better for everyone? [Let respondent list the THREE issues and mark with numbers 1 – 3]. 
 
 PROBLEM THREE KEY ISSUES 
Waiting times should be reduced   
Necessary drugs should be available at all  times   
Health workers should handle patients with respect   
The facil ity need to be kept clean both outside and inside  
No health worker should be given any un-receipted payments to offer treatment  
The health worker should explain to the patient the nature of their i l lness   
Facil ities should be nearer to the populati on  
Other (specify)   
 
 
Have you ever heard of the NHIF? 
 
Yes No [If NO, move to Q 2.9; If YES continue with Q2.7] 
1 2  
 
Are you a member of the NHIF?         
 
Yes No       [If NO, move to Q2.9; If YES continue with Q2.8] 
1 2  
 
Please tell me TWO MAIN reasons why you are not a member of the NHIF [Tick any TWO mentioned by 
respondent]: 
 
Q2.8. Reasons for non-membership 
Premium rates are unaffordable 1 
I fear funds would be mismanaged 2 
NHIF does not offer outpatient services  3 
I don’t know where to register and pay premiums 4 
NHIF offices are too far away 5 
It is voluntary to join NHIF  6 
Paying before one is i l l  is an invitation for i l lness 7 
No need to be a member because I’m never i l l  8 
Other (specify) 9 
  
Financial Protection for the Informal Sector Survey Questionnaire 
 
District [___]    Site number [___|___|___]  Economic Unit number [___|____|____]  
251 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 3:  CONTRIBUTION MECHANISMS 
Now I would like to ask you a few questions regarding paying for health care in advance and how, in your 
opinion, such payments could be done.  
 
 
3.1 Who, in your opinion, should pay for health care in this country? [Let the respondent answer but if there 
is no response, probe by reading out the options below for the respondent to pick ONE]  
 
 
 
3.2 The government does not have enough money to pay for everyone’s health and is encouraging everyone to 
raise extra money and pay for health care in advance. Payments made in advance for health care are meant to 
take care of future illness costs so that no one has to pay anything at the hospital when they are ill. Payment in 
advance can be done in two ways:  (1) Pay an additional tax to the government and then the government uses 
this extra money to pay for health care for everyone; (2) Contribute to a separate organization that collects 
money from all Kenyans and pays for their treatment costs whenever they fall ill.  
 
If everyone were to help in raising extra money to pay for health care, how would you like to raise this 
money? [Read out the two options to the respondent] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q3.1 Who should pay for health care? CHOICE 
 
The government alone should pay for health care for everyone  1 
The government and those who can afford should pay for health care on behalf of everyone   2 
Everyone should pay for health care 3 
I do not know who should pay for health care 5 
Q 3.2 Would you prefer: 
 
To pay additional tax to enable the government to pay for health care for everyone 1 
To contribute directly into a separate organisation that pays for health care for everyone 2 
Both ways are appropriate 3 
Neither of the above is appropriate 4 
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3.3 Looking at your community, what kinds of people do you feel should NOT pay towards the extra money 
needed to pay for health care in advance for everyone? [Mark ALL the groups that the respondent mentions 
as people who should not pay for health care and probe for more]. 
 
3.4 In every community, there are usually poor people and others that are better off (Show card and point 
out the different classes of people). With these groups of people in mind, if all were to pay for health care, 
how much should each group pay? [Show respondent Card on contributions levels and read out the 
corresponding options]  
 
 
3.5 By contributing for health care directly into the extra fund, people may prefer to pay their contributions 
in ways that they feel are easiest for them. Are you aware of any ways that you feel should be used to pay 
contributions? [If no response, probe by reading out the options below for the respondent to cho ose TWO 
preferred options]. 
 
 
 
 
 
Q3.3 Who should NOT pay for health care? CHOICE 
 
   
People who are proven to be very poor 1 
Children and the elderly populations  2 
Pregnant women 3 
All  disabled people 4 
Other (specify) 5 
Q3.4 How much should the different groups of people pay for health care?  
Everyone pays the same amount 1 
Very poor people should not pay at all  2 
All  must pay something but pay according to their levels of income 3 
Q3.5  TWO most convenient ways to pay premiums 
Use mobile phones to pay contributions (M-Pesa) 1 
Buy scratch cards (similar to those of mobile phones ) and use these to pay contributions  2 
Use agents at local shops or within the area to pay  contributions  3 
Go to town and pay contributions at the offices in the urban areas  4 
Use local groups such as SACCOs and agricultural societies  5 
Other (Specify) 6 
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SECTION 4: SOCIAL SOLIDARITY 
 
Now I would like to know how you feel about paying for health care in advance. 
 
4.1 I would like to read for you a statement and please indicate whether you “Strongly agree; Agree; 
Disagree; or Strongly disagree” with this statement: 
 
 
4.2 Which of the following statements do you agree with most (CHOOSE ONE) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 RATING 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
I  would agree to prepay for health care because even though I may not 
be s ick now, my contributions could help someone else or me in future 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Q4.2 Statement MOST agreed with 
 
CHOICE 
Everyone should only be expected to pay for their own health care 1 
 
I would be will ing to pay for health care in advance if it benefits my family only  2 
 
I would be will ing to pay for health care in advance if it benefits my family, friends and neighbours  3 
 
I would be will ing to prepay because I understand my prepayment could contribute to bringing 
health care benefits to all  Kenyans  
4 
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SECTION FIVE: DEFINING BENEFITS PACKAGE 
 
5.1 If you were to pay in advance for health care every month, what would you like your payments to cover? 
I would like to read out for you some options that you could choose from. Please choose one that you feel is 
best for you and dependents and one that you can afford [CHOOSE ONE]. 
 
Q5.1 SCENARIO CHOICE 
You and all  dependents are covered for all  medical conditions, both inpatient and outpatient 
(meaning you don’t have to pay anything whenever you or dependant seeks care) but you are 
required to visit public and faith-based health facilities only. For this you pay a total of Ksh 500 per 
month or Ksh 6000 per year 
 
 
1 
b. You and all  your dependents are covered for all  medical conditions but for inpatient care only (no 
outpatient care); you can seek care in public and faith-based facilities only. For this you pay Ksh 160 
per month or Ksh 1,920 per year 
 
 
2 
You and dependents are covered for all  medical conditions, both inpatient and outpatient. You can 
choose to go to any health facil ity (private, public or faith-based). If you choose to go to an expensive 
private facil ity, only a small part of the bil l  is paid, the rest you pay by yourself. For this you pay Ksh 
500 per month or Ksh 6,000 per year 
 
3 
 
None of these choices suits my needs  
 
 
4 
 
 
5.2 (For choice ‘d’ above)If none of these choices meets your needs, how much can you afford to pay per 
month or per year to pay for all health problems for you and dependants, both inpatient and 
outpatient?______________________________________ 
 
5.3 Based on the choice you have made above (benefits package), you might prefer to pay your 
contributions- once yearly or in small amounts (instalments.) From your point of view, how would you 
prefer to pay your contributions?  Would it be easy for you to pay (Read the options and let the respondent 
pick one): 
 
  
Q5.3 Contribution strategies CHOICE 
At once every year 1 
Once every month     2 
In instalments every two weeks to make up the required monthly total  3 
In instalments weekly to make up the stated monthly total  4 
In instalments daily to make up the total amount required per month 5 
In instalments any time there is money available to make up the monthly totals  6 
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SECTION 6:  PREDICTING FINANCIAL POTENTIAL TO PREPAY FOR HEALTH CARE 
 
People have different financial abilities and there are groups within the informal sector who have some money 
and can afford to pay for health care in advance. I would like to seek your opinion regarding what issues to look 
out for in order to know about people in the informal sector who can afford to raise money to pay for heal th 
care in advance. I would like to read to you a list of things that may or not tell whether someone in the informal 
sector (including farmers) has the ability to prepay for health care. Simply respond by saying whether you  
‘Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree, or Strongly Disagree’ with what I read out.  
 
 
6.1 Non-farming informal sector enterprises (URBAN area & RURAL market ONLY): 
  
Q6.1 [URBAN and non-farming enterprise owners/managers]  
Predictors of financial potential to Prepay in Urban areas 
RATING 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Type of s tructure (permanent/temporary/no s tructure) can tell that an 
enterprise owner has ability to prepay for health care  
1 2 3 4 
Any enterprise that  is l icensed is likely to ra ise enough money to 
prepay for health care 
1 2 3 4 
An enterprise that employs one or more people generally shows 
abi lity to prepay for health care for the owner 
1 2 3 4 
Only business owners in legally allocated areas may have ability to 
prepay for health care 
1 2 3 4 
A bus iness that occupies more than one room or a  large space is able 
to prepay for health care 
1 2 3 4 
Bus inesses whose owners are members of a  health scheme,  a   savings 
scheme (SACCO) or merry-go-round have ability to prepay for health 
care  
1 2 3 4 
Bus iness owners who spend money on running costs such as 
employee wages, electricity, telephone and fuel can afford prepaid 
health care 
1 2 3 4 
Any enterprise owner with other businesses is likely able to prepay for 
health care 
1 2 3 4 
Gender of the business owner may indicate ability to prepay for health 
care  
1 2 3 4 
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6.2 Predictors of financial potential to Prepay for health care in a highly productive agricultural rural setting 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Q66.2  [RURAL AREA ONLY]  
Predictors of financial potential to Prepay in the Rural area (farmers) 
RATING 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Being a  casual labourer could mean inability to prepay for health care 1 
 
2 3 4 
People who own no land are likely to be unable to prepay for health care 1 
 
2 3 4 
Households with many children and elderly people cannot afford to prepay for health 
care 
1 2 3 4 
Those living in rented dwellings in the vi llage are too poor to prepay for health care 1 2 3 4 
Informal sector workers whose children are often out of school for lack of money 
cannot afford to prepay for health care  
1 2 3 4 
Those who constantly miss some meals each day cannot prepay for health care 1 2 3 4 
People who do not belong to a  prepaid scheme or SACCO or merry-go-round cannot 
afford to prepay for health care 
1 2 3 4 
The s ize of land under cultivation is a sign of ability to prepay for health care.  1 2 3 4 
The number of dairy cows is a s ign of ability to prepay for health care.   1 2 3 4 
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SECTION 7:  MANAGEMENT OF COLLECTED FUNDS 
 
 
7.1 If you were to recommend how to manage all the extra money collected to pay for everyone’s’ health 
costs, what kind of body would you like to manage this money to use it to buy health services for everyone? 
[If no response, probe by reading out the options and then let the respondent choose ONE]. 
 
 
Q7.1  Type of organization  CHOICE 
The national government  1 
A body that has no connection with the government at all  2 
An organization with some connection to the government but has full  control of the funds  3 
Other (Specify) 5 
 
 
 
7.2 How should the head of this organization holding the money be selected? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q7.2 Selection strategy CHOICE 
Everyone should participate in electing the head of the organization 1 
Either the president or the minister for health should appoint the person to head the 
organization 
2 
The head of the organization should be interviewed and selected by an independent panel  3 
 
Other (specify) 
 
4 
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7.3 By paying for health care in advance, people may need some information concerning the use of their 
money. Please, state whether the kind information that I’m going to read is “Very important; Important; 
Somewhat important or Not important” to you. 
 
 
 
7.4 How would you prefer the organization holding your money to get you the information that you need?  
(Choose TWO most preferred channels):  
 
Q7.4 Preferred information source CHOICE 
Radio 1 
Community leaders and local authorities  2 
Health workers  3 
Newspapers  4 
Community notice-boards                     5 
Other (specify) 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q7.3 Is information on:  
Very 
Important 
Important Somewhat 
Important 
Not 
Important 
Amount of money received and used over a period of time  1 2 3 4 
The range of services on which money was spent 1 2 3 4 
Measures to avoid fraud and other forms of corruption 1 2 3 4 
Quality of care at health facil ities  1 2 3 4 
What to expect at  health facil ities so that patients are 
empowered to demand better services  
1 2 3 4 
Challenges facing the organization and what is being done to 
resolve them  
1 2 3 4 
Key appointments made and the procedure for such 
appointments 
1 2 3 4 
How health facil ities are chosen to provide services  1 2 3 4 
Other (probe for any other ‘Important’ or ‘Very important’ 
information) 
1 2 3 4 
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SECTION 8. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AND ASSET INDEX 
Q8.1 SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wal ls of the main dwelling 
Stone  
Brick/Blocks 
Mud 
Wood 
Cement 
Iron sheets 
7.     Other (specify) 
 
[____I____] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Roof of the main dwelling 
Iron sheets 
Ti les 
Concrete  
Makuti  
Grass 
Tin 
Other (specify) 
 
[____I____] 
 
 
 
Floor of the main dwelling 
Cement 
Ti les 
Earth 
Other (specify) 
 
[____I____] 
 
 
 
Does your household own the house?   
Owns  
Rented 
No rent, doesn’t own  
[____I____] 
 If house is rented, how much is paid on rent?  
Ksh.________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Main source of drinking water 
Piped into the house 
Piped within the compound 
Publ ic tap 
Well/Bore hole 
River/Stream/Dam 
Other (specify) 
 
[____I____] 
 
 
 
Toi let facility 
Flush toilet 
Modern pit latrine 
Traditional pit latrine 
None  
 
[____I____] 
 
 
 
 
 
Main source of cooking fuel 
Fi rewood 
Kerosene 
Electricity 
Gas  
Charcoal 
Other (specify) 
 
[____I____] 
 
 
 
Main source of lighting 
Kerosene 
Electricity 
Solar 
Other (specify) 
 
 
[____I____] 
 
 
 
Has  your household ever faced food 
shortages for lack of money? 
Yes  
No 
 
[____I____] 
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Q8.2 ASSET OWNERSHIP 
Does your household own: 
 
 Land Y =1                  N=2           DK=99 
 
[___I___] 
 Television Y =1                  N=2           DK=99 
 
[___I___] 
 Video/DVD Y =1                  N=2           DK=99 
 
[___I___] 
 Fridge/Freezer Y =1                  N=2           DK=99 
 
[___I___] 
 Cookers (Electric/Gas) Y =1                  N=2           DK=99 
 
[___I___] 
 Motorbike 
 
Y =1                  N=2           DK=99 
 
[___I___] 
 Vehicle 
 
Y =1                  N=2           DK=99 
 
[___I___] 
 Livestock (Cattle, sheep, goats) Y =1                  N=2           DK=99 [___I___] 
 
 
THANK THE RESPONDENT FOR THEIR TIME AND INQUIRE IF THEY HAVE ANY ISSUES/QUESTIONS TO RAISE. 
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CODES   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q1.17 Main source of 
income 
 
1. Formal job 
2. Other business 
3. Spouse 
4. Remittance  
5. Water vending 
6. Farming  
7.  Other (specify) 
Q1.18 
Employment status 
1. Employee full time 
2. Temporary/Casual 
3. Employer 
4. Owner 
5. Household worker 
6. Partnership 
7. Unpaid family worker 
8. Unpaid apprentice 
9. Other 
(Specify)________ 
Q1.15 
Education level 
1. None 
2. Nursery/pre-
school 
3. Primary  
4. Secondary  
5. Col lege (mid-level) 
6. University  
7. Other (specify) 
99. Don’t Know 
Q1.14 
Marital status 
1:  Married 
2:  Single 
3: Divorced 
/separated 
4: Widowed 
Q1.12 
Age in years 
1. 15<17 
2. 18-<24 
3. 25-<35 
4. 36-50 
5. 51+ 
99. Don’t Know 
 
Q1.27 
 
Why this particular 
business 
1. Tra ined in it 
2. Family trade 
3. Could not find formal 
employment 
4. Market demand 
5. Better income 
6. Influenced by others 
7. Easy to do/start 
8. Other 
(_____________) 
Q1.33 
Location 
1. Commercial premises 
2. Industrial area 
3. Open market 
4.  Jua-kali site 
5. Mobi le  
6. Roadside/Street 
pavement 
7. Res idence 
8. Farm 
9. Other 
(Specify)__________ 
99. Don’t know 
 
Q1.32 
Reasons for non-
registration 
1. Not necessary 
2. Process too long 
3. Expensive fees 
4. Cannot afford 
bribes 
5. Pay counci l daily 
6. Other (specify) 
99. Don’t know 
 
 
 
Q1.28 
Years in Existence 
1. <1 
2. 1-<5 
3. 5-<10 
4. 10-<15 
5. 15-<18 
6. 18-<35 
7. Over 35years  
99. Don’t Know 
 
 
1.25 Industry category 
1. Food vending 
2. Cloth & beauty 
3. Shop-keeping 
4. Hotel  & Food kiosks 
5. Manufacturing & 
Craft 
6. Transportation 
7. Repair & 
Maintenance 
8. Health & Medical 
9. Telecommunication 
10. Enterta inment 
11. Construction 
12. Farming & Livestock 
13. Energy 
14. Stationery 
Q1.35 
 
Occupancy of premises 
1. Own 
2. Lease 
3. Rented  
4. Temporary l icense 
5. Free occupation 
6. I l legal occupation 
7. Other 
(Specify)__________ 
99. Don’t know 
 
Q1.36 
Main threats to business 
1. Eviction by local or central 
govt 
2. Eviction by owner 
3. Natural disasters (fires, 
ra infall, other accidents 
4. Expiry of tenancy 
5. Harassment/Bribes from 
authorities 
6. Theft 
7. Bus iness competition 
8. Low capital 
9. Debts 
10. Unstable prices of inputs 
(inflation) 
11. Lack of markets 
12. Pests  
12. Other (Specify)___________ 
99. DK 
 
Q1.34 
 
Type of structure 
1. Permanent 
2. Temporary (fixed) 
3. Temporary (movable) 
4. No s tructure 
5. Handcart 
6. Vehicle 
7. Other 
(Specify)_________ 
Q1.39 
 
Consumption per month (KSH) 
1. <2500 
2. 2500 - 3500 
3. 3501 - 4500 
4. 4501 - 5500 
5. 5501 - 6500 
6. 6501 - 7500 
7. 7501 - 10000 
9. Over 10000 
99. DK 
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\a 
  
Q1.24 
 No. employed in 
business 
1. 1 – 2  
2. 3 – 4  
3. 5 – 10  
4. None (owner only) 
5. 11 – 20  
Q1.22 
No. of people aged 
>75 years 
1. 1 – 2 
2. 3 – 4  
3. 5 – 6  
4. None 
 
Q1.21 
No. of children <18 
yrs 
1. 1 – 3  
2. 4 – 6  
3. 7 – 10  
4. None 
Q1.20 
No. of children <5 
yrs 
1. 1 – 3  
2. 4 – 6  
3. 7 – 10  
4. None 
 
Q1.19 
Total number of people in 
household 
1. 1 – 3  
2. 4 – 6  
3. 7 – 10 
4. 11 – 15 
5. 16 – 20  
Q3.3 
Who should not pay 
extra? 
5. Orphans 
6. People with chronic 
conditions 
7. Everyone should pay 
Q7.2  
How to appoint head of 
the organization 
4.  
Q7.1 
Type of Organization 
4.  
 
Q 5.2 
How much can you 
afford per year for 
comprehensive cover  
5.   500 – 1000 
6. 1001 – 1500 
7. 1500 – 2000 
8. 2001 – 3000 
9. 3001 – 4000 
10. 4001 – 5000  
Q3.5 
Convenient ways to 
pay 
6. Tax on income 
7. Bank deposits 
Q7.3 
Important information 
needed by contributors 
  
Q1.43 
 Main crop grown 
 
1. Coffee 
2. Tea  
3. Garden crops 
(horticulture) 
4. Maize 
5. Other (specify) 
Q 1.42 
Size of farm under 
cultivation 
 
1. <1acre 
2. 1 – 2 acres  
3. 2 – 4 acres  
4.  5acres + 
 
Q 8.1e 
How much paid in 
rent (KSH) 
1.   500 – 1000 
2. 1001 – 2500 
3. 2501 – 3500 
4. 3501 – 4500 
5. 4501 – 6000 
6. 6001 – 8000 
7. 8001 – 10000 
8. Over 10000 
Q7.4 
Ways to disseminate 
information 
6. Internet 
7. Phone sms 
 
Q1.26 
No. of Sections in this 
Business 
1. One  
2. Two  
3. Three  
4. Four 
5. Five  
Q2.8 
 Why not NHIF member? 
 
9. Don’t know the benefits of NHIF 
10. It i s  for formal sector employees 
only 
11. Don’t know cost of premium 
12. Long process to join NHIF 
13. Never bothered to be a  member 
Q 1.38 
No. of days work in a 
week 
1. 1 – 2  
2. 3 – 5 
3. 6 – 7 
Q1.29 
How many other businesses 
owned 
1. One 
2. Two 
3. Three 
4. None 
5. Five 
6. Six 
99. Don’t Know 
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Tool B4: Guide for In-depth Interviews 
 
a) Policymakers NHIF 
 
Health financing situation 
1. What is your opinion about the way health care is currently funded in Kenya? 
 What are the sources of funds? 
 Who decides on the amounts to allocate to the health sector? 
  What services are provided? Are the services provided adequate? 
 Who benefits from the services provided? 
 
2. In your opinion, do you feel that the NHIF has effectively played its part in making health 
care more accessible to Kenyans? 
 Where has the NHIF succeeded most? Where has it failed most? 
 What needs to be improved? 
 
Views on universal coverage and priority services  
3. There are some discussions about provision of health care for all citizens (universal 
coverage). How should this be achieved? 
 In your opinion, what are the possible financing sources for universal coverage?  
 Who should manage funds from each of the sources? 
 In deciding the kinds of services to be provided under a universal system, which 
services do you regard as most important?  
 
Prepayment design and financial protection for the informal sector 
4. What is the prospect of a universal system through contributory health insurance schemes 
such as the NHIF? 
 How can contributory health insurance be made attractive to everyone?  
 If you were to make changes in NHIF, what would you want to change?  
 What should the NHIF do to ensure that the informal sector is more receptive to NHIF 
membership?  
 Is there a better approach to provide financial protection for the informal sector? 
 What other financing alternatives should be explored to provide coverage to the rest 
of the population (i.e. those who are not working in the formal or informal sectors)?  
 Could the NHIF learn anything from other health care schemes in the country? Explain 
5. What are the current challenges in covering the informal sector? 
 Revenue collection 
 Stability of incomes 
 Trust and solidarity 
 Knowledge and attitudes toward prepaid health care 
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6. In circumstances where the informal sector is required to pay into a ris k pool, how can 
groups within the sector that are able to prepay for health care be identified so that those 
least able to pay can be subsidized? 
7. What are the possibilities of a tax designed to target the informal sector specifically? 
 
Purchasing and provision of services 
8. From the mentioned sources of funds, how could the funds be collected and pooled? 
 Should all funds be combined in a single pool or should there be separate pools to 
cover different groups?  Why? 
 Who should purchase health services? Why? 
 Who, in your opinion should provide the services purchased? 
 In your view, how should the providers be paid? Why? 
b) Policy-Makers: Ministry of Health 
 
Topics: 
 Tax funding and how to get it to the poor 
 Roadmap to UC 
 Current funding arrangements 
 Funding arrangements to cover the informal sector 
 
Health financing and policy trajectory 
1. What is your opinion about the way health care is currently funded in Kenya? 
 What are the sources of funds? 
 Who decides on the amounts to allocate to the health sector? 
  What services are provided? Are the services provided adequate? 
 Who benefits from the services? 
2. What are the main concerns about health financing in Kenya? 
 What policies are being put in place to address these concerns? 
 What are some of the main highlights of these policies? 
 When do we expect them to be implemented and fully in operation?  
 What are some of the challenges to the implementation of the policies? 
 What kind of support is needed for the policies to become operational? 
 
Views on universal coverage and priority services  
3. There are some discussions about providing affordable health care for all Kenyans 
(universal coverage). What is the feasibility of achieving a universal health system? 
 What are the possible financing sources for universal coverage?  
 How should funds from each of the sources be managed? 
 What are the health services that you feel should be covered under a universal 
system? Why? 
 How should a package of health service benefits be determined? 
265 
 
 
 
 
4. The civil service has its own health insurance coverage, why did the government choose 
to organize and subsidize coverage for civil servants and not the rest of Kenyans? 
 What would you say about coverage for civil servants? Could it have been done in a 
different way? 
 Do you foresee all Kenyans getting covered? 
5. How is the ministry streamlining health financing in the country to ensure that all Kenyans 
have access to quality health care in line with the new constitution? 
 
Prepayment design and financial protection for the informal sector  
6. In your opinion, what financing arrangement can provide effective financial protection to 
the whole population? 
 Can tax funds be used to provide adequate health care for all? 
 What can be done to expand the tax base and the tax revenue collected?  
 In your opinion, what should be done to increase amounts allocated to health care 
from the government budget? 
 What are your views about earmarked taxes for health care? Which good/services 
should be targeted? 
 Is meeting the Abuja target (15% of the budget) feasible? 
 How can 15% of the budget improve health care in Kenya? 
 What do you feel are the challenges to meeting this target? 
 
7. What are the prospects of a universal system through contributory insurance schemes?  
 What kind of scheme is most preferred by the ministry/government? Why?  
 How can the informal sector be covered through such schemes? 
 The current financial protection policies through NHIF do not seem to reach the 
informal sector, what should be done to improve the situation? 
8. Under a universal system, how will the informal sector be covered? 
 In circumstances where the informal sector is required to pay into a risk pool, how 
can informal sector groups that are able to prepay for health care be identified? 
 What are the possibilities of a tax designed to target the informal sector speci fically?  
 What challenges are there in trying to provide financial protection to the informal 
sector? 
 
Purchasing and provision of services 
9. From the mentioned sources of funds, how will the funds be collected and pooled? 
 Should all funds be combined in a single pool or should there be separate pools to 
cover different groups?  Why? 
 Who should purchase health services? Why? 
 Who, in your opinion, should provide the services purchased? 
 In your view, how should the providers be paid? Why? 
10. What must be done to achieve effective universal coverage in Kenya? 
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 How do we ensure that people go to health facilities for treatment instead of relying 
on poor quality OP clinics, chemists, shopkeepers…? 
 
c) Policymakers: Ministry of Finance 
 
Health financing and taxation 
1. What is your opinion about the way health care is currently funded in Kenya? 
 What are the sources of funds? 
 Who decides on the amounts to allocate to the health sector? 
 What services are provided? Are the services provided adequate? 
 Who benefits from the services? 
2. In your opinion, can tax funds be used to finance health care for all in Kenya? 
 What may be the economic and social consequences of providing health care for all 
Kenyans through tax funds? 
  How does the treasury decide how much should be allocated to health care? Is the 
health ministry involved in this decision?  If so, how? 
 What do you think should be done to increase funding for health care? 
 What can be done to expand the tax base and the amounts collected? Is there room 
to improve tax collection methods? 
 What is the feasibility of ear-marked taxes for health care? What goods/services can 
be targeted? Why? 
 Are there possibilities of introducing a specific taxation method to target the informal 
sector? 
3. Apart from tax funding, what other funding arrangements should be explored to provide 
affordable health care for all Kenyans?  
 How can the informal sector be involved in such a system? 
 In circumstances where the informal sector is required to pay into a risk pool, how 
can informal sector groups that are able to prepay for health care be identified? 
 What challenges are expected in trying to provide financial protection to the informal 
sector? 
4. What challenges exist in efforts to provide adequate and affordable health care for all 
Kenyans? 
 Political 
 Economic 
 Social  
5. How can these challenges be overcome? 
 
 
 
d) Policymakers: External Agencies 
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Health financing situation 
1. What is your general opinion about the way health care is currently funded in Kenya? 
 Sources of funds (current funding arrangements) 
 What changes would you like to see? 
2. As development partners, where do you see yourself fit in improving the health care 
financing situation for purposes of universal coverage? 
 What is your opinion regarding health system governance and accountability in 
Kenya?  
 How can the government improve efficiency in the use of funds and service delivery? 
 Do you foresee an end to external funding for health care?  
 (SWAP)There have been calls to streamline donor funds for health care so that the 
funds are used as part of government budget for health care rather than for specific 
health programmes.... How far is Kenya in this regard? 
 
Views on universal coverage and priority services  
3. With your understanding of the Kenyan context, which is the most feasible policy 
approach to universal health coverage? Why? 
 Tax funding: 
i. How to expand the tax base 
ii. Earmarked taxes for health care 
iii. Getting tax funds to the poor 
 Contributory insurance:  
i. Social health insurance 
ii. Community-based health insurance 
 Any other arrangement? 
4. What do separate health insurance arrangements for civil servants and teachers mean for 
universal coverage and equity? 
 Is it likely to facilitate universal coverage? 
 Where does such an arrangement leave the rest of Kenyans? 
 Are these private pools within a national insurer? 
5. Providing financial protection for the informal sector is a difficult undertaking for many 
developing countries. How can development partners help Kenya to provide coverage for 
the informal sector in particular and the rest of the population in general? What policy 
advice would you give the government for informal sector coverage? 
 Technical capacity 
 Organization 
 Subsidy 
6. Not all services can be covered in a universal system, what constitutes the basic benefit 
package of care from an international perspective? 
 What services do you feel should be prioritized in the Kenyan context? 
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7. There have been a number of declarations aimed at improving health care, particularly 
for the poor: Alma Ata; Paris; Abuja, etc. 
 Do we need these milestones? 
 What do you think are the reasons for Kenya’s failure to meet the objectives of these 
milestones? 
8. In your opinion, what lessons can Kenya learn from other countries in terms of health 
financing and providing coverage for the informal sector? 
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Tool B4: Guide for In-depth Interviews 
 
a) Policymakers NHIF 
 
Health financing situation 
1. What is your opinion about the way health care is currently funded in Kenya? 
 What are the sources of funds? 
 Who decides on the amounts to allocate to the health sector? 
  What services are provided? Are the services provided adequate? 
 Who benefits from the services provided? 
 
2. In your opinion, do you feel that the NHIF has effectively played its part in making health 
care more accessible to Kenyans? 
 Where has the NHIF succeeded most? Where has it failed most? 
 What needs to be improved? 
 
Views on universal coverage and priority services  
3. There are some discussions about provision of health care for all citizens (universal 
coverage). How should this be achieved? 
 In your opinion, what are the possible financing sources for universal coverage?  
 Who should manage funds from each of the sources? 
 In deciding the kinds of services to be provided under a universal system, which 
services do you regard as most important?  
 
Prepayment design and financial protection for the informal sector 
4. What is the prospect of a universal system through contributory health insurance schemes 
such as the NHIF? 
 How can contributory health insurance be made attractive to everyone?  
 If you were to make changes in NHIF, what would you want to change?  
 What should the NHIF do to ensure that the informal sector is more receptive to NHIF 
membership?  
 Is there a better approach to provide financial protection for the informal sector? 
 What other financing alternatives should be explored to provide coverage to the rest 
of the population (i.e. those who are not working in the formal or informal sectors)?  
 Could the NHIF learn anything from other health care schemes in the country? Explain 
5. What are the current challenges in covering the informal sector? 
 Revenue collection 
 Stability of incomes 
 Trust and solidarity 
 Knowledge and attitudes toward prepaid health care 
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6. In circumstances where the informal sector is required to pay into a risk pool, how can 
groups within the sector that are able to prepay for health care be identified so that those 
least able to pay can be subsidized? 
7. What are the possibilities of a tax designed to target the informal sector specifically? 
 
Purchasing and provision of services 
8. From the mentioned sources of funds, how could the funds be collected and pooled? 
 Should all funds be combined in a single pool or should there be separate pools to 
cover different groups?  Why? 
 Who should purchase health services? Why? 
 Who, in your opinion should provide the services purchased? 
 In your view, how should the providers be paid? Why? 
 
b) Policy-Makers: Ministry of Health 
 
Topics: 
 Tax funding and how to get it to the poor 
 Roadmap to UC 
 Current funding arrangements 
 Funding arrangements to cover the informal sector 
 
Health financing and policy trajectory 
1. What is your opinion about the way health care is currently funded in Kenya? 
 What are the sources of funds? 
 Who decides on the amounts to allocate to the health sector? 
  What services are provided? Are the services provided adequate? 
 Who benefits from the services? 
2. What are the main concerns about health financing in Kenya? 
 What policies are being put in place to address these concerns? 
 What are some of the main highlights of these policies? 
 When do we expect them to be implemented and fully in operation?  
 What are some of the challenges to the implementation of the policies? 
 What kind of support is needed for the policies to become operational? 
 
Views on universal coverage and priority services  
3. There are some discussions about providing affordable health care for all Kenyans 
(universal coverage). What is the feasibility of achieving a universal health system? 
 What are the possible financing sources for universal coverage?  
 How should funds from each of the sources be managed? 
 What are the health services that you feel should be covered under a universal 
system? Why? 
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 How should a package of health service benefits be determined? 
4. The civil service has its own health insurance coverage, why did the government choose 
to organize and subsidize coverage for civil servants and not the rest of Kenyans? 
 What would you say about coverage for civil servants? Could it have been done in a 
different way? 
 Do you foresee all Kenyans getting covered? 
5. How is the ministry streamlining health financing in the country to ensure that all Kenyans 
have access to quality health care in line with the new constitution? 
 
Prepayment design and financial protection for the informal sector  
6. In your opinion, what financing arrangement can provide effective financial protection to 
the whole population? 
 Can tax funds be used to provide adequate health care for all? 
 What can be done to expand the tax base and the tax revenue collected?  
 In your opinion, what should be done to increase amounts allocated to health care 
from the government budget? 
 What are your views about earmarked taxes for health care? Which good/services 
should be targeted? 
 Is meeting the Abuja target (15% of the budget) feasible? 
 How can 15% of the budget improve health care in Kenya? 
 What do you feel are the challenges to meeting this target? 
 
7. What are the prospects of a universal system through contributory insurance schemes?  
 What kind of scheme is most preferred by the ministry/government? Why?  
 How can the informal sector be covered through such schemes? 
 The current financial protection policies through NHIF do not seem to reach the 
informal sector, what should be done to improve the situation? 
8. Under a universal system, how will the informal sector be covered? 
 In circumstances where the informal sector is required to pay into a risk pool, how 
can informal sector groups that are able to prepay for health care be identified? 
 What are the possibilities of a tax designed to target the informal sector specifically?  
 What challenges are there in trying to provide financial protection to the informal 
sector? 
 
Purchasing and provision of services 
9. From the mentioned sources of funds, how will the funds be collected and pooled? 
 Should all funds be combined in a single pool or should there be separate pools to 
cover different groups?  Why? 
 Who should purchase health services? Why? 
 Who, in your opinion, should provide the services purchased? 
 In your view, how should the providers be paid? Why? 
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10. What must be done to achieve effective universal coverage in Kenya? 
 How do we ensure that people go to health facilities for treatment instead of relying 
on poor quality OP clinics, chemists, shopkeepers…? 
 
c) Policymakers: Ministry of Finance 
 
Health financing and taxation 
1. What is your opinion about the way health care is currently funded in Kenya? 
 What are the sources of funds? 
 Who decides on the amounts to allocate to the health sector? 
 What services are provided? Are the services provided adequate? 
 Who benefits from the services? 
2. In your opinion, can tax funds be used to finance health care for all in Kenya? 
 What may be the economic and social consequences of providing health care for all 
Kenyans through tax funds? 
  How does the treasury decide how much should be allocated to health care? Is the 
health ministry involved in this decision?  If so, how? 
 What do you think should be done to increase funding for health care? 
 What can be done to expand the tax base and the amounts collected? Is there room 
to improve tax collection methods? 
 What is the feasibility of ear-marked taxes for health care? What goods/services can 
be targeted? Why? 
 Are there possibilities of introducing a specific taxation method to target the informal 
sector? 
3. Apart from tax funding, what other funding arrangements should be explored to provide 
affordable health care for all Kenyans?  
 How can the informal sector be involved in such a system? 
 In circumstances where the informal sector is required to pay into a risk pool, how 
can informal sector groups that are able to prepay for health care be identified? 
 What challenges are expected in trying to provide financial protection to the informal 
sector? 
4. What challenges exist in efforts to provide adequate and affordable health care for all 
Kenyans? 
 Political 
 Economic 
 Social  
5. How can these challenges be overcome? 
 
d) Policymakers: External Agencies 
 
Health financing situation 
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1. What is your general opinion about the way health care is currently funded in Kenya? 
 Sources of funds (current funding arrangements) 
 What changes would you like to see? 
2. As development partners, where do you see yourself fit in improving the health care 
financing situation for purposes of universal coverage? 
 What is your opinion regarding health system governance and accountability in 
Kenya?  
 How can the government improve efficiency in the use of funds and service delivery? 
 Do you foresee an end to external funding for health care?  
 (SWAP)There have been calls to streamline donor funds for health care so that the 
funds are used as part of government budget for health care rather than for specific 
health programmes.... How far is Kenya in this regard? 
 
Views on universal coverage and priority services  
3. With your understanding of the Kenyan context, which is the most feasible policy 
approach to universal health coverage? Why? 
 Tax funding: 
i. How to expand the tax base 
ii. Earmarked taxes for health care 
iii. Getting tax funds to the poor 
 Contributory insurance:  
i. Social health insurance 
ii. Community-based health insurance 
 Any other arrangement? 
4. What do separate health insurance arrangements for civil servants and teachers mean for 
universal coverage and equity? 
 Is it likely to facilitate universal coverage? 
 Where does such an arrangement leave the rest of Kenyans? 
 Are these private pools within a national insurer? 
5. Providing financial protection for the informal sector is a difficult undertaking for many 
developing countries. How can development partners help Kenya to provide coverage for 
the informal sector in particular and the rest of the population in general? What policy 
advice would you give the government for informal sector coverage? 
 Technical capacity 
 Organization 
 Subsidy 
6. Not all services can be covered in a universal system, what constitutes the basic benefit 
package of care from an international perspective? 
 What services do you feel should be prioritized in the Kenyan context? 
7. There have been a number of declarations aimed at improving health care, particularly 
for the poor: Alma Ata; Paris; Abuja, etc. 
 Do we need these milestones? 
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 What do you think are the reasons for Kenya’s failure to meet the objectives of these 
milestones? 
8. In your opinion, what lessons can Kenya learn from other countries in terms of health 
financing and providing coverage for the informal sector? 
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APPENDIX C: SIMINS BASIC® DATA INPUT ASSUMPTIONS AND JUSTIFICATION 
 
Appendix C, C1: POPULATION STRUCTURE 
 
Demography: Population projection 
Kenya’s total population as of December 2013 was 44.4 million people (IEconomics, 2014, 
FAO, 2014) .  To estimate total population by 2030, the following sources were considered: 
Government of Kenya (2011); the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)(FAO, 2014) 
(high variant); the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population 
Division (UNDESA/PD) (2011) (medium variant); the World Bank (2013a) and the Pardee 
Centre for International Futures (PCIF). Projections from each these sources using base year 
population of 44.4 million people are presented in Table 8.1. 
 
Table 8.1: Population projections from different sources 
Source Base year 2013 
(Millions) 
Population 2030 
(Millions) 
Average annual 
growth rate (%) 
Government of Kenya 44.4 66.45 2.40 
FAO (High variant) 44.4 67.01 2.45 
UNDESA/PD (Medium variant) 44.4 67.78 2.52 
World Bank 44.4 69.83 2.70 
PCIF 44.4 67.22 2.47 
Author’s  projections 44.4 67.56 2.50 
 
Estimates of annual population growth rate from most of the sources above (FAO, 
UNDESA/PD and PCIF) average about 2.5%. A 2.5% growth rate was therefore used to 
estimate population sizes between 2013 and 2030. 
 
Workforce and dependency projections 
Calculations of the proportion of the population that is in the workforce were based on data 
from the KNBS (2014b). In the calculations (Table 8.2), the workforce totals 9.77 million.  
The KNBS (2014b) reports that a total of 2.27 million individuals are working in the formal 
sector and together with their dependants constitute 20% of the population (or 8.88 million 
people), which means there are 2.91 dependants per formal sector worker.  There was need 
to estimate the total number of pensioners from the formal sector and according to KIPRRA 
(2013) (2013), the population is structured as follows: formal sector represents 20% of the 
population and the informal sector constitutes 80% including indigent populations (20%) 
and pensioners.  From the KNBS (2014b) data, one in 2.29 formal sector workers is 
employed in the public sector. Data available were for the number of pensioners in the 
public sector only (162,217 individuals according to the Ministry of Finance, Pensions 
Department, (2014) so it was estimated that the number of pensioners from the private 
sector is 2.29 times higher than from the public sector such that the total number of 
pensioners comes to: [(162,217*2.29) + 162,217 = 533,694 (0.534million) pensioners]. The 
Pensions Department reports that government pensioners had a total of 58,700 dependants 
as of July 2014 (i.e. 0.362 dependants per pensioner). So out of approximately 0.534million 
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pensioners, the total number of dependants would be: [534,000*0.362= 193,308]. So 
pensioners plus their dependants make a total of 727,308 people (i.e. 5.47% of the 
workforce or 1.6% of the population). 
 
 This left a total of 34.8 million people (or 78.4% of the population) in the informal sector 
including 20% who are indigent (the equivalent of 2.22million individual workers). The 
Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS) (Government of Kenya, 2006) observes 
that the average household size in Kenya comprises of 5.0 members (i.e. one member and 
four dependants). Since it is already known the number of dependants among pensioners 
and formal sector workers, it was assumed that each informal sector worker has 4.0 
dependants. So for the indigent this translates into 1.78 million workers (18.22% of the 
workforce) and 7.1million dependants. Of the remaining 25.92 million workers in the 
informal sector, there are 5.184 million workers (53.1% of the workforce) and 20.74million 
dependants.  
 
Table 8.2: Population groups, workforce distribution and dependants 
Population groups Workforce 
(millions) 
% Workforce Dependants 
per worker 
Population group 
(millions) 
Population group % 
Total Population 
Formal sector 
(a) Government 
(b) Private sector 
2.27 
           0.69 
           1.58 
23.24 
              7.06 
            16.18 
2.91 
           2.91 
           2.91 
8.88 
                    2.70 
                    6.18 
20.0 
                         6.08 
                       13.92 
Formal sector pensioners 0.534 5.47 0.36 0.73   1.6 
 
Informal sector 
(a) Indigent 
        (b)  Non-indigent 
6.964 
1.780 
5.184 
71.29 
18.22 
            53.07 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
34.80 
8.88 
25.92 
78.4                       
                       20.0 
                  58.4 
Total 9.77 100.0 2.82 44.41 100.0 
Data sources: KIPPRA, 2013; Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2014 and author’s own calculations 
 
In terms of dependency ratio: [44.4million (total population) – 9.77million] = 34.64 million 
dependants (or 78.02% total dependency). The percentage of child dependants was 
calculated from a report by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2014b). From the 
report, there were a total of 23.6million people aged below 19 years, which translates to 
68.1% of all dependants. The World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013b) showed 
that there is declining dependency in Kenya and in lower-middle-income countries although 
at a much faster rate in the latter than the former. It was therefore assumed that Kenya’s 
dependency ratio will decline at an average annual rate of 0.55% from 2013 to 2023 and 
then decline at an average annual rate of 1.0% from 2024 to 2030. This assumption was 
based on the observation of data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 
2013b) which showed that when average dependency ratio in lower-middle-income 
countries started to decline at 0.55% per annum (1980 – 1990) it took 10 years to start 
declining at a rate of 1.0% per annum and has remained at about the same rate to date. This 
assumption on the trend of dependency is further strengthened by the fact that population 
growth rate is expected to slow down from the current 2.5% to 2% in 2030 (Government of 
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Kenya, 2013a). Overall dependency therefore decreases from 78.02% currently to 68.8% in 
2030 and child dependency as a proportion of dependants increases from 68.1% in 2013 to 
74.8% in 2030 (Table 8.03). Such a trend is based on the fact that population growth rate is 
relatively high at 2.47% per annum and accompanied by improving economic conditions and 
growing employment, the proportion of adult dependants will decline such that the child 
dependency as a proportion of overall dependency will be larger than it is currently. Lower-
middle-income countries average rates were chosen as comparator because Kenya 
recalculated its GDP such that the GDP per capita is estimated at US$ 1,136 which makes it a 
lower-middle-income country (World Bank, 2014a).  
 
 
Table 8.3: Dependency ratio and decline rate according to the World Bank, 2013 
 1980 – 1990  1991 – 2000  2001 – 2010  2011 – 2013  2013 - 2023 2024 - 2030 
Kenya 
Dependency ratio 112.8 – 106.9  105 – 88.4  87.1 – 82.4 82.2 – 78.0 78.0 – 73.8 73.04 – 68.8 
Average decline rate (%) 0.51 1.88 0.70 0.38 0.55 1.0 
% Dependants who are children -- --- --- --- 68.1 – 71.9 72.3 – 74.8  
Average growth rate --- --- --- --- 0.55 0.55 
Average Lower-middle-income 
Dependency ratio 79.2 – 75.1 74.6 – 67.2 66.3 – 59.6 59 – 57.9 57.9 -  ---- 
Average decline rate (%) 0.55 1.01 1.21 0.93 0.93 ---- 
Data source: World Bank (2013), World Development Indicators (author’s ca lculations) 
 
The model seems to regard ‘self-employment’ as synonymous with ‘informal sector’. Even 
though this is not conceptually appropriate it was assumed that the model’s category of 
self-employment is in fact the informal sector so that all population groups are captured in 
the model. Several estimates by the government and most recently by KIPPRA (2013), 
although lacking details, give the percentage of the workforce in the informal sector at 83% 
but this also includes the indigent population and pensioners. However, calculations based 
on data from the Kenya Bureau of Statistics (2014b) indicates  the exact size of populations 
out of formal employment is 76.8% of which 5.5% are pensioners. This means that the real 
size of the informal sector is 71.3% including non-indigent workers (53.1%) and indigent 
workers (18.2%) (Table 8.4). 
 
Data from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) for the last 14 years indicate that 
the public sector employment declined at an average annual rate of 0.03% from 1999 to 
2013. Over the same period, the private (formal) sector grew at an average annual rate of 
3.28%. However, according to the Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis 
(2013), the same period (1999 to 2013) experienced declines in formal sector growth with 
the private sector registering job losses at an annual rate of 1.79% (from 18% of the total 
workforce to 14%) and the public sector at -6.5% annually (i.e. from 14% of the workforce in 
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1999 to 6.0% in 2013). The informal sector on the other hand grew at an annual rate of 
1.25% in the same period.  
 
The contradiction in reporting employment patterns from these two highly professional 
government institutions may be the fact that the KNBS estimates include employment 
patterns in the informal sector. Nevertheless, the reports from the two institutions are still 
contradictory and it was imperative to understand employment patterns particularly after 
devolved governance in other countries because devolution is likely to create more jobs 
both in private and public sectors in Kenya. However, the only study we could find that 
measured employment growth rate after devolved governance systems was Bivand et al. 
(2010) in a study in the UK between the period 1999 and 2008. Bivand and colleagues 
demonstrate that total employment in the devolved regions- Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland- grew at a higher rate than other regions. On average, these regions registered 
annual employment growth rate at 0.59% in both public and private sectors.  
 
The UK and Kenya are totally different regions and it cannot be confidently said that Kenya’s 
employment rates after devolution will grow at a similar rate but we used a lower annual 
growth rate of 0.50% to project employment trends in both public and private sectors from 
base year 2013 to the end of the simulation. Besides, an analysis of employment growth 
patterns in the period 1995 – 2008 in low- and middle-income countries by Cho et al. (2012) 
show that average formal employment growth rate in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa 
hardly go beyond 0.50% per annum. 
 
Data on growth trends of the pensioner population was lacking so a decision was made to 
estimate the growth rate of formal sector pensioners from the general growth rates of the 
elderly population in Kenya. The Partners in Population and Development (2012) estimated 
that the elderly population in Kenya (ages 65+) would grow from about 1.5% of the 
population in 2009 to about 2.27% by 2030, which represents an annual growth rate of 
2.0%. Given these growth trends, it means the informal sector workforce will be declining at 
an average annual rate of about 0.369% from 2013 to 2030. 
 
Wages projection 
In both the formal private and public employment, average wage growth rate of 5.0% per 
annum was used based on recent trends (2006-2010) by KIPPRA (2013). The growth rate in 
wages is in tandem with inflation rates and higher than 2.6% average rates for Africa (ILO, 
2012a) and 2.4% average growth rate projected by the (World Bank, 2007) between 2001 
and 2030. Earlier wage growth rates for Kenya showed wider discrepancies between 
government wages and private sector wages (i.e. 6.7% per annum between 2008 and 2013 
compared to 3.5% in private sector wages). However, this was a harmonisation period to 
bring public sector wages at par with private sector wages. The current estimated ratio of 
public to private formal sector wages is 1.1 and when projected to 2030 the ratio of formal 
public to private wages is 1.18.  
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Pensioners’ wages increase at a fixed rate of 1.5% per annum according to state statutes. 
This rate was used only for the baseline. It was assumed the rate will change to reflect 
inflationary tendencies. Based on this assumption a growth rate of 3.0% was used to project 
pensioner wages. 
 
Appendix C, C2: MACROECONOMY  
For purposes of triangulation, data for inflation rates  were obtained from the following 
sources: the World Bank (2014b), Government of Kenya (2013b), and the African 
Development Bank (2014) forecasts on Kenya’s economy. Average inflation rate was set at 
5.5% between 2013 and 2023 and 4.2% from 2024 to 2030. The model automatically 
calculates interest rates in the basic model.  
 
Appendix C, C3: UNIT COSTS 
Table 8.5a presents unit cost estimates at various levels of public provision as presented by 
different authors. The dates shown in author columns represent the year when data for 
computation of unit costs were collected. All unit costs were inflation-adjusted at an 
average annual rate of inflation at 7.8% (between 2004 – 2013), 8.43% (2007 – 2013) and 
8.99% (2008 – 2013), (World Bank, 2013b) (Table 8.5b). The only year we did not use the 
actual inflation figure in calculating the averages for the above periods was 2008 because 
the country was in a state of war which pushed up inflation rates beyond reasonable limits.  
 
 
Table 8.5a: Unit costs per outpatient visit and per inpatient day from different authors  
Provider category WHO/GTZ, 
Date:2004 
WHO-CHOICE 
Date: 2008 
Flessa et al., Date: 
2007 
Chuma et al., 
Date: 2007 
Dispensary (OP) 212.0 227.6 174.0 114.0 
Health Centre (OP) 222.0 227.6 223.0 114.0 
County Hospital (OP) 571.0 326.9 476.0 366.0 
County Hospital (IP) 1516.0 897.5 2523.7 1100.0 
National Hospital (OP) 623.0 395.0 1409.0 963.0 
National Hospital (IP) 2751.0 1185.0 4921.0 2890.0 
 
Table 8.5b: Inflation-rated to 2013 unit prices 
Provider category WHO/GTZ,  WHO-CHOICE  Flessa et al.,  Chuma et al.,  
Dispensary (OP) 391.07 326.60 264.37 173.20 
Health Centre (OP) 409.51 326.60 338.81 173.20 
County Hospital (OP) 1053.30 469.09 723.21 556.08 
County Hospital (IP) 2796.50 1287.88 3834.36 1671.27 
National Hospital (OP) 1149.22 566.81 2140.75 1463.12 
National Hospital (IP) 5074.64 1700.43 7476.67 4390.89 
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A decision on the data to use to estimate unit costs considered the robustness and clarity of 
methodology of each study. The following were eliminated: (i) WHO-CHOICE (2011) based 
on the fact that the unit costs were not country specific and unclarity over exact costs of 
drugs and diagnostics; (ii) WHO/GTZ (2004)because there was no explanation on how unit 
cost were calculated. This left Flessa et al. (2011) and Chuma et al. (2012) but a more robust 
methodology was presented by Flessa et al., 2011. We did not exactly use Flessa and 
colleagues’ categorisation of facilities but rather used government classifications and so we 
had to combine some facilities as reported by Flessa and colleagues then get average unit 
costs.  
 
Table 8.6: Projected unit costs from Flessa et al. 2011  
Facility Base year 2013 Target 2023 Target 2030 
Dispensary (OP) 265.55 460.53 614.23 
Health Centre (OP) 340.33 590.21 787.20 
County Hospital (OP) 726.45 1259.83 1680.29 
County Hospital (IP) 3106.49 5387.35 7185.38 
National Hospital (OP) 2150.35 3729.20 4973.81 
National Hospital (IP) 7510.20 13024.40 17371.28 
Private non-profit (OP) 1205.66 2090.89 2788.72 
Private non-profit (IP) 6058.83 10507.39 14014.22 
Private for-profit clinic (OP) 1297.23 2249.69 3000.53 
Private for-profit clinic (IP) 18116.97 31418.95 41904.99 
Private for-profit hospital (OP) 2952.34 5120.04 6828.84 
Private for-profit hospital (IP) 20606.13 35735.72 47662.47 
 
It was not sensible to go along with simply inflation-rated unit costs from 2007 to 2030 as 
above because that would be highly skewed towards the private sector. The skewedness is 
partly to due to under-resourcing of the public sector and lack of strategic purchasing and 
other cost containment measures especially in the private sector. A Ministry of Health task 
force in 2012 estimated that public facilities should get about twice the funding that they 
currently receive to improve service delivery to acceptable levels (Bourbonnais, 2013). Such 
rapid investment in the health sector may not be possible given past trends in funding from 
the government. On this basis we can assume that, while funding for the health sector may 
not more than double as recommended by the taskforce, the funding would increase at a 
rate twice higher than the prevailing inflation rates to better approximate future unit costs 
and the need to anchor universal coverage. On this basis a 14.6% rate from 2007 to 2013 
was used to estimate public provider unit costs for base year 2013. Implementation of 
strategic purchasing as more people get covered and coupled with competition from 
improved services in the public sector will put pressure on the private sector to have 
reasonable prices such that with over a period of time there would be a tendency towards 
convergence of unit costs between public and private services. On this basis it was assumed 
that average unit costs for private facilities increased at half the rate for public sector (i.e. 
7.3%) from 2007 to 2013. 
 
281 
 
 
 
 
To estimate unit costs for 2013 and 2023, it was argued that resourcing of public sector 
facilities will continue to grow at a rate similar to projected inflation rates; that is, about 
5.5% per annum. It was assumed that strong policies will reign in rising expenditure 
including implementation of cost-containment policies such strategic purchasing such that 
5.5% annual increase in costs would only be sustained from 2013 and 2023 after which unit 
costs would increase at a much lower rate. The WHO/GTZ (2004) had estimated that unit 
costs would be rising at an annual rate of 2.0%. This percentage was used to estimate unit 
costs from 2024 to 2030 for public sector services. For private sector services, the need to 
have reasonable prices will mean that growth rate in unit prices would be much lower than 
they are in the public sector. About 2.0% annual growth rate was used to estimate unit 
prices from 2013 to 2023 and then 1.0% annual growth rate from 2023 to 2030 for the 
private health sector (Table 8.7). Flessa et al. (2011) had noted very limited differences in OP 
and IP unit costs for non-profit providers so only one category each for OP and IP services 
were used. 
 
Table 8.7: Projected unit costs for OP visits and IP days per capita per annum 
Facility Base Year 2013 2023 2030 
Dispensary (OP) 394.15 679.67 780.72 
Health Centre (OP) 505.14 871.07 1000.58 
County Hospital (OP) 1078.24 1859.32 2135.77 
County Hospital (IP) 4610.83 7950.93 9133.12 
National Hospital (OP) 3191.68 5503.74 6322.07 
National Hospital (IP) 11147.08 19222.07 22080.12 
Private non-profit (OP) 1205.66 1469.69 1575.71 
Private non-profit hospital (IP) 6058.83 7385.68 7918.45 
Private for-profit clinic (OP) 1297.23 1581.32 1695.39 
Private for-profit clinic (IP) 18116.97 22084.49 23677.56 
Private for-profit hospital (OP) 2952.34 3598.89 3858.50 
Private for-profit hospital 
(IP) 20606.13 25118.76 26930.71 
 
Appendix C, C4: UTILISATION 
The table below presents the distribution of outpatient (OP) and inpatient (IP) utilisation 
patterns by type of provider according to the Ministry of Health (2014).  
 
Table 8.8: Distribution of OP visits and IP admissions as at 2013 
Facilities % Outpatient 
visits 
% Inpatient 
admissions 
Admission 
rates 
IP days per 
capita  
Government Dispensary  22.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Government Health centre 18.0 7.6 0.0029 0.0193 
Government hospitals  18.3 48.3 0.0184 0.1230 
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Private-not-for-profit (PHC)   5.1   1.3 0.0005 0.0033 
Private-not-for-profit hospitals   3.5 16.5 0.0063 0.0420 
Private clinics/health centre 10.3   2.8 0.0011 0.0071 
Private hospitals    6.9 20.0 0.0076 0.0509 
Chemists 13.2   0.0 0.0 0.0 
Traditional healers   0.4   0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nursing/maternity homes   0.3   1.8 0.0007 0.0046 
Others   1.9   1.7 0.0006 0.0043 
Total 100.0 100.0 0.038 0.2546 
Source: Ministry of Health, 2014 (Household health expenditure and utilisation survey)  
 
For our own work, all OP utilisation cases that were not classified as government were 
regarded as non-government (private) OP visits including visits to chemists, traditional 
healers and others. For IP utilisation rates, all government IP services were classified under 
government hospitals since no primary facility is expected to offer IP services and most of 
the health centres that do so are known as sub-county (sub-district) hospitals and so were 
classified under hospitals. Private-not-for-profit health centres offering IP services were 
classified under private not-for-profit hospitals. Under private for-profit facilities, all private 
health centres/clinics, nursing/maternity homes and others were all classified under private 
hospitals. The 2009 public expenditure review report states that the non-government 
(private) sector controls about 96% of health clinics , maternity and nursing homes and 
about 90% of medical centres (Government of Kenya, 2009). We assumed that government 
maternity hospitals were classified under government hospitals in the surveys such that all 
maternity and nursing homes shown in the report were classified as private (Table 8.8).  
 
In the 2013 household health expenditure and utilisation surveys (HHEUS) (Government of 
Kenya, 2014), total outpatient visits for public and private facilities were 3.1 per capita per 
year. Total IP days per capita were calculated from the same report which gave IP utilisation 
rate of 0.038 admissions per person (38 admissions/1000) and on average 6.7 days of 
hospital stay. So 0.038*6.7= 0.255 inpatient days per capita per year in total for private and 
public facilities. So the Base Year 2013 utilisation rates were 3.1 OP visits per person per 
year and 0.255 inpatient days per capita per year. The base year percentage distribution of 
utilisation of services per provider (Table 8.8) was used to calculate OP and IP utilisation 
rates for all providers. The results are presented in Table 8.8. To allocate public hospital OP 
visits per capita per annum between national referral and county hospitals, utilisation rates 
at the Kenyatta National Hospital (KNH) were taken as representative of national referral 
facilities. Based on the KNH data, the OP visits per capita were calculated: [0.6million (total 
OP visits) /44.4million (total population) = 0.0135] although this figure changes slightly to 
0.0136 when percent OP visits (0.44%) at national referral facilities is multiplied by total OP 
visits (3.1). The latter figure has been used in subsequent calculations. 
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Outpatient services for Target Years 2023 and 2030 
For the sake of the model it was decided that all utilisation rates falling under ‘Others’ 
including traditional healers and chemists will be shared among (private) non-government 
facilities using the percentage distribution of total OP visits per annum in Table 8.8.  
 
To calculate OP visits per capita per year 2023 target, it was argued that upon 
implementation of universal coverage policies, utilisation often increases. An estimated 
increase of 60% was used on the basis of a report by the NHIF (2014) indicating that OP 
visits in a scheme covering civil servants and armed forces increased by 60% within a year of 
implementation. At the same time, utilisation of maternity services increased by between 
10% and 100% in various government facilities across the country (Kenya) after user fees for 
delivery were removed in 2013 (Bourbonnais, 2013). Xu et al. (2006) and McIntyre (2012) 
had estimated similar rates (about 60%) of increase in OP visits upon enactment of policies 
that made health care free at the point of service. he WHO (2013a) in SARA (service 
availability and readiness assessment) tool recommends 5.0 OP visits per capita per year but 
this has not been achieved in any developing country with a universal system and is unlikely 
to be the case in Kenya so instead of 5.0 OP visits per capita per year it was estimated that 
by 2030 under a contributory system, the total OP visits per capita per year will be about 4.3 
which is close to the average annual OP visits per capita in Thailand (Table 8.9).  
 
Total OP visits at public facilities stands at 58.4% of total OP visits as of 2013 (Ministry of 
Health, 2014a). To estimate total OP visits in public facilities in 2023, reference was made to 
Limwattananon et al. (2012) in a study in Thailand where universal coverage scheme (UCS) 
increased OP visits by 25% entirely in public sector facilities. Bates and Annear (2013) also 
confirm that public facilities provide over 70% of health services mostly to the larger 
majority of Thai’s covered under UCS. It was therefore estimated that by 2023 OP visits to 
public sector facilities will increase to about 73% of total OP visits (i.e. 58.4*1.25= 73%).  
 
If OP visits to public providers would be 73% of total OP visits, it was argued that by 2030 
public providers are likely to account for about 78% of total OP visits per year. This was 
based on evidence from Rwanda and Thailand. In Rwanda, a country with high population 
coverage, primary facilities accounted for about 90% of all OP visits (Government of 
Rwanda, 2013). Also literature from countries such as Thailand which have universal 
systems suggest that about 70% of OP services are provided by government facilities. 
Adjustment of total government OP provision was done upwards to 78%. Sharing 78% of 
total OP visits between government primary health facilities and hospitals was based on the 
percentage distribution of total OP visits by provider category in 2023. The remaining 22% of 
annual OP visits was shared among non-government providers.  
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Table 8.9: Distribution of annual per capita outpatient visits by type of provider  
Provider category 2013  %OP 
Services 
2013 
OP/Capita 
2023 %OP 
Services 
Target 2023 
OP/Capita 
2030 %OP 
Services 
Target 2030 
OP/Capita 
Government primary care  40.10 1.243 50.13 2.005 53.56 2.303 
Dispensary  22.10 0.685 27.63 1.105 29.52 1.269 
Health Centre  18.00 0.558 22.50 0.900 24.04 1.034 
Government hospitals  18.30 0.567 
22.88 0.915 24.44 1.051 
County referral 17.86 0.554 22.33 0.893 23.85 1.026 
National referral 0.44 0.0136 0.55 0.022 0.59 0.025 
Private-not-for-profit  13.70 0.425 8.89 0.356 7.24 0.311 
Primary facility 8.10 0.251 5.25 0.210 4.28 0.184 
Hospital 5.60 0.174 3.64 0.146 2.96 0.128 
Private for-profit 27.90 0.865 18.11 0.724 14.76 0.635 
Cl inics/health centre 16.40 0.508 10.65 0.426 8.68 0.373 
Hospitals  11.50 0.357 7.46 0.298 6.08 0.261 
Total 100.0 3.1 100.0 4.0 100.0 4.3 
 
Inpatient services for Base Year 2013 and Target Years 2023 and 2030 (Tables 8.11 and 
8.12) 
Baseline inpatient days per capita were calculated as follows: multiply percentage 
admissions for each provider by total admission rate (i.e. 0.038) to get admission rates for 
each provider category then multiplying the admission rates at each level of provision by 
total number of inpatient days (6.7) (Table 8.11). Splitting IP days per capita between 
government facilities was facilitated by data from the Kenyatta National Hospital (KNH) 
according to which: [0.089million (annual IP cases)*6.7 IP days/44.4million (total 
population)= 0.0134 IP days per capita per year. Out of a total of 0.1423 IP days per capita 
for public hospitals there is 0.1289 IP days per capita per year for county referral hospitals.  
 
The admission rates at baseline are 55.8% for public facilities and 44.2% for private facilities 
of which non-profit facilities accounted for 40.5% of the 44.2%. Upon attainment of UC in 
2030, overall admission rates would have increased by 20%. This assumption is based on 
evidence given by McIntyre (2012) who states that utilisation of hospital services tend to 
increase minimally by around 20% upon implementation of UC coverage policies. 
Limwattananon et al. (2012) also observed the probability of 18% increase in utilisation of IP 
services at public facilities in Thailand over a period of about 10 years after attainment of 
UHC. However, suchan increase would be in public services only because the effect of UHC 
policies will be most felt by those currently without coverage; that is, the indigent 
population and informal sector workers. Assuming that utilisation IP services in the private 
sector remain the same as there are no incentives to increase their use, it means that the 
public sector would account for 76% of IP services by 2023 up from 56% in 2013. Little 
variation is expected in the utilisation rate up to 2030.  
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To calculate IP days per capita for target year 2030 the assumption was that 75% of all IP 
services will be publicly provided and the remaining 25% going to none private providers. 
The 75% rate is based on estimates that admission rates will be much higher in 2030 and 
close to admission rates in a middle-income country such as Thailand. As of 2009 Thailand’s 
universal coverage scheme (UCS) reported 90 admissions/1000 (ILO, 2009). The UCS 
members are mostly informal sector workers. The admission rate of 0.09 gives 3.39 hospital 
days, i.e. 0.3051 IP days per capita per annum. Reliability of these figures were triangulated 
using two additional sources: (i) current hospital days from none government hospitals in 
Kenya are on average 3.74 days (Mbogo and Otini, 2011). These hospitals represent higher 
levels of care compared to public facilities and it was assumed that with a universal system 
in Kenya, public services would improve to match private provision. (ii) Public hospitals in Sri 
Lanka with hospital days of about 3.6 days) (Medical Statistics Unit, 2008). 
 
For 2023 IP utilisation targets, assuming that admission rate increases steadily, it means that 
admission rates in 2023 will be 0.063 (i.e. 63 admissions per 1000) increasing at an average 
annual rate of 5.25% to reach 0.09 in 2030. The admission rates for various providers were 
then calculated and multiplied by hospital days to estimate inpatient days per capita per 
annum for 2023. The total inpatient days per capita was therefore estimated at 0.2865 for 
2023 and 0.3051 for 2030 (Table 8.10).  
 
Table 8.10: Admission rates and inpatient days per capita per year  
IP Provider category 
Admission 
rate 2013 
Inpatient 
day/Capita 
Admission 
rate 2023 
Inpatient day/ Admission 
rate 
Inpatient day/ 
Capita 2030 Capita 2023 
County Referral 0.0192 0.1289 0.0383 0.1742 0.0540 0.1831 
National Referral 0.002 0.0134 0.0096 0.0435 0.0135 0.0458 
Private Non-profit 0.0068 0.0453 0.0068 0.0309 0.0101 0.0343 
Private for-profit clinic 0.0017 0.0114 0.0015 0.0069 0.0023 0.0076 
Private for-profit hospital  0.0083 0.0555 0.0068 0.0309 0.0101 0.0343 
Total 0.038 0.2545 0.0630 0.2865 0.0900 0.3051 
Hospital days 6.7 4.55 3.39 
 
Utilisation by insured and uninsured groups 
In calculating differences in utilisation of OP and IP services between insured and uninsured 
populations, reference was made to the MOH-Kenya (2009) household survey. In the 
survey, for every OP visit by insured persons there were 0.8966 OP visits by uninsured. For 
IP services, the rate of admission among insured persons was 0.048 per annum against 
0.025 per annum for the uninsured (i.e. for every admission among insured persons there 
were 0.521 admissions among the uninsured). These utilisation rates of OP and IP services 
were used to estimate total OP visits and IP days per capita per year for insured and 
uninsured populations in all types of providers (in the public dispensary for example, OP 
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visits per annum among insured persons is: 0.685/1.8966= 0.3612; and among the 
uninsured OP visits would be: 0.685*0.8966/1.8966= 0.3238) (Table 8.11).  
 
Table 8.11: Baseline annual OP visits and IP days per capita by provider category  
Provider 2013 rates Uninsured Insured 
Publ ic Dispensary (OP) 0.685 0.3238 0.3612 
Publ ic Health Centre (OP) 0.558 0.2638 0.2942 
Publ ic County Hospital (OP) 0.554 0.2619 0.2921 
Publ ic County Hospital (IP) 0.1289 0.0442 0.0847 
Publ ic National Hospital (OP) 0.0136 0.0064 0.0072 
Publ ic National Hospital (IP) 0.0134 0.0046 0.0088 
Private non-profit (OP) 0.425 0.2010 0.2240 
Private non-profit(IP) 0.0453 0.0155 0.0298 
Private profit cl inic (OP) 0.508 0.2402 0.2678 
Private profit cl inic (IP) 0.0114 0.0039 0.0075 
Private profit hospital (OP) 0.357 0.1688 0.1882 
Private profit hospital (IP) 0.0555 0.0190 0.0365 
 
Utilisation by pensioners 
Utilisation rates for IP and OP services among pensioners considered evidence from Xu et al. 
(2006) who observed that pensioners were 67% and 61% more likely to use OP and IP 
services respectively than other population groups. These findings were significant for OP 
services (P=0.001) but not for IP services (P=0.078). The findings by Xu et al. (2006) were 
about similar to those by the MOH (2009) where the household health expenditure and 
utilisation survey (2007) indicated that OP visits per annum for pensioners (65+ years) were 
63% higher than other population groups. Henceforth utilisation rates for pensioners were 
adjusted upwards by 65% being average estimates by MOH and Xu and colleagues (Table 
8.12). Pensioners are considered as part of the formal sector and their coverage would be as 
easy as covering the formal sector because of the ease of identifying their incomes.  
 
Table 8.12: Pensioners’ annual OP visits and IP days per capita by provider category  
Provider 2013 Uninsured Insured  Target 2023 Target 2030 
Publ ic Dispensary (OP) 1.1302 0.5343 0.5959 1.8233 2.0939 
Publ ic Health Centre (OP) 0.9207 0.4353 0.4854 1.4850 1.7061 
Publ ic County Hospital (OP) 0.9141 0.4321 0.4820 
1.4735 1.6929 
Publ ic County Hospital (IP) 0.2075 0.0711 0.1364 0.2932 0.3349 
Publ ic National Hospital (OP) 0.0224 0.0106 0.0118 0.0363 0.0413 
Publ ic National Hospital (IP) 0.0216 0.0074 0.0142 0.0303 0.0346 
Private non-profit (OP) 0.7013 0.3315 0.3698 0.5874 0.5132 
Private non-profit (IP) 0.0730 0.0250 0.0480 0.0559 0.0551 
Private profit cl inic (OP) 0.8382 0.3963 0.4419 0.7029 0.6155 
Private profit cl inic (IP) 0.0184 0.0063 0.0121 0.0142 0.0116 
Private profit hospital (OP) 0.5891 0.2785 0.3106 0.4917 0.4307 
Private profit hospital (IP) 0.0893 0.0306 0.0587 
0.0686 0.0565 
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Table 8.13: Annual OP visits and IP days per capita by provider category for Base Year 2023  
 
Provider category 
Rest of population Pensioners 
Base Year 2023 Uninsured Insured Base Year 2023 Uninsured Insured 
Publ ic Dispensary (OP) 1.1050 0.5072 0.5978 1.8233 0.8619 0.9613 
Publ ic Health Centre (OP) 0.9000 0.4131 0.4869 1.4850 0.7020 0.7830 
Publ ic County Hospital (OP) 0.8930 0.4099 0.4831 1.4735 0.6966 0.7769 
Publ ic County Hospital (IP) 0.1742 0.0800 0.0942 0.2932 0.1004 0.1928 
Publ ic National Hospital (OP) 0.0220 0.0101 0.0119 0.0363 0.0172 0.0191 
Publ ic National Hospital (IP) 0.0435 0.0200 0.0235 0.0303 0.0104 0.0199 
Private non-profit (OP) 0.3560 0.1634 0.1926 0.5874 0.2777 0.3097 
Private non-profit(IP) 0.0309 0.0142 0.0167 0.0559 0.0191 0.0367 
Private profit HC (OP) 0.4260 0.1955 0.2305 0.7029 0.3323 0.3706 
Private profit HC (IP) 0.0069 0.0032 0.0037 0.0142 0.0049 0.0093 
Private profit hospital(OP) 0.2980 0.1368 0.1612 0.4917 0.2324 0.2593 
Private profit hospital(IP) 0.0309 0.0142 0.0167 0.0686 0.0235 0.0451 
 
Appendix C, C5: HEALTH INSURANCE 
Percentage population groups insured (exempted included) (%): The total population with 
health insurance is about 18% which means that just about 0.1% of the informal sector 
population is covered. Under the contributory scenario, the Government of Kenya plans to 
cover 54% of informal sector and indigent populations by 2023 and attain universal 
population coverage by 2030. The high rates of coverage for the informal sector may be 
supported by current new and aggressive strategies being employed by the NHIF to enrol 
the informal sector as well as a constitutional requirement that makes it mandatory for 
every Kenyan to enrol into a health insurance scheme. Our reference for 53% coverage by 
2023 is based on the MOH/WHO/GTZ 2004 mission (WHO/GTZ, 2004) which had projected 
that a coverage rate of about 53% of the informal sector is achievable within ten years of 
moderate implementation scenario. Under an alternative scenario (non-contributory), total 
population coverage would be attained in the second year of implementing UHC policies.  
Other dependants: Coverage for other dependants was presumed to be coverage of 
dependants of formal sector employees and was put at 65% of the total dependant to bring 
the proportion of the insured to about 18% of the population.  
 
Percentage population groups insured that are exempted (%): Under the contributory 
scenario, data input for this section was assumed to represent the indigent population and 
was put at 0% of the total population at the baseline to reach about 7.0% in 2023 and 20% 
of the population in 2030. The assumption was that only populations that are unable to 
contribute to the scheme would be exempted. These can only be indigent groups which are 
almost entirely found in the informal sector and constitute about 20% of the population.  
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Under non-contributory scenario, the percentage groups insured that are exempted was put 
at 0% at the baseline and 100% onwards from the second year of implementation. The 
population groups here are the informal sector and indigent populations representing 78.4% 
of the population. 
 
 
 Table 8.14: Informal sector population 
  Millions % of Population 
Total  informal sector population (including 
dependants) 
34.80 78.39 
Indigent people of working age   1.78 
4.01* 
Dependants of indigents   7.10 
15.99* 
Non-indigent population (including 
dependants 
25.92 58.38 
*Percent of total population exempt from contributions under contributory scenario 
 
About 80% of formal sector workers (public and private) and their dependants are covered 
by the NHIF at the baseline which should rise to about 99% from the second year of UHC 
implementation in both scenarios. The same trend applies for formal sector pensioners 
because their incomes are equally easy to identify. 
 
Health insurance contributions: The rates (2.4% of gross income from the formal sector and 
flat-rate contributions of KSh 6,000 per household per annum from the informal sector) are 
stipulated by the NHIF guidelines on contributions. Contributions are per household so 
dependants (both adults and children) do not contribute. 
Subsidies to health insurance: Under a contributory financing mechanism, the model 
considers premium contributions as follows:  
 Formal sector contributions gradually increased from 2.4% of gross pay at the 
baseline to stand at 6.5% from 2017 onwards;  
 Pensioners contributions were varied from 2.4% of monthly pensions at the baseline 
to 4% from 2017 onwards;  
 Government subsidies per exempted were put at KSh 3,000 at the baseline and 
automatically increased in the model in line with inflation;  
 Contributions from the informal sector were set at KSh 6,000 per household per 
annum at the baseline (or KSh 1,200 per insured adult, child and principal 
contributor). These increased with inflation;  
 Administrative costs gradually decreased from 12% of total revenue at the baseline 
to stand at 8% by 2023 and 7% from 2024 onwards. 
 
In the non-contributory scenario, the following assumptions were made: 
 Formal sector contributions gradually increased from 2.4% of gross pay at the 
baseline to stand at 6.5% from 2017 onwards; 
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 Pensioners contributions were varied from 2.4% of monthly pensions at the baseline 
to 4% from 2017 onwards; 
 Government subsidies per exempted were put at KSh 3,000 at the baseline and 
automatically increased in the model in line with inflation; 
 All informal sector workers and indigent populations were exempted; 
 Administrative costs reduced from 12% to stay at 5% throughout the simulation. 
 
Contributions from the formal sector were based on comparisons from countries with 
universal coverage systems where a section or the entire population was expected to 
contribute a percentage of their income for health insurance (OECD, 2010). Contribution 
rates from the informal sector are as stipulated by the NHIF and so sensitivity analysis did 
not consider lower contribution as there is already evidence that contributions at KSh 6,000 
per year are unsustainable. However, higher rates were considered in an effort to find 
sustainable financing for the contributory scenario.  
 
Co-payment rates for non-government facilities (% of average cost per health service): 
There are no co-payments for public sector health facilities. For non-government facilities, 
estimated co-payment rates were based on NHIF experience where co-payments vary from 
2% of the total cost for low-cost non-government facilities to 90% for the high cost private 
facilities. It was assumed these co-payment rates will not change for the entire duration of 
the simulation because they are based on recent statutes. 
 
Reserves, administrative costs and other non-health care costs (in % of health care 
expenditure of the insurance): The MOMS-Kenya10 (2012) states that surplus funds 
(reserves) would be maintained at about 4% from the second year of implementation of 
UHC. The WHO/GTZ mission to Kenya in 2004 recommended health insurance cash reserve 
level at 3% of total health insurance expenditure. It was not immediately apparent what the 
international best practice is in terms of health insurance cash reserve levels so reserve 
levels for the UHC scheme was estimated at 6% of total revenue for the first two years then 
drop off to 3% for the entire simulation due to efficiency gains and economies of scale. 
 
For administrative costs, we use the international best practice to estimate such costs for 
the entire period of the simulation even though the WHO-GTZ mission to Kenya in 2004 
recommended administrative costs at 5% of total health insurance expenditure within five 
years of implementation. The international best practice for administrative costs should 
range from 10% to 12% of total health insurance expenditure (MOH-PER, 2007) so based on 
international best practice it was estimated that administrative costs for the contributory 
system would be 12% for the first two years of implementing UHC then with efficiency 
improvements continue to drop off to 10%, 9% (2018 – 2020) and 8% (2021 – 2023) and 7% 
from 2024 to 2030.  
                                                                 
10 Ministry of Medical Services (MOMS) 
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